


# JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION



Ron Reed, Texas Wesleyan University 1957-1998

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**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION**  
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**David Snelgrove, Editor**

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION  
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 49

In Memoriam, Ronald Reed, 1957-1998 by Douglas Simpson

Clinton Allison, University of Tennessee, *The Conservative African American Intellectual: A Historical Inquiry*

Timothy Bergen, University of South Carolina, *The Journal Writing of an Outstanding Preservice Teacher*

Mary Bevel, Webster University, *The Search for "Differends": The Discourse of the Least Restrictive Environment*

**Mike Boone, Southwest Texas University, *The Other "Jim Crow:" Segregation of Mexican-American Students in Texas Schools***

**Carreiro, Keith, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, *Beyond Thinking: A Glimpse into Revelatory Teaching***

**Bill Cowart, University of Oregon, *Some Subjective Commentary on Effective Teaching***

**Dalton Curtis, Southeastern Missouri, *Recent Scholarship on John Dewey***

**Davis Douglas R., Louisiana State University, *Derrida and Right and Responsibility in Education***

**Densford, John P., Oklahoma East Central University, *Some Thoughts on Education***

**Jennifer Endicott, University of Central Oklahoma, *A Community Service Curriculum--Its Contribution to Buber's "I and Thou" Philosophy***

**Charles Fazzaro, *Sacrifice, Progress, and Social Order: Roberto Calasso and Education Policy Inquiry***

**Lou Goldman, Wichita State University, *The Sophists***

**Joe Green, Texas Tech University, *Wittgenstein, Behaviorism, and Teaching***

**Taiebeh Hosseini, *Multicultural "Psychology and Counseling Mmulticultural Students***

**Don Hufford, Kansas Newman College, *W.E.B. DuBois as Educational Philosopher: The Possibilities of Precarious Balance in Educational Thought***

**Ivie, Stan Texas Women's University, *Aesthetics: The Knowledge Base For Teacher Education***

**Fred Kierstead, University of Houston at Clear Lake City, *R. Freeman Butts' "Civic Education" Revisited***

**Jack Klotz, University of Southern Mississippi, *A Proactive Response to the National Reform Movement's Call for Changing School Administrator Training Programs to Meet the Needs of the Next Millenium***

**Jack Klotz, University of Southern Mississippi *Expectancy Theory: its Evolution and Impact on Educational Delivery***

**John Marshak, University of Southern Mississippi, *Weighted Educational Need as a Bsis for Full-State Funding of Schools, One Proposal***

**Spencer Maxcy, Louisiana State University, *Leadership Ethics and Images of the 'Good School'***

**Karen McKellips, Cameron University, *Rearranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Has the Media Really Become the Message?***

**Tyrone J. McNichols, *Deconstructing Constructivism: The Kantian Connection***

**Bartley Mcswine, Chicago State University, *The Role of Philosophy in the Breakdown of Modern Society Contrasted with the African World View and Intelligence in Ancient Kemet***

**Joseph Nwoye, West Liberty State College, *The Value of Urban Seminars in Rural Teacher Training Programs***

**Martin Schoppmeyer, Sr., *How to Suffer Prejudice as an Honorary Minority Member***

**Douglas Simpson, Texas Tech University, *John Dewey's Concept of the Dogmatic Mind***

**David Snelgrove, Oklahoma City Public Schools, *Dewey's Concept of Freedom***

**Sam Stack, University of West Virginia, *Deweyan and Marxian Aesthetics: A Pedagogy for Communicative Discourse***

**George Stone, Lyon College, *George S. Counts and the Education of Teachers***

**James Swartz, University of Arkansas, *Artificial Intelligence, Machine Intelligence: Implications for Curriculum and Culture***

**Michael R. Taylor, Oklahoma State University, *Teaching Infinity: Levinas and Moral Education***

**Paul Travers, University of Missouri, St. Louis, *The Charter School Movement: Educational Opportunity or Educational Elitism?***

**Jim Van Patten, University of Arkansas, *Charter Schools Revisited***

**Wayne Willis, Morehead University, *Dewey and Virtue Ethics***

**J. Scott Wright, North Texas State University, *An Evaluation of the Condition of the Foundations of Education***

**Donna Younker, University of Central Oklahoma, *Crisis of Faith: The Dead Sea Scrolls***

**Lisa Zagumny, University of Tennessee, *Historic African American Colleges: Education for Civil Rights Activists***

## IN MEMORIAM:

### RON REED

1947-1998

When Ronald F. Reed, Bebensee University Scholar and Professor of Education and Philosophy, Texas Wesleyan University, died at his home of a heart attack in late August, family and friends lost an affectionate and caring husband, father, and companion. Colleagues in foundations of education lost one of their greatest intellectual champions and warmest personalities. Indeed, everyone who knew Ron recognized him as a formidable proponent of the kind-spirited, intellectually rigorous qualities that he so superbly exemplified. His many friends around the globe have experienced both personal and professional loss with his passing.

Ron was born, reared, and largely educated in Brooklyn (B. S., St. Francis College, M. A., City University of New York) before attending and completing his Ph. D. at the University of Western Ontario. While in Canada, he taught at the University of Western Ontario and Lakehead University. In the United States, he taught at the University of Texas at San Antonio, Montclair State University, University of Central Arkansas, and Texas Wesleyan University. He was also a visiting professor at the Iberoamericana University in Mexico. As a teacher, he was noted for digging beneath initial responses of people and examining the thinking and reasoning of students and colleagues. Jake B. Schrum, president of Texas Wesleyan University, summarized well his perspective on thinking and teaching and his concern for others when he said: "Ron Reed was a great respecter of opinions. He always had an open mind and an open heart, and measured success not by students' answers but by their questions. He constantly urged his colleagues to think across disciplines in order to enrich their world view."

Going to Texas Wesleyan University in 1979, Ron became founder and coordinator of the institution's Analytic Teaching Program and was instrumental in establishing the Creative and Critical teaching center. He was promoted to Associate Professor in 1981 and to Professor in 1986. In 1996, he was designated Distinguished University Scholar, and shortly thereafter he was appointed Bebensee University Scholar. He played a vital role in instituting and editing two journals, Analytic Teaching and The Wesleyan Graduate Review. In addition to being a committed teacher and editor, he was also a scholar and prolific writer. He was the author of nearly 500 book reviews, more than a hundred articles and chapters, and approximately a dozen books. His first volume, Talking with children, was published in 1983 and his most recent book is When We Talk: Essays on Classroom Conversation. Probably his best known book is Rebecca, a text named after his daughter and used around the world to stimulate philosophizing by children.

Ron is survived by his wife, Anne Reed; son, Jeremy; and daughter, Rebecca Pflieger and her husband, Wade. He is also survived by a host of grateful readers, students, colleagues, and friends.

**SEARCHING FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES:  
A LEFTIST ENCOUNTER WITH THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR**

by  
Clinton B. Allison  
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

There is much in American society that I would like to understand better, but there are few things as fascinating to me or as difficult to make sense of as black conservatives. For a long-time student of the history of black education who knows that W. E. B. Du Bois, whatever his faults, was right and Booker T. Washington, however well intentioned, was wrong and for whom the Civil Rights Movement was the apex of American democracy, African American conservatives are an enigma. How is a left liberal to understand them? Are they simply opportunists getting positions of power and influence by saying what the powerful right in this country wants to hear from black leaders and intellectuals? Are they naive—not understanding the consequences of their beliefs if translated into practice? Or are their positions, at least some of them, thoughtful, plausible alternative visions of what is good for both members of their race as well as for American society as a whole?

I have a long-term interest in African American intellectuals or, at least, academics—they are not the same thing for members of any race, ethnic group, or gender. The first dissertation that I directed was David Mielke's study of the educational philosophy of Du Bois, and the last completed was Thomas Jones's study of the treatment of Booker T. Washington in early 20-century Midwestern African American newspapers.

Ideologically, I think that I can at least partially understand and sympathize with the motivation and goals of Du Bois; I simply cannot put myself in Booker T. Washington's place. My father truly believed that anyone who didn't see the world as he did simply lacked sufficient information or intelligence. Alas, as I grow older, I am chagrined to find that I am more like my father than I want to believe. Yet, unlike him, I also find those at the other end of the spectrum fascinating. Seeing and listening to them is the intellectual equivalent of traveling in an alien country or, in some cases, of visiting the zoo, which is why my wife, Claudia, gets so irritated with me when I listen to Rush Limbaugh, driving with one hand and shooting the bird at the radio with the other. I try to explain that that is the only way I can listen. Not really understanding despite my calm explanations, she insists that there is a better solution such as turning off the radio. I think she believes that I am a closet masochist. But I don't get as upset with Rush Limbaugh as with, say, Thomas Sowell. Limbaugh has found a shtick that has made him rich and famous. I catch myself trying to resist feeling that Sowell is selling out the proud, courageous history of his own people.

But, again, how is an old, left, white guy to try to understand black conservatives; my sense of the past has been colored by liberal and radical historians; my understanding of the present is filtered through the writers of the popular periodicals I subscribe to or read regularly: *Harpers*, *Utne Reader*, *The Nation*, etc. In thinking about this paper, my first reaction was to go to the usual sources: *Cultural Critique*, *Cultural Studies*, and perhaps *The Village Voice*, looking particularly for articles by Henry Gates, Cornel West, or Houston Baker. The first promising article I found was by Adolph Reed, "What Are the Drums Saying, Booker? The Current Crisis of the Black Intellectual," in *The Village Voice*. Reed accuses liberals West and Gates of being public intellectuals with "deceptively conservative politics," of playing the same role as Booker T. Washington for our generation. Enough.

If I am to gain some understanding of black conservatives, I need another, very different set of lenses. Rather than the usual suspects, I read articles, book reviews, and editorials on race in all issues, since January 1990, of *The American Spectator*, the popular journal of the new right. I also read, but did not use in this paper, five years of the *National Review*. I thought about also reading the *Weekly Standard* and *Human Events*, but they are weeklies (400 issues of each); masochism always has its limits.

For even an occasional listener of Rush Limbaugh, entering the world of *The American Spectator* was Allison in wonderland. Under the leadership of R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., editor-in-chief, the magazine hews to a consistent ultraconservative position in articles, features, book reviews, cartoons, and advertisements. Writers are obviously not going to be published in *The American Spectator* unless their opinions conform to a relatively narrow range of right-wing Truth. Writers dismiss liberals and leftists in often smart-ass and mean-spirited ways with much name calling, including expressions such as "liberal-Leninist elitism" and the "unrelentingly left-wing National

Education Association.” Hillary Clinton is cartooned as a witch, and is pictured that way on the particularly ugly cover of the June 1994 issue; throughout the period, the editor referred to her as Bruno. Jesse Jackson is often lampooned, but, as a devotee of *Prairie Home Companion*, I particularly resented the editor calling Garrison Keillor “Smarmy.” For shame! But, as I indicate later, the biblical admonition about the beam in one’s own eye is appropriate here.<sup>1</sup>

The magazine is sometimes intentionally humorous, even with the silly kind of humor that I appreciate—for a time the legal council on the masthead read: Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish, & Short. The appearance of the magazine became slicker as the 1990s progressed. It obviously shared in the growth and prosperity of the conservative movement, and the present circulation exceeds 200,000 copies a month. Advertisements strongly reflect the politics of the magazine. There are many ads for conservative books, particularly for those written by Limbaugh, Cal Thomas, and Thomas Sowell. In each issue there are scores of ads for hate Clinton, pro ditto head, antigay materials, including bumper stickers such as: “Sodom and Gomorrah had Gays in the Military.” And, to me, there are a surprising number of ads for “romance and life mates” with East European and Asian women.

To give a further sense of *The American Spectator’s* ideology for nonreaders of the magazine before I look at their treatment of black scholars and writers, it may help you to know that it often included innuendoes that Vincent Foster was murdered, Rhodes scholar Bill Clinton was a paid Soviet agent of the KGB, and Governor Clinton was a cocaine user if not an addict. On the other hand, it rejected the idea that David Duke was an acceptable “conservative Republican.”<sup>2</sup>

In its film reviews, it gave *Glory* a negative review and criticized high school teachers for taking African American students to see it in order to develop black pride. Indeed, the magazine writers tended to think that black youth already had far more pride than they had earned. But they liked *Driving Miss Daisy*.

They published a positive book review of Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., *American: An Autobiography* until the very end of the review: “Readers should also turn the other cheek when the general admits to having been a Mondale supporter and a fan of affirmative action. No record is spotless.”<sup>3</sup>

Writers for *The American Spectator* offer less analysis of the work of conservative black intellectuals than they poke derision at liberal African American scholars. Some of it is simply gratuitous: liberal scholars’ work is “very thin” as are their books. More substantially, they criticize liberal black scholars for romanticizing underclass black culture, even excusing its violence, and for engaging in chic but vacuous postmodern social theory. They are particularly critical of what they call the “diversity movement,” the idea that diversity is to be cherished as a positive good in and for itself, which they argue is simply another defense of affirmative action. Black intellectuals who embrace the diversity movement help create an “intellectual ghetto” in which African American academics are scholars only on black issues.<sup>4</sup>

Leftist black intellectuals are criticized for their angry stance that, the conservatives claim, is a stereotypical role adopted by black academics to intimidate white liberals: “black anger and white surrender have become a staple of contemporary racial discourse.” In subtle racially-loaded language, Cornel West, as an example, is accused of “racialist crowing”: “West knows the radical, racial boilerplate sells books, makes reputations and cowers those afraid to call—West’s phrase—a spade a spade.”<sup>5</sup>

The magazine denounces radical African American scholars for romanticizing black culture and the black vernacular; in the minds of conservative writers, such an explication not only justifies the worst black behavior but may corrupt superior Anglo culture as well. Henry Louis Gates and the college crowd, they complain, bend over “backwards to justify whorehouse music.” President Clinton is an example of the wrong-headed white liberal who encourages the diffusion of black culture into mainstream society. At the 1996 inaugural gala, Mark Steyn complains, “The big stars were Aretha Franklin, Babyface, Savion Glover, and Stevie Wonder--while the white folks were, to paraphrase one of Stevie’s early hits, either uptight or outta sight.” “Earthy white culture (such as country music) never gets a look-in at inaugural galas or other elite venues,” he complains.

Whites are generally uncomfortable with the alien, noisy black culture which is a reason that they like Colin Powell, who doesn’t shout. “The most sweetly endearing moment in the general’s autobiography,” Steyn writes, “is when he says his favorite music is Andrew Lloyd Webber. No wonder Jesse Jackson began to wonder whether the guy was even black.”<sup>6</sup>

For the editors of *The American Spectator*, however, more serious than the romanticizing of black vernacular culture is the tendency of leftist black intellectuals to excuse violence by African American males. On one

hand, according to the conservative writers, for blacks to criticize black behavior is a “form of self-hate” that must be avoided at all costs, and, on the other hand, “radical-chic enthusiasts automatically sympathize” with rioters and other perpetrators of black violence because, in their view, such behavior is “authentic,” and, above all, radical black scholars must not lose face by being inauthentic. At any rate, according to this critique, radical black intellectuals offer “excuse theory” for the worst self-destructive behavior of the black underclass.<sup>7</sup>

Conservative critics were also critical of radicals’ enthusiasm for continental social theory—“dialectical mumbo-jumbo” one called it; another just dismissed it as “blarney.” African Americans pay a great price for leftist professors’ preoccupation with nonsense masquerading as social theory, according to these conservative critics. An upper middle-class white graduate who knows “more Derrida than Dante” can recover because they often have “Daddy’s money to fall back on.” Black intellectual Houston Baker, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, is accused of “submerging himself in the impenetrable blather of postmodern theory.” It is particularly “perverse and irresponsible” for black professors, wrote Marc Carnegie, “to feed our young a diet of Frenchified jargon--and pretend it is a way of studying the plight of American blacks!”<sup>8</sup>

Fortunately, according to *The American Spectator*, there are courageous and wise black intellectuals on the other side who do not “hew the racialist line” and are able to go beyond the “too-narrow framework of race” and the “rhetoric of hopelessness.” Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, and Glenn Loury are among them, but they are subjected to much abuse. The writers and editors of *The American Spectator* engage in a good deal of name calling directed at those on the other side of the ideological spectrum (“leftover sixties trash” and “modern scalawags” are examples). I can share some of Corry’s criticisms of the Afrocentric black studies program at Temple University but bristle at his calling the courtly, scholarly John Hope Franklin, “the cranky historian who heads up Clinton’s advisory program.” On the other hand, they are outraged when black conservatives are the targets. Dinesh D’Souza complains that black conservatives have been “castigated and reviled” for criticizing the “pathologies of black culture.” Some of the barbs directed at black conservatives are unconscionable: “mouthpieces for white bigots, craven apostates ... black impersonators who deserve ostracism ... frustrated slaves crawling back to the plantation.” According to D’Souza, Spike Lee called Michael Williams, a black advocate of “racial-neutral” scholarship, an Uncle Tom who should be “dragged into the alley and beaten with a Louisville Slugger.” Syndicated columnist Carl Rowan called Thomas Sowell a Quisling who did more damage than the Nazis. And liberal editorial cartoonist Don Wright engaged in ugly racism: “And Justice Scalia. You vote no on affirmative action--that makes it four to four! What about your protégé there?” “He votes with me! Right, Clarence?” “YASSUH, BOSS!”<sup>9</sup>

The magazine writers are particularly annoyed by suggestions that black conservatives are currying the favor of the white power structure for fame, profit, or privilege. John Corry, senior correspondent, was appalled that Mike Wallace on “60 Minutes” asked Ward Connerly if he was “being used by white conservatives.” But Corry did recognize that there is truth to the claim that white “conservatives patronize” these black scholars “by regularly trotting them out as exhibits for the cause, trump cards against the latest ill-conceived proposals of the NAACP or the Congressional Black Caucus.”<sup>10</sup>

Writers for *The American Spectator* usually embrace the general conservative position that black/white relations were improving before the civil rights movement of the 1960s, which, they argue, is given far too much credit for black progress. Indeed, they often view the 1960s as the time when black social problems (D’Souza calls them “pathologies”) began to exacerbate. Again, part of the problem is liberal intellectuals’ romanticizing of underclass behavior as authentic, certainly not what Du Bois had in mind when he presented the model of the talented tenth. The result of this foolish romanticizing, according to the magazine, is that black culture “embraces violence and celebrates ignorance.” Resistance to acting white by repudiating standard English and academic achievement become understandable, if not acceptable, by liberal academics. And, incredibly, from the conservative viewpoint, some leftist intellectuals, black and white, worship in the Cult of the “Bad Nigger”; liberals blame race for black antisocial behavior and find heroes in violent criminals among the black underclass. Even privileged blacks, according to this argument, may excuse their bad behavior because of feelings of racial rage and persecution.<sup>11</sup>

Much of the magazine’s critique of black culture centered on the black family, particularly on what they called the “normalization of illegitimacy as a way of life” and “a tragic diminishment” of a sense of obligation among black males to their families. An essay review of Stephen Themstroms and Abigail Thernstrom’s *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible* focused on the state of the family: “Almost three out of four black births occur

out of wedlock, and since 1987 the birth rate for married black women has been lower than that for the unmarried.” The major cause of the black family’s problems is the welfare system: “Welfare does not ‘break up’ black families. It keeps them from forming.” African American women, so their argument goes, settle “down to a life of relative stability with [their] welfare check.” As a result black men face lives of constant humiliation and “a need to prove manhood by spectacular feats of crime and abandon, an intense intermale rivalry, a lack of concern about the future, and as a result, a life expectancy lower than that of men in Bangladesh.” William Tucker, the magazine’s Washington correspondent, argues that there is little hope for African Americans until their men “start burning down welfare offices and reclaiming their women from the bureaucracy.”<sup>12</sup>

Rather than helping African Americans recognize their “pathologies” and begin a process of healing them, black and white liberal intellectuals propose the false panacea of multiculturalism. According to the magazine writers, multiculturalism is aimed at making “blacks feel better about themselves and what they don’t know.” In the process of embracing multiculturalism, they turn their back on “America’s greatest success story”: the assimilation of millions of immigrants into a common American culture. And black intellectuals are the “storm troops” in the battle for multiculturalism. The managing editor of *The American Spectator*, Marc Carnegie, was contemptuous of Henry Gates and others for arguing the need for learning about other cultures because we increasingly live in a global culture: “as if the Maori and the Xhosa and the Zulu had changed the course of recorded history and become relevant to our society.” Writers for *The American Spectator* are clearly on the side of Booker T. Washington. According to D’Souza, “What blacks need to do is ‘act white’—that is to say, abandon idiotic Back-to-Africa schemes and embrace mainstream cultural norms, so that they can effectively compete with other groups.”<sup>13</sup>

A sense of the level of the discussion may be gained by quoting R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., editor-in-chief of the magazine, when he announced the founding of “Amnesty in Academia” to protect students from political correctness and multiculturalism:

There is more sophistication at the gaming table of Monte Carlo than in the faculty club of Stanford University—and infinitely more charm. American students seeking a sound grounding in their civilization would be better advised to head out for the University of Tokyo, where the profs speak better English and probably are superior to the average American prof in Nintendo.... We shall send ... trained human rights negotiators ... to campus despotisms where students are being oppressed and, at places like Stanford University, quite possibly tortured.”<sup>14</sup>

*The American Spectator* is even harder on black political and civil rights organization leaders (what they call the civil rights industry) than on black intellectuals—perhaps they consider them more dangerous. Accusations against leaders range from charges of communism to denunciation of demagogues. When Benjamin Chavis was appointed head of the NAACP, the title of the hit piece on the appointment was simply “NAACCCCP.” He was called the “most prominent public figure associated in recent years with the Moscow-funded, hard-line Communist Party, USA,” and, the magazine warned darkly, that Hillary Clinton, with her Marxists contacts, may have played a key role in getting him the job. Stephen Schwartz, the author of the piece, was irritated with Dick Army who apologized for accusing “Hillary” of hanging “around with a lot of Marxists. All her friends are Marxists.” After all, the author argued, it was simply true.<sup>15</sup>

The favorite, long-time target for *The American Spectator* is Jesse Jackson. In a 1998 article titled “Jesse Shakes Down Wall Street,” Marc Carnegie, now the magazine’s correspondent-at-large, charged that except, possibly, for Rodney King, “Jackson is the most famous unemployed person in America.” Carnegie criticized the Wall Street power brokers for surrendering to Jackson’s demands for opening up opportunities for young African Americans in the financial community, teaching them how to get the moguls “to come hustling when the Mau Mau artists” call them. You will remember that the New York Stock Exchange was closed for the day, giving Jackson a chance to address the “creme de creme of the White Power Structure, lay some ham-and-egg mumbo-jumbo on them, and force them to open the bank vaults.” Conservatives seemed to resent particularly Jackson’s most powerful weapon, his voice:

That Voice--that amazing butterbean biscuits-and-gravy fired catfish uplifting-the-people twang. You know how it sounds: it sings. It swings, it rows and rumbles, ebbs and flows, shucks and jives. He could read the phone book and make it soulful, turn a shopping list into a Duke Ellington rhapsody ... building the fever until his listeners are awash in a torrent of cornbread rhythms and churchified feeling, so caught up in the moment they don’t even notice that the Reverend has just gone ahead and broken the language barrier, that

he has erased any distinction between meaning and pure noise.<sup>16</sup>

In order to keep social workers, liberal Democrats, and Jesse Jackson employed, according to the magazine, the civil rights industry has to deliver on promises of preferential treatment for African Americans. Unlike previous generations, when Du Bois's talented tenth succeeded by their own merit in a much more racist society, today's black scholars and professionals are stigmatized by affirmative action. They and the white society know that they have lowered standards by taking the places of qualified students. They often don't graduate anyway but when they do, the consequences can be disastrous for the broader society: "This society consciously and deliberately graduates doctors who are less qualified to treat the sick than would be the case if admissions to medical school were based purely on ability and not on race."<sup>17</sup>

Most white Americans, according to the correspondents for *The American Spectator*, deride the "racial grievance industry"; they find it hard to take seriously flaps over whether the Puerto Rican Barbie doll is too white. They argue that President Clinton's dialogue on race will encourage the grievance industry: "Benign neglect is called for, and not an exploitation of old resentments." Besides opposing the grievance industry is good politics. Conservatives may blame the "deplorable conditions of black-white relations" on two decades of affirmative action, but they argue that the issue is good for conservative Republicans. Whites, Fred Barns argues, know that Democrats care more about poor people and African Americans than they do middle-class whites. But this works to the benefit of Republicans--"it's a wedge issue, pulling lower-middle-class and suburban whites from the liberal coalition." Race issues "helped to spur the political realignment that" elects Republicans. Republicans are not racists, however, he argues, they are racial conservatives, Democrats are racial liberals, and "the GOP benefited greatly from the contrast."<sup>18</sup>

And what did I come to understand about black conservative intellectuals from reading nearly a decade of *The American Spectator* on race? Not much. The experience was ultimately disappointing in giving me an increased understanding of black conservatives' philosophy. The arguments on each side are not all that complicated; they have more to do with values than analysis. And reading years of arguments from the conservative position didn't make them more compelling to me. Perhaps I didn't, or couldn't, bracket my prejudices sufficiently, but I learned little—gained little insight as the pop psychologist would say.

It did cause me more concern about the role of public intellectuals in popular media. Public intellectuals have had a proud and crucial role in American social and political life, a role both advocated and exemplified by John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Rusty Curtis and Tony Johnson used their presidential addresses before this society to promote and explicate the responsibility of philosophers as public intellectuals. But in our present period of incivility, name calling, and distortion of others' positions, a thoughtful philosophical explication is falling victim to intense partisanship. I resented, as an example, the take-it-for-granted certainty of the magazine writers that liberals (who are always jerking their knees) would thoughtlessly rush to the defense of basketball player Latrell Sprewell, National Baptist President Henry Lyons, boxing promoter Don King--or even O. J. Simpson.

But I suspect that an elderly true-believing conservative, who, being unable to understand how the liberal mind works, naively but honestly decides to read *The Nation*, *The Village Voice*, or *The National Republic* would be as appalled by the left's distortions, name calling, and cheap shots as I was by the right's, while reading *The American Spectator*.

ENDNOTES

1. Examples of "Bruno" may be found in the October 1994 (page 10) and March 1995 (page 8) issues of the *The American Spectator*; Keillor name calling may be found in the June 1994 issue.
2. See, for example, the July 1996 issue; *The American Spectator* (Oct 1990): 16-18.
3. *The American Spectator* (April 1990): 34 and (July 1991): 39.
4. Arch Puddington, review of Stephen L. Carter's *Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby*, *The American Spectator* (Dec. 1991): 44.
5. Kenneth S. Lynn, "Up From Gunnar Myrdal," an essay review of Stephen Themstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible.*, *The American Spectator* (Oct. 1997): 70; M. D. Carnegie, essay book reviews, *The American Spectator* (Sept. 1993): 80.
6. Mark Steyn, "Paint it Black: The Ebonification of Approved American Expression," *The American Spectator* (March 1997): 46.
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THE JOURNAL WRITING OF AN OUTSTANDING PRESERVICE TEACHER

Timothy J. Bergen, Jr.  
University of South Carolina

In an interview which examined the characteristics of entering teacher candidates, Brookhart and Freeman (1992) called for more qualitative case study research, identifying as problematic the survey methodology adopted in 38 of the 44 studies they considered. Similarly, Zeichner and Tabachnick (1985) pointed out that as the induction of beginning teachers involves a unique interaction between a particular individual as well as a particular school context, it becomes necessary to examine individual cases before generalizing about the processes of entry into the teaching role. Pigge and Marso (1987) came to a similar conclusion with respect to the preservice educational context in a study of 581 student teachers: "Those wishing to make meaningful assessments of the impact of teacher training must consider characteristics of the prospective teacher as well as characteristics of the training experience and setting" (p. 114). The present study is responsive to these concerns through the analysis of a journal undertaken by a particularly outstanding teacher candidate during his university coursework and school internship experience.

Journal writing has been defined as "written conversation between two persons on a functional, continued basis, about topics of individual (and even neutral) interest" (Staton, 1988, p. 312). Recent research (e.g., Francis, 1995; Hettich, 1990; Rodderick, 1987; Zulich, Bean, and Henrick, 1992) has illustrated the value of data derived from journal writing in providing insight into students' thinking about teaching. As Brookhart and Freeman (1992) noted, students' written work is a promising and very accessible source of student thoughts as they are accustomed to expressing them on paper in college classes. It can therefore provide access to students' internal dialogue, the way they process information as well as personal experiences, and thus an opportunity for truly understanding the occupational socialization of preservice teachers (Goodman, 1988). This is particularly so with "free writing" (Elbow, 1977) where as in the present case, the writer makes no attempt to interrupt his or her stream of consciousness by rereading or editing.

The journal writing described here was started by J.T. at the beginning of the second year of a five year teacher education program at the University of South Carolina in Columbia and was maintained until the completion of his practice teaching at the end of his M.A.T. program. During this period J.T. was given the opportunity to engage in ungraded journal writing with his professor in his introductory foundations of education course who was also responsible for supervising the first practicum he took in the undergraduate course sequence. He continued this correspondence during the next three years even though no longer receiving class instruction from this professor. Some early entries, in chronological order, are indicative of how valuable he found this dialogue.

Has anyone noticed that the journal is taking on the form of a personal letter rather than a report? I feel quite comfortable writing and I write whatever comes to mind. Sometimes thoughtful, sometimes thoughtless. I see it as a forum to aim my views on school, courses, personal problems, feelings, and just about anything I can think of...It is my voice and my time alone with the prof.

The written medium is, to me, the most personal in many ways. It actually lets a person into your mind.

What the reader is getting is my true thoughts. They get a chance to read and reflect on who I am and what I think.

I can say that I have three journals to keep this semester and this is not even close to the rest of them in content or length. This one gets special attention and special thought. Now why is that if my other ones are marked?

J. T. entered the preservice program at the age of 30 with two years of junior college education and a diploma in engineering technology. He was married and had enjoyed, for seven years, a successful career in electronics before deciding to return to college to pursue a teaching career.

The purpose of this study is to examine J.T.'s journal for insights into factors that may help explain this culmination of a journey towards becoming a certified teacher. Implicit in the narrative is the professor's commitment to, and valuing of J.T.'s writing and thinking.

**Data Analysis**

The study employed qualitative research procedures based on a content analysis of the journal and constant comparison analysis for emerging patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This research

approach was used because it allows for the generation of analytical categories which are grounded in recorded data, as well as verification of existing theoretical notions found in professional literature. This grounded theory research allows the freedom to combine a variety of data gathering methods in developing interrelated hypotheses about teacher preparation and socialization.

The journal entries were first categorized using open coding techniques, a process which breaks down, examines, compares, conceptualizes, and categorizes data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 61). As categories emerged, questions arose which guided further investigation into the professional literature. The findings from these investigations were compared to the initial categories. This approach alternated between a “bottom-up” and “top-down” focus (Bruner, 1986). Top-down conceptualizations considered and rejected as insufficiently encompassing included Jungian and Myers-Briggs frameworks (cf. McCrae & Costa, 1989), the five factor model of personality (Goldberg, 1993), a variety of reflective-thinking concepts (e.g., Hatton & Smith, 1995), stage theories of intellectual and ethical development (Kitchener & King, 1981; Perry, 1970), and Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (1983).

### Results

Three fundamental factors appear to affect the nature and speed of professional growth among preservice and beginning teachers:

- 1 the biography of a novice;
- 2.the nature of the particular service program; and
- 3.the school/classroom context in which teaching occurred (Kagan, 1992)

Kagan suggests that a summary goal of preservice education should be to encourage biographical reflection in order to help resolve the novice’s image of self as teacher:

The necessary and proper focus of a novice’s attention and reflection may be inward: on the novice’s own behaviors, beliefs, and image of self as teacher. Novices who do not possess strong images of self as teacher when they first enter the classroom may be doomed to flounder. Instead of expecting novices to reflect on the moral and ethical implications of classroom practices, teacher educators might be wiser to guide novices through their biographical histories: for example, helping them to examine their prior experiences in classrooms, their prior experiences with authority figures, and their tendencies to assume that other learners share their own problems and propensities (pp. 162-3).

### Biographical Influences

Kagan’s premise receives support from J. T.’s spontaneous journal reflections on biographical factors which influenced his career direction. For example, he becomes aware that his mother may have had something to do with why his curiosity has never seemed to die and why he asks “why” whenever he sees something he does not understand.

I used to sit with my father and ask why about everything. He would patiently answer for hours. I would even follow him into the bathroom and while he had a bath I would sit and question him. I never could find anything he didn’t have an answer for. It became a sort of game.... I used to think that my mother played no part in my intellectual growth from [this] aspect, but as I grow older I see how wrong I was in this regard.... I discovered recently (since I began asking myself questions in my journal) that my mother has a Why disease. Whenever she hears something about a situation in another country she asks why it is that way.... One thing I remember my mother hammering home time after time. She would always say: “Find out what other people know. Get out there and pick their brains.” It sounds kind of gross, but it has done a lot for me. I do recognize that everyone has specialty areas and you can learn so much from people it’s amazing. Mom is a people learner; dad is a book learner.

J.T. also speculates on the origins of his amazing memory, wondering if it was promoted by family games which required remembering a list of things or a sequence and were played often. Interestingly, Huizinga (1939/1970) claimed that science, J.T.’s speciality, spontaneously evolved in every culture as games of riddling in which individuals tested their memory. Finally, J.T. talks about two exemplary adults who strongly impacted his learning *prior to professional preparation*:

He [his father, a certified teacher] has truly been the most influential person in my life. He has been my idol in so many ways and I try to emulate him and his approach to life and learning as much as possible.... The one thing I hope I can do is become the teacher that he would be proud of.

A grade 7 teacher...taught me that there are opportunities to learn every day and in every field. He taught me that learning is a life-long process and can always be accomplished by those with the desire to broaden their horizons.... He practiced more than he preached. It was his attitude and actions that changed me more than his words....a certain something that held your attention and made you realize the importance of what you were learning.

Inspiring mentors are commonly cited in the biographies of outstanding teachers (e.g., Roaden, 1991; Seiderberg & Clark, 1990), but the formative importance of their role, touched on by Lortie (1995), has received little systematic attention (Atkinson & Delamont, 1985). Instead, the current focus in teacher education is more on how to effect individual change in dysfunctional conceptions of teaching (Kagan, 1992; Zeichner & Gore, 1990) rather than on how to reinforce unusually functional attitudes, beliefs, or values by nurturing those interests that attract teachers to their speciality in the first place.

For J.T., it was mainly a love of science that brought him to teaching:

I have always loved to teach, but as long as I can remember I have loved science. When I was a kid some of my fondest memories were collecting insects and classifying them on my bedroom wall.... My grade 4 teacher sent one of my pieces of work home one day saying I cheated because I used words like Hymenoptera and Odonata. Needless to say, I was just writing about my hobby. I loved those words and what they meant to me.

I have always been fascinated by all things and mostly by the natural world and its wonders. Our family walks, which we had very often, always involved (and still do) naming all the plants and animals as well as commenting on geological formations and anything else we saw that interested us. The world is a fascinating place, and I cannot find all the time I need to learn all that I want to about it.

The deeply imbedded nature of this early socialization was plainly apparent in a journal entry made several days earlier:

I was at Science World this week. I was watching a movie about the rain forest and suddenly I was struck by a thought. It hit me like a bolt. As I was busy naming each creature I saw, I realized that the university can't possibly teach me what I want to know. I want to know so much about so many things, and the university is too confining.

It seems reasonable to speculate that naming creatures originally experienced in J. T.'s childhood family nature walks, an affect that, he abruptly becomes aware of, is currently absent in his university learning experience. It is this experiential knowledge, and not solely rational-analytical information (Epstein 1994), that he would like to convey to students.

...the reason I want to teach science [is] not to simply broaden my knowledge, but to entice students. To pass on some kind of curiosity that I have about the world and its wonders. I don't want to simply pass on information. I want to see students get excited about learning and about science....I hope to be able to pass on to my students some of the love for learning that my father and mother passed on to me.... They opened the world up for me. I hope that I can do the same for my students.

Noddings and Shore (1984) observed that children begin their lives full of initiative and love of learning and that to keep it alive requires sensitive parents and educators and responsible institutions. The foregoing biographical excerpts support this notion as do certain experiences which J.T. encountered in the second year of his program.

#### **Preservice Program Influences (Second Year)**

There was a marked difference between the way J.T. regarded his university experience in the second as compared to the third year of the program. In his third year, as he began to teach, all his thoughts centered on the classroom.

It seems the university is pulling me away from the classroom. I could be learning at the school, but instead I have to learn at the [university]. I don't think I like that. The problems they address seem so slow to develop. The way we are teaching in the classroom is not what's happening in the lecture halls.... LEARN BY DOING, NOT BY LISTENING. Oh well, I always want to speed things up when it comes to teaching me (oops, that just slipped out).

And some days later:

Teaching styles in the university as opposed to elementary school. Wow, what a difference!... The

university is dominated by passive learning, students engaged intellectually, but rarely physically or socially....Interesting to note that the arts may be an exception here. Are university classes in the arts both intellectual, social, and physical in nature? If so, why are these the classes that students feel they do the poorest in?

Here, J.T. is reflecting upon how completely he became involved in the second year program in which he worked in an integrated humanities curriculum that consisted of art, drama, and music. He was critical of his art and singing ability although somewhat less so of the latter by the end of the year. He fell in love with the guitar and felt he achieved a personal growth in music, understanding the whole picture of music better. Drama uncovered some forgotten memories:

I was in three operas as a child: *The Mikado*, *The Pirates of Penzance*, and *The White Horse Inn*. I have always viewed these as musical performances and I still have fond memories of the great fun we all had presenting these operas. It was a tremendous amount of work but I had forgotten about many aspects of these performances. I forgot all the late nights drawing, painting, and constructing sets, and endless hours in classrooms practicing the movements and gestures of the actors, the laughs we all got out of practicing dancing maneuvers. Yes, I had forgotten all that went on to accompany the musical aspects of the program, but the connections have been made, and I remember now.

Reflecting back on his courses in the arts, he writes:

I think the single most important thing I have learned this year is not how to use music, drama, and art, in my classroom; it is an appreciation for the arts....our work in the arts has altered the way I view the arts for me. How can I do it for my students?

Eisner has long held that the arts are “mind-altering devices” (1991, p. 39). For J.T., just as by spelling a word on paper we may discover what our fingers already know, participation in drama exercises was the catalyst that brought to consciousness bodily knowledge of childhood opera experiences. Bodily knowledge has largely been ignored in teacher education (McLaren, 1988; Reed, 1993) despite treatments of the role of the arts in education by writers such as Harry Broudy (1972), Elliott Eisner (1994), and Maxine Greene (1995). Polanyi (1958) described this learning as a tacit form of personal knowledge because, being embodied in ways of doing things, it is difficult to articulate. J.T., in his passion for “learning by doing” as opposed to listening seems to be adept at picking up on bodily cues, perhaps thorough bodily-kinesthetic perception (Gardner, 1983). Recall that it was the attitude and actions of his seventh grade teacher, and not just words, that created a lasting impression. This teacher’s presence apparently embodied the subject matter in a personal way, demonstrating “a living relationship” (Van Manen, 1991, p. 200) between science and life that J.T. may have absorbed as much with his body as with his mind. His journal contains some vivid examples of how acutely he is aware of embodied excellence:

To see Michael Jordan play basketball is to watch an artist touch brush to canvas. He does the same things as everyone but you catch your breath when he simply passes the ball. I watched him play against the Indiana Pacers and I recorded the game on my VCR. I spent about 15 minutes recording and playing again his reception of a pass and a subsequent pass that he made. It didn’t amount to a field goal or a break away, but what he did was so beautiful it was beyond belief. He had the confidence and the ability to perform what many other players could not even have thought of. You may think I’m nuts saying this about a sport, but watch Michael Jordan one day; note the difference between him and the ordinary player, then you will see what I mean.

While my sister (with a high school diploma) and my brother-in-law (a concert pianist) were both playing the piano, one after another, there was no comparison in their playing. My sister played the music and it was wonderful, but it was not the same as my brother-in-law. The difference was small, but while my sister’s made you smile, my brother-in-law’s made you cry. To hear the creativity and interpretation of Chopin’s “Barcarolle” was simply incredible. The piano was simply an extension of his mind and he laid it out for us to hear. I went out and bought the CD with Horowitz playing the piece, but it’s not the same as sitting in the living room with a Kawai grand at your side and watching it being played.

In both of these instances J.T. perceives a living relationship between artist and his craft - an extension of mind that is laid out for the audience, arguably analogous to the manner in which “discourse [was] given sentence” (McLaren, 1988, p. 168) by his seventh grade teacher.

**Preservice Classroom Influences (Third Year)**

I can see that early in the year I tried to force the lessons rather than let them flow from within. It wasn't natural and it seems so now.... So much of it is instinct and in your head. It only gets better with experience.

I found teaching an incredible experience. At first exhausting but then once you're in the groove, exhilarating. The students simply carry you along and keep you up. Every action you do affects them and vice-versa. It is the most incredible ego-trip I have ever had. They all want you. Your life is so full of people, and you can do something for them all. What an opportunity. It sounds like heaven. The workload is tremendous, but you get better at handling it quickly. You get feedback all the time. Appropriately named since this is the fuel that drives you forward, it seems. To see that class respond is incredible. To see them produce is even better.... Watching people learn is exciting, motivating, and just generally thrilling.

For several years Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues have been interested in a state of being termed *negentropy*, *optimal experiences*, or *flow* (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) in "which individuals experience activities as *autotelic* or intrinsically rewarding. The state is described as one of:

...intense involvement, deep concentration, clarity of goals and feedback, loss of sense of time, lack of self-consciousness and transcendence of a sense of self, leading to an autotelic, that is, intrinsically rewarding experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988b, p. 365).

This ordered state of consciousness, valued for its own sake, has been identified the world over in people engaged in diverse occupations such as surgeons, teachers, mountain climbers, and Japanese style motor gangs (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Several of J. T.'s journal entries, including his statement of how his lessons flow from within, converge in suggesting that it is this state that J.T. finds so exhilarating when he teaches.

Optimal experience (flow) requires a balance between a given situation and the skills a person brings to it. No activity can sustain it unless both the challenge and the skills become more complex (Csikszentmihalyi, 1982). For example, a person without the requisite skills is unlikely to persist with chess, as the challenges are almost impossible to exhaust. Flow forces people to stretch themselves, to always take on another challenge in order to improve on their abilities. That is, the sense of exhilaration, energy, and fulfillment which flow produces, intrinsically motivates one to replicate the state of being, seeking out the activity that produced the experience again (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988a). J. T. appears to be intuitively aware of how important his balance between challenge and success is for instilling a love of learning from within:

Good teachers treat students fairly. Fair means giving students what they deserve and need rather than treating everyone equal. Equal treatment is essential in disciplinary matters, but fairness is essential when it comes to providing students with activities that will challenge them.... Effective teachers assess students in a comprehensive manner and award [them with] comments and grades which truly reflect [their] effort and achievements.

These words echo the conditions that Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, Whales, and Wong (1993) found promoted intrinsic motivation in talented teenagers: (1) match intellectual challenge with capacity so that the likelihood of success becomes about 50/50; and (2) provide immediate feedback, informational rather than controlling, so that tasks are undertaken unselfconsciously, within ego investment. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) also found that learning flourished in environments and relationships that took the cultivation of passionate interest as a primary educational goal. They referred to such environments as flow classes, run by flow teachers who never stopped challenging their own abilities and seemed determined to help students experience the same rewards that they were obtaining in the continuing exploration of their specialty. This is perhaps the essence of J.T.'s teaching style. He is determined to impart to students his excitement about science and its wonder as he models this love of learning.

I constantly compete with myself to always ask for more. Is it wrong to strive for personal excellence in each endeavor you undertake?

Some examples of this striving in his second year included, in addition to a heavy academic load, running a chess club, tutoring math, running the Apple lab in the education technology center, and volunteer work at a senior citizen's home. The flow concept can also account for why, when he first began to teach, he stopped playing chess. At least for the present, no other challenge was necessary.

I really feel I am best needed in the elementary school [in comparison to a career as a teacher educator].

That is where the learning is going on. I learned more in there myself this year than in two years at the university. I need the elementary school and what it offers.... The challenges...are tremendous and fluctuate

from moment to moment.

Another requirement for flow is that the activity must have relatively clear goals and provide rather quick and unambiguous feedback in order to know how well one is doing (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988a). As noted above, J.T. experienced feedback as the fuel which drove him forward: "To see the class respond is incredible. To see them even produce is even better." This feedback has an embodied quality. For example, in coping with a noisy class he was able to "reel them in... [and] tighten the class up a little." He "simply stayed on top of their behavior and they responded well." Again, when asked whether he found teaching intellectually challenging, he wrote: "Really, I hadn't thought about it. I let the kids do the thinking; I just point them." And reflecting back on his relationship with his students after a year together:

I feel these bonds have changed but they are stronger than ever. The students know who I am now as a person and what my values are. I no longer am trying to be anyone's friend in terms of students but I still treat them as equals, and we have a great relationship.

These examples seem illustrative of a kind of bodily-kinesthetic intelligence (Gardner, 1983), strikingly present in some early imaginings.

For ages now I have had this fantasy. When I was a kid, I used to read a comic book called "The Fantastic Four".... The leader was like rubber and could stretch and distort his body. I fantasized for years that I would like to be the rubber man. Reed Richards was his name. I would think about what it would be like to have his powers and put them to use in sports.... I came to the conclusion that it would just be very handy to have these powers and be super human. So these fantasies have not died. Lately Reed Richards has come to the classroom. As a teacher, I could stretch out and control the classroom without moving around much.... What a power it would be. Oh well, I guess I'll just have to do my best. But fantasizing is fun.

And so was reality when he "reeled in" a particularly energetic student:

One student was a perpetual problem in class. Always disruptive and not performing well, I worked hard with him and he started to come around. One day, he was sitting on a stool and was rocking back and forth walking himself around the classroom. I had warned him once or twice and he continued. So I walked over to him, the whole class was working quietly at math. I picked up the stool (him on it) and walked across the room placing him on his stool back at his desk. By this time he was laughing embarrassingly as was the whole class who had now seen the incident. I was laughing now but reprimanded him to stay and begin working at math. Fifteen minutes later he came up to me for help. Before asking me, he looked at me and said, "Mr. T...., you are the best teacher I have ever had." Doesn't figure, does it? He got 23% on my first test of the year. I just marked his final math test today; he got 85% !!! Yahoo! I wrote on his test "Thanks for the nice going away present." This was really a special incident for me.

It was not uncommon for feedback to be expressed in a more explicitly embodied but equally unambiguous manner:

I visited the school on Friday and it was so nice to see the students. Some of them almost knocked me over giving me hugs. Something I wouldn't expect for seventh graders, but what can I say?

With one student, in grade 7, I really sat and had a long chat with [him] about his behavior on the day I left.... He had given me the finger when my back was turned, but I saw him. I reprimanded him at the time by emphasizing the fact that I had treated him better than that during the year and I didn't deserve to be treated like that. I am an individual and have feelings, and he was being insensitive, rude, and disrespectful. I really think that it was innocent and he was trying to keep his image in front of his friends. He was actually trying to be humorous. Anyway, he came to me later in the day, apologized and hugged me when I left. I was flabbergasted. He said he would miss me. They are resilient, but I think they want to be treated fairly and as individuals.

J.T.'s supervising teacher had never encountered a class where they viewed the intern as the primary teacher. When J.T. left, the cooperating teacher's students kept unwittingly calling him Mr. T.... and were always asking her when Mr. T.... was returning. J.T.'s supervising teacher asked him what was his secret. How did he get along with the students so well? At least part of the answer may have to do with the type of teacher that adolescents experience as influential (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi, 1986). Most of these are teachers who are able to generate enthusiasm for learning, who communicate a sense of excitement, a contagious intellectual thrill through their personal involvement with the subject matter. Teenagers found such teachers to be exceptionally approachable. In J.T., this intense love of learning is combined with a respectful enjoyment of children.

I have always got along with kids really well. We enjoy each other's company. Just last night the neighbor's kid (5th grade) knocked on the door and asked if I could come out and play.... When I was young, I often tried to talk to adults on their level. Often I was shunned. I hated this more than anything in the world and I never have forgiven those who treated me in that way. I was a person, equal to them, but often they treated me as inferior. I make a concerted effort to treat youngsters as equals. I listen to them, address their concerns, and ask their advice in many matters. I love the energy they have and the uniqueness of thought that each has. I know that I have carried this attitude into the classroom and maybe this attitude has something to do with my relationship with the students.

More than maybe, judging from an earlier journal entry:

I had this discussion with my class on my last day. I told them if they learned 1/1000th from me of what I learned from them, I was thrilled. So, all of a sudden some students piped up, "What do you mean, Mr. T....? What did you learn from me?" And I began to list from every student who asked me, one thing that I had learned from them. It became a kind of game and we had a fun couple of minutes. I thanked them for being my teacher and I think they found this odd.

### Discussion

J.T.'s journals account of his teaching experiences during the second and third year of his preservice education portrays many of the qualities which have been found to typify outstanding experienced teachers: namely, a strong inner driving force, a desire to replicate the high level of performance of valued mentors, and a compelling motivation to foster children's personal growth (Sederberg & Clark, 1990). Sederberg and Clark, in interviews with Minnesota teachers of the year, were struck by "the intensity of their voices and body language when they related anecdotes about successes with students" (p. 8). In J.T.'s descriptions of this classroom experiences a similar intensity of "body language" (e.g., "reel then in") is apparent and one can infer from the hugs he draws that they are equally transparent to his students.

The present analysis has shown that the dimensions of flow or optimal experience that have been identified by Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues provide a framework for interpreting J.T.'s experience of teaching and the powerful rapport he establishes with his students. An optimal balance between skills and challenges is there for J.T. in his sixth grade class. When such excitement is present, learning becomes a pleasure and the teacher's involvement with his subject matter translates into effective learning for students (Csikszentmihalyi & McCormack, 1986). This was perhaps the "certain something" that J.T.'s sixth grade supervisor conveyed to him, which held his attention and made him realize the importance of what he was learning.

According to Daniel Goleman (1995), "being able to enter flow is emotional intelligence at its best ... the ultimate in harnessing the emotions in the service of performance and learning (p. 90). J.T. reflected:

I do find I am forced to keep more up to date....but I never think of [teaching] as intellectually challenging. I think of it as a social/emotional challenge. Perhaps that is the portion of the person that really needs to be strong to be a teacher.

Sternberg (1985) attempted to answer this question by asking successful teachers and business executives what they needed to know to succeed on the job:

With stunning regularity our subjects told us that the formal knowledge that they had learned in school had little to do with their success. Rather they relied on informal knowledge in thought and action. Such knowledge was acquired on the job, essentially through osmosis: it was never explicitly taught and may never have been verbalized. For this reason, we have sometimes referred to such knowledge as "tacit" (p. 197).

Van Manen (1995) suggests that it is difficult to articulate the tacit knowledge that animates teaching because such practical knowledge is not primarily in the intellect or the head but rather depends "upon the internalized values, embodied quantities, thoughtful habits that constitute virtues of teaching" (p. 48). The hugs J.T.'s students gave him may have been an appropriately inarticulate acknowledgement of the absorption of such values, largely through osmosis.

In their study of talented teenagers, Csikszentmihalyi et. al. (1993) found that for too many of them, mathematics and science remained arid subjects, useful in the long run but not enjoyable in the present. It thus becomes particularly urgent to recruit teacher candidates such as J.T. who are capable of turning such learning into a flow experience. Love of learning, rather than grade point average, may be the critically important criterion. J.T.

speaks this issue with considerable passion:

One thing this week has really bothered me. My nephew was denied entry to the university.... I found this news shocking. It is not just that he is my nephew, it is that he is a very good student. His refusal led me to consider all the students who are being denied entry. [My nephew] is one of the more academic of all my nephews and nieces. His grade point average was 2.83 out of 4 and this was sufficient to deny him entry. To me, that means that any student who isn't a B student is being refused by [the university]. Incredible. What are we doing here? I know that the factor must be room, but wow!! Something has to be done. If we continue this trend, we are only letting the intellectual elite into university. We are disqualifying the "well-rounded" individual. There are plenty of students out there who have so much to offer without being academically gifted. We are saying, in one sweep, that only the students who haven't done anything in grade 12 but homework can come. [My nephew] was a straight A student until grade 11, where he met a girlfriend and got a driver's license which allowed him to go fishing more often. This just seems like incredible punishment to impose on our "good" students. Anyway, you've probably heard the argument a thousand times. I would like to point out, however, that under current conditions, neither my wife nor I would ever have been allowed into this university.

Kagan (1992) concluded her comprehensive review of professional growth among preservice and beginning teachers with a similar comment:

Classroom teaching appears to be a peculiar form of self-expression in which the artist, the subject, and the medium are one. Whether any academic program of study can truly prepare someone to practice it is a question that one dares not ask (p. 164).

J. T. dares to ask and he evidently has cause. At least as important as academic standing may be a life history such as J.T.'s that has been filled with successful growth experiences. Such individuals are likely to display in their demeanor the intensity that comes with continual pursuit of new challenges to overcome, and possess the power to spark the joy of learning in their students (Csikszentmihalyi and Rathnude, 1990). This journal analysis supports such a viewpoint and underlines the need to identify and value these qualities in teacher candidate selection and to nurture them during teacher preparation. To quote Dewey once again:

Here is A who is much more successful than B in teaching, awakening the enthusiasm of his students of learning, inspiring them morally by personal example and contact, and yet relatively ignorant of educational history, psychology, approved methods, etc., which B possesses in abundant measure. The facts are admitted. But what is overlooked...is that the success of such individuals tends to be born and die with them; beneficial consequences extend only to those pupils who have personal contact with such gifted teachers. No one can measure the weight and loss that come from the fact that the contributions of such men and women in the past have been thus confined, and the only way by which we can prevent such waste in the future is by methods which enable us to make an analysis of what the gifted teacher does intuitively, so that something accruing from his work can be communicated to others (1929, pp. 11-12).

#### **Postscript**

After its completion, this manuscript was given to J.T. to read. His comments included the following: The grade 7 teacher I mentioned is my father....I don't really like to talk that openly about him and what he has meant to me because it embarrasses me. That is why I wrote the "a seventh grade teacher" part.

The whole idea of "inspiring mentors" raises questions for me when I read this article...I truly cannot think of any teachers who "turned on the lights" and inspired me. My family and upbringing turned them on. I really believe they have always been lit.... It was the actions of my father, mother, and family that had the lasting impression. They were and are my teachers. I wonder if I have ever taught them anything?.... The environment in my home was one where learning was the norm. It was not something else that was done; it was life and living itself.... We never went anywhere - and I mean it - where we didn't comment on something, learn about it from dad or mom or simply raise questions about why things are the way they are. This has not changed.... Perhaps it just comes down to my comment that my family has never seemed to manage to separate learning from living.

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THE SEARCH FOR DIFFERENDS:  
THE DISCOURSE OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

Mary Woodard Bevel  
Webster University

**Introduction**

One of the grounding tenets of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, also known as the I.D.E.A., is the *normalization* of individuals with disabilities through a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, most often called LRE, thereby extending an equal education opportunity, and allowing for *access to autonomy* to all citizens regardless of ability.<sup>1</sup> Embedded in LRE and the notion of access to autonomy as implied in the democratic ideal, is the issue of the *inclusion* of children with disabilities within the regular education classroom. Inclusion, in turn, is embedded in the notion of access characterized in the discourse of the American democratic ideal. The LRE consideration has evolved into specific practices and policy decisions designed to allow access. In a general sense, policies and practices are established to insure some action for a specific purpose. In the case at hand, the policy of determining LRE is an integral aspect of each I.E.P. meeting. If L.R.E. is successful in allowing for access to autonomy through education, then individuals with disabilities should be normalized into society.

Despite Constitutional ideals, and special education practices and policies specifically established to facilitate access, research demonstrates most disabled individuals, who are graduated from public school systems and colleges, are either underemployed for their training and education or remain unemployed two years after completing their education.<sup>2</sup> Such apparent contradictions between the discourse of liberation and the results of regular and special education practices, compel one to question whether individuals with disabilities do indeed have access to the American democratic ideal and the promise of autonomy. One method to examine these questions is through a *language games*-based inquiry.

**Jean-François Lyotard and Language Games**

Through his notions of *language games* and the search for *differends*, Jean-François Lyotard provides a framework to deconstruct discourse. A *differend* is the point within discourse where the existing representational frameworks are unable to deal with difference without reproducing clashes of incommensurable conflict. In an effort to find justice through literary politics, Lyotard searches for *differends* in policy language and “the not yet presented” in a *ruse*. He describes a *ruse* as a strategy to build an entirely new language game that does not favor an existing language game inherent in the *differend*. Lyotard views deconstruction as a form of *literary politics*; whose purpose is not “in quest of what is lost, but hopes for what it has never yet found, ‘like an old beast awaiting its pasture.’”<sup>3</sup> Lyotard draws upon Wittgenstein’s theory of *language games*, purposing that in its broadest form, “a language game is a set of rules by which some use of language is governed.”<sup>4</sup> When the role of the game or the pragmatic situation of instances changes, then the game changes. The interrelationship between words, phrases, and their linkages perpetuates the social bond, legitimates knowledge, and distributes power through language games.<sup>5</sup> There are two distinct ways to play any language game. The first is to speak according to the rules specific to each language game and the second is to change the rules with or without the agreement of the players.

Language games function as agents of “truth” in the *denotative* game, where statements answer only to the criteria of true/false distinctions. The *prescriptive* game, pertains to the notions of justice and fairness, answering only those issues concerning just /unjust distinctions. In the *technical* game, the criterion of legitimacy is efficient-inefficient distinction. Phrases made in one game can only be made legitimate by phrases from the same language game. In regard to the deconstruction of LRE, if the language in the intent and implementation of a policy are in the same language game, then the policy can be judged to be legitimate. If the language games under consideration are not congruent, then the policy and its implementation are incommensurable and at this point lies a *differend*.<sup>6</sup> Any search for *differends* in relation to the Least Restrictive Environment policy must begin with a discussion of Lyotard’s interpretation of the nature of truth, justice, and knowledge.

**The True and the Just**

In modernity, the roles of truth and justice are often intertwined. At first, it can appear that one might reach justice through examining issues based on a criterion of truth. This is not the case; for these language games operate within two distinctly different and totally separate phrase universes. Justice is only presentable in the prescriptive

language game and truth is only presentable in the denotative language game. Justice is not the same thing as *truth* and justice cannot be arrived at through a search for truth. Yet, justice has historically been defined by denotative statements which, according to Lyotard, represent:

... a type of discourse that somehow dominates social practice of justice and that subordinates it to itself.

This type of discourse is common to an entire political tradition (that includes Marx as well), in which it is presupposed that if the denotation of the discourse that describes justice is correct, that is, if this discourse is true, then the social practice can be just insofar as it respects the distribution implied in the discourse.<sup>7</sup>

It is this notion of justice, based in an assumption of an *a priori* transcendental, that dominates the liberation discourse inherent in modernity. Lyotard offers a different notion of justice which is situation specific based in values. Such judgements operate in the mode of reflective judgement and potentially, at least, can consider all possibilities. When few opportunities are opened, access is limited. When endless opportunities are considered, the possibility of access exists.

### **The Narrative of Access in Process of Achieving Justice and Progress**

The narrative of access can precede in at least two ways: either toward justice or toward progress. On the one hand is the narrative of access, in which knowledge serves humanity through a dialectic relationship in the domain of justice--with all discourse in the prescriptive language game. In this case, one examines issues of justice through *opinion* and not through predetermined criteria.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, is the narrative of access in which humanity is controlled by knowledge in the service of progress.<sup>9</sup> In this case, the narrative of access operates in a denotative language game that can only *describe* the parameters of justice but not assume the speculative of justice.<sup>10</sup> Any attempt to reach justice through denotative statements is contradictory to Lyotard's notion of justice. For Lyotard, there is no possibility of building a bridge from the true to the just.<sup>11</sup>

### **Two Views of Justice**

For Lyotard justice is an idea of possibilities with at least two components. The first is a notion of a *multiplicity of justices* viewed through the social bond and language games. The second is a notion of a *justice of multiplicity* based on values that prescribe justice for each language game by evoking imagination.<sup>12</sup> Both views of justice are important for this inquiry. The *multiplicity of justices* allows not only for the examination of discourse and the discovery of *differends*, but it also allows for the invention and innovation of the *ruse*. The *justice of multiplicity* operates as an idea allowing many possibilities for the imagination to reflect, and to prescribe the rules of operation within each language game.

Grounded in notions of equality, zero reject, normalization, and supported by the constitutional principles of equal protection, and both substantive and procedural due process, LRE gives the appearance, at least, that it is subsumed in the genre of justice. LRE began as an attempt to end the exclusion of individuals with disabilities by balancing the values supporting appropriateness of educational opportunity with individual rights of association.<sup>13</sup> In this regard, LRE should allow for access to knowledge. An examination into the nature of knowledge and the role knowledge it plays in access, is beneficial to this inquiry.

### **Knowledge**

For Lyotard, knowledge is competence expressed through many types of "language games." Although knowledge is always expressed in the narrative form, *scientific* statements are fundamentally different from knowledge reflected in other narrative statements. In modernity the dominance of scientific knowledge has resulted in the science/narrative binary. As Derrida argues, the first term in the binary is privileged over the second term.<sup>14</sup> Within Western metaphysics, narratives are often considered to operate at the surface of discourse without representing the foundations of the dominant discourse. Although at base, both scientific and narrative knowledge are composed of denotative statements based on true/false distinctions, the legitimating process of scientific knowledge is very different from that of narrative knowledge. The legitimation of scientific knowledge is based on only two criteria. The knowledge is judged to be "good" if its claims are accessible for repetition and if the claims are judged by recognized experts to be eligible for inclusion into the canons of science; therefore, scientific knowledge does not necessarily require philosophical grounding in the domains of ethics and morals (justice) for legitimacy. Scientific knowledge is a powerful influence in the implementation of many educational policies even though the philosophy of public education--at least--is grounded in issues of justice. Such is the case in LRE.

According to Lyotard, "knowledge first finds legitimacy within itself, and it is knowledge that is entitled to say what the State and Society are."<sup>15</sup> In other words, knowledge defines modernity. Consequently knowledge,

whether denotative or prescriptive, can become either philosophical or speculative. Under these conditions, knowledge, “can only play this role by changing levels, by ceasing to be simply the positive knowledge of its referent (nature, society, the State, etc.), becoming an addition to that knowledge of the knowledge of the referent, that is, by becoming speculative.”<sup>16</sup> Then knowledge is not the subject, in service of another subject but, rather, knowledge finds “Its legitimacy (though formidable) is in the fact that it allows mortality to become reality.”<sup>17</sup> A deconstruction of this complex process should reveal areas of cognition (denotative game) and areas of ethics (prescriptive game) which demonstrate incommensurability between the intent and the effect of LRE as viewed in the narrative of access.

### **The Narrative of Access in Education**

While the narrative of access is presented as an ideal in the domain of ethics, through the discourse of the prescriptive language game, many regular educational practices and policies are presented and implemented in the domain of science through the discourse of the denotative language game. In the case of children with disabilities, the incommensurability between the intent, the implementation, and effect of educational practices and policies is even more evident. The majority of children with disabilities who are taught in different locations than their non disabled peers have very different educational and social experiences than their non disabled peers. The nature of remedial pullout programs is such that they are unable to offer all of the experiences and levels of stimulation available in regular classroom programs. Children in regular classrooms have many more experiences from which to construct their *other* than do children with disabilities in pull out or segregated programs.<sup>18</sup> In the present system of schooling, the child with a disability does not have an equal basis from which to achieve access to the American democratic ideal. Another *differend* in narrative of access is evident in American public schooling systems in “a politics of primary education.”<sup>19</sup> The intent of public schooling is to provide an education for children in order to achieve access, grounded in notions of liberty at least implied in the Constitution (expressed in the prescriptive language game). Yet state departments of education mandate state standards (expressed in the denotative language game and implemented in the technical language game) in the name of “knowledge” and “liberty” as promised in the American democratic ideal (also expressed in the prescriptive language game). These language games, denotative, technical and prescriptive, are incommensurable, that is, one cannot legitimate another. Here lies a *differend* of at least three incommensurable language games.

### **LRE, Narrative Knowledge, and Appropriateness**

On its face, LRE appears to be fair and just, but nowhere in federal law nor in any regulation are there regulations governing the placement of *normal or average* children. One must determine--judge on some criteria--who is normal and who is disabled. Some children are evaluated on a battery of “scientific” tests to determine whether or not they fall within the pre established “normal” range, thus establishing a division, a classification, a binary distinction, a hierarchal ordering. Once classified, “professionals” trained in the evolving and cumulative “science” of special education determine educational placement regarding the LRE policy mandate of *the maximum extent appropriate*. The outcome, no matter how clinical, professional, and scientific the process might be, is exclusion not inclusion. In Kantian terms, a decision about appropriate placement based on predetermined criteria is in the domain of determinant judgement, a judgement based on some standard (e.g., normality). According to Lyotard, such judgements cannot be considered “just” because judgements based on a pre determined standard exclude the possibility of reflective judgement. Bounded domains of judgement are in the realm of totalitarianism. Just judgements are open-minded, always awaiting the possibilities of the not yet presented.

### **Summary**

In summary, the application of Lyotard’s notion of language games to LRE revealed several *differends*. LRE begins as a narrative of *access* in its ideal sense, operating in the domain of ethics and functioning as a dialectic to discuss an injustice to children with disabilities. In its implementation, LRE attempts to prescribe educational strategies through a dialectic relationship between the addresser as professional and the addressee as client-student. This creates a *differend* because incommensurable language games--prescription and efficiency--are operating simultaneously. In its implementation, LRE as access is captured by applications of externally legitimated criteria of “appropriateness,” most often grounded in a behavioristic ideology. Another *differend* was revealed when the idea of access through LRE was deconstructed in the larger context of the American democratic ideal. This *differend* occurs when the ideals of access as justice (prescriptives) are sought through scientific knowledge (denotations) in the service of progress. The transformation of LRE from the discourse of access in its ideal sense into a discourse of science changes the role of LRE from one of justice to one of denotation, which in practice is, itself, likely to be

displaced by efficiency. Such discourse allows current educational practices to trap individuals with disabilities in a life whose quality is distinctly different, inferior, and separate from that of non disabled individuals.<sup>20</sup> Servan describes this subtle process of hegemony:

When you have [thus] formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their masters. The stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains, but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas; it is at the stable point of reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link is all the stronger in that we do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be our own work; despair and time eat away the bonds of iron and steel, but they are powerless against the habitual union of ideas, they can only tighten it still more, and on the soft fibers of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires.<sup>21</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

Normalization covers the notions that disabled individuals should live as normal a life as possible with his/her differences from the normal individual minimized by equal treatment. Social role valorization covers the notion that individuals with disabilities should be given the same opportunities as individuals without disabilities to enjoy socially valued roles. Wolf Wolfensberger, "Social Role Valorization: A Proposed New Term for the Principle of Normalization," *Mental Retardation*, 21 (Dec. 1983), 224.

Association for Retarded Children, *A Report Card to the Nation on Inclusion in Education of Students with Mental Retardation*, 1992; National Association of State Boards of Education, *Winners All: A Call for Inclusive Schools, cited from the Fourteenth Annual Report to Congress*, 1992; SRI, *National Longitudinal Transition Study of Special Education Students*, 1991.

Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Libidinal Economy*, trans., Iian Hamilton Grant (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), xviii. Originally published as *Economie Libidinate* (France: *Les Editions De Minuit*, 1974).

Wlad Godzich, translator's note in the "Afterward" of Lyotard's, *Just Gaming*, 118.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis, MN : University of Minnesota Press. Originally published in France as *Le Differend. Les Editions de Minut*, 1983.

Lyotard notes, "It is not how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of communication [l'enchaînement] that is relevant." Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, trans. Wlad Godzich,. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota press, 1985. Originally published in Paris as *Au Juste*, 1979. Within every phrase is a "phrase universe" presenting a tripartite relationship between an "addresser" (speaker), an "addressee" (a listener), and the "referent" (object) and governed by its own specific pragmatic and linguistic framework.

Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis, MN : University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 41. Originally published in France as *Au Juste*, by Les Editions de Minut, 1979.

For issues of access( liberty), the means of legitimation of knowledge can precede in two distinct modes. In the first, knowledge only serves the subject, which is humanity, in the pursuit of access (liberty). The knowledge of legitimation is "practical" in the form of ethics expressed in the prescriptive language game of a just/unjust criterion of distinction. In the sense of Aristotle's three-fold classification of disciplines--theoretical, productive, and practical--where the practical disciplines are those sciences that deal with and political life whose purpose (*telos*) is wisdom and knowledge in the service of liberty. Narratives of

knowledge which serve humanity are narratives in which the people achieve their power from the state or government and the state receives its power from the people in an ideal reciprocal relationship--a dialectic. In the ideal sense, the narrative of access operates in the mode of values operating in the name of justice. But the ideal narrative of access is very different from the narrative of access which operates in modernity defines access in terms of *progress*. For a more complete discussion of this classification related to education see Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis, *Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research* (Philadelphia, PA: The Falmer Press, 1986).

When the narrative of access is completely captured by science in the name of progress, the denotative language game is supplemented by the technical game of efficiency. It is at this point that incommensurable language games clash in a *differend*.

In this form of legitimation, knowledge becomes the subject of itself. The knowledge of legitimation is transformed into a form of scientific knowledge expressed only in the denotative game with the true/false criterion of distinction. When a government appropriates the narrative of access in the name of progress (instead in the name of justice), this narrative of legitimation is transformed from prescription to denotation. Although in both cases the government recognizes the right of the people to have knowledge, when the narrative of access is subsumed in the name of progress and the knowledge is reduced to science, then the government controls both "what counts as knowledge" and "who has access to knowledge" through state controlled education.

Bill Readings explains, ". . . injustice and political terror (totalitarianism) proceed directly from the assumption the true and the just may be united. Lyotard insists that prescriptive are formulated in reference to an Idea, an irrepresentable law (such as 'Justice', in the case of the political) rather than to an object of cognition (such as a description of what society should be). Bill Readings, *Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991)108.

According to Lyotard, "Yes, there is first a *multiplicity of justices* [emphasis added], each one of them defined in relation to the rules specific to each game . . . Justice here does not consist merely in the observation of the rules; as in all games, it consists in working at the limits of what the rules permit, in order to invent new moves, perhaps new rules and therefore new games.

And then the *justice of multiplicity* [emphasis added]: it is assured, paradoxically enough, by a prescriptive of universal value. It prescribes the observance of a single justice of each game such as it has just been situated: formalism of the rules and imagination in the moves. It authorizes the "violence" that accompanies the work of the imagination. It prohibits terror, that is, the blackmail of death toward one's partners, the blackmail that a prescriptive system does not fail to make use of in order to become the majority in most games and over most of their pragmatic positions." Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 18-22. For more information see, Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, trans. Karl Popper et al., (New York: Basic Books, 1949) and "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in Imre Lakatos, and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge, UK:: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

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Lyotard, 34-35.

Lyotard, 36.

In order for words to form and language acquisition to occur, the ego must be in the position of the signified, because in this stage of development, the individual does not yet possess signifier. For Kristeva and her mentor Jacques Lacan, the thetic phase occurs in the break between the child and the mother (gap between the imaged ego and the drive motility). According to Kristeva, "In this way the signified/signifier break is synonymous with social sanction: 'the first social censorship.'" The thetic phase constructs signification, it is the place of the "Other," the place of the *signifier*. In other words, both experience and drives are funneled into the chora through the thetic. The thetic acts as a socially constructed filter separating the subject and the object as a precondition of acquiring language. It is through this process of taking impressions of one's environment and attaching meaning to those impressions, that one begins to form self concept. For Kristeva, "The thetic—that crucial place on the basis of which the human being constitutes himself as signifying and/or social—is the very place textual experience aims towards." This process of signification seems particularly important when institutions stand in place of the individual in making judgements about one's physical, mental, and social abilities. For more information see, Julia Kristeva, *The Kristeva Reader*, ed., Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 90-117.

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SEGREGATING SPANISH-SPEAKING STUDENTS IN TEXAS SCHOOLS: 1900-1945

Mike Boone  
Southwest Texas State University

*For nearly a century, Texas law segregated white and African-American school children in the public schools. Separate facilities for children of these two races was the norm from 1876 until well after the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954. During the same period another, extra-legal, brand of segregation existed. Never sanctioned by law, the segregation of Mexican and Spanish-speaking children from other white children in public school classrooms was every bit as entrenched as was the legal segregation of black and white children. For many years, three distinct school systems operated in the state of Texas: one white, one black, and one brown. This paper explores the practice of separate schooling for Mexican children and discusses some of the social, cultural, and intellectual assumptions underlying it.*

In January, 1930, the board of trustees of the Del Rio Independent School District, located in Val Verde County in South Texas, voted unanimously to submit a \$185,000 bond issue to school district voters. The trustees needed the money to build a new high school and to complete other remodeling projects, including an expansion of the existing two-room Mexican school. Although trustees considered their proposal to be routine not everyone in the community agreed. A group of Mexican parents, assisted by legal expertise from the fledgling League of United Latin American Citizens, sought an injunction to stop the board from spending the money as proposed and to force the school district to close down the separate school for Mexican children.<sup>1</sup> At the time of the litigation the Del Rio school district consisted of four school buildings and an athletic field, all located on the same piece of land. The high school and two elementary schools for Anglos were on one side of the property and a two room school for Mexican students, called the West End school, was on the other. The schools were separated by the athletic field. It was the expansion of the West End school to which the parents objected. They argued that, unless the court stepped in, "school authorities will continue...segregation in the West End building...."<sup>2</sup> The parents believed the intent of the school board was to:

"...affect, and...accomplish, the complete segregation of the school children of Mexican and Spanish descent...from the school children of all other white races in the same grades, thereby excluding the one from the classrooms of the other, and denying them the right and privilege of mingling with those of the other races in the common enjoyment of identical school facilities, instruction, associations, and environment."<sup>3</sup>

It was not the building of new schools to which the parents objected, but to the continuation of a segregated education for their children.

Although the Court of Appeals ultimately decided against the Del Rio parents, *Independent School District v. Salvatierra* is an historically important case because it represented the first time state courts had been asked to determine the constitutionality of segregating Mexican school children in Texas public school districts.<sup>4</sup> There had been other protests against this wide spread, but not universal, practice over the years, but nothing that had involved the state court system. Most protests against separate schools had ended with local school boards, although some had reached the level of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who routinely upheld local school board actions. More importantly, the decision in *Salvatierra* defined the targets for an ultimately successful challenges to separate schools for Mexican children. For while the decision made it clear that Texas school districts could not constitutionally segregate Mexican children on the basis of national origin, it did allow separation for unspecified "educational" reasons.<sup>5</sup> These educational reasons would remain the object of legal challenges and political activity for the next fifty years. Finally, the decision is important because in arguing their case the defendants articulated many of the social, cultural, and intellectual assumptions supporting the assignment of Mexican children to separate school facilities across much of south Texas.

**Early Texas Schools** Although the period of European occupation of what is now Texas extends far back, the history of public education in the state is more recent. The colonial period (before 1821) saw little attempt to provide education in any form. A sparse population, harsh frontier conditions, and the concentration of the Catholic Church on converting and civilizing native populations pushed education far down the list of survival needs for most

settlers.<sup>6</sup> Some primary schools were established during this period, particularly in San Antonio, where the 1791 census recorded 285 boys and 264 girls of school age, and at La Bahia (Goliad,) but none of these early attempts to establish public schools were successful.<sup>7</sup> After 1821 the new republican constitution of an independent Mexico guaranteed free public education for all children and made it the duty of the governor of each state to see to it that the local municipal authorities established and maintained appropriate school facilities. Unfortunately, local municipal authorities were perpetually short of funds and few schools were ever established, a problem that sparked frequent protests to the legislature of Coahuila-Texas. An 1834 survey conducted by Juan Almonte discovered only five public schools in all of Texas above the Rio Grande.<sup>8</sup> The situation was only marginally better in the Anglo settlements of the same period. Three schools were in operation at San Felipe de Austin in 1828, enrolling 51 pupils out of a population of school age children totaling 434. By 1831, enrollment was only 77 students out of a potential population of over 1100 children. Although there were several private academies in the Anglo settlements, few operated for very long or were able to sustain any enrollment. The transition to a Republic of Texas and then to statehood brought about little improvement. A truly viable state financed public education system was not in place in Texas until the end of Reconstruction and did not enjoy widespread popular support until the late 1880's.<sup>9</sup>

Privately supported schools for Mexican children often filled the void left by a lack of public facilities. Private and parochial schools opened in many locations across the state but were most common in south Texas, where the largest concentration of Mexican children could be found. San Antonio, Brownsville, and El Paso all had private or parochial schools in operation before 1900. Two of the most successful of these privately sponsored schools were the *Collegio Altamira*, which opened in Hebronville in 1897 and continued to serve Mexican children of that area until the 1930's<sup>10</sup> and the Mexican Preparatory School, which opened in El Paso in 1887 under the direction of Olivas V. Aoy, a well educated Spaniard. The purpose of the Preparatory School was to prepare Mexican children for entry into the segregated El Paso public schools by teaching them the English language. By 1900, the school was serving over 500 Mexican children in double shifts. Eventually incorporated into the public school system on a segregated basis, Aoy Elementary School boasted the highest enrollment of any school in the El Paso system for many years.<sup>11</sup>

When public educational facilities became available in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Mexican parents were quick to enroll their children. Some of the public facilities were segregated, others were not. Mexican school children were segregated in the public school systems of Brownsville, El Paso, and San Antonio from the beginning. In Corpus Christi, Mexican and Anglo children went to the same schools.<sup>12</sup> Educational opportunities were less common in the rural areas of South Texas, where it was not unknown for local school authorities to actively discourage school enrollment of Mexican children. Some landowners operated "rancho" schools for the Mexican children of their employees. Located on a ranch (hence the name) or large commercial farm, the rancho school term was short, the facilities primitive, and the teachers untrained. Instruction was conducted in Spanish, since the students knew little if any English. Mexican families who had the means rarely sent their children to these schools, preferring to send them out of state or to a privately supported Mexican school if one was accessible.<sup>13</sup>

The geography of Mexican segregation in Texas schools is well defined. In a study of Americanization programs in Texas schools during the period 1920-1945, Simmons<sup>14</sup> found that the practice of separating Mexican and Anglo children in local school districts was "highly concentrated" in Central Texas, along the Gulf Coast, and in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, while being less frequent in West Texas and in the Texas Panhandle. The first official listing of separate "Mexican" schools appears in the 1922 *Texas Public School Directory*. School districts in seven counties, Nueces, Kerr, Kleberg, Caldwell, Hidalgo, Lubbock and Williamson, operated separate school facilities for Mexican and Anglo children. The number of districts reporting separate Mexican schools rose until the 1936-37 school year.<sup>15</sup> By then perhaps 90% of the school districts in south Texas were segregated.

In 1928 Herschel T. Manuel surveyed the conditions of education for Mexican and Spanish-speaking students in Texas,<sup>16</sup> One part of his study examined segregation practices of common school districts in 48 south Texas counties. His findings are revealing. What he discovered was a variety of arrangements, including places where Mexican and Anglo children were taught together in the same schools and by the same teachers, places where fully or partially segregated facilities were common, and places in which no provision of any kind for the schooling of Mexican children had been made. For example, Mexican and Anglo children were being educated together in 4 "border" counties and in 7 of 21 "near border" counties. But as Manuel focused his attention away from the border, he found increasing instances of segregated schooling except in places where the Mexican population was "very

small.”<sup>17</sup> School districts in Cameron, Hudspeth, Presidio, Starr, Jim Hogg, Kleberg, Matagorda, McMillan, Uvalde, and Wilson counties reported no separate schools for Mexican children in the 1928-29 school year. In Atascosa, Bee, De Witt, Frio, Goliad, Gonzales, Guadeloupe, Karnes, Live Oak, Medina, Rufugio, and Victoria counties, arrangements varied. Some districts in these counties segregated Mexican students, others did not. In Caldwell and Culbertson counties school facilities were totally segregated and in Brown County only summer schools for Mexican children were available. Superintendents of 17 school districts across Texas reported having no school facilities for Mexican children, even though Mexican children were living in the district. Manuel concluded “...It is certain that [this] does not tell even approximately the whole story. Even where facilities were technically available to all the white children of the community, a policy of antagonism on the part of the other white population too often means that actually the Mexican child has no school open to him.” Adapted from Montejano, p. 247.<sup>18</sup>

The most common method of segregation was to house Mexican children in separate facilities for the lower grades. Theoretically, Mexican students were to be admitted to Anglo schools when they completed the restricted grades. Schools in Abilene, Charlotte, Del Rio, Port Lavaca, and Temple, for example, segregated Mexican children in grades 1-3. Schools in Crystal City, Edinburg, Harlingen, Kerrville, McAllen, Mercedes, Mission, Pharr-San Juan, Raymondville, Uvalde, and Weslaco separated Mexican children in grades 1-4 or 1-5. Alpine, Brady, Goose Creek, Kenedy, Kingsville, Rosebud, Runge, San Benito, and Taylor maintained separate schools through grades 6-7.

Segregation persisted in south Texas twenty years after Manuel’s initial study. Little’s study of the education of Spanish-speaking children for the school year 1942-43 found segregation to be “...a fixed practice in many school systems of Texas.”<sup>19</sup> Although the grades into which Mexican-American children were separated continued to vary widely from school district to school district, the practice of providing separate school facilities did not. Housing patterns used by 122 school districts in 59 counties that school year indicated that the most common practice continued to be to separate Mexican school children in grades 1-8. Eighty-three of the one hundred and twenty-two districts followed this pattern. Only two school districts segregated Mexican children for all 12 grades.<sup>20</sup> The low incidence of separate facilities for Mexican school children after grade 8 is indicative of the low numbers of these children who continued their education beyond that point.

Although not legally prevented from joining their Anglo classmates in the public schools after completing segregated schooling, many Mexican children failed to take advantage of the opportunity. Either Mexican children were needed to work to help support their families or they were discouraged, some times physically, from further education. Mexican children who did attempt to move to the Anglo school in a community were often the subject of hazing and other forms of social ostracism.<sup>21</sup> While some children persisted in continuing their education, many others refrained from even trying to attend school beyond the segregated grades out of fear or discomfort. The pattern of a prematurely terminated education for Mexican children was not universal across south Texas, but occurrences were frequent enough to reflect a deliberate pattern of discrimination.

School facilities provided for Mexican children were commonly substandard. School buildings tended to be small, ramshackle, ill-maintained and ill-equipped. Teachers were less well-paid and well-trained than teachers in the Anglo schools, and were frequently just marking time until a better paying position in an Anglo school became available. Conditions in Mexican schools were difficult, but not always because school districts lacked funds. Texas public schools of the time received an equal amount of state funds for each “scholastic” between the ages of six and seventeen residing within the district, regardless of race. These state funds could be supplemented by local funds. While not overly generous, funding for schools was at least adequate by the standards of the day. It was common practice for local school authorities to use the bulk of these funds, allocated for both Mexican and Anglo students, for Anglo schools. Little was left over to maintain and supply Mexican schools or to secure well-trained teachers for them. The practice of using school funds appropriated for Mexican children for the support of Anglo schools was a general practice in numerous districts across south Texas.<sup>22</sup> One school superintendent in Nueces county was quoted as saying “Mexicans in this district draw about \$2,000.... We also have an \$18,000 property tax and all that goes on the white school.”<sup>23</sup> Not everyone who benefited from the shift in funds to Anglo schools was comfortable with the practice. One large landowner in Dimmit County remarked that “...the school board uses money it gets from the State for the Mexican scholastics on the white school. If they didn’t have to, they wouldn’t have any school for the Mexicans....when you say anything to them about it, their attitude is ‘Oh, well, they’re Mexicans.’”<sup>24</sup> Mexican-American students were denied funds that were rightfully theirs.

David Monetejano suggests that several factors worked together to determine whether school facilities in a

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

particular county were segregated or not. Looking at data from fourteen counties in Manuel's original sample, Montejano noted a relationship between population, land ownership, and predominant economic activity. For example, in counties where the Anglo population was under 20% schools tended to be integrated. On the other hand in counties where the Anglo population exceeded 20% Mexican students were segregated.<sup>25</sup> The following table illustrates this pattern:

Counties	% Anglo	Integrated Counties	% Anglo	Segregated
		Zapata	1.0	
Cameron		34.3		
		Jim Hogg	14.8	Hidalgo
	24.0			
		Brooks	17.2	Kleberg
	44.4			
Wells		Webb	10.6	Jim
	42.5			
		Duval	8.4	
Wilacy		37.7		
		Starr	3.6	
Nueces		49.9		
	Dimmit		24.7	
	Zavala		30.3	

Adapted from Montejano, p. 169.

Two other factors which appeared to be related to segregation of Mexican school children were the extent of Mexican land ownership in a county and its predominant economic activity. Counties in which Mexican land ownership was widespread and ranching was the predominant economic activity ("Mexican counties") were integrated. Counties in which land was concentrated in the hands of Anglo ownership and in which the predominant economic activity was commercial agriculture ("Anglo counties") were segregated. The following table illustrates this relationship:

"Mexican Counties"	Economic Category	"Anglo Counties"
Zapata	Ranch	
Kenedy	Ranch	
Jim Hogg	Ranch	
Kleberg	Ranch-Farm	
Brooks	Ranch	
Jim Wells	Ranch-Farm	
Webb	Ranch	
Wilacy	Farm	
Duval	Ranch-Farm	
Cameron	Farm	
Starr	Ranch-Farm	
Hidalgo	Farm	
	Nueces	Farm

Adapted from Montejano, p. 247.

It should be noted that the "Mexican" counties were older in terms of settlement than were the "Anglo" counties. Mexican counties had a longer history of occupation and a sociocultural environment dominated by large ranches (haciendas) and the quasi-feudal relationships which characterized this way of life.<sup>26</sup> "Anglo" counties, on the other hand, were more recently settled, with newer towns and economies dominated by large commercial

agricultural enterprises. Relationships between Anglos and Mexicans in the “Anglo” counties were governed by temporary, contractual work relationships and widespread segregation in all aspects of community life.<sup>27</sup> As Montejano concludes:

In ranch counties, where there were landed Mexicans, one found Mexican office holders, access to schooling, lack of officially sanctioned discrimination, and other evidence suggesting that being Mexican carried with it no significant pejorative meaning....In the farm counties, where there were no Mexican landowners, everything was to the contrary and segregationist rules separated Anglo and Mexican thoroughly.<sup>28</sup>

**Rationalizing Segregation.** Justification for segregation of Mexicans in schools and in other aspects of community life was a consequence of a changing social order in south Texas which began shortly after the turn of the century and accelerated after 1920. Large commercial agricultural enterprises displaced the ranch society which had dominated the area for decades. The world of the cattleman and the vaqueros gave way to the world of commercial farming and migrant labor.<sup>29</sup> Paternalistic relationships with the *haciendado* and complacent patriarchal attitudes were replaced by wage labor, impersonal labor contracts and a “rational market orientation.”<sup>30</sup> Anglo-Mexican relations in South Texas were governed primarily by three forces which served to keep Mexicans separate: the need of commercial farmers to maintain a permanent and docile pool of wage laborers; the temporary and impersonal nature of labor contracts; and “race thinking,” which played upon already existing beliefs in Mexican inferiority. One of the characteristics of the new social order in south Texas was its blatant racism.<sup>31</sup>

There were two variations to be found in “race thinking.” While both variations wove together elements of Texas history and folklore, experience with other races, biological-medical theories and Anglo-Saxon nationalism, there were some differences.

“Old-timer” ideas, characteristic of Anglos who had been in Texas for more than one generation, utilized racial stereotypes rooted in frontier memories, and in war and conflict with Mexicans and Indians. “Newcomer ideas,” on the other hand, tended to use themes of hygiene and germ theories prevalent in the popular culture of the times.<sup>32</sup> The two sets of stereotypes were not exclusive to one group or the other. What differentiated old timer’s views from those of newcomers was the readiness with which each group referred to one set or ideas of the other. Over time, ideas from each group tended to merge and differences in racial stereotype became less important.<sup>33</sup>

A common element running through old timer stereotypes grew out of Anglo-Texas memories of the Alamo, Goliad, the Mexican War, and years of border conflicts with Mexicans. In these memories, Mexicans were always portrayed as the enemy that Texans had fought and defeated in several declared and undeclared wars fought throughout the nineteenth century. The ambiguities of the Texas Revolution and the subtleties of international border disputes were submerged in a folklore in which Texans came to view themselves as a chosen people. The myth, embodied in the battle cry “Remember the Alamo!” became a stalwart of popular culture and an essential part of school curricula and state wide celebrations. The “Mexican as enemy” myth made it easy to denigrate Mexicans as inferior and to render any suggestion of equality between Texan and Mexican totally unthinkable.

By the time newcomers came to dominate much of south Texas, the world of the old timer had passed. Tales of frontier conflict appealed largely as history or as romanticized tales of adventure. What was more relevant to the new entrepreneurs who developed large commercial agricultural holdings and to other Anglos who moved within their world was reference to hygiene. Mexicans were “dirty.” Among farmers and others members of the farm society, hygienic concerns became a useful vehicle for separation of Mexicans.<sup>34</sup> The pejorative term “dirty” referred to more than just bodily uncleanness. It was also a synonym for dark skin color and an inferior social position. It became, moreover, a description of the Mexican’s status as a field laborer. When Anglos spoke of Mexicans being “dirty,” they frequently didn’t mean unclean in a physical sense, but dirty in the sense of being one who grubs in the dirt for a living. “Dirty” also came to denote the status of living conditions in the “Little Mexicos” of south Texas. Ultimately, the metaphor of Mexicans as a dirty people came to symbolize the fact that farm labor was exclusively the province of Mexicans and to generalize about the physical conditions of Mexican communities.<sup>35</sup> The reality of living conditions for many poor Mexican families was deplorable. Unpainted one- or two-room shacks, dirt floors, and outdoor toilets were commonplace. Cooking was often done out of doors over open fires when weather conditions permitted. Children slept on dirt floors rolled up in quilts. Clothing was stored in boxes or on open shelves. Under such conditions cleanliness was impossible and sickness rampant. That such conditions might be the result of low wages and seasonal employment largely escaped the notice of many Texans.

The theme of Mexican hygiene thus carried with it several meanings for Anglo Texans. It referred to race, to work positions, to living conditions, as well as general hygiene. The theme recurred several times in segregationist statements as justification for keeping Anglos and Mexicans apart, especially in public schools. The theme was broad enough to include matters of hygiene, race, and class. As Montejano says, "...The idea of dirtiness was sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate the various interpretations of why the Mexican had to be kept separate; yet it was sufficiently meaningful to represent the collective sentiment---the Mexican was inferior, untouchable, detestable."<sup>36</sup>

Rationalizations for separating English-speaking and Spanish-speaking children were often disingenuous. For instance, in presenting the Del Rio school district's case for separate facilities, the school superintendent voiced a generally accepted justification. He argued that the assignment of Mexican children to the West End school was based not on prejudice, but on sound educational considerations. "The whole proposition was from a standpoint of instruction and fair opportunity of all children alike. That was the only consideration I had in the matter."<sup>37</sup> In fact, the presence of large numbers of Mexican children did present two major problems to school authorities. First, Mexican children did have irregular attendance habits:

We [find] that a great number of these people are at work in cotton fields and on ranches, and some of them go entirely out of the district in the fall season, that is, return in the fall and enter school late, and in considerable numbers, and where you have already organized your classes on a basis of certain size...you are greatly hampered if a great number of people continue to drop in.<sup>38</sup>

Little found a similar pattern of attendance among Mexican students in his 1942 study. School attendance of Spanish-speaking children tended to follow a predictable cycle : lowest in September, peaking in December through March, and then declining as the weather warmed and the fields were ready for work. While the need of poor Mexican families to have their children working certainly contributed to the lack of regular attendance, Little also suggested that "...It {irregular attendance} may be a direct result of the school's failure to make the necessary adaptations in curriculum content and in methodology."<sup>39</sup>

The second major educational justification for placing Mexican children in separate schools was the issue of a non-English home language. School authorities argued that when Spanish-speaking children were placed in the same classroom as English-speaking Anglo children , they were at a distinct disadvantage. Mexican children were "handicapped because they are slow in reading English and read it with difficulty, and as a consequence, fail in considerable numbers in English and history."<sup>40</sup> It was thought to be kinder to Spanish-speaking children to be placed in their own classrooms where they could learn to communicate in English, rather than in classrooms with children who already knew the language. The theme of language deficiency was still being sounded by school authorities in the 1940's. Little asked several superintendents why Spanish-speaking children received a separate education in their districts. These were some of the answers he received:

We think that in the elementary schools we can give them better opportunities to learn English and other fundamentals so difficult to get otherwise.

They [Spanish-speaking students] are not at the disadvantage of being graded in English on the same standards as Anglo-Americans who are speaking their native tongue.

Children with language difficulty can be given special treatment and special methods in teaching my be employed.<sup>41</sup>

But if gaining proficiency in the English language were the only reasons for housing Spanish-speaking children in separate schools, Little considered it a "...tremendous waste, both of human resources and of money...."<sup>42</sup> This waste was most glaring in light of the fact that "...a respectable share" of Spanish-speaking students were not enrolled in the public schools at all and that the majority of those who were enrolled, were concentrated in the first three grades.<sup>43</sup> Why then, Little asked, the irregular patterns of separate school facilities reaching in some cases all the way to the twelfth grade? Moreover, as George I. Sanchez argued, there is more to education than learning English:

There are many phases of the curriculum and many activities of the school life that are not dependent upon proficiency in English..... English is but one small part of the education to be attained in the primary grades, and many significant parts of that education arise out of school activities that depend very little on proficiency in English.... [E]ven if English could be learned best under segregation, there is no doubt that the rest of education would suffer....<sup>44</sup>

Sanchez also noted that children from homes and communities where other non-English languages

predominated were not segregated as were Spanish-speaking children. Indeed, in these communities, school authorities accepted the “very logical and pedagogically sound” idea that foreign home-language children learn English best when they are in constant contact with English-speaking children.<sup>45</sup> The practice of segregating Spanish-speaking Mexican students could not be justified on educational grounds

Reliance on suspect educational justifications for segregating Spanish-speaking children were supported by other questionable practices. One of the most widely adopted of these was the failure to enforce the compulsory attendance laws of the state. During the period under discussion, Texas law required all children between the ages of eight and fourteen, living within two and one-half road miles of a school house, to attend school for 100 days a year.<sup>46</sup> In many places across south Texas, school authorities either neglected or were strongly encouraged not to enforce the law for Mexican children. Taylor recorded the following comments from four superintendents of small Nueces County towns:

The board won't let me enforce the compulsory attendance law....If I tried to enforce the compulsory attendance law here the board would get sore ....so I don't say anything.

The trustees say “We have too many Mexicans [in school] now. Don't build up any more Mexican enrollment...We would have to have a new building and three or four teachers.”

We have absentee owners and they are not interested and the Mexicans are not interested, so we let the law slide.

The compulsory attendance law is a dead letter. There is no effort to enforce it. Nobody cares.<sup>47</sup>

Some of the most powerful influences on school authorities to ignore the compulsory attendance law was the attitude of large farm owners. Many farmers served on local school boards, especially in the rural areas, and did not want Spanish-speaking children to receive much of an education. It was generally believed that the more education Mexicans received, the less amenable they were to field work and the more likely they were to move to the cities for higher paying jobs.<sup>48</sup> Thus, keeping an available labor pool played a role in the non enforcement of the compulsory attendance law.

In communities where schools were provided for Mexican children, the school year tended to be shorter than the year for Anglo children. In Nueces County, for example, open periods for Mexican schools ranged from one to four months shorter than periods during which Anglo schools were open. One school trustee in the county noted that “We start the Mexican school one month after the whites' and not four or five would come if we opened it [earlier.] We stop the Mexican school term one month early for cotton chopping.”<sup>49</sup>

The quality of instruction in the Mexican schools was also frequently lower than that offered to Anglo children. This was because teachers in the Mexican schools were often poorly trained and less experienced than teachers in Anglo schools. Teachers in Mexican schools were also paid less, partly because of shorter school terms, but also because school officials staffed the Mexican schools with inexperienced teachers and with teachers who were not considered good enough to teach Anglo children.<sup>50</sup> Some Anglo teachers simply did not like to teach Mexican children, citing lack of regular attendance of their students, an unfamiliar cultural background, and a native language they did not understand. But other teachers preferred to work with Mexican children, finding them “eager and appreciative” and hard workers when teachers treated them well and they understood what was expected of them. Others felt that Mexican children were easier to discipline than Anglo students. One Nueces County school teacher told Taylor “The Mexicans are easier to handle than the Americans. The parents come to me and say ‘Give me back the bones.’”<sup>51</sup> As a consequence, the education Mexican children received in their segregated schools was of an uneven and uncertain quality. Taylor's summation of the factors affecting the education of Spanish-speaking children in Nueces county is worth quoting at length, since it represents conditions in many south Texas school districts of the time. Taylor summarized his findings this way:

To the historical and contemporary factors in the failure of such a large number of Mexicans to obtain sufficient education to alter their socio-economic status a few more points may be cited which elaborate or add to those already mentioned....Wrong methods of instruction, unsuitable text books, improperly trained, low-salaried and sometimes uninterested teachers, poor and often unattractive buildings and equipment, all retard the educational advance. The fact of a different home language is the most serious instructional handicap. A sense of shame and dissatisfaction arising from failure to maintain the educational pace of other is a further obstacle to many. Segregation of Mexican from American school children sometimes, but not always, operated to the same end; frequently it

contributed to the provision of substandard [education] for the Mexican children.<sup>52</sup>

Problems of poverty and discrimination both in education and in other aspects of community life, would continue to plague Texans of Mexican heritage for many decades to come. It would take the determination of Mexican-Americans no longer willing to be treated as second class citizens, the impact of the civil rights movement, and a shift from private to corporate ownership of large commercial farms before the situation would change and an era of extra-legal segregation would come to an end. The evolution of Anglo-Mexican relations along the border in the twentieth century has been slow and painful and much more still remains to be done. But sometimes in the face of what appear to be unsolvable social problems, it is important to remember how far we have already come.

ENDNOTES

1. *Independent School District v. Salvatierra*, 33 S. W. 2d, 790.
2. Quoted in San Miguel, *Let All of Them Take Heed: Mexican-Americans and the Campaign for Educational Equality in Texas, 1910-1981*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987. p.79.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. See also Foley, Douglas E., Clarice Mota, Donald E. Post, and Ignacio Lozano, *From Peones to Politicos: Class and Ethnicity in a South Texas Town, 1900-1987*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988. and De Leon, Arnoldo, *The Tejano Community, 1836-1900*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
6. Eby, Frederick. *The Development of Education in Texas*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. And Berger, Max, "Education in Texas during the Spanish and Mexican Periods." *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LI, July, 1947: 41-53.
7. Ibid.
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BEYOND THINKING: A GLIMPSE INTO REVELATORY TEACHING

L. Keith Carreiro  
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

To discover the mind of another human being or one's own requires the risk of opening oneself up to the unfamiliar, the unexpected, which is often felt to be threatening. In the process something breaks and gives way: an eggshell. That is the price of birth and growth.

— Walter Kaufmann<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes there is an understanding, or a realization and a certitude born, regarding the experience of learning that translates into a transcendence<sup>2</sup> of being toward which this discussion strives to capture. That is, there are times when the flow<sup>3</sup> of events in learning help bring deep levels of knowing into cognizance, or bring unexpected degrees of awareness into view. These discoveries are tapped by the release of the imagination<sup>4</sup> by the teaching moment, by the power of will, by the passion to learn, or even by serendipity. It is axiomatic to this author that there is a sacrality, or sacred grounding,<sup>5</sup> upon and through which this degree, or phenomena, of learning occurs. It is sacred because the bond that must be established between learner and teacher, teacher and subject, and with the greater scholarly communities throughout which the act of learning occurs, is a promise of intellectual potential<sup>6</sup> being released. Such a promise is implicitly held between instructor and student and it rests upon the heart of revelation itself.

Revelatory processes, and other epistemological dynamics and ontological approaches, when purposefully and intentionally engaged by a teacher help lead student and teacher toward richer levels of intellectual unfoldment and spiritual development,<sup>7</sup> both of which lead one into a fulfillment of professional potential and personal realization. The wealth of content and the equal abundance of reflective<sup>8</sup> processes to tap into knowledge are so plentiful that even the mere deliberational<sup>9</sup> act of dwelling pedagogically in such a value laden understanding brings forth metacognitive strength, greater awareness about what one is doing, and reflective sensitivity. Deliberative<sup>10</sup> instructional practice, whether or not it serves an individual's autodidactic purpose, helping another to learn, or is used in group learning, when suffused with the aesthetic qualities mentioned here cannot but help, then, to ignite the mind<sup>11</sup> and enrich consciousness. Not to strive for such a virtue in one's teaching is to settle for less than superior learning. In this understanding, evaluation about one's teaching and learning becomes more than a meaningless rote, or a merely automatic, process;<sup>12</sup> it does not become mindless itemization, similar to quickly checking a recipe for accuracy. It is not another method of cognitive reductionism.<sup>13</sup> Rather, it becomes more closely aligned with an inspired outline in which play, creativity, imagination<sup>14</sup> and artistic thought<sup>15</sup> may be released and combined practically<sup>16</sup> with elemental knowledge and technical facility of the subject being studied, as well as with the students engaged in the teaching and learning process with the instructor.

Traditionally, from an epistemological sense, and in western philosophy, revelation is considered to be one of the ways individuals receive knowledge, or insight. Such revelation and revelatory experiences can metaphysically occur through a variety of spiritual, cognitive, and affective insights and realizations. The critically connective tissue that teaching can provide is to create an environment in which such linkage with revelatory material<sup>17</sup> can occur. To bring insight, awareness, realization and understanding into being implies that illuminatory understanding upon the teacher's behalf must enter into play.<sup>18</sup> This understanding centers at the mastery and deft craftsmanship of pedagogical and andragogical brilliance. Thus, techniques and methods used are subsumed under the connoisseurship<sup>19</sup> and the heightened teaching sensitivity of a fully cognizant teacher.<sup>20</sup>

The teacher must get out of the way of the student. This shift away from a teacher controlling a student's thinking processes to that of the student not having their power taken away from them by the instructor is very important to consider.<sup>21</sup> To paraphrase Rogers (1969), do not assume that it is the teacher who gives the student power, it simply means that the teacher has not taken the student's power away. The teacher does not provide the student with the teacher's perceptions or self-assumed realities of knowledge management. Thought being controlled by instructional methods is routinization<sup>22</sup> of awareness. If the focus of the teaching learning interaction is

maintained from an instructor's locus of power, the subtle dynamics and processes involved in invoking imaginative and critical awareness by the student is unduly limited. Consequently, unconditional positive regard<sup>23</sup> for the axiological realm of human awareness must be in place for an individual to be able to grasp unconditional forms of knowledge that will be revealed to them. This revelation may appear in a variety of degrees and over a span of time, from an instant nanosecond of feeling to a lifetime of struggle for percipience, from a nudge of an idea, or a brief opaque glimpse of understanding, to a fully conceived realization or speculation.

For transcendent<sup>24</sup> thought to occur, transformational teaching must take place for the student and teacher to experience. This notion, conceptually alluded to by Roszak (1970) as rhapsodic intellect and by Polanyi (1967) as tacit knowing, may be likened to two jazz musicians interacting with one another on a musical level. The contextual relationship within which these two players dwell is a metaphorical reality wherein they are actively collaborating with one another. They also are fluidly interchanging between the rôles of teacher and student. The overt musical interaction going on is in a nondiscursive realm, and the representative structure of their activity may be construed as follows in the visual schematic provided the reader in Table 1.

Table 1 depicts an enhanced learning environment in which a variety of elements, processes, dynamics, characteristics and teaching factors are brought together, or suffused into one another, by a teacher who incorporates the labeled areas into the teaching and learning interaction. Likening this moment of instruction to a moment in time when the composition the two jazz players alluded to above is being performed between them, the teacher and student now engage in a similarly structured occasion. Although a musical composition may not be what is occurring between them, an intellectual one, nevertheless, is initiated, nurtured and sustained. The depth of the realization of knowledge that is released and realized by the players depends upon the abilities of the teacher and the student and their willingness to sound, if you will, the instrumentality of their states of being. Thus, if the two of them strike a resonance within one another, a discussion and transference of teaching and learning materials can occur. By employing the student's background awareness, the teacher can help make this peripheral awareness become explicit by engaging him or her in conversation. Such a discussion is conducted through the judicious use of applying the philosophical realms of inquiry we know as the metaphysical, epistemological and axiological dimensions. The acute and sensitive application of this philosophical focusing is dependent upon the liquid degree and fluency of thought the teacher brings to this moment. Consequently, the teacher's sense of instructional literacy, of subject expertise and his or her technical facility in coaching higher level awareness into a cognitively held space for deeper reflection can now be held.

When does an example of this phenomena of revelatory teaching happen? It often occurs when the following statement is placed on a college classroom chalkboard:

**Deeply Seated Enjoyment = Profound Learning**

The instructor, in this case, the author of this paper, is of the opinion that true learning only takes place when the masks<sup>25</sup> of artificiality and false ceremony are lifted away from us. That which is superficial to us, and that which does not go to our core sense of the what and the when of valid experience and awareness, will be resisted and rejected by our sense of proportional evaluation. We value and hold dear to us those elements we cherish. They guide us, enthrall our temporal moments, sustain our levels of energy and provide us in being resilient. Consequently, when teaching at the beginning of a semester, or during an initial course meeting, questions given to students echo the preceding sentiment expressed above as follows:

1. What excites you about learning?
2. When do you find yourself losing your normal sense of time, and when do you find yourself becoming enraptured in what you are doing?
3. What do you enjoy doing the most in your life?

Many students do not equate learning in school with moments of rapture. Neither do most of them associate schooling with pure enjoyment, nor do they view themselves in pleasurable and timeless awareness<sup>26</sup> when so engaged in schoolwork. So the questions about peak moments of experience<sup>27</sup> are moved from school into searching using questions to help search and sift through their memories and sense of selves and realities about their lives away from schooling and schools.

This shifting and refocusing away from school experiences to overall life experiences usually brings answers that center upon issues that rest closer to their hearts. The love of family and being with friends, the outdoors, of food, of sports and avocations holding deeper meaning to their individual identities now surfaces. After

generating conversations about these matters, another question is asked, "What do you find is beautiful about what you have shared with us?" At this point, discussions about beauty and the nature of beauty begin. If there is enough instructional time, the realm of aesthetics is broached, because the teleological aim here is to link the students' awareness of beauty, aesthetics, enjoyment, and love of life with their sensing similar qualities about the nature of true learning and that of a deeply-satisfactory education.

Frequently, the understanding gained about beauty in life does not extend to any idea about what is beautiful about school.<sup>28</sup> This contradiction, or oppositional tension, is now examined. Another round of questions is asked:

Why cannot school be beautiful? Can a school be one where beauty is known? What is a beautiful school? What constitutes a beautiful curriculum, and what is beautiful about knowledge? Hence, what is a beautiful teacher, a beautiful student? To echo the spiritual understanding of the Navajo in this matter, how does one walk in beauty while in school?

While these questions create further reflective power, their use is to break through the seeming paradox of beauty and schooling as being totally separable from one another.<sup>29</sup> When the question, "What can I study that seems to have the most value and worth to me?" is asked, many students give a two-part response:

- (1) (a) "No one's ever asked us."
- (b) "Why haven't I ever been asked such questions before?"

It is at this moment, when questions become student generated, that conversations between students begin to flow more equitably and are less centered between them and the instructor. Instead of the instructor having to go from direct to indirect instruction, s/he can now facilitate the conversations being held. If the class is a research class, or a writing-intensive class, the instructional aim is to help students examine relevant areas and critical issues that they wish to explore. The revelation is that examining a surface paradox may lead students to realizing and discerning, heretofore, hidden levels of meaning about which they have never fully explored.

Beyond thinking means neither the absence of thought, nor thought left in abeyance of rational control. On the contrary, it represents a thoughtfulness that is permeated with the complete presence of one's mind. It is an awareness that seeks to prepare itself for cognitive, ontological, and aesthetic information in the learning environment. Such intelligence, or sentience, if you will, senses, searches for, and discerns latent ideas in order to develop them into relational structures of thought for further consideration. This intentionality is held not only within the power of a teacher's mind, but by the teacher's transferring his or her instructional powers into creating a highly cognitive<sup>30</sup> learning environment that is pleasurable,<sup>31</sup> inspiring, and empathic.<sup>32</sup> To do so means not only has one designed a caring<sup>33</sup> and nurturing place for students to experience learning, but a thoroughly professional commitment to the development of human potential is now being released into the temporality of the teaching and learning moment.




Table 1: Elements Involved in Releasing Revelatory Teaching

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SOME SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS ON EFFECTIVE TEACHING

Billy F. Cowart, Ph. D  
The University of Texas Pan American

**Introduction**

I have used this paper primarily as a means of clarifying my own thinking about effective teaching and America's seemingly endless preoccupation with educational reform. At times these thoughts may sound a little like the ramblings of J. Abner Peddiwell without ever reaching that level of insight. But your patience will be appreciated and I look forward to our few moments of discussion at the end of the presentation.

**Background**

Webster describes the term "reform" as a transitive verb, (1) to make better by removing faults; correct. (2) to make better by stopping abuses, introducing better procedures, etc. (3) to put a stop to (abuses). (4) to bring a person to give up misconduct and behave better.

As a noun,

(1) an improvement; correction of faults or evils, as in social problems. (2) an improvement in character and conduct. (p.624)

It is interesting that most of the usage's included within this definition carry value laden connotations, mostly negative. On the basis of this definition, it would be difficult to utilize the term to describe the "reforming" of even a routine change of process or procedure without the connotation of deficiency or wrongdoing. Could this explain why educational reform tends to be so negative? The term "form," on the other hand, has a number of definitions, as a noun, related to physical shape, body or figure but it also includes one usage as a transitive verb, "(1) to shape; fashion; make as a school *formed* after Oxford." (p. 294) This definition refers to function and carries no particular connotation, positive or negative. It is interesting that the term utilized to describe the need for change in education does not provide the same option for a neutral connotation in the English language as the term "to form." It is interesting that Americans utilize the same term to describe the need for change in education that they use to describe behavior in their penal institutions. Perhaps this means that there should be a predictable relationship between the rate of recidivism in the penal system and the reoccurring need for educational reform.

**Problems With Reform**

In their book, *Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Educational Reform*, David Tyack and Larry Cuban offered some revealing conclusions:

1. most reform efforts fail to recognize the resilience of the school as an institution;
2. that the institutional structure of the school probably has more influence on the implementation of policy than policy has on institutional practice;
3. the grammar of schooling is the result of previous reforms that have powerful political allies and a strong foundation in the social expectations about schooling;
4. to bring about improvement at the heart of education---namely, classroom instruction---is the most difficult kind of reform;
5. better schooling, in the future, will result primarily from the steady, reflective efforts of the practitioners who work in schools and from the contributions of parents and citizens who support (while they criticize) public education; and,
6. the major aim of reform is to improve learning defined as rich intellectual, civic, and social development, not simply impressive test scores. (Ibid., p. 134-136.)

In *The Manufactured Crisis*, Berliner and Biddle commented that,

Above all, we should bear in mind that the best ways to improve our schools are those that enhance the dignity of parents and the autonomy and professional status of educators. When they are able, the adults of our country who care most about our youngsters---our parents and our teachers---generally take care of their charges well. When they fail in their missions, they fail because they no longer have meaningful and fulfilling employment, because they cannot earn wages that provide a decent standard of living, because

they are not given respect, and because, as a result the youngsters they serve no longer have hope. (p.342)

These are all excerpts from nationally recognized authors highlighting characteristics considered important to effective schooling.

### **Intrusion**

But one of the more damaging aspects of the current reform effort has been the serious intrusion by public policy elites into the curriculum of teacher education. In a democratic society, the public, hopefully in the form of parents with a deep personal interest in effective schooling, must retain the overriding responsibility for the determination of objectives, funding and final assessment of their system of education. The concern arises in differentiating between the role of the lay citizen to develop policy and the role of the professional to develop a program. The same is true in contracting for the services of architects, engineers, lawyers, and medical doctors. The public must decide, for example, if they wish to build a new school, how much they wish to invest, and a vision of the functions which the school building will be expected to perform. They will then hire an architect to draw up the plans and supervise the construction of the building. If they are dissatisfied with the services performed there are a variety of options which the board, as a public entity, can pursue in taking action against the firm or the profession but those options do not traditionally include rewriting the curriculum for the School of Architecture.

In a related area, the public must decide if they wish to fund cancer research and at what level, but they will traditionally contract with the medical research community to conduct the research and to recommend programs for remediation, if not cure. The public has never attempted, as laymen, to rewrite the curriculum of science or medicine in spite of their slow progress in solving the problems of cancer. Discovering the cause or causes of cancer is obviously a process of great complexity but so are the conditions affecting the learning processes of 50 million children enrolled in public education. There are differences associated with “contracting for services” and “contracting for employment” which may accurately reflect the fact that teacher education has yet to convince the public that we have much in the way of “a recognized and exclusive body of knowledge” which can be used to address the learning problems of children. In his book, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, B. F. Skinner expressed concern in 1971 over the lack of public interest in the problems posed by human behavior. He stated,

It can always be argued that human behavior is a particularly difficult field. It is, and we are especially likely to think so just because we are inept in dealing with it. But modern physics and biology successfully treat subjects that are certainly no simpler than many aspects of human behavior.... We are not close to solutions.... We have used the instruments of science; we have counted and measured and compared; but something essential to scientific practice is missing in almost all current discussions of human behavior. It has to do with our treatment of the causes of behavior. (pp. 4-5)

I am not interested in moving beyond “freedom and dignity” to address the “causes of human behavior” but I am interested in the deficiencies Skinner mentioned regarding our understanding of human behavior, deficiencies which affect our work in teacher education every day. I particularly support his call for a major expansion of research into human behavior. In the case of teacher education, that expanded research should be centered around topics such as child development, learning, and establishing a meaningful relationship between teacher work and student learning. If the issue of promoting such a public commitment is left to the behaviorists, they will control the parameters of the research whether it comes through the National Science Foundation, private foundations or the private sector. In their textbook, *Education Today*, Joan and Glenn Smith reported on cognitive science as an emerging field which includes research from neurosurgery, neuropsychology, developmental psychology, cognitive and educational psychology and computer science. They cite the work of Robert Glaser who describes cognitive science as working toward the development of “a cognitive basis for pedagogy that fosters thinking and reasoning in school learning.” (pp. 158-159) All of this work will, by definition, follow the mandates of scientific methodology but to be of any value to education, there must be an expanded participation of individuals directly involved in the teaching/learning experience and probably an expanded use of action research.

With all of the emphasis on cognitive development emanating from the reform movement, my attention was drawn back to the work of Boyd Henry Bode in *How We Learn*, Gilbert Ryle’s, *The Concept of Mind*, and John Dewey’s, *How We Think*. Each of these writers attempted, in different ways, to deal with the thinking process in terms of the serious contradictions which they found in the traditional concepts of the mind such as the doctrine of formal discipline, the mind-substance theory, the theory of mental states, apperception, and behaviorism from a philosophical, rather than a scientific perspective. Rather than reveal new information about minds, Ryle set out to

“rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess.” (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 9.) Dewey advocated reflective thinking, as an educational goal because “it makes possible action with a conscious aim.” (*How We Think*, p. 17.) He went on to describe mind as “the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them.” (*Democracy and Education*, p. 39.) Bode came to the conclusion that “methods of teaching are determined by our conception of mind.” (*How We Learn*, p. 279.) These are basically philosophical concepts but if they hold a key to the determination of method, they must be moved into the mainstream of policy and curriculum decision-making in teacher education. They are examples of philosophical thought that perhaps cannot be replicated in scientific research but must serve to enlighten our judgment.

In 1983, Lee Schulman noted an impending change in educational objectives and certification standards in the *Handbook on Teaching and Policy*.

Early in the 1970's, ... the beginning of a new research tradition emerged. Instead of asking whether schools or teachers made any difference, scholars modified the syntax of their inquiries ... Their assertion (became) that resources had to be transformed at the school level into teacher behavior and pupil responses to render a meaningful account of school effectiveness. (pp. 486- 487.)

Later in the same article, he stated,

... the teacher must remain the key. The literature on effective schools is meaningless, debates over educational policy are moot, if the primary agents of instruction are incapable of performing their functions well. (Ibid., p.504.)

Schulman went on to cite the work of Edmonds in formulating five principles of effective schooling which emerged as a result of these studies.

The correlates of effective schools are

- (1) the leadership of the principal characterized by substantial attention to the quality of instruction,
- (2) a pervasive and broadly understood instructional focus,
- (3) an orderly, safe climate conducive to teaching and learning,
- (4) teacher behaviors that convey the expectation that all students are to obtain at least minimum mastery, and
- (5) the use of measures of pupil achievement as the basis for program evaluation. (Ibid., p. 487.)

In 1988, Western Oregon University initiated a research project which would attempt to relate teacher work to student learning based on a methodology, developed internally, entitled Work Sample Methodology. After six years of funding through institutional resources, the project was funded externally at a level that permitted the sharing of the data from our project with the broader research community on a more systematic basis and to promote dialogue regarding teacher effectiveness at the national level. The project could have been limited to the development of a model and the reporting of that model to the profession through the literature. We chose instead to organize the Teacher Effectiveness Project under the general supervision of a campus Research Design Committee composed of faculty, and a national advisory panel with broad representation from educational assessment, curriculum theory, educational psychology, and social foundations. The project has sponsored three annual conferences on the subject of teacher effectiveness with participation from a cross section of universities, school districts and state departments involved in research on teacher effectiveness. The choice was a deliberate one on our part with the intent of both sharing information and testing the reaction of scholars from the broader community of educational research to the results of our work. The latter was motivated by a desire to bring an additional element of science into the assessment of effective teaching. I continue to reflect on whether we made the correct choice but to have followed another course of action would have ducked the issues of validity and reliability which, in the context of this type of research, constitute the ultimate measure of scientific inquiry. Until you go through a discussion regarding validity and reliability, with individuals seriously into educational assessment, those of us who are not deeply involved in the field do not quickly recall or never fully understood that a relationship between teacher work and student learning which will stand the test of validity and reliability has never been established, at least as it relates to high stakes decisions such as tenure, salary, and termination of employment. In point of fact, all of the process/product research done in the 1960s and 1970s could find “no significant relationship” between teacher work and student learning. How is the public to interpret research data such as this when it emanates from a profession that is constantly professing the need for a lower teacher/pupil ratio and higher salaries as the only means of improving student learning and attracting and retaining quality personnel? Will it simply be labeled as “misleading information”

emanating from a very “complicated process,” which no one fully understands, or will it serve to reinforce a perception of contraction and incompetence? The public reaction is particularly problematical when it is understood that the annual cost of education constitutes the largest single item in state budgets today and personnel costs are the largest single item within the operating budget of the local school district. Thirty years ago these budgetary commitments were above question. Today they are under constant attack! At one point in the midst of a discussion on the process/product research data, I proposed, to the group sitting at our table, a research project to test the “no significant relationship” hypothesis wherein the experimental group would have no teacher assigned. The initial thought being that all direct contact between the school and the students assigned would be limited to providing the material, resources and support normally provided to a classroom teacher. The control group, on the other hand, would have to “suffer” the tribulations of having a regularly assigned teacher. I was probably fortunate that no one took me up on my proposal but it is the type of proposal that would challenge a myth and, in my judgment, the type of challenge that teacher education must embrace if it is to regain a preeminent position in the formulation of policy for American education.

#### **Limitation**

It is important to note here that a major problem encountered by researchers in attempting to use the current tests of validity and reliability in relating teacher work to student learning is that they have been unable to neutralize the “human potential” to influence, distort or misuse the data. This is particularly evident in the willingness of assessment personnel to accept student learning data as a part of formative evaluation of teacher performance but the denial of its use as a part of summative evaluation. The result is that as long as teachers voluntarily seek to improve themselves, they will be allowed, by current research methodology, to gather and utilize data on student learning. However, the administration, the district or the state cannot base so-called “high stakes” decisions regarding tenure, salary or termination on student learning data for any specific teacher. This, of course, does not mean that decisions are not made regarding tenure, salary, or termination, but it requires that they be explained on some basis other than the ability of the teacher to foster learning in students. It also means that the student learning data is not available to protect teachers against irresponsible administrative decisions, to provide feedback to students on their academic progress, or to evaluate programs.

#### **A Recent Development**

Before proceeding, I must state that at our last annual conference, a representative from the Dallas Independent School District indicated that they have solved the problem of how to relate teacher work to student performance on standardized tests based on a combination of their research methodology and the methodology developed in the Tennessee project. If this materializes, it will significantly enhance the efforts of states such as Texas and Tennessee to utilize data from state-developed tests such as the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills as the primary basis for the evaluation of teachers and schools, assuming that it can satisfy all of the legal challenges that will certainly be raised. The Dallas Value-Added Accountability System, the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System, the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System, and the Oregon project utilizing Work Sample Methodology are all described in a recent publication edited by Jason Millman entitled, *Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student Achievement a Valid Evaluation Measure?* The discussions sponsored by the Oregon Teacher Effectiveness Project served as the genesis for the publication which outlines in some detail the work being attempted in the area of accountability as well as the considerable degree of disagreement remaining regarding the issues of validity and reliability.

In reality, many of the issues are more ethical than technical or legal but the public and profession forum for the resolution of ethical issues seems to have been surrendered to the courts which I believe is a serious loss for professional education.

#### **Another Alternative**

The Oregon project on teacher effectiveness took a different approach to the problem by attempting to relate student performance to actual teacher work in the classroom. However, for any system of teacher accountability to be more than a tool for the enforcement of public or administrative whim, teachers must be protected from the variables affecting student learning over which they exercise little or no control. To address this problem, the Teacher Effectiveness Project has been attempting to identify the variables affecting student learning and to study the relationship and/or interaction between these variables as they relate to student learning. Each student is required to complete two work samples during the course of their student teaching experience which are

monitored for a number of factors including content, methodology, assessment procedures, student learning gains based on pretest and posttest results, and the level of educational objectives utilized in the work sample.

The use of standardized test data will always be attractive to school districts and state departments because it facilitates the handling of large populations of teachers and provides a basis for comparison across districts, across states and across the nation. However, by design, it ignores the particular contextual variables which the teachers must address in practicing their profession. The design of a project in this format also provides an opportunity to assess the performance of the teaching faculty against the total curriculum of the school (as opposed to only approximately 30 per cent represented by most standardized tests), and to deal more directly with the treatment of variables over which the teacher has no control. I recognize that it is possible to make some adjustments to testing procedures at the state level and at the district level, which can attempt to limit the impact of certain variables. Direct knowledge regarding these variables, however, is available only at the building level by a principal actively involved in the role of instructional leadership and in open and continuous dialogue with the teachers that work under his or her supervision.

### **Criticisms and Concerns**

As with any research methodology, there are potential limitations both with design and with implementation which must be addressed. Dr. Dan Stufflebeam, the Director of the Evaluation Center at Western Michigan University, noted in his critique of the Oregon Teacher Effectiveness Project,

It matters little whether ratings of teacher performance are associated with pupil gains in work sample performance if the student teachers employ biased outcome measures or assess low-level knowledge and skills. (*Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student Achievement a Valid Evaluation Measure?*, p. 57)

Dr. Peter Airasian, Professor of Education at Boston College, expressed the need to

...insure the quality of the pre- and posttests constructed by student teachers, the quality of test items, the levels of student learning being assessed, the variability in difficulty across tests, the number of items per test, the format of items, and the comparability of the pre- and posttest items. (Ibid., p. 47.)

These are all valid concerns which must be addressed to insure accurate and reliable assessment of student learning, but they do not appear to raise serious questions regarding the theory or the structure of the methodology. The primary concern appears to be the potential for misuse of the methodology which relates back to the difficulty which all assessment measures have encountered with "the human potential to influence, distort or misuse."

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, it is my thesis that the profession does not have a definition of effective teaching and the College or School of Education does not have one which is utilized in any functional sense. Curriculum and Instruction may have a definition related to content and methodology, Educational Psychology may have one related to learning theory or child development, Foundations of Education may have one related to social, historical and philosophical issues, and Education Administration may have one related to effective classroom management but the sum of these parts is not necessarily an effective teacher.

During the recent educational reform effort, teacher education has been particularly harmed by the fact that graduates of our programs have joined the critics as major protagonists against the quality of their preparation. Other segments of the profession have taken the position that criticism is to be endured and utilized as justification for budgetary increases. My hope would be to gain increased insight into the process and on the basis of that new insight, to be in a better position to respond: in short, to enhance the credibility of the profession. Ignorance will never serve as a deterrent to educational reform. Everyone, unfortunately, believes that they know something about education and insist on demonstrating their ignorance. I believe that it is the function of the professional to develop and propose solutions. We are better prepared by both training and experience to do so but we must be capable of demonstrating our competence and be willing to defend our actions. To do less in this age of self-indulgent competition between citizens and public institutions will be to forfeit any possibility of meaningful participation in the decision-making process about the education of children.

But let me conclude with a definition of teacher effectiveness which might serve, at least for discussion purposes as a focal point for the development and assessment of programs.

### **Definition of Effective Teaching**

My first assignment in Teacher Education was the supervision of student teachers, with only a single course to be taught in Foundations. It seemed to be a natural thing to ask for a copy of what was being used as a definition

of effective teaching. I was surprised to find that there was no general agreement about a definition of effective teaching. I was aware that, historically, it had been defined in terms of a teacher's use of methodology, content knowledge, and the ability to maintain discipline in the classroom. Knowledge about student learning at that time was limited, and while the profession has always been relatively comfortable with the assessment of student performance, it has never had the capability of relating teacher work to student learning. This would appear to be a major deficiency for a profession whose sole responsibility is the development of teacher behaviors, however broadly defined, which foster learning in students because if it is possible for a teacher to "foster learning in students" it must also be possible for a teacher to inhibit or impede learning in students which can hardly be described as a desirable end result.

A definition of effective teaching is important only to the degree that it can serve as the focal point for the development, delivery, and assessment of programs of instruction, and allocation of resources. It should be sufficiently broad that it can serve as a guiding principle for the development of curriculum theory and professional programming. It should be sufficiently explicit to provide meaningful direction but make no attempt to define the program. It should identify the most fundamental purpose of teaching but allow for the inclusion of both the art and science of teaching. It should be sufficiently meaningful to identify explicit direction for program development but make no attempt to set specific objectives. It should, in fact, be "objective free" in order to serve as a criterion for effective instruction without being identified with any particular set of objectives. In this sense, the definition can remain constant as the focal point for program while the objectives can be modified in response to new developments in the art and science of relating teacher work to student learning. In this sense, the definition of effective teaching will provide the overriding purpose of teacher education while the objectives serve as the defining points for the curriculum within the context of the established definition. Education has long been cited as the means by which society perpetuates itself. Student learning would appear to be a necessary requisite to accomplish this purpose. Therefore, if student learning is to be the focal point of education, and the teacher is the primary agent of instruction, the ability to relate teacher work to student learning must become the defining element of teacher effectiveness. It will also become the key factor in expanding the "recognized and exclusive body of knowledge" related to the professional status of teacher education. If it were to be stated as an equation it might take the form of:

Teacher Effectiveness (TE) is a function (f) of Student Learning (SL)  $TE = (f) SL$

Conversely,

Student Learning (SL) is a function of Teacher Effectiveness (TE)  $SL = (f) TE$

After putting this material together, I could not help but relate student learning, as it is used in this definition, with the concept of growth which Dewey described in *Democracy and Education*.

Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact. (p. 53)

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

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SOME RECENT THOUGHTS ON JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Dalton B. Curtis, Jr.  
Southeast Missouri State University

Literature reviewed in this essay:

*John Dewey and American Democracy* by Robert Westbrook Cornell University Press, 1991, 570 pp.

*John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* by Alan Ryan Norton, 1995, 414 pp.

*Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920* by James T. Kloppenberg. Oxford University Press, 1986, 546 pp.

"Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking" by James T. Kloppenberg. *Journal of American History* XX (June 1996) 100-38.

"A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy" in *Renewing Philosophy* by Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam by Hilary Putnam. Harvard University Press, 1992, 234 pp.

"Education for Democracy" in Hilary Putnam, *Words and Life* edited by James Conant. Harvard University Press, 1994, 531 pp.

The state of democracy in the United States has become a topic of renewed interest among philosophers, historians, political theorists, and social critics. For some, this concern has arisen from the dangers posed by a distorted sense of progress, the insulation of the elite from the rest of society, and the decline of self-governing communities. For others it is the unwillingness of many citizens seriously to accept responsibility for the society and the lack of a civic community.<sup>1</sup> As they have searched for answers to these issues, some scholars have begun to reconsider the philosophy of pragmatism, especially what John Dewey thought about the problems of democracy. For example, philosophers Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, Alan Ryan, Hilary Putnam, and Cornel West have recently written about Dewey and the philosophy of pragmatism. In addition, the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas has rekindled a pragmatic approach to the issues of communication and community in a democracy. Complementing the work of these philosophers are the efforts of historians Robert Westbrook and James Kloppenberg who have studied Dewey and the influence of pragmatism on American politics.

Among these scholars, Rorty, Habermas, Bernstein, and West have received the most attention from other scholars and, in some cases, from the public: Rorty because of his postmodernist interpretation of Dewey and pragmatism, Habermas because of the appeal of his theory of communicative action, Bernstein because he has reinterpreted pragmatism in light of postmodernist thought and the growing pluralism of our society, and West because of his idea of prophetic pragmatism and its applicability to the problems of race and culture in America. Equally deserving of attention from philosophers and historians of education are Alan Ryan, Hilary Putnam, Robert Westbrook, and James Kloppenberg. Consequently, I have chosen to review some of their recent work on Dewey and democracy. I also have included in this review an essay that Hilary Putnam co-authored with Ruth Anna Putnam, since they draw on Dewey's ideas in an attempt to sketch an "education for democracy."

Together these scholars have furthered our understanding of Dewey's views and their applicability to the current problems of American society and democracy. Ryan and Westbrook have written intellectual biographies that offer new insights into the life and thought of John Dewey and his place among American liberals. Kloppenberg has placed Dewey and his ideas in an international context in which several European and American philosophers were attempting to deal with the problems of the newly emerging corporate industrial societies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He also has compared the ideas of Dewey and William James to Rorty, Bernstein and other contemporary scholars who call themselves pragmatists. Hilary Putnam has rethought Dewey's theory of

democracy, and together with Ruth Anna Putnam, he has applied Dewey's ideas to some of the current problems of education.

Before beginning to survey these recent thoughts about Dewey, it would be well to set the stage by considering what Bernstein and Rorty, have said about the need to look again at pragmatism and the problems of democracy. In 1988, Richard Bernstein, who has done the most to keep Dewey's thought alive, explained the importance of rethinking the value of pragmatism to his philosophical colleagues in the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association:

The time has come to realize that there has been an ideological cultural lag in our profession--to realize that the ideological battles characteristic of the first wave of the reception of analytic philosophy in America no longer make much sense. The time has come to heal the wounds of these ideological battles. The time has come to realize how unilluminating and unfruitful it is to think in terms of an Anglo-American/Continental split. The philosophical interminglings that are now taking place defy any such simplistic dichotomy. Philosophy has been decentered. There is no single paradigm, research program, or orientation that dominates philosophy. The fact is that our situation is pluralistic. But the question becomes how we are to respond to this pluralism. There are powerful centrifugal tendencies toward fragmentation. But there are also counter-tendencies--not toward convergence, consensus, and harmony--but toward breaking down of boundaries, "a loosening of old landmarks" and dialogical encounters where we reasonably explore our differences and conflicts. In this situation, the pragmatic legacy is especially relevant, in particular the call to nurture the type of community and solidarity where there is an engaged fallibilistic pluralism--one that is based upon mutual respect, where we are willing to risk our own prejudgments, are open to listening and learning from others, and we respond to others with responsiveness and responsibility.<sup>2</sup>

Bernstein's plea seems appropriate not only for philosophy, but for the problems of democracy as well, considering the growing pluralism of our society and the need for free and open public debate among our citizens. It also might be a useful tool for solving the problem Richard Rorty recently raised in *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America*. Rorty, who has done more than anyone to foster the recent revival of pragmatism, argues that, in their effort to criticize American culture, members of the New Left have become spectators of democracy rather than participants in the effort to produce a democratic way of life as the Old Left had been. He complains that leftists are standing on the sidelines carping about American society, or worse, they are devoting too much energy to devising arcane theories of culture that only they can understand. Rorty wants to reawaken the commitment to seeking ways of connecting cultural and political reform that would produce the kind of national self-respect necessary to achieve the ideals of democracy. In order to attain this end, he looks to the Old Left, especially Dewey, for guidance on how today's leftists could cease being spectators of democracy and become participants in a democratic way of life.<sup>3</sup> The New Left should also consider the books and essays reviewed here since the themes of participatory democracy and a renewed sense of community appear in each of them.

#### **Biographical works on Dewey's ideas about democracy and his liberalism**

In *John Dewey and American Democracy*, Robert Westbrook has produced the first thorough examination of Dewey's theory of democracy in biographical form. Westbrook concentrates on Dewey's democratic thought and activism throughout the book, explaining its origin and development in the context of philosophical, political, and social thought and events of each period. Following a brief sketch of Dewey's early life, he picks up the story in 1882 and carries it to Dewey's death in 1952. In contrast to Dewey's critics, such as Clarence Karrier and Morris Cohen, Westbrook sees Dewey as a minority spokesman among liberals--that is, "a social philosopher whose democratic vision failed to find a secure place in liberal ideology--in short, a more radical voice than has been generally assumed." (Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, p. xiv.) For instance, he shows how Dewey's radicalism was apparent in his educational and philosophical thought as it ran against the grain of the dominant viewpoints in each of those fields of human endeavor. During the Chicago years, according to Westbrook, Dewey's educational thought was the only place in his growing corpus of writings that one could find "...a hint of the sermon on behalf of radical democracy which Dewey had appeared ready to preach when he arrived in Chicago." (Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, p. 92.) He was referring, primarily, to *The School and Society* and *The Child and the Curriculum*. In these and other works, Dewey stood between the advocates of traditional education and those who espoused "child-centered" pedagogy in his contention that the school must be a cooperative community that develops the child's social interests and democratic character by linking the interests and activities of the child with the subject matter of the curriculum. Westbrook points out that, although Dewey later came to see the

school as one of several social institutions that should foster the movement toward a democratic way of life, he continued to stand apart from both proponents of traditional and progressive education.

Dewey's philosophical radicalism became most apparent when he moved to Columbia University in 1904. Having been part of a school of like-minded philosophers at the University of Chicago, whom Darnell Rucker called "the Chicago Pragmatists,"<sup>4</sup> Dewey found himself among a group of philosophers who respected him but were critical of pragmatism. Most prominent of his intellectual sparring partners was F. J. E. Woodbridge who was concerned about the legacy of speculative idealism in Dewey's work and encouraged him to reconsider the classical realism of Aristotle. Westbrook notes that, although Dewey did not agree with Woodbridge, he acknowledged the value of Woodbridge's ideas in further refining his own.

Westbrook also sees Dewey as the "... the most important advocate of participatory democracy" of his day. (Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, pp. xiv-xv.) For example, while some progressives, such as Walter Lippman, and leading political theorists took an elitist view of democracy during the late twenties and throughout the thirties, Dewey steadfastly held to a belief in the efficacy of participatory democracy. Westbrook also thinks Dewey's ideas had some influence, albeit indirect in most cases, on the New Left radicals of the sixties.

Despite a few scholars' acknowledgments or criticisms of Dewey's ideas and the call in the "Port Huron Statement" for participatory democracy, albeit devoid of any thought of community, Westbrook's point exaggerates Dewey's influence at a time when most philosophers saw his ideas as passé and the cliché "Do your own thing!" became a caricature for participatory democracy. The sixties also was a time when romantic critics in education ignored Dewey's criticisms of progressive education in *Experience and Education* and fell into the same trap by advocating schools that freed children from the stifling demands of authoritarian teachers so they could choose what they would learn without regard for the development of social intelligence and a sense of community.

Westbrook's claim about Dewey's influence on the New Left also troubles philosopher Alan Ryan. Ryan, a British philosopher and frequent reviewer of works on liberal thought for the *New York Review of Books*, has written a lucid intellectual biography entitled *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism*. In contrast to Westbrook, he does not see Dewey as a precursor of the New Left or as the quintessentially American philosopher concerned only with the problems of Americans, but as a participant in the transatlantic liberal tradition who struggled with the problems of "modern man." He is interested in the reception of Dewey's "modern" thought in America. In an effort to define his place among American liberals, Ryan discusses the range of Dewey's writings on such topics as philosophy, religion, politics, education, and art in the context of his life. At the same time, he seeks to explain Dewey's broad public appeal.

According to Ryan, Dewey had two careers: one as philosopher and the other as public intellectual. The "high tide" of Dewey's development as a philosopher occurred between 1894 and 1914. In that twenty-year period, Dewey worked out his own brand of pragmatism, which he preferred to call experimentalism. He clarified his ideas about human behavior in his applied psychology and, along with James Hayden Tufts, he presented the world with his views on ethics in what was to become a very influential textbook. Dewey also set forth his educational thought in this period, which eventually led to his recognition as the preeminent American philosopher of education. His second career began remarkably at age sixty, when he became associated with the fledgling periodical, *New Republic*, in 1914. Prior to that time, Dewey had discussed politics primarily through his educational writings. During the First World War and the succeeding three decades, however, he concentrated on working out the details of his philosophy and on the public expression of his political views.

In his first career, Dewey's liberalism was readily apparent in his philosophy of education. Following the lead of Lawrence Cremin and others, Alan Ryan is anxious to connect John Dewey with progressivism writ large and separate his educational thought from progressive education. He calls Dewey "the guru of progressive educators"--that is, he "... was not an enthusiast for progressive education but became a guru to those who were. ..." (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, pp. 119, 376.) Ryan refers to the passage in *Democracy and Education* where Dewey explains the importance of recognizing the social nature of the child and connecting it to the organic nature of society through education in order to produce individuals capable of social service. He calls this explanation "... the educational creed of a progressive, but not altogether the creed of a 'progressive educator.'" (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, p. 134.) Ryan also points out Dewey's contempt for the tendency of progressive educational theorists to inflate the role of the child in the classroom at the expense of sound teaching and learning. He concludes this discussion of the progressive nature of Dewey's educational thought by pointing out that Dewey understood a

democratic society was necessarily dynamic and creative. As early as 1896, he recognized the impossibility of predicting the future and thus of preparing children for a particular set of circumstances. Consequently, he argued that preparing children for their lives after school meant cultivating their powers and making them masters both of a portion of society's accumulated knowledge and of the ability to obtain what will unpredictably be added to it in the future. "In a general way," writes Ryan, "this is plainly the liberal view of education." (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, pp. 134-35.)

Throughout his book, Ryan alludes to the continuity between the openly religious young John Dewey and the "secular, liberal, and pragmatic" older John Dewey. He contends, for instance, that "My Pedagogic Creed" has the qualities of Dewey's Sunday morning talks with students at the University of Michigan. In this first statement of his emerging educational thought, Dewey's claims about the religious nature of all true education, according to Ryan, are equally as remarkable as his arguments about "... the centrality of the school to social progress and the centrality of the educational experience to all social understanding. ..." (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, p. 133.) Ryan believes that, in his second career as "secular preacher and lay saint to the Republic," Dewey attracted public attention because he communicated "in the language of traditional Christianity."

[H]e was always happy to use a religious idiom in talking about politics and social reform; he talked readily about democracy's 'faith in the common man,' was glad to call his belief in democracy a 'religious' belief, and wrote *A Common Faith* to argue that he was as entitled as anyone to talk of 'God' when he talked about his deepest beliefs—even though his admirers wished he wouldn't. (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, p. 20.)

Ryan also attributes Dewey's wide appeal to his effective use of the lay sermon as a literary device. By cultivating the art of the lay sermon, Dewey found the middle ground of "intelligent persuasion" between pure philosophy and political policy when he wrote about democracy.

The characterization of "My Pedagogic Creed," *A Common Faith*, and other works about a democratic way of life as "lay sermons" is indicative of Ryan's careful reading of Dewey's works. He successfully uses his consummate skill as a philosopher to identify the liberal themes contained in the corpus of Dewey's writings. However, when Ryan attempts to play the role of historian and connect Dewey's thought to his life and times, he assumes that many of the details of Dewey's life are common knowledge and, therefore, he fails to support his discussion with sufficient citations of the sources. This problem notwithstanding, one comes away from his analysis of Dewey's writings with a clear image of Dewey's liberalism and his theory of democracy.

Ryan thinks Dewey offered a useful explanation of what the quest for democracy should be about: a set of beliefs that go far beyond constitutional structures and political organizations that link "... the attitude toward the world that we call 'religious' with our 'faith in the common man.'" (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, p. 33.) He also believes this radical theory of democracy was evident in Dewey's writing beyond patently political works such as *The Public and its Problems*; it can be found in *Human Nature and Conduct*, *The Quest for Certainty*, *A Common Faith*, and *Art as Experience*. In the last book, for instance, Dewey expressed his belief that the acme of the aims of democracy is "universal access to art." Finally, Ryan sees Dewey's view of democracy at the heart of his liberalism, which he calls a *via media* that stands between the extremes of the rights-based liberalism and quick-fix politics of our current era. He characterizes Dewey's answer to the problems of "modern man" as "... a genuine liberalism, unequivocally committed to progress and the expansion of human tastes, needs, and interests; its focus is on the self-development and autonomy of the individual; it is, if not rationalist in outlook, certainly committed to the rule of intelligence." (Ryan, *Dewey and Liberalism*, p. 367.)

#### **Historical and historiographical writings about Dewey's democratic thought**

Although both Westbrook and Ryan refer to some of Dewey's contemporaries in Europe who held similar views to his, in *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920*, James T. Kloppenberg explicitly links Dewey and William James to four other philosophers in Germany, England, and France. These six men, Wilhelm Dilthey, Thomas H. Green, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Fouillee, James and Dewey, created a *via media* that was intended to solve the epistemological problems apparent in the dominant idealist and naturalist philosophies of the latter decades of the nineteenth century. The philosophy of the *via media* entailed a radical theory of knowledge based on the claim that truth is grounded in human experience, a historical sensibility permeated with the belief that meaning is woven into experience, and a conviction that humans have to create their own values. Kloppenberg called these ideas radical "... because it [the theory of knowledge] cut to the core of attempts to find an Archimedean point for epistemology and substituted an acceptance of contingency for the

standard quest for certainty.” (Kloppenber, *Uncertain Victory*, p. 4.)

Beyond epistemology and ethics, according to Kloppenberg, this eclectic group of philosophers was not as insightful in their attempts to deal with the political and social problems of the second industrial revolution. They took unorthodox positions on reform measures and on the ideals of liberty, equality, and justice. The generation of William James considered existing liberal and socialist answers to the problems of the late nineteenth century as inadequate. But their own alternatives were no more satisfactory. Consequently, it was left to the social democrats and progressives that followed the philosophers of the *via media* in Germany, England, France, and the United States about twenty years later to develop the blueprints for the modern welfare state between 1890 and 1920. This generation of social democrats included Eduard Bernstein, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Jean Juares, and Walter Rauschenbusch. The progressives were Max Weber, L. T. Hobhouse, Leon Bourgeois, Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and John Dewey.

Kloppenber sees Dewey as the linchpin of this era since he contributed to the formulation of the philosophy of the *via media* and was one of the leading American progressives. In particular, he links Dewey with Croly, Lippman, Hobhouse, Bourgeois and, somewhat at a distance, with Weber. These progressives had faith in science, broadly defined, as a means for dealing with the problems of the society and democracy. They believed that the conscious application of intelligence would enable society to distinguish and promote common interests, and to identify and eliminate conflicts. Weber, however, was not so sanguine about the prospects of using science to extricate society from the “iron cage of capitalism.” Nevertheless, he joined the other progressive theorists in departing from the liberalism of John Stuart Mill in the realization that politics requires the linking of responsibility and conviction. They transformed the liberalism of Mill by grounding politics in a philosophy that understood the social and value-laden quality of experience, which led them to an egalitarian and progressive concept of civic virtue. The progressive theorists recognized, moreover, that this reorientation of values required a reorganization of politics and a redistribution of power to be successful. They also understood that the transformation of the culture, its politics, and its economy depended on a new kind of education, one that taught individuals how to think experimentally in order to solve unanticipated problems and one that engendered a sense of community that recognized the growing interdependence of individuals. As Kloppenberg points out, it was John Dewey who presented this progressive theory of education in “My Pedagogic Creed,” *School and Society*, and *Democracy and Education*, works clearly grounded in the *via media*.

The significance of these radical ideas for understanding our present circumstances becomes apparent in Kloppenberg’s conclusion. On the one hand, he thinks it reasonable that we are concerned about finding explanations for the disasters of the twentieth century. On the other hand, he says our search has resulted in too little attention to the philosophers of the *via media*, the theorists of social democracy, and the theorists of progressivism who “... transformed the ideas of revolutionary socialism and *laissez-faire* liberalism, and thereby helped give birth to the political world in which we now live.” (Kloppenber, *Uncertain Victory*, p. 411.) These thinkers propounded a radical theory of knowledge that concentrated on immediate experience and the value-laden nature of life. They emphasized the importance of voluntary action and social relations to individual growth and social reform. They sought to break down the barrier between the individual and society. They also contended that “... politics must remain a servant to human purposes and that no values enjoy immunity from critical examination.” (Kloppenber, *Uncertain Victory*, p. 412.) Their radical epistemology influenced the formulation of a theory of politics rooted in the idea that political reform required moral reform, which meant that it was necessary for education to cultivate civic virtue. Their pragmatic theory of knowledge coupled with an awareness of history led them to identify democracy as the best means of achieving social and political reform. In the end, it was their acceptance of the uncertainty of existence that resulted in the recognition that no solution to the problems of social theory could be wholly adequate and the necessity of a “critical attitude toward all forms of knowledge.” They believed that society could not be redeemed by faith or politics “... but only be shaped by purposeful and pragmatic social action” born of cultural reform through education and democratization and a radical politics that required “... the participation of all citizens and the pursuit of justice through constant experimentation...” (Kloppenber, *Uncertain Victory*, p. 413.)

James Kloppenberg’s interest in pragmatism extends to seeking the origins of its current revival and to arguing that it holds benefits for historians in their attempts to understand human experience in the past. In “Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking,” he traces the connections between William James and John Dewey and what he believes to be two versions of recent pragmatism. One current interpretation of

pragmatism coming from Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish is postmodern in its outlook. The other recent form of pragmatism emerges from the work of Richard Bernstein and Hilary Putnam, whom Kloppenberg believes sustain the tradition of James and Dewey. He briefly sketches the history of pragmatism from James' and Dewey's early work to the conflict with analytic philosophers to the Kuhnian revolution and the revival of hermeneutics. He connects Habermas to the pragmatic tradition and then begins his treatment of the two recent strands of pragmatism. Essentially, Kloppenberg contends that Rorty has created a fictional Dewey for his own purposes, and that his emphasis on language and his explicit rejection of the concept of experience seriously weaken his connection to the tradition of James and Dewey.

Kloppenbergs sees pragmatism, in general, and Dewey's theory of democracy, in particular, as useful to historians. For example, he connects the pragmatic concept of experience to the problem of the historian attempting to understand the lived experience of another person. Language usually is the vehicle through which this experience is recorded, but there are extralinguistic experiences, such as race, class, and gender, that, according to some, make their experiences generally inaccessible or at least incomprehensible to those that have not had such experiences. According to Kloppenberg, the ethical and political dimensions of the early pragmatists' conception of truth offer a means for accessing and evaluating these claims. Dewey's theory of democracy, for example, fosters expressions of difference and opposes anything that encroaches upon or hinders communication, which would undermine democracy. Dewey saw expressions of difference as means of enhancing a person's life experiences. As Kloppenberg put it, "Dewey's conception of democracy involved enriching the range of choices, and expanding the possibilities of finding different kinds of fulfillment, for all persons." (Kloppenbergs, "Pragmatism," p. 121.)

As for pragmatism in general, Kloppenberg sees its strength "... in its denial of absolutes, its admission of uncertainty, and its resolute commitment to the continuing vitality of the ideal of democracy as a way of life." (Kloppenbergs, "Pragmatism," p. 131.) Drawing on the work of Richard Bernstein, he also contends that historians can avoid the problems of subjectivism and relativism by applying the pragmatic test propounded by both James and Dewey: "Is it [historical scholarship] consistent with the evidence we have of others' lived experience, and will it make a difference in our lives?" (Kloppenbergs, "Pragmatism," p. 136.)

#### **Philosophical works on Dewey's ideas about democracy**

Kloppenbergs recognizes Hilary Putnam as one of the leading pragmatists today. Along with Richard Bernstein he has challenged Rorty's version of pragmatism because it stresses language and ignores experience. In a recent book entitled *Renewing Philosophy*, written in a spirit similar to Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Putnam has offered "A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy." He contends that democracy is not just one of many forms of social organization; it is a necessary condition for the full use of intelligence in solving social problems. He begins his argument by contrasting Dewey's justification for ethical claims with that of Bernard Williams. Both of them see the aim of justifying ethical claims as giving members of a community reason for wanting to help in creating a community held together by common concerns. But Williams' view is individualistic in that he believes that the promotion of human flourishing requires a branch of psychology to provide reasons for that justification. In contrast to Williams, Dewey takes a social perspective and offers what Putnam calls an epistemological justification for ethical claims in that he "...thinks of us primarily in terms our capacity intelligently to initiate action, to talk, and to experiment." (Putnam, *Renewing Philosophy*, pp. 180-82.)

Putnam then asserts that Dewey grounded the notion of democracy in a precondition to intelligent action: the application of science to human problems. He conceived of scientific thinking as a product of the sort of inquiry he espoused in *Logic: The theory of Inquiry*: "epistemology is hypothesis." Putnam goes on to point out that Dewey believed if we are unable to reduce the scientific method to an algorithm, "we have learned something about how to conduct inquiry in general, and that what applies to intelligently conducted inquiry in general applies to ethical inquiry in particular." (Putnam, *Renewing Philosophy*, p. 185.)

The one objection to Dewey's theory of democracy that Putnam voices is its inability to deal with situations such as Sartre's famous example of an existential choice, Pierre and the problem of participating in the Resistance in World War II or staying home to take care of his mother. Putnam believes that James provided a more satisfactory solution to this choice in his essay "The Will to Believe." James would have said that Pierre had the right to "believe and act 'in advance of the evidence.'" (Putnam, *Renewing Philosophy*, p. 192.)

In the end, Putnam points out that Dewey's use of scientific thinking is not elitist. He did not want a society run by scientific experts. Rather, Dewey was a radical, not a "radical scoffer at 'bourgeois democracy,'" but one who

wanted a society that develops the capabilities of all of its citizens to think, to engage in the creating and testing of social policies, and to evaluate the results. Achieving such a democracy requires education for all citizens, a topic on which Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam have had some thoughts.

Under the title *Words and Life*, Hilary Putnam and James Conant have attempted to further our understanding of the philosophy of pragmatism. Among the essays in this volume is one entitled "Education for Democracy," which Putnam co-authored with Ruth Anna Putnam. In this essay, they offer their thoughts on the current educational scene and the value of Dewey's ideas for dealing with some of its problems. The Putnams believe that we are in a similar educational circumstance to the one Dewey found in 1938, when he felt compelled to write *Experience and Education*. He saw the educational alternatives being treated as an either/or choice between traditional and progressive education. Today, contend the Putnams, the alternatives are similar, only this time the multiculturalists are the progressives. Analyzing this problem, they note that Dewey had some experience with multiculturalism early in this century in the melting pot vs. cultural pluralism debate. At that time, he stood with the cultural pluralists, claiming that the hyphen in names was not a means of separation but a link that requires recognition of the ethnic groups on both sides of the hyphen. The Putnams then review Dewey's philosophy of education, reminding us that education involves the reconstruction of experience both for the individual and society, that "the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education." Regarding values, they add that schools should teach "... the experience of applying intelligence to value questions." (Putnam and Putnam, "Education for Democracy," pp. 226, 229.)

At this point, the Putnams have set the stage for dealing with the culture wars of recent time. They note that Dewey proposed two criteria for good societies: shared interests and free interaction among groups. The more the interests are shared and the freer the interaction among groups the better the society. The Putnams locate the origins of the culture wars in the predisposition of the dominant white culture in America to overshadow or ignore other cultural groups in the society. Then they argue that applying Dewey's viewpoint to the debate over the canon in the face of the growing pluralism of our society indicates the need for multicultural education, or what Henry Louis Gates calls "canon deformation."

In their discussion of the current culture wars, the Putnams are careful to point out the various positions on the meaning of multiculturalism. They also object to the Europhobia of some multiculturalists who fail to recognize that the dominant thread in the cloth of American culture is Anglo-Saxon, not some monolithic European culture. One wishes, however, that they had been as careful in their effort to connect Dewey to the cultural pluralists of the early twentieth century. In a note, they point out that Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne had taken positions similar to Dewey's in articles published in *The Nation* and *Atlantic*, respectively. Yet, as historian David Hollinger has noted, Kallen's cultural pluralism emphasized the distinctiveness of each culture in the society while Bourne went a step further in pointing to the need for common bonds among those cultures. It was the latter cosmopolitan position that was similar to Dewey's pluralism.<sup>5</sup>

The Putnams clearly believe that Dewey was a pluralist when it came to education. They also believe that support of expanding the canon and changing the ways we teach, do research, and think, especially in order to avoid a tower of Babel, are very much in the Deweyan tradition of democracy and education.

All of the writers whose works I have reviewed in this essay seem to be saying that pragmatism and, especially, Dewey's theory of democracy offer a means of dealing with the fragmentation of our society. Unlike Christopher Lasch, who once criticized Dewey and the progressives for providing cultural solutions to political problems, Westbrook and Kloppenberg believe Dewey consistently argued that cultural transformation through education for intelligent social action was a necessary condition for political, social, and economic reform.<sup>6</sup> In light of that history, Ryan and Putnam, as well as Bernstein and Rorty, call for the application of pragmatism as a means of moving us from a democracy of spectators to a democracy of participants. But before we act imprudently in our efforts to deal with the problems of democracy in an increasingly pluralistic society, we must remember that Dewey and the other philosophers of the *via media* believed no solution to the problems of society, even their own, could be wholly adequate. If we can accept their warning of uncertainty, then we must adopt a critical attitude toward all forms of knowledge; provide all members of the society with an education that develops social intelligence, civic responsibility and a sense of community; and engage in experimental social action and a radical politics in which all citizens participate.

#### ENDNOTES

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

- 1 For example see Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991) and *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995); Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and *An Aristocracy of Everyone: The Politics of Education and the Future of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- 2 Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992).
- 3 Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
- 4 Darnell Rucker, *The Chicago Pragmatists* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1969).
- 5 David A. Hollinger, "Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence of the Liberal Intelligentsia," Chap. 4, In *The American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
- 6 Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism: The Intellectual as a Social Type, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

DERRIDA AND RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY IN EDUCATION

Douglas R. Davis  
Louisiana State University

**Introduction**

This paper uses Derrida's writings to examine issues related to uniformity and diversity in American public education. The goal is not to somehow argue how Derrida might view specific issues or how he might deconstruct the language and arguments within current debates, but rather to consider the relevance of portions of Derrida's writings on right and responsibility to our discourse. The hope is to expand discourse to new levels, to expose new meanings within the language, and open new possibilities for consensus on public education. This is a shift of focus away from finding the correct answers (i.e. the best political, economic, or social solution) towards a new understanding of the discourse; of the multiple meanings within the language we use to identify problems and propose solutions.

The writings of Derrida on right and responsibility are used here to examine the use of language within the dialogue of educational policy in the United States. Currently, the political agenda for education is dominated by issues of uniformity and diversity. Views and policies regarding equal opportunity (busing, racial quotas, affirmative action), multicultural education (Afro-centered curriculum, cultural literacy, bilingual education), and school choice (magnet schools, vouchers, charter schools) are being passionately debated throughout the country. The language of policy discourse is unique to the United States and deeply embedded in our history of public education. From its beginning, public education in the United States has been influenced by forces of uniformity and diversity; preservation and change.

**Derrida and *Differance***

When viewed from the general context of western thought, the writings of Derrida allow reflection upon our thinking that drives educational discourse. There is, according to Derrida, a common dualistic assumption in western thought which often supports the belief that there is a privileged position that can be distinguished and separated from something other than itself. Derrida (Kamuf, 1991, 65) argues against this assumption. Rather than locating meaning through reliance on objectivity, Derrida finds meaning elusive and uses the term *differance* to describe this status. *Differance*, is defined as: "the movement according to which language..., is constituted 'historically' as a weave of differences" (p. 65). There are two key concepts attached to the meaning of *differance*. Meaning, in the broadest sense of the word, is found through a system of difference and deference. Meaning comes from that which is not the same and that which always puts off to the future a final privileged position. Thus, through Derrida's use of *differance*, we might come to a different understanding of the meaning of individuality and community, stability and transformation, and right and responsibility. It becomes possible to view dualistic constructs as an arbitrary set of ideals rather than as a choice between one or the other.

One context in which Derrida discusses education is *Du Droit a la Philosophie* (1990)<sup>1</sup>. In this book, Derrida examines the relationship between the state and philosophy, the relationship between philosophy and education, and more significantly a Hegalian like synthesis of philosophy as education. Derrida declares:

Indeed it can rightfully be noted that in order to analyze these problems (institutional law and the philosophical institutions for research and teaching) one must talk to philosophers about right and law, one must talk to philosophy about right and law. (4)

Therefore, *Du Droit a la Philosophie* is a work about right but also about responsibility; the responsibility to philosophy. In addition, the book is about education and language, knowledge, subject identity, and government.

Further, while *Du Droit a la Philosophie* is about philosophy, the educational context of the book allows us to view education similarly, suggesting a need to talk to educators about right and law, and to talk to education about right and law in a similar manner that Derrida suggests that "one must talk to philosophy about right and law" (4). This discourse "to education" includes a responsibility to the historical and cultural context of our language and a responsibility to continually clarify what the discourse means. The difficult nature of this responsibility is articulated by Egea-Kuehne (1995):

Each time, it is necessary to re-"invent" what responsibilities are involved in order to respond to the singularity of the event, not by ignoring previously developed concepts, but by going beyond them. This dual

obligation, “contradictory and conflictual,” seems inherent to Derrida’s concept of responsibility, as opposed to a sheer moral or political approach. In facing such responsibilities, there is no guarantee, no certitude of a unique, pat, successful solution. (303).

Derrida calls for a deconstruction of language to uncover historical and cultural assumptions, to expand possibilities and open the future to new meanings. Responsibility, in this form, requires an examination of American educational discourse. Our language of discourse is unique to a certain colonial past, Puritan influence, common school movement, frontier experience, struggle with slavery, immigration experience, process of industrialization, progressive education movement, and other historical themes through which we, as Americans, uniquely formulate educational policy, describe the benefits of public education, and articulate our programs of reform. Derrida’s examination of right and responsibility throughout his writings and specifically applied to education in *Du Droit a la Philosophie* will be used in this paper to facilitate a textual critique of educational policy discourse in the United States.

### **The Paradox of Public Education in A Democracy**

The issue of education in a democracy is an antinomy, a paradox that calls for a “double duty,” a set of responsibilities that contradict one another. Derrida (1992) explains this duty:

The *same duty* dictates assuming the European, and *uniquely* European, heritage of an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that this idea, like that of international law, is never simply given, that its status is not even that of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, but rather something that remains to be thought and *to come [a venir].*” (78)

This “double duty” becomes a starting point for considering the nature of current educational discourse. Egea-Kuehne (1995) explains, “Whether in philosophy, politics, or education, the first step, of course, is to recognize, to become aware of, the double imperative” (304). Through the double imperative we recognize, and Egea-Kuehne (1997) argues, that there is no neutrality in education, no privileged position from which to objectively make privileged claims nor to make final decisions on political and social issues including issues of diversity. To claim a privileged position is to assume an objective framework from which one’s ideas become right beyond the limits of subjective thought. Yet, the writings of Derrida suggest that democracy exists in the space between double imperatives rather than in the space of knowing what is true. These double imperatives include the necessity of both individual rights and personal responsibilities, individuals’ interests and group needs, independence of thought and dependence on social norms, cultural difference and national unity, and desire for stability and the need for change.

With these types of seemingly competing norms of needs and values, how do we situate education and define its role in our democracy? Derrida (1992) writes of “Democracy to Come” with the understanding that democracy has existed, exists now, and yet, will never fully exist. Democracy remains:

...not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the *future*, but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise-- *and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now.* (78)

There will always be that part of democracy that is still to come, that waits for birth, that is a promise. No one will ever be able to say about democracy, “this is it.” The argument can be made that the same holds true for public education. We have a history of public education, a current system of public education, yet, in the final analysis public education remains still to come; always an unfinished project.

Key issues of educational policy today regarding uniformity diversity provide the promise of public education to come. It is through these issues that public education is changing in the United States. We are attempting through educational policy to identify, negotiate and transcend borders between the educational needs of an increasingly diverse student population and the desire to retain a core of ideas inherited from the past dominance of our European heritage. In addition, we seek to respect the right of parents to choose the best educational program for their children while we respect societies efforts to provide equal educational opportunity and a common educational experience. The issues or dilemmas, of choice, opportunity and unity are driving, shaping and defining a current process of change in American public education. In the introduction to *Du Droit a la Philosophie*, Derrida declares that, “For it is precisely a certain right to philosophy which is at stake” (6). In the United States, it is precisely a certain right to education which is at stake. What is “education to come” in our society?

Discourse on changes in the education regarding uniformity and diversity issues remains embedded in social, political and economic language and frames. These frames maintain the privileged position of knowledge, the

non-neutral vantage point. Maxcy (1995) explains:

...this frameworks thinking is nearly always represented in structuralist (and may we say, positivist?) language; a unitary metanarrative--at once "scientific" and "rational." As a kind of privileged eyewitness view (perspectivism), the super theory of frameworks is offered as a scanning and identification device for explaining differing research orientations, while functioning as an elite view that politicizes research efforts, defining and circumscribing research work to be done within an essentialized system of facts and assumptions regarding the objects of inquiry and the means of their specification. (474).

In the end, however, frameworks provide little guidance in how we negotiate cultural and racial borders and how we balance the rights of parents to choose the best education for their child with the communities' rights to receive specific benefits from their investment of public resources. There is no privileged position from which to decide these "double imperatives," these issues will remain political and social questions. At a core level the debate is about the definition of public education in the United States, the benefits expected from public education, and how we might best structure a system of public education to provide these benefits. These are not scientific question nor are they questions with some answer out there waiting to be discovered. Rather, these questions will be answered through our own cultural representations and values. The illusive realm of rights and responsibilities, as the two central values guiding our search for answers to questions of uniformity and diversity, drive current educational policy debates.

The dominance of right and responsibility themes is understandable because they are the foundation of a democratic society. The social benefits, the benefits we all receive, of education are based on the desire to protect our rights and maintain the responsibilities that are the *aporia*<sup>2</sup> of liberty, freedom, and human rights. In the United States, a system of public education has been created with the purpose of developing and maintaining a common core of knowledge<sup>3</sup>, the understanding of right and responsibility, upon which our democracy depends. With the common school movement in the nineteenth century, public education became the state's mechanism of citizen training within a changing and evolving cultural context. Levin (1991) describes the creation of common schools as a defender of democratic ideals in the face of rapid change:

The history of nineteenth-century America was one of a remarkable transformation characterized by massive immigrations, urbanization, and industrialization and an increasing shift from local political issues to regional and national ones. These dramatic changes in American life, with their attendant requirements for a common educational experience, set the stage for the establishment and expansion of common schools....The teaching of collective values, a common language, and shared political practices for a relatively uniform social system of production expanded both the potential and actual performance of the nation. (18)

The common core of knowledge that drives public education was developed to maintain our democratic institutions through changes occurring in the early nineteenth century.

Today, our society remains one of rapid change. The National Council for the Social Studies (1992) reports that "Students of color will make up nearly half (46 percent) of the nation's school-age youth by 2020, and about 27 percent of those students will be victims of poverty" (274). Forces of change bring to the discourse questions about collective values, common language, shared political practices and uniform social systems. These are the same questions that legitimize the existence of public education. Without the convenience of an objective neutral answer, we must continually ask ourselves, what is the purpose of public education? Many answers will be offered; but, which is the *right* one? And, what is a *right* to education? And, how do we get *right* to education without the state getting in the way?

### **Derrida and the Deconstruction of Right**

Derrida deconstructs the term 'right' in *Du Droit a la Philosophie* with a discussion of several different meanings. The first is right as a law or the authority of the state's historical foundation of the correct position. Derrida (5) asks, "What is the relationship of right (law) to philosophy (education)?" (my parentheses<sup>4</sup>). The second meaning goes to the source as in, "One must speak of right to philosophy (education), and therefore to philosophers (educators)." The third describes right as the privilege to do something and the question is asked, "Who has a right to philosophy (education), and under what conditions?" Finally, Derrida considers the use of "right" as an adverb. Derrida asks:

As some believe, is it always possible to philosophize *strait on, directly*, immediately, without the

mediation of formation, of instruction, or of philosophical institutions, without even [the mediation] of the other or of language, of this language or that one? (5)

There is a lure to this, yet Derrida cautions against “yielding to it immediately,” and suggests the need of time for “diversion” and “analysis.” We do not go right to education in the United States. We mediate the formation of instruction and educational institutions. We involve the state.

The state uses its capital authority to define the relationship of right to education.

A certain title must be confirmed because “A title authorizes, legitimizes, gives status to, and brings together” (12). The title “public education” then is understood to be the authority to educate by right; the law that legitimizes the State as the institution that forms instruction and establishes public schools. The result is a State, a government, itself a title, conferring a title. Derrida explains this and calls this the “institutional assumption”:

When the title is given (or refused) to someone by a constitutional body, it means that the safekeeping of titles as well as their guarantee is the responsibility of what, as an institution, already bears a title. Therefore the origin of the power conferring titles can never phenomenalize itself as such. The law dictating its structure--or the structure dictating its law--wants it to disappear. (13)

For, the question of “What is philosophy?” pervades all institutional decisions, all questions of authority, or of title. Again, for our purposes we can ask, “What is education?” We may, as Derrida does for philosophy, consider two “prevailing figures” in our answer: essence and function. Therefore, education is both the form of its being and that which it does.

Two relevant points relate to the discourse of uniformity and diversity in current policy debates. The authority of a title “public education” is not of itself either the essence or function of education. Also, uniformity and diversity have nothing to do with the title “public education” but as a forms of difference they are inherent to the essence and function of education. The key is that a title “public education” remains the same while the essence and function of “public education” change, differ, defer, and remain to come. “Public education” is that which we, in all of our individual, unique, and different ways, make it to be, think it to be, and that which is still to come. There is no universal meaning for “public education” from which it must, or even could be, defended against the forces of change. Derrida concludes this point with:

Questions of title and of right always have a topological dimension. No institution does without a symbolical, or physico-geographical and ideal data, with a homogenous or heterogeneous space. (18)

Space remains and the search for common meaning cannot be separated from a language originating and operating within historical and cultural constructions. Language, the most democratic of processes, is the defender of meaning, the protector of titles, and the authority of law. Levin describes the instilling of a “common core” of knowledge as the reason for public education in the United States; yet, Derrida problematizes any specific definition of a common core. Language, however, presumes a “common core” of understanding that makes communication possible. A circle presents itself where language requires a common core of education, and education requires a common language. There is a need to get right to education, to speak to education, to speak to educators.

Derrida’s discussion of going “right to philosophy” applies directly to language and education:

What *happens* if to go “right to philosophy,” one must *pass through* at least one language and a great number of *sub-codes* whose dependence on a “root”-language is both indomitable and over-determining, this over-determining being precisely nothing but the very trial of philosophy? And what if this passage--because it is not of the order of a mere deviation or of instrumental mediation--necessarily deceives any desire to go *right to philosophy*?

Even if we could do away with every institution, every school system, every school (either in the Greek or modern sense of the word), every discipline, and every mediatic structure (private or public), the recourse to language is indispensable to minimal practice of philosophy. (50)

It is also true that recourse to language is indispensable to the practice of education, of getting right to education. The institution of “public education” must be different in each time, place, school, and cultural characteristic and as such the discourse is always different. Procedures for “intralinguistic” translations are required. The importance of these procedures are stressed by Derrida:

In fact, to access effectively to these procedures, and therefore to have the *right to philosophy as it is spoken*, in order for the philosophical democracy, the democracy in philosophy to be possible (and there is no democracy in general without that, and democracy, the one which is always to come, is also a

philosophical concept), one must be trained to it. One must be trained to recognize connotations, effects said of style or rhetorical, semantic potentialities, virtual folds and creases, a whole economy at work in what may be, under the name of philosophy, nothing but the most economical practice of the natural language. (52)

We require a skill within the language that will allow a rigorous and complex “intralinguistic” understanding of a discourse about diversity. There are multiple meanings within an American version of a language that speaks from many historical and cultural experiences. When one version, one history, one experience, is favored as the “right” education the ability to translate is diminished, education is undermined, and democracy is threatened. There is a need to understand the historical experience from which language of education policy discourse arose, yet, there is also an imperative to understand the historical experience of those who differ, or those who are using the language within a different cultural frame.

The trend in the education reform discourse is to maintain all “theoretical models, forms of control, and social rules” which control the institution of public education. Derrida says of philosophy, and the same applies to education, that those who raise concern about the rigidity of the discourse are seen as wanting to “‘adapt,’ ‘adjust’ philosophy to a social demand” (53). Derrida holds the contrary position that those defending specific versions of what is right are unknowingly serving a social demand. As society changes, the need is not to adjust individuals to “the one” education, “Rather, it is to increase its<sup>5</sup> opportunities, its rights, or the rights it gives, and which it leads to conceive differently” (53). When it is recognized that there is no single “one” right education, the issue shifts to what is, and who has, a right to education.

Derrida (57) considers two ways to examine a right to philosophy through the frame of right to education within the universal declaration of human rights. First, a right to philosophy (education) that extends beyond national and social differences. Second, the thought which claims the right to question foundations of judicial discourse. The problem is, “the declaration of human rights implies a philosophy--a reminder which will surprise no one--but also a philosophy of philosophy, a concept of truth and of its relationship to language” (60). This is also true with a declaration of a right to education. There is present a philosophy of philosophy of education that also expresses a similar concept of truth and language. Therefore, instruction in language “can render one sensitive to the concept of right, especially the right to instruction” (60). Derrida reiterates:

The right to education supposes the knowledge and teaching of right. Right to, as in right to access (to whatever, education, philosophy, and so on) it supposes access to a right which in turn supposes the capacity to read and to interpret, in short, which supposes education. (65)

The power of the State must guarantee the power of the individual to access their right to education. Derrida again emphasizes the ability to use language as necessary to exercise power:

The purpose of the power of the State is to guarantee that the power of the citizen does not remain formal, that it ceases to belong to the sole order of possibilities, of abstract wishes or of simple prescriptions. But how is it possible to guarantee the passage between the two meanings or the two modalities of power? By a power-to-interpret, a power-to-speak, write, decipher. It goes through a practice of the language, and in as much as universal principles are at stake, through philosophy: through the development of power as linguistic and philosophic competence. Indeed, the latter power is inscribed in the circle, but it is also the condition of the circulation of the circle. It is the effective becoming of right, as right to [droit a]. (66)

The universal declaration of human rights can be seen, when applied to the discourse surrounding uniformity and diversity and educational policy, as an obligation to teach knowledge that transcends simple frameworks, emphasizes different points of view, and most importantly, encourages and teaches a philosophical tradition that challenges and questions all that is taught including itself. This obligation can be viewed as an ethical responsibility for educators and those engaging the discourse of educational policy or those speaking to education and those speaking to educators.

### **Responsibility and the Obligation to Question**

A call for ethics in order to facilitate and improve the discourse through which we negotiate cultural and contextual borders involves the assuming of responsibility for the discourse. The theme of responsibility to the use of language is repeated through many of Derrida’s texts. Three specific responsibilities related to the use of language are identified for the purpose of this work: (1) a responsibility to never stop thinking about meaning and avoid creating binding schema or declaring permanent judgments, (2) a responsibility to avoid “immediate presentation” of

thought, and (3) a responsibility to maintain a rigorous commitment to memory. These responsibilities readily applicable to current discourse involving issues of uniformity and diversity in American education.

1. Derrida uses the example of Naziism to illustrate the responsibility to meaning. "Heidegger, the Philosopher's Hell" (Weber, 1995) warns us never to stop thinking about the meaning of all Naziisms. The meaning of Naziism is never finished and Derrida warns of the dangers of assuming or declaring a final determination:

Because I believe in the necessity of exposing, limitlessly if possible, the profound adherence of the Heideggerian text (writings and acts) to the possibility and the reality of all Nazisms, because I believe this abysmal monstrosity should not be classified according to well-known and finally reassuring schemas, I find certain maneuvers to be at the same time ludicrous and alarming. (186)

Derrida follows with, "There has never been an *effect of the obvious* in Heidegger's text, neither for me nor for those I mentioned a moment ago. If there was, we would have stopped reading" (187).

For the discourse of uniformity and diversity, there is a responsibility to carefully avoid declaring a final meaning or assuming an "effect of the obvious." Terms such as multiculturalism, cultural literacy, afrocentric and eurocentric curriculum, and parental choice call for limitless interpretation. When meaning is final, the reading stops and the possibility of discourse ends.

2. In "Comment Donner Raison?" (Weber), Derrida speaks of a different responsibility, the need to avoid "immediate presentation of thought." This is not always possible and Derrida tells us "Doubtless one must not, in certain situations, suspend the imperative of moral or political judgments, that it, that of an 'immediate'--or nearly so--'presentation'" (192). With Derrida's discussion of Heidegger, (and we might also include are discourse on education) the immediacy is removed and we should forgo final conclusions. Derrida explains:

...why is Heidegger's trial never over and done with?, perhaps because we have to, we've already had to, respect the possibility and impossibility of this rule: *that it remains to come*. That in the name of which we immediately--or nearly so--condemn Naziism can no longer, must no longer, I believe, be formulated so simply in the language of a philosophy... (194)

Derrida concludes this reasoning by stating, "No *immediate presentation* for thought could also mean: less facileness in armed declarations and morality lessons, less haste toward platforms and tribunals, even if one does so to respond to acts of violence, rhetorical or other" (194). It is striking how much of our educational discourse is fraught with impassioned declarations of morality and hasty appeals to grand platforms and tribunals.

3. A third responsibility is a call for memory. In "Dialanguages" (Weber), Derrida remarks that:

I have the feeling there is loss when I know that things don't repeat and that the repetition I love is not possible; this is what I call loss of memory, the loss of repetition, not repetition in the mechanical sense of the term, but of resurrection, resuscitation, regeneration. (145)

There remains a tie to history that allows the prevention of relativism. The language of discourse always remains relative to the resurrection, resuscitation, and regeneration of the past. Neglect of the past is a loss of memory and thus the loss of the guiding assistance of experience.

The protection of memory is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the philosopher and educator. Derrida firmly declares:

In this sense, for me, the philosopher is above all a guardian of memory: someone who asks himself questions about truth, Being, language, *in order to keep*, between truth and keeping. You must have read the texts in which Heidegger speaks of truth as keeping; truth is what allows for keeping, self-keeping. In this sense, the philosopher is the guardian, in the noblest sense of the term: not just a guardian of the institution, or a watchdog. But the guardian of truth, the guardian of what keeps or guards itself, the desire to keep. (145).

The educator and those who speak to education retain the responsibility to the memory of the past and to the "truth" that is our tradition of "public education."

### Conclusion

This paper has examined a dualistic condition within a democracy and the institution of a system of public education within a democracy, of right and responsibility. It would be convenient for our purpose, our discourse on uniformity and diversity, if there was a single, objective, knowable, and true set of "rights" and "responsibilities." Derrida demonstrates repeatedly that such simple determinations do not exist. Differences exist in and are unavoidable with the use of language; yet, it is through language that a point much be reached between the aporia of

that which is and that which will always remain to come.

#### ENDNOTES

1. *Right to Philosophy*, is not yet published in English, translations by Egea-Kuehne.
2. Aporia is a common theme of Derrida's which identifies an unspecified space between two apparently mutually exclusive terms or concepts. In this case the term is used to describe the space between the benefits of rights and the obligations of responsibility that we regard as essential to democratic citizenship.
3. It is understood that the 'purposes' for public education in the United States are many including the need to provide a reliable and productive labor force for a capitalistic economy. I am lumping these purposes together under the assumption that they all relate in some way to the stability of existing political and economic institutions.
4. I have inserted education in parentheses throughout this introduction to the deconstruction of right to emphasize that in this context education and philosophy are similar, or identical.
5. "its" refers to philosophy in this Derrida quote, however, I am using it as a referent to education. All Derrida quotes loose meaning when separated from their original text, so in that sense they are always 'out of context.' In this case, I believe the switch maintains the flow of my argument without disrespecting Derrida or attempting to explain his precise use of the language.

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SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION

John P. Densford  
Oklahoma East Central University

I must begin with an apology to John Locke who, circa 1700, wrote a book with this same title. Locke's thesis included some ideas we wouldn't follow today--among them the view that growing boys could get by very well on bread, jam, and tea, that they did not need meat or spicy foods. He believed that girls needed only to learn to speak French, sew, and play the piano.

But he had other ideas which were influential on Thomas Jefferson, namely that all males were created equal--except, of course, Africans and American Indians.

Locke wrote that boys went to school, not to acquire knowledge, but to cement their social status; i.e., the children of nobles and the rich went to the university, the children of workers went to trade schools or apprenticeship. Suffice it to say that I do not share these views, and so I shall proceed to set forth my own.

Not to labor the point, but my credentials for writing this paper include 34 years of teaching in both public and private schools, in both high schools and universities, a doctorate in educational theory, and the parenting of three children, two of whom have Ph. Ds of their own and are currently teaching.

Along the way, I've read and heard some pretty awful versions of the meaning and practice of education. I'd like to negate some of them and suggest a model.

'One of the cutest and most sentimental definitions of education I've ever heard came from a man some of you may have known: Leonard Duce of Houston University. Duce said: "Education is like two people walking down a path, one of whom has been there before."

Can't you just see teachers swelling out their chests as they contemplate themselves leading bright-eyed and trusting children down a dark and forbidding road? But it doesn't take a genius to note that if the student can go no further down the path than the teacher has already gone, there is a finite limit to education--a limitation I do not accept.

I prefer the comment of Albert Einstein who remarked, when told that he was encroaching on the divine with his investigations into the realm of time and space, "There is no limit to what man can accomplish if he will only quit believing in God."

The pastor at a church I used to attend called John Kennedy "foolhardy" for seeking to put a man on the moon. Our government, he said, is invading the province of God, and God will be angry and punish the nation.

This idea--that education has and should have definite and enforced limits--is quite common and widespread, I admit, but, I assert, criminally stupid.

Here's another monstrosity from a well-respected philosopher: "Education is nurture in a protective environment which excludes evil and presents only the good." (Plato, ca. 370 BC)

Sounds pretty good, I suppose, until you think about it. Teach kids only things you know are good for them and don't let them have or develop any knowledge of evil. Above all, don't let them learn anything you don't already know and approve of.

It is most certainly the case that what is good for children is often a matter of opinion. In France and Italy, children drink wine from infancy; their parents do not see anything wrong with that: but in most American families, such a practice is vigorously frowned upon.

Some parents think nudity is a definite evil and keep their children from it. Other parents think knowledge of sexual matters is natural, that nudity is healthy so that their children grow up knowing and respecting the human body. The latter believe that frankness and openness are better than prudery and misinformation, and I agree.

In school terms some people think that learning a foreign language cements the knowledge of one's native tongue and makes for a wider awareness, a more flexible attitude, and better international relations. The late Savoie Lottinville once remarked that "a one-language man is a no-language man." But conservatives today decry "multiculturalism" as a great evil which militates against good old American values.

In today's political environment, how could a nation's educational leadership, let alone ordinary parents, decide what is "good" for all school children and what "evil" should be excluded?

And what of the child who has never known anything of the dangers of drugs, tobacco, running in the street,

leaping off rooftops, examining medicine bottles, playing with fire, etc.? Will parents or teachers be constantly at his side to shield him, to keep him innocent? Hardly.

Teen years are times when hormones kick in, and experimentation and curiosity replace blind trust. Is it possible that your child will never encounter or be swayed by another child or adult who has experienced evil and found it momentarily rewarding?

Plato's definition is naive at best, suicidal when applied to an educational system.

Another definition of education I find offensive goes like this: "Education is the reproductive part of a culture, the process of developing in the immature the knowledges, skill, attitudes and appreciations cherished by the mature." This definition was central to the educational philosophy of Millard Scherich of Oklahoma State University.

Again, that definition seems, at first glance, to describe education's purpose correctly; we who are grown up and know better should develop in youngsters the knowledges and attitudes we have learned to approve of.

But does that account for taste? Does that recognize the spark of divinity that is inherent in each of us? Does that deal honestly with individual talents and rights? You know it does not. How many fathers have browbeaten their sons into following their own footsteps--and thereby deprived the world of great natural genius in music, art or law because those were not the father's interests?

Do all mature people cherish the same knowledges, skills, and attitudes? Nonsense!

If all I do as a teacher is to imbue the knowledges I cherish into my students, and they, when mature, pass on only the same to their students, whence new knowledge, new inventions, new progress?

F.C.S. Schiller says the function of truth is to lead us to new truth, not to be hoarded, saved, encapsulated.

Every person with any education realizes how much more knowledge is still out there to be learned. Where does anyone get off asserting that all is now known and that education's sole responsibility is to keep what is known pure and undefiled?

A Math teacher I once knew said the ability to do mathematics was something a person was born with--or without. No amount of cajoling or punishment could help if one was born without this inherent ability. He went on to assert that those who were born with it were genetically superior.

The late great Charles Mayo fell prey to this view--that man's knowledge was finite and his condition determined. Mayo said, in an address to a Rotary Club meeting in April 1927: [From the benefits of medical research] "... the age of man has been advanced to 58 years (on the average). But little more can be added." In other words, medicine has gone as far as it can go. He went on to say, "I hope no one is expecting to read of that 'bunk.' gland transplantation...." Too bad the good doctor could not be alive to see what wonders have been wrought in the field of gland transplantation.

Far more recently, Oklahoma's Governor Frank Keating and his Secretary of Education, Floyd Coppage, have suggested that they know precisely what every teenager in Oklahoma needs to know and, by implication, what the future will surely hold. They have suggested that a four-year pursuit of Math, Science, English, and History will suffice for all youth. Coppage recently reported to the Ada Rotary Club that the three greatest, all-encompassing needs of an educational system were the four-by-four curriculum, better-trained teachers (which, he suggested, would come about most rapidly from the abolition of all teacher-education institutions and courses) and, third, dedicated parents who can and should determine, and enforce "proper moral standards" for their children. He stopped short of endorsing vouchers for religious schools, but he did laud home-schooling and private schools.

Well, I've criticized enough, and I did promise you a model.

You who are schooled in educational theory will, I hope, acknowledge that John Dewey had a far more rational understanding of the problems of education than today's political hacks. Dewey had logic on his side in suggesting that the primary function of the system was to motivate students to learn what they wanted to learn. My favorite quote from Dewey--which I used in every class I ever taught--went as follows: "It makes no difference what a child learns up to age 12, so long as the child goes on wanting to learn further."

He didn't put in these terms, but I believe it would be an accurate paraphrase to say, "The curriculum be damned. Inspire the kid, and he'll learn what he needs to know when he needs to know it."

I cannot think of any words more antithetical to those of Plato, Scherich, Coppage, and Keating than those of Dewey.

A motivated student, one whose appetite for learning has been whetted, will learn forever. But one whose curriculum has been circumscribed by others and whose natural interests have been ignored will never learn much

though he may well become a successful candidate for the United States, Congress.

**A COMMUNITY SERVICE CURRICULUM: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO IMPLEMENTING  
BUBER'S "I AND THOU" PHILOSOPHY**

Jennifer Jane Endicott  
University of Central Oklahoma

**Service Learning: Defined, Rationale, Types**

Community Service Learning according to Kinsley (1993) is a pedagogical method which allows students through active service to develop both cognitively and effectively through active participation in the community through active service and reflection upon that service. The National Youth Leadership Council defines Service Learning as "... a teaching/learning method that connects meaningful community service with academic learning, personal growth and civic responsibility." Service Learning is a blending of both service and learning outcomes in such a way as to mutually support both the school learning environment and the community. The National Community Service Act of 1990 defines Service Learning as a method:

\*Under which students team and develop through active participation in thoughtfully organized service experiences coordinated in collaboration with the school and community.

\* That is integrated into the students academic curriculum or provides structured time for a student to think, talk, or write about what the student did and saw during the actual service activity.

\* That provides students with opportunities to use newly acquired skills and knowledge in real life situations in their own communities.

\* That enhances what is taught in school by extending student learning beyond the classroom and into the community and helps to foster the development of a sense of caring for others. Fertman (1994) defines Service Learning as a structured, thoughtful method where participants learn and develop through organized service projects that are deliberately designed to link service to academic learning. Service learning involves children in real life situations which benefit the individual as well as the community.

The rationale for utilizing a Service Learning curriculum allows for the recognition and respect of diversity to emerge within the learning environment. Second, it builds community through utilizing the diversity of talents within the learning environment. Third, it taps the multiple intelligences of the learners and allows for the expression of each of these intelligences. Fourth, real world skills and competencies can be developed, thus enabling students to build life skills. Fifth, it allows for an integrated multi-cultural perspective to develop within the curriculum.

Additionally, *A Source Book on Integrating Youth Service into the School Curriculum* indicates specific benefits for students: 1) Self Esteem: students earn a sense of empowerment by engaging in community service where they are needed, valued and respected. 2) Citizenship: students learn that citizenship requires an actively engaged community life. 3) Academic skills: students' desire to team is heightened by their experience in community service. They learn to connect the classroom experience with life in the community. Students learn the relevance of subject matter from science and mathematics to the social sciences and humanities. Students reflect on important moral and ethical issues. 4) Career Education: students directly experience the world of work.

Benne states the issue of the need for community building as essential to the future of humankind:

The most hopeful way through and beyond the desert of collectively, social fragmentation, and impending self-inflicted doom in which we now wander is for persons thirsting for a fuller life to unite in building community within contemporary collectivities and between and among contemporary fragmentations. (p. 66)

How the curriculum can prepare students for a common citizenship while nurturing group cultures, values, and institutional participation is best addressed through Service Learning.

There are three Service Learning Models which are currently operating under the term Service Learning.

**1. COMMUNITY SERVICE THROUGH DIRECT VOLUNTARISM**

\*After school activities: usually community programs

\* School credit for a specific course in which a required curriculum is not related to the course or to the after school activities/academic requirements involved

\* Assessments are usually informal and do not meet the required curriculum assessment standards

**2. COMMUNITY SERVICE LEARNING**

- \* Usually single unit preparation
- \* Curriculum developed in addition to the required curriculum
- \* Academic requirements are usually met through separate subject approaches
- \* Assessments are formal, but do not necessarily meet the required curriculum
- \* Stated beliefs of Service Learning require academic/service/reflection, but actual implementation usually does not meet the requirements

### **3. LIFE-SKILLS COMMUNITY SERVICE**

- \* Developed through an integrated curricular approach
- \* Identified community needs and life skills
- \* Thematic in nature
- \* Developed through the required curriculum
- \* Assessments are formal/multiple and evaluated as a part of a required curriculum
- \* Thinking reflectively and Thinking Analytically
- \* Real-world experiential: De-mystifies methodologies through actual experiential participation in the community.

A selection of one or a merging of these three models is dependent upon the local leadership, belief systems, and resources within the school and the community.

#### **Philosophical Perspectives for Service Learning**

In Varlotta's (1997) discussion of the philosophical basis for Service Learning Barber's (1984) integrated philosophical approach based upon liberalism, with its emphasis on individual freedom, and communitarianism (the common good) and Dewey's (1916) experiential learning with his theory of democracy, community, and public service emerge as the most widely cited authorities. "In the first place, the school must itself be a community" (Dewey, 1916, p. 358). Although differences appear in the discussion, there is a commonality based upon "consensual communities, notions of justice, a consensus approach, and the rational, unified self" (Varlotta, 1997, p. 454). Varlotta posits Service Learning be expanded from a narrow consensus community, "those born out of similarity, justice, and the common good," to "communities of difference," to those that favor contestation, dialectical relationships and multiple realities" (Varlotta, 1997, p. 455). In support of this, William Tiemey's "communities of difference" (Varlotta, 1997, p. 455) emerges as one of the components of Varlotta's discussion. This paper proposes that there is a more personal philosophical basis for Service Learning which contributes to Martin Buber's "I and Thou" philosophy which is critical to the emergence of community.

#### **Service Learning and Buber's "I and Thou" Philosophy**

Each individual is unique in his or her self-image and is to be respected for his or her own uniqueness. In order to meet and embrace this self within a positive social climate, a dialogue between individuals must be created. Martin Buber saw man as a whole, unique being and that the educated person is one "whose life is characterized by existential decision making" (Nash, 1968, p. 435). Buber created a model of an educated person whose life is one of autonomous decision making through real experiences and specific situations. "Vital to Buber's ethics is the concept of responsibility, viewed in terms of one's response to another, Thus, the dialogue or the sphere of the interhuman becomes a central focus of concern" (Nash, 1968, p. 435).

Buber's "I and Thou" philosophy demonstrates a keen understanding of the nature of human communication with all of its misunderstandings due to experiential differences between senders and receivers of messages (Nash, 1968). These differences in experiential points of reference affect the acceptance and respect of self within the changing social dynamic. This existentialist belief is established not through rigid codes, though a respect for

principles and traditions are useful but through an active interaction between individuals in the real world. In his work "Ich and Du," published in 1923 and in English in 1937, it was critical that one understands that our relationship with God emerges through our experiences in the concrete world with man, and that freedom is found through our seeking authentic encounters with others (Nash, 1969). Thus, Buber maintained that many relationships with other people merely consist of "talking past" or "talking at" someone, whereas, true acceptance and understanding of another person's perspective are established through a dialogue which emerges through an "I and Thou" relationship, as opposed to the "I-It" relationship, which is the way people relate to inanimate objects. The dialogue can only be created through responsible interpersonal relationships based upon respect and acceptance. The dialogue demands authenticity and honesty and is destroyed by deception and pretense.

The respect for one another emerges as crucial to the "I/Thou" dialogue as shared from Buber's "Elements of the Interhuman," the William Alanson White Memorial Lectures given in the spring of 1957 in Washington, D.C. at the School of Psychiatry (translation by Ronald Cregor Smith, in *The Knowledge* (1965)). Buber states "The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that each should regard his partner as the very one he is. I become aware of him, aware that he is different, essentially different from myself in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him, and I accept whom I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can direct what I say to him as the person he is." (Nash, 1968, p. 442).

In application of Buber's philosophy to the educational environment, the importance of dialogue, responsibility, and community in each individual emerges. The learner assumes the role of active participant in his or her own education and is an active and divergent thinker. In Buber's 1925 address in Heidelberg to the Third International Educational Conference he espoused the view of the person as one of living responsibly. The opportunity for responsibility emerges in the Service Learning curriculum through the identifying problems, encountering them, and seeking solutions. Likewise, the teacher becomes a model of understanding and acceptance and interacts with the learner as they share with each other and draw strength from one another and become mutual learners. In Buber's "Teaching and Deed," translated by O. Marx in *Israel and the World* (1948), he encourages the relationship between teacher and learner as one of interaction and mutual respect and learning and to be able to transform learning and belief into action. The child is given the opportunity to explore, yet encounters the teacher's values. The classroom becomes one of participation with a variety of methods and approaches varied to meet the individual needs of the students. The classroom management is inclusive within a democratic environment. The curriculum has no definite rules, but is based upon the needs of the teacher and learner with an emphasis on utilizing the total environment. This theme of community and personal responsibility merge together in this kind of classroom environment. Buber's free man is "one who voluntarily comes together with others in community, who attains the level of being able to speak as an authentic We" (Nash, 1968, p.451). Through the Service Learning curriculum the individual has an opportunity to explore his or her own personal seeking of freedom.

Buber also contends in the 1957 White Memorial Lectures that the modern world believes that there is nothing, including man, which cannot be analyzed, reduced, or dissected into its smallest components, thus destroying the mystery between man and man. He is not speaking against analytical methodology in the sense of learning about man, but in the sense that we cannot make man into a generic formula and have no regard for his wholeness, unity and uniqueness. Children understand and seek their own uniqueness and when not given opportunities to explore their uniqueness within a positive educational environment, they will explore alternative avenues. Service Learning provides an opportunity in our lockstep form of education for the child to explore, reflect and make decisions within an environment which encourages the development of self. Self-development through Service Learning in a community context provides the individual with the freedom from self, yet, not losing self and one's ability to relate with others. In Buber's *Paths in Utopia*, he painstakingly points out that "A real community need not consist of people who are perpetually together; but it must consist of people who, precisely because they are comrades, have mutual access to one another and are ready for one another" (Buber, 1996 p. 145). Although Buber believed that our culture with its complex diversity would not be best served by one educational model Service Learning may serve as one of the vehicles through which Buber's model may be applied as it provides opportunities for dialogue, Relationships, and community. After all, "Education is relation" (Noddings, 1995, p. 65).

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**ROBERTO CALASSO ON SACRIFICE AND SOCIAL ORDER:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION POLICY INQUIRY**

Charles J. Fazzaro  
University of Missouri-St.Louis

**Introduction**

Modern American public education policies and practices both explicitly and implicitly claim to be in the service of providing students with the knowledge and skills to access the “good life,” under some definition. In its purest sense, the American democratic ideal of *liberty* could logically be construed to promise and guarantee that the definition of “good life” is to be the sole judgement of the individual, and that the means of achieving such is not to be encumbered by government, except in special cases regarding the “public good.”<sup>1</sup> Consequently, public school educators, at least, are obligated to promulgate policies that require schooling practices to be consistent with these ideals. Because these ideals allow for the expression of one’s subjectivity, of at least a very broad if not infinite spectrum of values, then multiple frames of policy “inquiry” would more likely help educators develop policies and their concomitant practices that more closely approach the ideals.<sup>2</sup> But multiple frames alone will not help if the frames are all conditioned by the same epistemology. For example, among the more recent new frames is what has come to be known as “Critical pedagogy.” Although those engaged in “Critical pedagogy” have been sharp and helpful critics of modern education policies and practices regarding access, there is an inherent problem with their frame of inquiry as with the older frames. That problem is Modernity. Beginning with the Renaissance, the modern Western world has been shaped by a particular mode of thought characterized by the notion of “progress” to be achieved exclusively through the application of rational-empirical technologies in the domains of economics, politics, and social structures.

Because of its long trans-generational history, the influence of Modernity is so pervasive that the epistemological foundations of Modernity are rarely called into question by contemporary educators. More recently, some educators have been examining education policy from the perspective of poststructural/postmodern inquiry, which allows for possibilities of developing frameworks from the humanities (especially art, literature, and drama). This paper is an exploration into the possibility of using the insights and style of inquiry of Roberto Calasso, an Italian novelist, nonfiction writer, essayist, and publisher.

Calasso burst on the American literary scene in 1993, with his celebrated, *The Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony* (*Le nozze di Cadmo e Armonia*), in which he carefully examines ancient Greek myths that, to a large extent, inform Western thought and language. Classifying Calasso’s work is anything but easy. In the 12 April 1993 *New Yorker* the critic, describing a 1993 panel discussion on Calasso’s *Calamus* held at the Italian Consulate, noted that neither of the panelists, Susan Sontag, Simon Schama, or Joseph Brodsky, could quite define the book, “and it was this that delighted them most.” The critic went on to say that, “Apparently, it is not fiction, history, or literary criticism, not a collection of aphorisms or rhapsodic Cliff’s Notes on the classical, but a little of these, like the deities themselves, it is constantly changing form.”

Calasso’s most recent work is *Ka: Stories of the Mind and Gods of India*.<sup>3</sup> *Ka* is the third in a series of five books in which Calasso uses a literary style that places ideas and not characters at the center of sophisticated plots. In a recent review of *Ka*, Sunil Khilnani wrote of Calasso, “A writer with philosophical tastes, he thinks in stories rather than arguments or syllogisms.”<sup>4</sup> The discussion in this paper is built on Calasso’s second book in the series, *The Ruin of Kasch*, published by the Harvard University Press in 1994, originally published in 1983 as *La Ravina di Kasch* by Adelphi Edizioni.<sup>5</sup> Like his *Calamus*, *The Ruin of Kasch* leaves readers at a loss to classify it in any particular genre. In a review of this work, Khilnani wrote:

In this brilliant work, Roberto Calasso ... cracks the code of what Baudelaire named the Modern—the increasingly murderous period from the French Revolution to the end of World War II. From Talleyrand’s France and the legendary African city of Kasch, to Lenin’s Russia and the killing fields of Cambodia, Calasso leads us along an enticing maze of mythology, literature, art, and science to the heart of civilization, where he deciphers the deepest secrets of history.<sup>6</sup>

In a review of *Kasch* in *Civilization*, Jay Tolson commented that,

Calasso seems to have plundered no less than a national library to make this demanding but unflinching

provocative book. Its theme ... is the shallowness of the modern mind, and because of the very workings of modern culture that Calasso so astutely analyzes, I hesitate to apply to this book the epithet it richly deserves: masterpiece.... Like all great books, it reads us more than we read it. And like all great works of art or reflection, it may make you change your life.<sup>7</sup>

### **Controlling Notions of Modernity**

My particular project of inquiry has been the philosophical and historical grounding of the controlling notions of modern education and schooling. Included among these notions are *division*, *hierarchy*, *natural*, *normality*, and *repetition*, all operating in the service of *progress*. Along with many others, these notions are the tools and building blocks of the social dimensions of Modernity, which claims science as its epistemology foundation. In its nascent state, science was preoccupied with the classification of natural objects, which depend fundamentally on the notion of *division*. From the division of objects, science moved to the division of fact from value regarding the physical world. By the eighteenth century, these grounding notions of science were being used to explain the social world as well, signaling Modernity's transition from infancy to adolescence.

From the notion that division and its accomplice *hierarchy* were *natural*, the agents of Modernity would eventually appropriate other controlling constructs such as *evolution*, *systems*, *standards*, and, one of the more important notions, *mathematical probability*. The use of both scientific and mathematical notions to explain the social world began with the development of *political arithmetic*, the early analysis of population data to make political decisions. By A.D. 1800 this new method of analysis was being called *statistics*,<sup>8</sup> and was quickly added to the expanding repertoire of modern political technologies. By the nineteenth century the foundations of the full range of what we now call the "social sciences" was clearly in place. These "sciences" would constitute the scaffolds upon which the modern human would first be constructed then in a bloodless sacrifice offered to history in the name of progress.

Depending on the particular period of Modernity, these constructs borrowed from science separately or in elaborate combinations have been used to both construct and legitimate a differentiated social order. But Modernity surreptitiously only wears the mask of science. Lurking behind the mask is Modernity's ever expanding repertoire of technologies of order which exist materially only in the discursive elements, the proper names, that serve as surrogates for their operational notions. The origin of these correlate notions is the mind, not the materiality of *nature* that the physical sciences claim transcends the mind.

### **Social Order, Law, and Sacrifice**

In the *Ruin of Kasch*, Calasso uses the notion of *sacrifice* in an elaborate deconstruction of modern thought, which, to a very large degree, depends on the controlling constructs that are the substance of Modernity's extensive arsenal of technologies designed to control not only nature but humans as well. The most general technology is law. But "[l]aw presupposes itself. Therefore the law strives, but never actually manages to speak unambiguously at all times. Lacking this definitive clarity, the law asks, more modestly, that we not doubt its pronouncements too often. It is right, then, that the word 'law' itself should denote social rule and natural rule. It makes no difference whether these rules refer to a divine commandment or a statistical frequency; they are rules to which the world in general adheres. With these rules we can, almost always, live together. Nowadays, the law makes no claim to offer us any more than this." [162-163]

Calasso first deconstructs the relationship between social order and law by arguing that ... order is what law, on its own, cannot achieve.... (O)rder is law plus sacrifice, the perpetual supplement, the perpetual extra that must be destroyed so that order can exist. The world cannot live by law alone, because it needs order that law alone is unable to provide. The world needs to destroy something to make order; and it must destroy it outside the law, with pleasure, with hatred, with indifference. [148]

Calasso further argues that the most devastating destruction occurs whenever attempts are made to make law perfectly equal order. A visible, material example here would be the holocaust and the sacrificial furnaces of Auschwitz. But it is the seemingly endless profusion of sacrificial acts that operate invisibly through institutions such as education that are the most dangerous and devastating to the ideals of subjectivity and the autonomous self regarding access. But just how does sacrifice operate invisibly?

Unlike the early advocates of eugenics who depended on visible measurable characteristics of the physical body to explain human behavior, the modern social scientists, at least those not engaged in the currently popular genetic psychology, set about explaining human behaviors in terms of processes of the mind, and gave them names

such as *intelligence* and *hysteria*. Because these mental processes could not be seen, their materiality had to be “constructed” in the mind of the social scientist from evidence (traces) that could be observed—for example, responding vocally or in writing to tests that claim to measure a particular “construct,” such as *personality*. Because modern notions about order are borrowed from nature, mental constructs gain validity if they somehow can be attributed to nature, the paragon of *repetition*, which is the link between order and sacrifice.

Institutions function to both establish and maintain order. Like nature, institutional order depends on repetition, which is the function of policy. To qualify as a policy, a statement must prescribe a particular action to be repeated every time, without exception, whenever a particular condition obtains; therefore, policy is repetition itself. In the ideology of Modernity, repetition is aided and abetted by such notions as *systems*, which has its “natural” origins in biology; thus, “[s]acrifice is inscribed in our physiology. Any order, biological or social, is founded on an expulsion, on a quantity of consumed energy, because order must be smaller than the matter it orders. The only order without visible expulsion would be analogous to the metabolism of plant life. It would be a culture that managed to exist without being founded on difference, hence without any foundation at all—a culture indistinguishable from the rustling of a tree.” [149] In short, whether in nature or in culture, order, by its very definition, presupposes division; thus, without division there would be no need for culture. Likewise, in social structures as in nature, order can exist only if *surplus* can be eliminated, which is beyond the ability of law alone to balance the order equation.

For Calasso, “The impotence of the law stems from its inability to deal with surplus. The law presupposes an undivided subject. Sacrifice presupposes a dual subject: the sacrificer and the victim. And the surplus is, in fact, the victim. Therefore, the law is always the exoteric [the path of action] of sacrifice.” [148] The surplus that fuels Modernity’s sacrificial furnaces, its institutions, is human subjectivity.

### **The Origins of Sacrifice**

Calasso describes the origin of human sacrifice as the historical moment the divinity detached itself from the world which it created, “allowing it to live according to its own rules and no longer to divine whim. But the invisible chord between divinity and creation is not completely severed. The divinity can take back its world and intervene in it brutally: it can obliterate order, prevent stars from returning. Hence the sacrifice performed by men: along the same chord, which becomes a column of smoke rising from the sacred pipe, rises the human offering—that part of life which is not allowed to live unless it is reabsorbed by the sky from which it descended. In surrendering part of the world to the divinity, the sacrificer also wants the divinity to surrender the rest of the world to him, and to cease intervening in its arbitrary, uncontrollable way. The sacrificer also wants the divinity’s permission to use the world. Thus, the first consequence of the eclipse of sacrifice will be that the world will be used without restraint, without limit, without any part being devoted to something else.” [138] The Human arrives at this notion of sacrifice from observing the reoccurrences of nature; the seasons, the tides, the celestial bodies in the heavens where the divine resides. Each ceaseless repetition itself a sacrifice of nature to the divine so that nature itself can continue. The success of nature’s repetitive sacrificial offerings is the prototype for human sacrifice. The Aztecs engaged in conquests not for territory but for victims to sacrifice. The sacrificial act, repeated perhaps 20,000 times a year, was performed using a particular technique, the “obsidian butterfly,” to remove the heart of the victim as it still beats “which links the cavity of the wound to the All at the moment it is opened.” [135]

Unlike murder, which effects substitution by killing the one to be replaced, sacrifice presupposes that the replacement “will go on living in the replaced; since both are fragments of the ‘resonant substance’ from which the world was born, of which it is made.” [163-164] Substitution must be accompanied by deception, it must be devious, such as Jacob’s deception. His father Issac was blind; therefore, Jacob and his mother Rebekah could deceive Issac so that Jacob could get his father’s blessing rather than his curse. Jacob, pretending to be his elder brother Esau, offered him a “savory meat,” the slaughtered (sacrificed) kids from Issac’s own flock, the substitute for the venison promised Issac by Esau. In the requirements for bloodless sacrifice in Modernity, both substitution and deception take place through language.

The character of the reasoning behind the sacrificial act is circular: because the victim is sacred it is criminal to kill him, but the victim is sacred only because he is to be killed.<sup>9</sup> Christianity itself is sacrifice. The Father sacrificed his somewhat unwilling son Jesus for the sins of the Human, the Father’s own creation. As sinners we are both the victim and the sacrificers, the murderers. We murder ourselves through long suffering guilt in not being able to fully satisfy the Father; thus, “[s]acrifice is self elaborating guilt. It transforms murder into suicide.” [134] But how does sacrifice operate in Modernity, which effectively severed its connection to a divinity by going directly to

nature? The answer lies in what constitutes the sacrificial act itself.

### Modernity and the Sacrificial Act

To function, sacrifice needs surplus to offer in the name of order. Unlike the ancient times, the surplus in Modernity must not emit the least drop of blood when sacrificed; thus, the sacrificer, armed only with a writ of progress, requisitions human *subjectivity*, the always fertile, infinite domain of the psyche. Calasso explains this state of affairs by turning to the *Upanishads* of the ancient sacred Veda texts: “The basis of sacrifice lies in the fact that each one of us is two, not one. We are not a dense and uniform brick. Each of us consists of the two birds of the *Upanishads*, on the same branch of the cosmic tree: one eats, and the other watches the one that is eating.” [134] As exemplified in the *Upanishads*, this duality had a long tradition in the West up to at least German Romanticism, after which it was rejected in order to accommodate Modernity’s needs for order based on rational-empirical calculations. In a relatively short passage Calasso skillfully describes the rise and subsequent calling into question of modern Western thought and its attempts to obliterate any differences that might exist between the “Self” and the “I.”

[T]he official course of philosophy, the Locke-Hume-Kant sequence we find in textbooks, had always striven to erase any duality from the mind and tended to reduce the subject to the command center, whose reliability remained to be tested. The task of patiently checking the joints, a task undertaken by Kant, led finally to the shattering of the joints, which Nietzsche accomplished with his hammer. In the subject’s place an empty cavity now yawns. Obscure beings pass through it, like dolphins’ backs, momentary impulses. Meanwhile, science agreed to transform itself once and for all into a prosthesis, an apparatus fastened during laboratory hours to a subject, who conducted himself like a good citizen of the realm of Public Opinion. Yet within that very rigorous epistemological project, devoted to Ockham and to the elimination of all superfluity, the original duality of the subject would emerge once more. In the last years of the nineteenth century, when people began to talk about the paradoxes of set theory, another line began to emerge, one that would lead to Gödel and then spread in every direction: the sign of a definitive disruption, of the now recognized inadequacy of all language which would not include self-reference. And here, in the duality between a language that has a referent and that which has itself as referent, the two birds of the *Upanishads*, *tman* and *j v tman*, reappeared. At the very core of science, as at the core of Vedic ritual, the two birds once again exchange gazes, clinging to the same bough on the immense tree of life. [153-154]

Because sacrifice presupposes a surplus, a surplus must be readily available at all times or order will degenerate into chaos. The origin of the notion of surplus is in nature, it is “... the excess of nature with respect to culture, the part of nature that culture is obliged to gamble with, consume, destroy, consecrate. In the process of dealing with that excess, every culture draws its own portrait. Law tends toward monotony; its variations are paltry compared to the rich diversity of forms. And the variety of forms determines the range of sacrificial games.” [149] Humans consume ever increasing natural resources, all in the name of *progress*. The consumption, the use of the largest or even the smallest part of inorganic or organic nature seems not beyond justification. Entire mountains are leveled for the minerals they cover; tundras destroyed for the oil beneath them, rain forests for their exotic woods; genes manipulated to produce super bovine to meet the needs for super Big Macs; and, very soon, custom designed children for the super trendy “parent (s?).”

Regarding surplus, Calasso informs us that “[t]he sacrificial offering itself is the surplus which must be severed, expelled, celebrated, burned, because otherwise society would once again coincide with nature. That surplus is the disorder and the sequence of killings that precede the law, but it is also everything that exists prior to society and that secretly feeds it: the ‘hidden ocean’ of Varuna, without which the social order would dry up and crumble to dust.” [163]

But what of the excess, the surplus part of the Human that Modernity tries to explain away, ignore? The part that Nietzsche reawakens us to: Subjectivity. The solution for Modernity was to substitute names (e.g., *hysteria*) for those mental attributes assumed to have an effect on one’s behavior. But “The origin of substitution does not even lie in the ability to give names (and thus replace things with them). It lies in the ultimate and self-encompassing ability to shape mental images: invisible, fleeting, sporadic entities, states of awareness that overlap with what is perceived—or that even replace it, delete it. Here we witness the original bifurcation of the psyche; here the two birds of the *Upanishads* descend from the sky to cling to the same bough. The bird that eats is the one that is constantly *obliged* to perceive (to feed himself), by receiving stimuli. The other, the bird that watches, constantly superimposes his gaze on the gaze that the other bird trains on the world.” [141]

Paradoxically, while Modernity attempts to negate subjectivity, it calls on subjectivity itself--in the name of scientific inquiry--to "construct" (discover?) a seemingly never ending number of human mental pathologies appropriate for dividing one person from another. Nowhere is this more evident than in special education with its alphabet soup of labels affixed to each child at the modern sacrificial ritual par excellence, the IEP meeting. Here is where selected aspects of a child's self are declared abnormal and the character that defines the entire child is surgically replaced with a particular sequence of letters that signify a particular "diagnosed" pathology which best explains why the child-victim remains outside of society's norms.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

Modern techniques of performing the sacrificial act are bloodless yet more painful in that the victim does not die with the removal of a still beating heart. This living death is without mercy in that the victim must live with the deep remorse that he failed the divinity by being less than perfect. An efficient method of performing bloodless sacrifice is to enlist the aid of discourse that effects a more than adequate substitution for bloodless sacrifices.

The sacrificial act requires both a sacrificer and a victim to be sacrificed. To be a bloodless sacrificer for Modernity, one must already have substituted at least some observable trace for some aspect of the victim's hidden psyche. This is perfectly consistent with language itself because "The very act of naming, the arbitrary decision that enables a thing to be annulled and replaced with a sound, contains the same primordial murder that the sacrifice at once exposes and tries to heal. The continually renewed fabric of correspondences, the meanings each time attributed to the single syllable, to the single meter; it is all a vast attempt to mend the woof around that minuscule rent produced by the word, by the mental image that annuls a presence to evoke an absence, by the sign, by all that replaces something else that *sounds* for something else. Over this gap another magnificent edifice has been built, the opposite of that of the Vedic sacrifice, which in its incessant expansion seems both to foreshadow it and to want to conceal it, until the cycle rouses it in its present form, within us, around us." [137] Consequently, "Sacrifice gives canonical, repeatable form to a pair of actions: giving and taking. All meanings of these actions--without which communication, and hence society, cannot exist--are enclosed in sacrifice." [165]

Michel Foucault clearly saw the power of language as discourse in the construction of the modern human, and what he saw he did not like. For Foucault it is the use of history in the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. The Modern human used history as if it "is neutral, devoid of passions, and committed solely to truth." But if closely examined, the modern human would find that the various forms of scientific consciousness embedded in history were, as now, propelled by the *will to knowledge*. For Foucault, "[e]ven in its greatly expanded form it assumes today, the will to knowledge does not achieve a universal truth; man is not given an exact and serene mastery of nature. On the contrary, it ceaselessly manipulates the risks, creates dangers in every area; it breaks down illusory defenses; it dissolves the unity of the subject; it releases those elements of itself that are devoted to its subversion and destruction. Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence. Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the *subject* [emphasis added] of knowledge."<sup>10</sup>

ENDNOTES

1. See here, for example, *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, Supreme Court of the United States, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 178 (1943).
2. I have adopted the notion of “policy inquiry” instead of the more popular “policy analysis” because many have directly linked, if not completely replaced, “program evaluation” with policy analysis. Policy inquiry allows for a variety of frameworks for making judgements about policy.
3. Roberto Calasso, *Ka: Stories of the Mind and Gods of India* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
4. Sunil Khilnani, “The First Syllable,” review of *Ka: Stories of the Mind and Gods of India*, by Roberto Calasso, *New York Times Book Review*, 8 November 1998, 24.
5. Roberto Calasso, *The Ruin of Kasch* (Harvard University Press, 1994); Originally published in Italy in 1983 as *La Ravina di Kasch* by Adelphi Edizioni). Calasso has a somewhat unique style of citing quoted material. He eliminates the superscript and all other marks of reference except the quotation marks. This allows for much easier reading. In order to check a particular quote, the reader can refer to end notes where quotations are correlated to specific pages. In order to reduce the number of end notes for this paper, the page numbers of all quoted material from this book will be in brackets [ ] at the end of the quote.
6. Back cover of *The Ruin of Kasch*
7. Back cover of *The Ruin of Kasch*
8. Although its roots are in the Latin *status* (state) and the Greek *statistik* (study of political facts and figures), its early nineteenth century usage was more likely from the Italian *stato*, meaning state, and *statista*, a person who deals in the affairs of the state. Andres Hald *A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications Before 1750* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), 81.
9. Rene Girard *Violence and the Sacred*, trans., Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 1: Originally published in France as *La Violence et le sacrè* by Editions Bernard Grasset, 1972.
10. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, in Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977, 162-163.

## THE SOPHISTS

Louis Goldman  
Wichita State University

In his book, *The Social Philosophers*, Robert Nisbet writes, "Hateful though the idea may be to most of us, war can bring -- on the evidence has brought -- things the West has cherished: liberty, democracy, socialism, social welfare, civil rights, technological and scientific progress, and, perhaps above all else, the feeling, however temporary, of membership in a collective communal crusade."<sup>1</sup> Sometimes the "benefit" might never have come but for the war: radar and nuclear power, for example. More often the war hastened a development which might have come eventually: the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War, for example.

After the Great War during which the fate of democracy hung in the balance, a cluster of events and tendencies emerged. The enemy had conquered many colonies which had provided raw materials and markets for goods and had cut off many trade routes. Devoted to the production of weapons and supplies, the economy produced but a bare minimum of consumer goods. During the perilous struggle the democratic leaders portrayed the war as a contest between the forces of freedom and the forces of barbarism, and to achieve maximum solidarity at home and among the troops, either promised or implied that after the war all citizens would enjoy greater rights and privileges and a more perfect democracy.

When victory was won the trade routes were reopened, raw materials became available again, and the pent-up demands of the civilian population began to create an era of unprecedented postwar prosperity.<sup>2</sup>

For decades and even centuries before the war philosophers and scientists had built up systems of thought that purported to be based on their discoveries of the fundamental principles of nature and human nature. There were reason and order in all things and man was almost godlike in his ability to discern it. Similarly, in social affairs, through either inborn talents or age-old tradition, everyone had his (and her) proper place in the social hierarchy. Education revealed the nature of the physical world on the one hand and promoted the traditional values of society on the other.

But the postwar situation changed all of this. Now more and more people experienced economic success and social mobility. As material success became more and more possible, more and more people sought a new kind of education that was more practically or vocationally oriented, and began to abandon the older liberal studies. A radical individualism vied with traditional civic virtue for the loyalty of the young.

Claims of superiority by one culture or subculture or segment of society -- and hence its right to rule -- were undermined by arguments of cultural relativism. Claims of individuals to have specialized knowledge which justified their authoritative place in society was challenged by a relativistic or subjectivist philosophy. Older social relationships which were predicated on assumptions of hierarchy gave way to the new egalitarianism. And many teachers and philosophers came to feel that if hierarchical structures in society were to be challenged, so too must hierarchical structures in our understanding of nature.

The absence of any legitimate standard to measure truth or justice or the good or the beautiful led many to seriously believe that "image is everything," that there was no ultimate reality beyond perception. To be a great politician one had to be a great communicator, a great persuader, a great image-maker.

What has just been described is Athens in the fifth century B.C., a century that began with the Persian War and saw immense social change in its aftermath which transformed most institutions, not the least of which was education.

The seeds of this great transformation were sown at the close of the sixth century -- apparently in 509 B.C. - by Cleisthenes, "one of the most brilliant reformers -- or revolutionists -- in Western history."<sup>3</sup> Until then Athens had been ruled by four ancient tribes whose kinship culture was the basis of loyalty and morality. Cleisthenes nullified this centuries-old tradition in one single stroke. In place of the four tribes he created ten new organizations which he also called "tribes" -- but which had none of the kinship features of the old tribes -- which were constituted by all the free men of Athens, whatever their origins or social or economic positions. He further divided Athens into a hundred small townships called *demes*, all equal in size. "All Athenians would belong to one of the ten military tribes but also to one or other of the hundred territorial demes ... The ten demes belonging to each tribe were scattered throughout Athens, with no possibility, therefore, of forming any kind of alliance based upon mere

contiguity ... All freemen were obliged to vote and, when elected, to hold public office ... All able-bodied males ... were made constantly subject to military conscription -- The first clear instance in Western history of the military draft."<sup>4</sup> The basic unit of the state no longer rested on kinship. Now the individual was the ultimate unit, and his rights and responsibilities were being delineated.

The Persian War began soon afterwards in 499 B.C. and lasted for twenty years, when in 479 B.C. the Greeks inflicted a devastating defeat on the Persians at the battle of Plataea, killing tens of thousands -- perhaps hundreds of thousands -- of Persians while suffering only a few hundred casualties themselves. (It sounds like the recent Gulf War.) The Dardanelles or Hellespont was reopened to Greek shipping and trade with the Black Sea; the Ionian coastal colonies were regained, and an era of commercial prosperity began. Kerfeld writes that "Greece as a whole in the fifth century B.C. would appear to have surpassed all previous periods in the products of agriculture, industry and trade ... private affluence was very much greater than in earlier generations at Athens, or indeed in other Greek cities."<sup>5</sup>

About 462 B.C. Pericles emerged as the great leader of his era and further reforms were instituted. Among them was the selection of many political positions by lot rather than by vote and payment of officeholders. Now any freeman could suddenly find himself in a responsible legislative position, and it quickly became apparent that his success in his new role depended in part upon his ability to persuade others to accept his policies while simultaneously refuting the policies of his opponents. A similar emphasis on persuasive speech and refutational logic came from the judicial practice of requiring both plaintiff and defendant to argue his own case. Athenian commercial activity generated many contractual disputes, making Athens an extremely litigious<sup>6</sup> society. Success in business often depended upon success in the courts. Hence, from two sources arose the need or desirability of becoming proficient in verbal disputation, and the subjects of rhetoric and logic assumed a high priority in the education of the young. The older pedagogues resisted this new emphasis and sought to retain their traditional emphasis on physical education and Homer, so the new curriculum was in the hands of foreigners who saw the opportunity to capitalize on their teaching and earn handsome fees from *the nouveau riche* of Athenian society, the pro-democratic, upwardly mobile merchant class. This class was also Pericles' constituency and soon these teachers, now called Sophists, saw that his emphasis on individualism and democracy coincided with theirs. They became champions of Pericles' democratic reforms and Pericles became an advocate of their teachings and formed a close relationship with the greatest of them, Protagoras.

The Sophists were to make many significant contributions to the theory and practice of education which any brief history of education will enumerate. Here I will stress that they were the first *humanists* in our Western tradition, and I will examine the two most prominent pronouncements made by them to substantiate this claim.

The first is the most famous, Protagoras' dictum that "man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are and of things that are not, that they are not," the opening sentence of his major work, *Truth*. The rest of the book is unknown to us, so we are free to interpret his intention.

On one level we can take Protagoras to mean that each individual man determines for himself what is real, true, beautiful, etc. and the empiricism, if not the sensationalism, of the Sophists generally supports this subjectivistic interpretation. Kerfeld spends many pages arguing this interpretation.

However, men do not usually have idiosyncratic ideas and values. Rather, they tend to conform to those of their peers and communities. Hence, perhaps, a better interpretation is that groups of men -- that is, cultures -- are the measure of all things. Earlier philosophers had already remarked that if elephants had gods they would have trunks, and the gods of the Ethiopians would be black. Protagoras' position, then, was one of cultural relativism, consistent with many other anthropological themes in his thought.

Perhaps this *homo mensura* doctrine is even more profoundly epistemological than axiological. Consider my favorite saying of Spinoza: What Peter tells us about Paul tells us more about Peter than about Paul. All of our judgments about the world, after all, are *our* judgments and reveal *our* interests, preferences, abilities, etc.

Vico and Herder continue the humanistic Sophist tradition by developing notions of *volkgeist* or *zeitgeist* to show that our ideas and values are shaped by cultural forces and our place and time, respectively.

Immanuel Kant, perhaps, took Protagoras one step further. It is not the individual man or a group of men, but the quality of the human mind as such, the innate categories of human apprehension -- space, time, causality -- that shapes or measures all things.

And doesn't Heisenberg follow in this same tradition when he asserts that the act of observation disturbs the

thing being observed? We never know the thing-in-itself *das ding an sich*, but always the thing as we make it.

More recently the theories of Thomas Kuhn<sup>7</sup> agree with the Sophistic denial of a knowable objective reality. For Kuhn, our ideas are functions of an underlying paradigm, akin to Stephen Pepper's world hypothesis.<sup>8</sup> Paradigms are not true or fake; they are abandoned and accepted based on how well they satisfy our prevailing interests or needs.

And if we can never simply passively receive impressions but, of necessity, always contribute to our experience, are not the contemporary educational constructivists the latest in a long line of Protagoras' disciples?

Almost as highly regarded and influential as Protagoras was his colleague Gorgias. Foremost among the fragments we have of his work *On Nature or Non-Being* was the terse pronouncement that "Nothing is; if it were, we could not know it; if we could know it, we could not communicate it."

What are we to make of this pronouncement? My favorite approach is to first clarify what and whom a thinker is philosophizing against and what and whom a thinker is philosophizing for. Here, I think, it is apparent that Gorgias is putting himself in opposition to the doctrine of Parmenides who denied the possibility of the existence of non-being and its consequence for change and pluralism, asserting that Being was one and unchanging. And apart from his substantial differences with Parmenides it seems clear that Gorgias is also demonstrating the Sophistic boast that they could take the opposing position on any issue and argue it with conviction and persuasiveness. (Gorgias was also opposing the whole Pre-Socratic attempt to discover an objective *physis*.)

And in doing this Gorgias is obviously reinforcing the agnosticism of Protagoras and other Sophists. Recall Protagoras' statement on the nature of the gods: "With regard to the gods, I cannot feel sure either that they are or that they are not, nor what they are like in figure; for there are many things that hinder sure knowledge, the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." For these antireligious views Protagoras was banished from Athens.

Gorgias shared Protagoras' position, but, perhaps for political reasons, stated his views in a metaphysical rather than theological mode. We can easily convert his pronouncement:

- 1) Nothing is = There is no ultimate Being = There is no God.
- 2) If there were we could not know it = If there were a God He would be neither Temporal (i.e., eternal) nor spatial (i.e., omnipresent) nor material (i.e., spiritual). Man's knowledge is conditioned by his temporal, spatial and material nature. How can we know anything beyond our nature?
- 3) If we could know it we could not communicate it = We cannot know God through our sense perceptions. If we had a faculty for transcending experience, whether we call it intuition or revelation, we could not communicate it to others since our language is based on our sense experience. What could we predicate of God? Is He tall or short, male or female, black or white? Of course not! So Being, or God, is ineffable. This has not stopped legions of philosophers and theologians from trying to eff the ineffable and ignoring skeptics from Gorgias to Wittgenstein who concluded his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* with "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent."<sup>9</sup>

Greek culture provided us with the distinction -- or opposition -- of *physis* and *techne*. *Physis* is understood as *nature*, that which is apart from human intervention. *Techne*, on the other hand, encompasses the whole range of human intervention or invention. It includes language, culture, the arts -- everything which transcends nature or has transformed nature.

Sixth century Greece was the era of *physis* when the Pre-Socratic philosophers from Thales onward explored the nature of nature. Some of them, as I have remarked, were keenly aware of the human ingredient -- the *techne* -- which infused our ideas of reality and sometimes distorted them.

In the fifth century, the focus swung toward *techne* and away from *physis*. It is embraced most zealously by the Sophists, often in complete denial of *physis*, and permeates all other aspects of the 5th century Greek mind. Read Sophocles' paeon (in the *Antigone*) "O what a wondrous work is man --" Read Pericles' funeral oration, overflowing with pride in Athens and its *techne*.

Of course, as there can be no dark without light, no high without low, there can be no *physis* without *techne*, no *techne* without *physis*. Our existence, our universe, is a transaction between the two, and while a zealous attention to one or the other often produces dramatic and profound insights, the two are inseparable.

My old teacher, John Herman Randall, Jr. at Columbia, used to say that there were two kinds of philosophers: the "nothing-but" (or reductionist) type and the "and also" type. I honor the Sophists for their brilliant grasp of the implications of *techne*, their denial of *physis*, and their initiation of a great humanistic, often liberal,

tradition that usually celebrated man and his powers and consequently democratic government. But Professor Randall's teaching has stayed with me. We can glory in change and refreshing novelty, but with it all we should not ignore the permanencies in existence. We may glory in diversity and marvel at the variety of God's or nature's creation, but we should also cherish commonalities and universals, lest we foster chaos.

I began this paper with a description of a Great War and its postwar consequences, and though I was describing the Persian War and its aftermath, I fashioned it to sound as if I were describing our present day, and, indeed, much of what I have said is absolutely relevant today. The names have changed but the theories are basically the same. The Sophists are alive and well; we call them Post-Modernists.

#### ENDNOTES

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WITTGENSTEIN, BEHAVIORISM, AND EDUCATION

Joe Green  
Texas Tech University

Philosophers of education remain, for the most part, relatively uncomfortable with the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is understandable for a number of reasons, and on different levels. First, for the most part, Wittgenstein's ideas are quite technical compared to those of normative philosophers of education, who are actuated largely by issues that are political, sociological, or economic, and mainly by problems of schooling. Secondly, because he is not readily accessible to most philosophers of education -- for whatever reasons there might be -- Wittgenstein's philosophy is often either not understood or is misunderstood. This paper is aimed at alleviating a major misunderstanding surrounding one aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, one which seems to cloud many of its other aspects. I refer to the relationship of Wittgenstein's philosophy to behaviorism, and by extension, to his philosophy of mind.

Following my presentation of these ideas at the annual meeting of the Society for the Philosophy and History of Education at the University of Oklahoma on September 25, 1998, I was asked lightheartedly by the spouse of a colleague, both of whom had graciously attended my session, "Why do the things you said even need to be said at all?" I tried to answer the question, but I'm afraid my reaction was neither very clear nor very satisfying. I can only say that, since Descartes' philosophy of the seventeenth century, and to some extent since that of Aquinas of the thirteenth century, western philosophy has been more or less in the grips of one or another kind of mind-body dualism which many philosophers (myself included) find untenable, but which presents logical difficulties of a fundamental sort. A consequence of this extended metaphysical dualism is that the grammar of our ordinary language is inadvertently inaccurate, often in systematically misleading ways. These inaccuracies, some of which are discussed herein, end up going unnoticed by many serious thinkers, not to mention others less interested in truth and meaning. Finally, our conceptual clarity and understanding are negatively affected, a fact which, where educational theory, policy, and even practice are concerned, creates problems that need not exist. These problems (conceptual and linguistic) are obfuscatory in ways that deter not only the achievement of educational aims and objectives, but quite often preclude our clear statement of these.

For me, the work of the later Wittgenstein is foundational in its implications for the resolution (or, more accurately "dissolution") of this genre of problems. Yet, I sense from the literature of philosophy of education, that Wittgenstein's ideas remain largely unknown or misunderstood as they pertain to certain forms of educational and psychological theory. Here I wish to consider one such theory, or family of theories, -- behaviorism. The point is mainly to show that Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist in any of that theory's variant forms, but that he laid a solid claim for the necessity of behavioral criteria in making truth claims about other minds. The same cannot be said about claims to knowledge of one's own mind, owing to the fact that the former kind of knowledge is indirect, while the latter is direct.

The point may seem to some to be exceptionally abstruse, or even useless or irrelevant to others. But it seems foundational in situations where processes of student assessment, evaluation, grading, and so forth are pursued on the basis of one or another kind of behavioral theory.<sup>1</sup>

In order to keep things fairly simple, I call attention to an article on "Behaviorism" in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. The author sets about to distinguish two kinds of behaviorism: (1) scientific (psychological, methodological) and (2) philosophical (logical, analytical).<sup>2</sup> While this piece is interesting if fairly brief (less than one page), it fails in its somewhat indefinite conclusion that in Wittgenstein's later work can be located the germ cell of a recent version of philosophical behaviorism. The author is correct in pointing out that Wittgenstein "... argues that the epistemic criteria for the applicability of mentalistic terms cannot be private, introspectively accessible inner states but must instead be intersubjectively observable behavior."<sup>3</sup> He then concludes with a non sequitur, inferring that, "Wittgenstein's behaviorism seems to be consistent with metaphysical mind-body dualism...."<sup>4</sup> Granting that this is a dictionary article, it strikes me as quite useless in its contribution to a beginner's literature on Wittgenstein, especially as it might lead one into that body of serious work which seeks to understand, appreciate, and, perhaps, explicate Wittgenstein's stance on the epistemic role of behavior.

A more careful treatment of this problem may be found in Ronald Suter's interpretive work on

Wittgenstein. In a chapter titled "Behaviorism: Logical, Philosophical, Metaphysical," Suter argues that these "... are not three different types of behaviorism," but they should be taken "as roughly synonymous" terms.<sup>5</sup> He does so on the ground that their arguments "are alleged to be true solely on the basis of the meaning of the words of which the analyses are composed."<sup>6</sup> In locating this common quality in logical, philosophical, and metaphysical sources of behaviorism, Suter establishes a necessary condition for his claim that Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist, but may be acknowledged to be a quasi-behaviorist. While this claim might seem a trifle to the casual reader, it is a powerful requirement for those who would read Wittgenstein accurately.

Following a summary of behavioristic arguments, Suter argues that Wittgenstein is actually a "criteriologist" on the ground that his philosophy "makes a claim about the meaning of psychological words, connecting them with behavioral terms."<sup>7</sup> This, he argues, is why Wittgenstein should appropriately be termed a quasi-behaviorist: He makes nothing so strong as the behaviorists' claim concerning psychological terms, i.e., that there exist behavioral conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the meanings of all such notions. Rather, Wittgenstein claims that there must be behavioral criteria by which an "inner process" (desire, admiration, grief, contrition, modesty, etc.) may be known and expressed in second- and third-person statements. This is to contend, in Wittgenstein's words, that "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."<sup>8</sup> It suggests that when we assert that one thing constitutes a "criterion for" another thing, these have a two-place, irreflexive, nonsymmetrical relationship.<sup>9</sup> In asserting such, Wittgenstein is concerned primarily to describe and understand mentalistic images and psychological terms. For him, these exist independent of language, but can be said to be known only by means of language or some other form of behavior. Thus, mental images and psychological terms possess an ontological status distinct from their manifestations, and that these can accurately be claimed to be "known" by means of some appeal to behavioral criteria. If, for example, in the claim that "X knows P about Y," where P represents a mentalistic or psychological state or term, the claim requires some form of behavior exhibited by Y. It is this behavior that constitutes a criterion (or criteria) upon which the claim has a basis. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein is accurately appreciated as a quasi-behaviorist -- or, specifically as a criteriologist. The behavior may provide sufficient conditions for certain claims about second- or third-person psychological states, and it may be insufficient concerning others. Nevertheless, for Wittgenstein, a person's mental or psychological state and the behavior by which truth claims about such states are made possible, are logically separable. Neither the state nor the behavior is reducible to the other.

Logically, where one thing is a criterion for another thing, the two possess a two-place predicate relation, which also suggests that the two are not identical. To state that "X is a 'criterion for' Y" is to imply an irreflexive relation, just as the term "criterion for" implies that X and Y occupy a relationship that is nonsymmetrical. Thus, clapping one's hands and cheering impulsively at a football game is a criterion of delight at a play or series of events that has just occurred on the field. The asymmetry of the psychological state (delight) and the behavior (clapping, cheering) becomes clear when we consider that while clapping and cheering are a criterion for delight, delight is not a criterion for clapping and cheering. Moreover, a relation "is irreflexive if and only if for no object 'a' is 'aRa' true. Thus 'is lighter than' is an irreflexive relation since no object is lighter than itself."<sup>10</sup>

In his analysis of this Wittgensteinian notion of criteria, Suter offers the following characteristics which, collectively, constitute a conceptual framework.<sup>11</sup> (1) There may exist several criteria for the same state of affairs. (2) While a criterion constitutes a kind of evidence for the existence of a state of affairs, it is not just any kind of evidence. Circumstances must be normal for this to be the case, a point which precludes certain behaviors emanating from dramatic acting, role playing, or untruthfulness. (3) Satisfying a criterion is not logically decisive. (4) A distinction exists between a criterion and plain empirical evidence, although, as previously stated, a criterion is a certain kind of evidence. For example, the fact that my car is parked in my faculty parking spot at Texas Tech University is evidence that I am in my office. Yet this is not a criterion for faculty members being in their offices, nor can it be viewed as a criterion for my being in my office. (5) A criterion is stronger than mere evidence. Indeed, a criterion is something that possesses a recognizable conceptual relation to the state of affairs it represents or suggests. Accordingly, we are compelled to agree that frowns, curses, gnashing of teeth, and clenching of fists are behaviors ordinarily associated with anger. They are criteria, though neither necessary nor sufficient ones. But still, if a person asks, "But what do frowns, curses, gnashing of teeth, and clenching of fists have to do with anger?" We should be astonished. We would pause and wonder: "Has he never seen a cartoon? Is he a Martian in disguise as a human?" But, philosophically, we would suspect that he does not know or understand what it means to be angry. (6)

Suter points out the following implication of the claim that "X is evidence for Y:"

A test for whether X is a criterion for Y is always: could you completely understand the meaning "Y" without having grasped the connection between X and Y? If the answer is yes, X is not a criterion for Y, though it may be evidence for Y. If the answer is no, X is a criterion for Y. Talk of completely understanding the meaning of an expression indicates that this notion is subject to degree: a person can understand the meaning of an expression to a greater or lesser extent; it is not a matter of all or nothing.<sup>12</sup>

The final two characteristics of Wittgenstein's criteriological framework of understanding and meaning are as follows, "(7) Criteria for mental events are not always directly observable, a claim which is supportive of the conclusion that Wittgenstein is a quasi-behaviorist and not a full blown philosophical, metaphysical, or logical behaviorist. Frequently a criterion may be a propensity, a capability, or a capacity. Following Anthony Kenny, Suter cites the following passage from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: "How are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such? -- The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion."<sup>13</sup> Thus, the capability of a person to, say, extract a square root, can be a criterion for having meant this or that, say, addition by the plus sign, or subtraction by the minus sign. (8) Finally, psychological concepts are not always employed on the basis of criteria. Wittgenstein argues that criteria are valid only with reference to second- and third-person reports of psychological concepts. This means that a person does not identify her or his own sensations by criteria. Of oneself, it is inaccurate to say, "I know I am in a state of anguish." It is correct to say, "I am in a state of anguish." Such a person does not "know" he is in anguish in the same way, logically speaking, that he knows another person is or was in anguish. In first-person terms, one experiences anguish directly. In second- and third-person terms, anguish is a state of mind knowable and/or claimed by means of criteria that are not necessary or valid in first-person terms. Thus, "I know I am in anguish" is a grammatically puzzling remark, because it suggests a reduction of a mental state to criteria for "knowing" which are only valid in second- or third-person statements.

The asymmetry between criteria and the things criteria are for is furthered by our recognition of how we use psychological language in our lives. Wittgenstein finds it impossible not to employ criteria as reasons for holding that other persons are in one or another psychological state -- envy, anger, a mystic ardor, infatuation, joy, frustration, despair, and so forth. Our keenness in appreciating a complex variety of behavioral criteria explains the wide range of differences in our abilities -- to know other minds, abilities which, according to certain psychologists (like Howard Gardner, for example), amount to a discreet form of intelligence. Our knowledge of other minds, necessarily based on behavioral criteria, is of a different category than our "knowledge" of our own minds, which is direct and not based on criteria. This distinction, found in our use of psychological language, allows us to recognize as nonsense such a statement as "I know I feel joy," since an emotive state, such as joy, is apprehended directly by the person who is in such a state, and is thus not "known" by an appeal to criteria. It is sufficient to say, as our children might demonstrate for us in their elemental language, "I am happy," and not, "I know I am happy." The logic, then, of using psychological predicates to speak of other persons, is altogether different from that employed with reference to ourselves. Suter declares, "This asymmetry in the use of psychological and mental predicates -- between first-person present-tense and second- and third-person present tense -- we may take as one of the special marks of the mental. Physical predicates display no such asymmetry."<sup>14</sup> The philosophical issues that emerge from, for example, predicate logic of the sort outlined here, represent, in large part, philosophers' refusal "to accept the workings of our language, even though they know perfectly well how to use the language."<sup>15</sup>

Following this outline of Wittgenstein's quasi-behaviorism, educators may rightly wish to inquire into its implications for education and its manifold aspects -- teaching, schooling, learning, knowledge, motivation, inquiry, and so forth. For purposes of parsimony, I shall consider schooling, which is only one of these, keeping an awareness that schooling is an aspect, or perhaps a means, to educating. (Note: Some who find the educational bureaucracy incorrigible might wish to reverse this means/end relationship in the interest of truth.) I choose schooling because it is probably the most concrete of the notions mentioned above, and, as such, requires relatively little stipulation or conceptual analysis. Moreover, the idea of school involves each of the other aforementioned aspects of education in logical and obvious ways.

Schools are fertile sites for the study of behavioral language and the logics which drive it. In fact, the range of usage concerning and employing psychological terms and mental states is so broad as to be practically impossible to summarize without creating arbitrary reductivist categories. Much of this language is cogent, while much is so

misappropriated as to be absurd. Perhaps the least cogent of the prevailing theories of behaviorism are those that reduce mind to overtly observable behavior. If we are to believe Wittgenstein, this is untenable because it denies the autonomy of inner experience. While psychological predicates and mentalistic terms can be accompanied by behavioral criteria for ascribing second- and third-person meanings to such statements, the mental state itself is not reducible to its criteria. Philosophically, Wittgenstein's arguments concerning other minds afford a basis for the most effective critique of crude behaviorism -- i.e., the type which "identifies the mental phenomenon with a piece of actual behavior. Such behaviorists are rare,"<sup>16</sup> Suter believes, "but Skinner sometimes sounds like one; he seems not to like dispositional terms." For example, he writes, "When we say, 'I have an idea; let's try the rear door; it may be unlocked,' what is 'had' is the behavior of trying the rear door."<sup>17</sup>

Under Wittgenstein's view, Skinner's argument illustrates a logical error in our attempts to understand other minds. While it is a tempting one for a variety of reasons, among the most compelling of these is that it resolves the mind-body problem formalized by Descartes, one which separates the mental from the physical in a discreet way.<sup>18</sup> But the behaviorist resolution is really no resolution at all, since it eliminates the mental by reducing it to the physical. Thus, it represents merely a reversal of the Platonic argument, which reduces body (behavior) to mind. This is the sort of misunderstanding that has too often subjugated the mental to behavior in schools through a misuse of behavioral objectives, performance-based teaching and evaluation, and, - worst of all in its oversimplification -- competency-based teacher education, the activities of teaching, the processes of student learning, and student, teacher, and program evaluation.

This is, I believe, a large part of what Charles Silberman was talking about in his book *Crisis in the Classroom* in the early 1970s when he characterized conventional approaches to teaching and curriculum as exercises in "mindlessness." Much has been offered by normative and analytic philosophers on such themes as aims and objectives, as well as on most other educational concepts. But schooling is ill-fitted to get very far beyond one or another type of behaviorism in its quest for understanding students' minds, or other minds in general. This is true, in part, because of schooling's endemic strain to exercise its custodial and social control functions. Moreover, its overall "form" places the school at some disadvantage here. In attempting to educate (or process) large numbers of children and youth, it necessarily resorts to, at best, an alienating bureaucracy, and hence places a further impediment between its more noble aims and its thoughtful consideration of problems of mind. Finally, there is the reality that school always, to some degree, mirrors the values, social problems, and knowledge of the society at large. To the extent that anti-virtues exist in a society (racism, sexism, and other forms of social bias, supernaturalism, etc.), the school can hardly avoid the negative influences of these factors, which, by definition, inhibit its sensitivity to problems of mind in education. (I should note that when I refer to the school's "sensitivity" to issues of mind, I am referring in an aggregate way to persons involved in schooling, including what sociologists and anthropologists mean when they refer to "the culture of schooling.")

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In making this argument, strong credit must be given to Ronald Suter, whose book, *Interpreting Wittgenstein: A Cloud of Philosophy, a Drop of Grammar* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), has been indispensable. It is, in my judgement, the best single secondary source available to those who desire an introduction to Wittgenstein's later work.

1. Marras, A. "Behaviorism," gen. ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 67-68.
2. Ibid., p. 68. This view by Marras is successfully refuted in Ronald Suter's book, cited above. The importance of Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of private languages is that, if correct, it undercuts subjectivist philosophies such as phenomenology. In short, if Wittgenstein's argument is true, phenomenology is wrong in its basic tenets. This argument is summarized clearly in Stephen Priest, *Theories of the Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), pp. 56-64.
3. Marras, p. 68.
4. Suter, p. 61. The chapter cited is Chapter 4, pp. 61-72.
5. Ibid., p. 61.
6. Ibid., p. 62.
7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1953, 1968), #580.
8. Suter, pp. 139-140. Cf. Wittgenstein, #146, #222, and #377 as sources cited by Suter.
9. Suter, p. 239.
10. Ibid., passim. My outline of the following eight points in Wittgenstein's criteriological/conceptual framework is abstracted and adapted from Suter's analysis.
11. Suter, p. 145.
12. Wittgenstein, #692; cited in Suter, Ibid.
13. Suter, pp. 152-153.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 63.
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17. The corpus of secondary literature on Descartes' dualism and its central problem of the *cogito* is quite enormous. For a nonphilosophical introduction to this problem, I recommend Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994). The author is a scientist and a physician.

INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Taiebeh Hosseinali  
Blackburn College

I believe that there is a time when everyone might need and seek help to get his or her life in order. Family, friends, relatives, teachers, or colleagues are not always available or able to help. In the United States more than any other nation, some people are trained for mental and emotional help. Psychologists, counselors, and social workers are among those whom society depends upon for help regarding psychological and mental disorders.

Trust is the most important factor in a therapist-patient relation. The problem of trust gets more complex when the patient comes from a different cultural, ethnic, and/or racial background. The critical question of trust for a minority is whether or not the therapist is able to see the issue from the patient's point of view. Is he or she aware of patients' cultural values, deprivations, deficiencies and problems? When he or she agreed to see the patient, did he or she think about the problem of cultural differences? How experienced is the therapist regarding multicultural treatment?

Being from a different culture and knowing what it means to be "different," helps me to better understand the problems in the multicultural therapy. Do the counseling or psychology programs in the United States include any course in multicultural therapy? What is an ethical approach to this problem? How would a careless approach affect a patient?

**Minorities: An attitude toward the therapist, A self-image**

The United States is probably the most culturally diverse country in the world. Studies indicate that by the year 2000, the minority or ethnic population of the United States will be 30 percent of the whole population (Parker, 1988). Culture consists of the behavior patterns, symbols, institutions, values, and other man made components of society. It is the unique achievement of a human group that distinguishes it from other human groups (Banks, 1981). Every society, community, or culture has problems of its own. With the minorities in a country, these problems arise because these minorities have their own special needs. They also have their deficiencies considering adaptation to the rules and regulations of the dominant society. Some minorities have left their motherland, which causes them to miss some values from their homeland. They may also lack the awareness of the culture and values of the dominant culture.

In recent years, as racial and ethnic minority groups have become a more visible, vocal, and socioeconomically viable part of society, counselors have found it necessary, for a variety of reasons, to assess their efficacy relative to meeting the mental help needs of the persons from such groups. Most of the evidence resulting from this assessment indicates that the profession as a whole is failing to effectively meet the mental help needs of racial and ethnic minorities (Ponterotto and Cases, 1987).

**Stereotyping**

One of the prominent problems that minorities face is the prejudgement or stereotype with which the dominant society has branded the minorities. Allport (1958) describes "stereotype" as a standardized concept or image invested with special meaning and held in common by members of a group. Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Orientals are all stereotyped with special characteristics.

These stereotypes are bad per se, but when it comes to therapy, the problem becomes even more critical. How is it possible for a counselor who is unaware of the cultural backgrounds, values, basic issues and concerns of ethnic minorities and, moreover, laden with stereotypes, to help a member of that group? The majority of the counselors in the United States are from the White Anglo-Saxon Race. They come from the Anglo-Saxon Protestant descent. A great number of them might not have had contact with minorities for the most part of their lives.

The minorities are not spread evenly across the United States. People in California, especially Los Angeles and San Francisco, have a better view of ethnic minorities especially Orientals and Hispanics. In the Midwest where the middle class is dominant, with the members of the society belonging to smaller communities, people are not in contact with minorities as they are in large cities. Attitudes toward minorities and even people from other parts of the nation differ on the East Coast (with the exception of big cities like New York or Washington, D.C.).

Counselors, teachers, and other helpers, who most frequently do not know or understand their minority clients, place conscious or unconscious limitations on their chance to succeed. Some counselors, like the society at

large, may still view native Americans as wild beasts with limited potential. Many still view Asian Americans as those with technological or mathematical minds who have no place in a wide variety of existing occupations. Too many still think of Blacks as servants whose role is to make life comfortable for White superiors. Likewise, many see Hispanics as servants or those preoccupied with sex. Counselors who view ethnic minorities in these limiting ways, or have similar attitudes toward them, treat them in these limiting ways. For example, many counselors do not assist minority high school students toward college admission because they believe that minority students do not belong in colleges and universities (Parker, 1988).

Counseling is based on mutual respect, acceptance, and belief in the client's abilities to solve his or her problems. These therapeutic conditions are threatened when counselors perceive their clients as inferior or when counselors have low expectations of clients' abilities to succeed.

On the other hand, foreigners and minorities have their own codes for Americans. They think that Americans are cold, insensitive, and materialistic. This stereotype on the patient's side hardens the situation just as it does for the therapist.

Another point of concern in counseling or treating people from a culturally different background which makes the issue of awareness essential to the therapists (especially counselors) is that almost all universities in the United States have a number of foreign students, and almost all major institutions where foreign students attend have counseling centers. Foreign students refer to these centers due to the fact that the international students face enormous pressures and problems. International students experience differences in climate, food, social values, modes of behavior, and verbal and nonverbal communication (Dillard, Chisolm, 1983).

Although most international students have been academically successful in their native lands, many experience new and stressful academic pressures on college campuses in the United States. Feeling deprived of their personal and cultural identities, these students attempt to regain their once familiar world and self-identity through forming informal microcosms or subgroups that provide valuable support systems. In these support systems they find others who share the same problems with them.

International students have to struggle with their personal problems alone. Chu, Yeh, Klein, Alexander, and Miller state that the most important problem that international students are concerned with is their academic adjustment. They must deal with their financial states, housing arrangements, course schedules, and scholastic performances. These are more important concerns for international students than their social contacts and being homesick. Although the psychological stress within those cultures is usually handled within a social and cultural context by family members and peers, the need of international students for professional counseling assistance is often greater than that of the American students.

It seems, however, that counselors cannot expect all international students to engage in warm, intimate relationships during counseling. Many students, just as is the case with the minority members, stop seeing the counselor after a few sessions. The reasons should be found within the counselor.

When international students or members of minorities seek help from a therapist, they are expecting to see signs of awareness and consciousness of their special situation in the first couple of sessions. If they do not feel this, they are not willing to continue the treatment.

#### **Training Psychologists and Counselors in Multicultural Awareness**

Training is a popular response to the demands placed on individuals confronting work in settings that involve interpersonal communication with individuals of different cultural backgrounds. The most frequently occurring form of intercultural training is offered for individuals facing work in a foreign culture. This type of training has been offered most extensively to persons in business, politics, foreign affairs, or international finance.

Currently, counseling psychologists in training programs around the country are confronted with a similar task, that of training practitioners who are capable of demonstrating effectiveness with individuals from a wide variety of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Success appears to have been achieved by organizational psychologists in making trainees aware of differences in international cultures. In terms of teaching trainees what to do about differences in international cultures, there seems to be much less success.

In the case of both counseling psychology and organizational psychology there is a need to design training strategies that go beyond teaching trainees to "know that" cultural differences exist and move toward teaching them to "know how" to conduct their work with individuals from a wide array of cultural backgrounds effectively (Johnson, 1987).

Advocates of programs for counseling and therapists' multicultural awareness have many suggestions for the improvement of the situation. The basic proposal is that universities should offer courses in multicultural counseling. Ponterotto and Cases have identified the leading cross-cultural training programs and universities which offer those programs. More practical suggestions are given to psychologists and counselors in order to help them gain an awareness of their abilities and disabilities in relation to teaching culturally diverse groups. The very first step is that the therapists must thoroughly know themselves. The belief is that barriers to the development of a flexible counselor lie within the therapist, within the profession, and within the society (Sue, 1981). Hulnick (1977) emphasized that counselors must know themselves, their inhibitions, and issues that will cause them problems before working with others. He stated that counselors who can identify and work through their own problems would be more effective with their clients than counselors who do not work through these problems. Knowing oneself is the basis for overcoming the barriers to the development of a culturally flexible counselor. Sue also suggests that within the counselors are the obstacles of ethnocentrism, prejudice, stereotypes and other preconceptions regarding minorities.

Parker (1988) suggests that in addition to self-knowledge, the lack of specified categories of cultural knowledge is a barrier to developing cultural flexibility in counselors. Harper (1973), in regard to counseling Blacks in America, suggests that if therapists are to broaden their perceptual fields, understand the world of the Black client, and be able to relate interpersonally across race barriers, they must learn the history, sociology, economics, and psychology of Black Americans. Sue (1978) proposed that counselors must understand the world view of ethnic minority individuals. The therapist should at least have a notion of the values of a nation, nationality, or minority prior to starting the treatment.

Parker also suggests that action will help therapists gain a better view of minorities. Through multicultural action planning the therapist will gain a better understanding of the patient by having more contact with them. Among different suggestions for making those contacts are:

1. Attend a lecture that focuses on ethnic minority issues and concerns.
2. Make a tour of an ethnic community, observing the community's environment such as quality of homes, condition of lawns, sidewalks and characteristics of people.
3. Watch specials on television that explore minority issues or provide insight concerning the lifestyle of ethnic minority families. This objective may also be achieved by reading popular magazines or newspapers geared toward particular minority groups.
4. Arrange to eat at an ethnic restaurant, a vehicle through which the customs, traditions, cultural values, lifestyles and language may be keenly observed.
5. Attend a church service where the majority of the members are members of ethnic minority groups. Observe the order of the service, the attitudes of the people toward you, and behavioral differences.

Atkinson, Morten, and Sue have introduced five developmental stages: 1. conformity, 2. dissonance, 3. resistance and immersion, 4. introspection and synergetic articulation and 5. awareness. These different stages should be discussed in relation to different minorities such as Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, etc. A point that has been extensively discussed is whether the needs and problems of ethnic minorities are different from those of the dominant culture or not. While people experience certain problems in general, minorities experience those problems to a greater degree. Minorities are also caught between double standards. They have to respect their own cultural values and at the same time they have to cope with the values of the dominant culture. In some cases such as with women, standards triple.

### **Conclusion**

It would be ideal for students in psychology or counseling programs to take courses in multicultural counseling. It would also be good for students or therapists to seek ways of improving their acquaintance with different cultures. But there are some other realities which exist in society; racism, and prejudice are among them. There might be a therapist who cannot bring himself to not believe in racial differences. There might be a therapist who thinks that white Americans built the United States and that there is not any reason for Orientals or Blacks to rise up and demand equal rights with the Whites. In most cases, a therapist might not feel comfortable with someone from a different orientation. This might be only due to his or her coming from a small, closed community and not having contact with different minorities. The premier issue is not that this therapist should broaden his or her view, or alter his or her notions overnight. This might be the ideal, but it takes time even when the therapist is willing to

try.

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**THE POSSIBILITIES OF PRECARIOUS BALANCE IN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT:  
W.E.B. DUBOIS AS FREIREAN LIBERATORY EDUCATOR**

Don Hufford  
Newman University

W.E.B. DuBois was - in many ways - a “man for all seasons.” He was a scholar, civil rights activist, novelist, journalist, editor, historian, sociologist, political agitator -- the list goes on. But DuBois’ own choice for a self-definition was summed up in the statement, “I am a teacher.” It is here proposed that - as an educator - he was a “liberatory theorist” and exponent of “critical pedagogy” before the terms were invented and added to the current political/educational lexicon of “in” words. Many will challenge the above statement, and will remember DuBois as the one who - in the words of his friend, Arthur Springarn - “created a Negro Intelligentsia.” This leads to the assumption that he was actually an educational “elitist” who based his teaching and educational theory on philosophical Idealism. And this is a partial-truth.

DuBois did not articulate a specific - and certainly not a systematic or consistent educational philosophy. In words used to describe a minor character in one of his novels, “he had a mind too keen to be consistent.”<sup>1</sup> It may not be far from the truth to interpret that this man of self-described “double consciousness” was also able to hold in positive, creative tension a “double educational philosophy.”<sup>2</sup>

In June 1996, Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, referred to the educational “elitist” in DuBois when he noted that African Americans “... had DuBois who saw that we should be educated in the arts and science, in literature and history. We should become scholars.”<sup>3</sup> Mr. Farrakhan here made a connection to the historical conflict between DuBois and Booker T. Washington. The two men - each guided by a different educational (and political) philosophy - sought to define the why, what, and how of education for African Americans. At the time this disenfranchised group was effectively excluded from the power that may be bestowed by education. Both men - each in his own way - sought ways to remedy the situation. The DuBois/Washington ongoing debate had, perhaps, as much to do with social/political power as it did with educational philosophy.<sup>4</sup> It did, however, help to establish DuBois’ reputation as an educational elitist and philosophical Idealist.

DuBois’ vision of a socially conscious “talented tenth” - although later modified to fit historical reality - has also helped to contribute to the image many hold of DuBois today. David G. DuBois has written of this image:

.... little more is passed on to our youth today of W.E.B. DuBois than the elitist concept of black leadership, the Talented Tenth. Last year (I was) introduced to a young African American ... At mention that I was a stepson of W.E.B. DuBois, the young man responded in recognition: “Oh the Talented Tenth!” This incident confirmed for me once again how great the need is today to make the work, the enormous contribution, and the truth of W.E.B. DuBois known....<sup>5</sup>

Here was a realization that something should be done to make known the reality that W.E.B. DuBois was more “liberatory” than “elitist” - more Pragmatist/Existentialist than Idealist/Realist - in educational philosophy. To better understand “the work, the enormous contribution, and the truth of W.E.B. DuBois” as a liberatory educator I found it helpful to engage in an intellectual exercise in which his educational philosophy is “compared and connected” to that of the Brazilian educator and philosophical reconstructionist, Paulo Freire. Freire (1921 - 1997) stands out today as a model - some might even say the “father-guru” - of the “critical pedagogy” movement. Considering Freire in these terms Peter McLaren has written:

Freire.... has provided the conditions for countless individuals, regardless of race, gender, class, and caste, to break free from their historically contingent and entrenched vocabularies to face up to their fallibility and strength as agents of possibility. As the standard-bearer of what has become known as critical pedagogy, Freire continues to identify and challenge not only those pedagogical mechanisms central to the phenomenon of oppression but also those relations within wider social, cultural, and institutional contexts that confront individuals with the logic of domination in the guise of grand narratives of reason and univocal meaning in the service of capital.<sup>6</sup>

In a “connect and compare” exercise - matching W.E.B. DuBois’ educational thought to Freire’s educational philosophy - one is able to recognize a persona that is a more accurate reflection of the “real” DuBois

than is his elitist/Idealist image.<sup>7</sup> To engage in this exercise requires a hermeneutical process that involves a personal, subjective analysis of the writings of both men, an analysis in which the content of their writings invokes “meaning” based on the interpreter’s political/philosophical biases.<sup>8</sup>

As this writer “compared and connected” it was possible to construct a “liberatory educator” profile of DuBois that has much in common with Freire. DuBois’ educational thinking was influenced by a concept of humanity based on a natural rights philosophy. He understood there is an inherent learning drive in each individual which seeks correspondence with a social/political right to learn. DuBois understood that the individual - irrespective of his or her racial, cultural, ethnic group - inherently wants to learn, needs to learn, has a right to learn. DuBois would certainly have echoed Freire’s statement that “dehumanization is not a given destiny, but the result of an unjust social order ... which dehumanizes the oppressed.”<sup>9</sup>

The demands for equal distribution of knowledge and for equitable access to help in understanding that knowledge, are social responses to a natural right. This right establishes a bond that unites diverse individuals into a common humanity. It is the basis for a conceptual model that draws from both DuBois’ and Freire’s educational philosophies. DuBois would certainly have agreed with a Freirean ideological construct as interpreted by Frank Margonis:

For Freire the central “problem” of existence is humanization. Human nature embodies an inherent drive towards humanization; it is only an oppressive social order that prevents human beings from realizing this fundamental human “vocation”.... Freire’s solution to the problem of humanization is a pedagogy of praxis that simultaneously addresses the individual need for self-realization and the social need for a revolutionary movement.<sup>10</sup>

DuBois understood the implications of such a duality of needs. He was a social visionary, possessing a prophetic understanding of how oppression and injustice relate to the denial of both individual and communal needs. In this role he was a stinging gadfly who would not allow a nation to rest easy while powerless individuals and groups were oppressed. He wrote of his own prophetic role: “Here comes the agitator. He is the herald. He is the prophet. He is the man that says to the world, ‘there are evils which you do not know, but which I know and you must listen ....’”<sup>11</sup> As an educator he reminded those who were “called” to teach: “To be silent when injustices call out for redress, to fail to speak when poverty and ignorance keep some in social bondage, to muffle the sounds of indignation and righteous anger, is to fail the teacher’s calling.”<sup>12</sup> DuBois understood the liberatory and pedagogical implications of this demand when he defined himself by the ontological statement, “I am a teacher!”<sup>13</sup>

As a teacher DuBois was influenced by the metaphysics of philosophical Idealism, but his educational “double consciousness” allowed insights from more experiential sources to penetrate his thinking. He was aware of a world of ideas and of the meanings and possibilities that were to be found in seeking “the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.” But, he was also aware that the search was always circumscribed by a world in which “the false, the evil, and the ugly” were to be found in the realities of social injustice and oppression.

DuBois agreed with the Idealist, Plato (and the Realist, Aristotle), that the good life for the individual is inextricably bound to that of the just society. His enduring search was for the good society which would allow for “fullest realization of the individual human spirit.” As a philosopher of freedom, he understood that any individual’s search for self-realization is handicapped if he or she is restricted by exterior forces from full exercise of the right to learn. DuBois and Freire shared a common understanding that “to educate” and “to liberate” are branches of the same philosophical root system. To know provides the stimulus to act, and education is “not only to make Truth clear but to present it in such shape as will encourage and help social reform.”<sup>14</sup>

Both DuBois and Freire have written about the liberatory potential inherent in the individual’s process of growing and expanding toward human possibility within a social/political setting. Both men may be interpreted as believing that education should help develop one’s ability to creatively use the tension developed between self-realization (an individual dynamic) and sacrificial service to others (a social dynamic). DuBois stood for the right of every individual “to do, (and) to be” - to seek fulfillment of individual potential. Freire has also responded to this human right. John Elias in his interpretation of Freire’s concept of “conscientization” wrote:

The educational process of conscientization is one that gives people a genuine sense of power. It gives them the realization that they have the power to be ... It gives them the power of self-affirmation.... People begin to affirm their own being and their own significance. Self-esteem is increased. Conscientization also gives people the power of self-assertion - the power to express themselves against opposition, the power to

demand that they be recognized as persons.<sup>15</sup>

DuBois understood the importance for an individual to fulfill the potential "to be." But, he understood that "to do" - to act for the good of the larger society - is a necessary and complementary goal. Freire also, it has been interpreted, "was able to demonstrate a thoroughgoing harmony between the twin goals of social justice and individual realization."<sup>16</sup> DuBois understood the liberatory educational theory that formal education is for both self and society. He understood that without a social dynamic the educational process is narrowed by an egotistic, "me-oriented" inwardness that fails to be liberatory. Without the individual dynamic, however, education lacks a "centered" purpose that can unify the process of liberation.

When "connecting/comparing" DuBois to Freire it is obvious that implicit in the educational thought of DuBois is the knowledge that the seemingly oppositional demands of self-affirmation and social responsibility may be held in a creative, productive tension. Positive, productive action occurs when the individual allows him/herself to be creatively involved in a larger "self/other" interdependent process.<sup>17</sup> DuBois believed - as did Freire - in the importance of a positive self-concept for the individual; and that self-concept as an individual "quality" is related to the communal "quality" of social, political, and economic justice in any given society. DuBois understood the importance of individual self-fulfillment and the educational search for human possibility, but he placed this concept of individuality (not individualism - there is a difference) within the larger context of social purpose and a common humanity.<sup>18</sup>

Those who understand Freire's use of the concept "Conscientization" will be able to relate to DuBois' belief that one's education should be used for challenging assumptions about both self and society. DuBois expressed a "conscientization" concept when he wrote about educating "human beings, young and old, into an intelligent working knowledge of the world in which we live." This knowledge-put-to-work translates to an active social conscience. This social conscience (keeping in mind Freire's "conscientization") leads activists - in DuBois' words - to "dedicate our lives to lessening others' sorrow, the uprooting of poverty, and to the broadening of life and living for human souls."<sup>19</sup>

Implicit in DuBois' educational philosophy is the belief that the pedagogical process should stimulate both intellectual curiosity and social awareness. Education should provide not just the skill but also the motivation necessary for one to engage in constructive social action based on critical reflection of the issues involved. Writing of one of his fictional protagonists DuBois described this motivational force: "He wanted to get his hands into the tangles of this world. He wanted to understand.... (I) was a longing for action, breadth, helpfulness, great constructive deeds."<sup>20</sup> DuBois was a dreamer of great dreams, and believed - as he wrote in his Autobiography - that we should be "dreamers toward a better world." He was, however, constrained by a philosophically pragmatic understanding that "there is no dream but deed."<sup>21</sup> The deed - the constructive act - is partner to the dream.

DuBois' connection of Dream (as reflection) to Deed relates to Freire's political and educational use of the word praxis. Praxis - as a definition, a concept, and, indeed, a challenge - has entered the vocabulary of today's educators.<sup>22</sup> DuBois used the concept -even though use of the word to define a teaching methodology was a future away - when he wrote in his autobiography of the interpenetration of "thought and action and effort." It was this kind of praxis - a reflection/action iteration - which made it possible for DuBois to combine dream and deed into his personal brand of social activism.

The philosophical Idealist in DuBois searched for metaphysical absolutes. But the liberatory Pragmatist knew that, as moral guidelines, philosophical absolutes must be related to the realities of "work, service, and sacrifice."<sup>23</sup> DuBois understood that meaningful education must lead to liberty, justice, and equality. It takes praxis - reflective action, caring effort - to turn possibilities into reality. The search for a truth and/or for the Truth is a lovely but sterile mental exercise unless knowledge wedded to critical understanding creates the possibility for active service to humanity.

DuBois - as a philosopher of liberty - was a "critical pedagogue" before the term was created and defined. He recognized the dangers of the "banking" system of education which Freire has caused us to seriously reflect upon.<sup>24</sup> DuBois understood that for education to be "liberatory" it has to involve more than the student-as-object passively "taking in" knowledge. To be liberating, education has to consist of analyzing and criticizing, evaluating and questioning, interpreting and engaging, challenging and transforming. DuBois' own pursuit of a Ph.D. was motivated by this combination of "dream and deed." He wrote that he wanted "to take the field of social science under political science with a view to the ultimate application of its principles to the social and economic

advancement of the Negro people.”<sup>25</sup> In responding to the educational needs of black Americans he wrote: “What black men need is the broader and more universal (education) so that they can apply the general principles of knowledge to the particular circumstances of their condition.”<sup>26</sup> Here was knowledge not just “poured in” but critically evaluated and used for the purpose of social reconstruction.

DuBois - wearing his Idealist persona - was inspired by the “romance” of knowledge. He enjoyed the challenges and the delights inherent in learning. But the purpose of “becoming educated” for him transcended the personal thrill of the pursuit, or even the achievement. For DuBois, a liberating education required a goal beyond the self. It required a transforming connection to the wider world.

In his novels DuBois often wrote symbolically and metaphorically of education as “the way.” It is a way to seek solutions to the miasma of poverty and oppression, a way to understand and reach toward possibility, a way to dream dreams. It is also a way to forge the tools with which to transform society so that dreams may become reality. Education is a way toward “conscientization” - a way to a reflective understanding of “who I am” in relationship to the realities of social, racial, cultural, economic, political, and religious realities. It is a way of “knowing” how a society’s sanction of injustices and oppression penetrates the human psyche and creates self-fulfilling prophecies. It is a way of using this knowledge to remove barriers and open new avenues of possibility.

As an educator DuBois demanded that scholarly impartiality and objectivity be interwoven with a knowledge and an understanding of the subjective pain of injustice and oppression. He viewed teacher and student as actors on a larger stage of life, and wrote: “The teachers, then, cannot be.... mere technicians and higher artisans, they have to be social statesmen of high order.”<sup>27</sup> Education cannot be complete without personalizing the connecting links between the self and the triumphs and tragedies of others. A teacher’s scholarly objectivity cannot excuse a failure to ask hard, critical, penetrating questions about man’s inhumanity to man and about historical, sociological, economic, and political “cause and effect” determinants. DuBois understood this, and noted in one of his letters:

I have sympathy for the ideal of cold, impartial history; but that must not be allowed to degenerate as it so often has into insensibility to human suffering and injustice. The scientific treatment of human ills has got to give evil full weight and vividly realize that it means to the world’s oppressed.<sup>28</sup>

DuBois’ own scholarly and scientific observations as historian and sociologist were penetrated by his concern for education as a form of social activism and by his concern for confronting pressing social ills. He realized he “could not be a calm, cool, detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered, and starved.”<sup>29</sup>

DuBois gave evidence of the blending of two educational philosophies - philosophies that may contrast and disconnect at times, but that retain the possibility to merge at other times. He began as a classically educated, nineteenth-century Enlightenment-influenced, “march of progress,” educational elitist in search of capital-letter-Truth-as-Ideal. He took strength from the fact that he could “sit with Shakespeare ... move arm in arm with Balzac and Dumas ... summon Aristotle and Aurelius.”<sup>30</sup> To this he connected a pragmatically-driven, egalitarian search for small-letter-truths as active responses to injustices and oppression. He “believed in the justice of the ordinary mass of folk if they ever got the power to apply it.”<sup>31</sup> This educational “double consciousness” represented a philosophical search for Truth, illuminated by sociological realities. In a DuBois philosophy, education is the search for Truth, Goodness, and Beauty leading to the practice of “all that makes life worthwhile -- liberty, justice, and right.”<sup>32</sup> This search (philosophically Idealistic) and practice (philosophically Pragmatic) may be connected to Freire’s “education for critical consciousness.” And ... an education for critical consciousness also has the possibility of being an “education for discontent.” DuBois was aware of this when he wrote that “to stimulate ... untrained minds is to play with mighty fires.”<sup>33</sup> He knew that such fires can be stoked to generate sufficient heat to inspire people to seek redress of grievances - to seek change in both self and system. He was aware that “education ... always has had, and always will have, an element of danger and revolution, of dissatisfaction and discontent.”<sup>34</sup> Martin Luther King, Jr. understood DuBois’ belief in an education for discontent. In a 1968 speech celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of DuBois’ birth, Dr. King once again used his famous analogy of justice as rushing water.

He reminded his listeners of DuBois’ committed empathy with all the oppressed and his divine dissatisfaction with all forms of injustice. Today we are still challenged to be dissatisfied.... Let us be dissatisfied until this pending cosmic elegy will be transformed into a creative psalm of peace; and justice will roll down like water from a mighty stream.<sup>35</sup>

DuBois frequently used his novels to address an “education for discontent” theme. In one, the young Bles

spoke prophetically and metaphorically to Zora: "When you're educated you won't have to live in the swamp."<sup>36</sup> The swamp symbolized ignorance - and its companion, powerlessness - which allow an individual or group to be mired in the quicksand of social, political, and economic injustices. Education represented a way out of the physical and the metaphorical/psychological swamp.

Earlier in *Quest*, cotton - representing hope, opportunity, and possibility - was planted in a small patch of prepared swamp land. There was a shout of "de seed done sowed - de seed done sowed," symbolizing the planting of the desire to know, to learn, to understand - of discontent with the past and vision for a transformed future.<sup>37</sup> Once the seed is sown it must be nurtured toward the possibility of a blossoming harvest. It was the "seed" as "desire to learn" that would blossom into the protagonists' conscientization, and their eventual liberation from ignorance and poverty -- followed by a continuing struggle against social and economic oppression.

Another interpretation of the "seed" metaphor involves recognition of it as a literary expression of how "enlightened social discontent" may lead to a psychic awakening. As a novelist, DuBois has his heroine, Zora - representing an oppressed people's awakening - exclaims: "I want to know," and later - "I must know."<sup>38</sup> Driven by the flowering of discontent she gradually became knowledge driven. The seed of "want" became the flowering "need." Symbolically, the latent energy contained in the seed of possibility is liberated by education. The power thus generated fuels continuing educational motive and method.

In another creative work DuBois reminded those who would listen that once the seed is sown "we must not be content with plans, ambitions, and resolves; with part of a message or part of an education, but be set and determined to fulfill the promise and complete the task."<sup>39</sup> Both DuBois and Freire have acknowledged that too often the seed - the promise of possibility - is trampled under the feet of an uncaring and/or oppressive social system, and the will of the powerless to challenge the status quo is lost. Then the promise remains unfulfilled, the task incomplete, the dream denied! All too often even "caring" people act in unwitting complicity with an uncaring system, and then - as DuBois wrote - it seems as if "the whole world emerges into the Syllogism of the Satisfied."<sup>40</sup>

But for DuBois - as with Freire - it is a commitment to the power residing in liberating education that will shake up the satisfied and complacent; that will make possible the transformation of the "now" and help redefine the future. DuBois used his novelist's pen to describe the flame of hope which is ignited when education awakens an exploited people to the reality of their current dissatisfaction and the promise of their future possibility: "One could not fail to be impressed with the sense of potency and possibility (once they have) tasted of the tree of knowledge."<sup>41</sup>

Once the taste of knowledge is experienced there is an Augustinian "eternal discontent" born of savoring the taste. Knowing this, DuBois declared: "I cannot promise you happiness always, but I can promise you divine discontent with the imperfect."<sup>42</sup> DuBois understood that it is through "the way" - education - that this discontent becomes "known." Freire correspondingly wrote of "conscientization" as a reflective process that may lead the powerless masses to challenge imposed false realities. DuBois understood this, and reminded us that once the powerless "have tasted of the Tree of Life, they will not cease to think, will not cease to read the riddle of the world."<sup>43</sup>

In a *Crisis* article DuBois reminded his readers that "education means ambition, dissatisfaction and revolt. You cannot both educate people and hold them down"<sup>44</sup> Shortly after World War II he warned that "education for (oppressed) people must inevitably mean unrest and revolt."<sup>45</sup> DuBois recognized that education is necessary for awareness (conscientization), which in turn leads to discontent with unjust social systems ---which in turn leads to increased demands for justice and freedom. Writing in 1944 about the economic foundation of Western Colonialism he described the need for an education for discontent -- for a Freirean "conscientization":

The majority of the world's peoples do not understand what the world is, what it has been and what the laws of growth and development are; and they are unable to read the record of its history ... And the human mind with all its visions and possibilities is today deliberately distorted and denied freedom of development by people who actually imagine that such freedom would endanger civilization.<sup>46</sup>

To know what the world is, has been, and has the potential to become is not simply a matter of historical recognition - particularly for the oppressed. Rather it requires a hermeneutical "reading" of history and the of structures of power, a reading that helps one define the parameters of power and powerlessness. In Freire's terms it requires "reading the word and reading the world." For DuBois it meant "reading the Riddle of the world." To "read" the riddle impregnated world presupposes an education for discontent. Such an education connects to a liberatory education that prepares the individual to define his or her own process of self-definition, even as he or she

challenges historical and sociological distortions sanctioned by an educational status-quo. Freire described this as an education that prepares the student “to discuss courageously ... to reevaluate constantly ... to assume an increasingly critical attitude toward the world and so to transform it.”<sup>47</sup> DuBois voiced a similar educational vision: “My supreme interest is that they (students) should have the right to come to their own conclusions, and their conclusions should be based on their own efforts ... to learn the facts, to reason out their connections and to plan the future; to know the truth, to arrange it logically, and to contrive a better way (transform the future).”<sup>48</sup>

Individual and cultural/political conceptions of “truth” - not always logical and transformative - vie with each other in the educational marketplace of ideas. Today’s contentious educational debates revolve, in significant, ways around two differing views of “truth” as applied to the purposes of public education. One view, the Empirical/Behaviorist, overpowers the other, the Critical/Humanistic. This is, of course, a simplistic look at a complex issue, but it allows one to focus on a major issue.<sup>49</sup> The Empiricist view emphasizes the quantifiable and measurable. It leads to a mandated, standardized, outcome and accountability-based, test-driven curriculum designed to produce “world class workers” in order to enhance economic competitiveness in a global economy. The language spoken is one of technical competency influenced by corporate-world definitional standards of “excellence.” The discussion is of standardized tests, exit tests, aligned curriculum, state and national performance assessments, bottom-line efficiency, and teacher accountability measured by student “scores” based on a “free market” competitive philosophy.

This tends to reinforce a behavioristic view of learning. Here is an emphasis on “correct” answers defined by standardized, almost “scripted” content knowledge, and a de-emphasis on the hermeneutical. It tends to negate student-generated questions and the pedagogical use of student “lived realities.” We see here at its most obvious the “banking model” of education as identified by Freire, and we are reminded of DuBois’ warning that “there is a widespread feeling that school is a machine. You insert a child at 9a.m., and extract it at 4 p.m., improved and standardized.”<sup>50</sup>

The Critical/Humanistic, “student-as-subject” view of education is a viable counterpoint to the “student-as-object” view which flows from an Empiricist dominated educational system.<sup>51</sup> The student-as-subject view is one of possibility - of personal growth and social transformation. According to Barry Kanpol such a pedagogy “allows students and teachers to share and understand their respective voices in light of structural configurations, such as race, class, gender, and age ... (T)he language of possibility presumes ... understanding of one’s own and the Other’s voice.”<sup>52</sup>

Critical/ Humanistic educational philosophy is imbedded in Freire’s “problem-posing” and “generative themes” methodology. Here open-ended possibilities (as in divergent questions) - not test-generated outcomes (as in convergent answers) are allowed to drive the educational process. In Freire’s words “problem-posing education affirms men and women as beings in the process of becoming - as incomplete beings with a likewise unfinished reality,” where the students’ “generative themes inaugurate the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom.”<sup>53</sup> DuBois related to this Critical/Humanistic philosophy of education when he recognized that “technical training (the what of education) ... is of secondary importance to the people being civilized (the who of education);”<sup>54</sup> and that “necessary as it is to earn a living, it is more important and necessary to earn a life.”<sup>55</sup>

An Empiricist/Behaviorist educational philosophy is a good match for today’s economically driven reform movements. Such “reforms” call for public education’s basic purpose to be defined as providing the “world class workers” necessary for the U.S. to - in President Clinton’s words - “compete and win in the world economy.” The Critical/Humanistic philosophy -in counterpoint- inspires an education that aids the student in achieving a Freirean “consciousness of alternative possibilities,” and a DuBoisian recognition of “education as (preparing) individuals for the broader life; not (for) production of goods,” but “to develop to our full potential ... every capacity God has given us.”<sup>56</sup>

The thinking here expressed is not intended to be a total negation of educational purposes derived from an Empiricist world view. Nor should it be construed as an apologetic for the egocentric excesses which may be committed in the name of Humanistic freedom. DuBois reminds us of an educational reality - “... the truth lies ever between extremes.”<sup>57</sup> And Freire reminds that education should be dialectical and should “harmonize a truly humanist position with (the technical).”<sup>58</sup> Reflection on today’s educational issues - and on the prevailing educational philosophy -does, however, give one pause for thought.

Such reflection indicates that a public school system dominated by a free market, bottom-line, competition-

for-excellence, accountability-by-test-score mentality does not represent a “happy mean.” In counterbalance we should consider a Critical/Humanistic educational philosophy; one which comes closest to a DuBois goal for education: “To develop our own powers ... to come to the broadest, deepest self-realization. To make life ... broad and free for all men, that you and I and all may earn a living and earn, too, much more than that - a life worth living.”<sup>59</sup> And - in this context - we may subscribe to Freire’s hope that “education could help (people) to assume an increasingly critical attitude toward the world and so transform it ... (while) seeking to redirect our educational practice toward the goal of an authentic democracy.”<sup>60</sup> To this educational purpose DuBois would add his realistic appraisal that “education is the foundation stone of our democracy.”<sup>61</sup>

Let the congregation say “Amen,” or ... let the each individual define a personal educational philosophy and continue the discourse/dialogue.

#### ENDNOTES

1. DuBois wrote in an article (*Crisis*, April 1934): “I am not worried about being consistent. What worries me is the Truth.” He also noted, regarding his life experiences, that “contradictions and paradox poured over paradox and contradictions.” (*In Battle for Peace*, intro. Herbert Aptheker. Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1990. Reprint, 1976.)
2. DuBois wrote of his “double consciousness: “It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness ... One ever feels his twoness - An American, a Negro; two souls, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals.” *The Souls of Black Folk*, intro. Nathan Hare and Alvin Poussaint. (New York: New American Library, 1982. Reprint, 1903).

A hint of DuBois’ educational “double consciousness” is also found in *Souls* (p.124): “To make here in human education that ever necessary combination of the permanent and the contingent - of the ideal and the practical in workable equilibrium - has been, as it ever must be, in every age and place, a matter of infinite experiment and frequent mistakes.”
3. Louis Farrakhan, quoted in an interview with John Kennedy, Jr., in *George*, October, 1996.
4. Both DuBois and Washington believed in the need to educate African Americans for the opportunities and responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society. Each man, however, expressed a different educational purpose. Washington emphasized the vocational/practical - a terminal process. DuBois demanded for his people the right to a liberal/humanist education - a continuing process making room for higher education for African American leaders. Washington was willing to compromise political and civil rights for workplace opportunities. DuBois would not compromise.
5. David G. DuBois, “Understanding the Legacy of W.E.B. DuBois,” *Emerge*, October, 1993, 63.

It is helpful to compare DuBois’ “Talented tenth” with Paulo Freire’s “lucid vanguard.” Freire noted: “Every radical transformation implies a ‘lucid vanguard.’ It is also necessary, on the other hand, that such a transformation is nurtured in dialogue with the popular masses ... the intellectual’s role is to place his ability at the disposal of the people.” Quoted in Moacir Gadotti, *Reading Paulo Freire: His Life and Work*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 59-60.
6. Peter McLaren, “Introduction,” Gadotti, *Reading Freire*, xiii.
7. In classical Greek theater the masks worn by the actors to denote character changes were called “personas.” The “personas” might be changed to facilitate a new thespian characterization, but the real person behind the mask remained.
8. For a scholarly interpretation of “hermeneutics” see, Sharon Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
9. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Ramos. (New York: Continuum, 1993), 28. For DuBois, the “given destiny” includes the innate right to an education; “being born is being given (that right).” DuBois, *Darkwater: Voices From Within the Veil*. (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson

- Organization, 1988. Reprint, 1975), 216.
- 10 Frank Margolis, "Leftist Ideology and Enlightenment Faith," *Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*. (Urbana, Illinois: A Society Printing, 1993), 254.
  11. DuBois, quoted in Arnold Rampersand, *The Art and Imagination of W.E.B. DuBois*. (New York: Schocken Books, 1990), 112.
  12. DuBois, *The Crisis*, May, 1914, quoted in Nathan Huggins, *W.E.B. DuBois: Writings*. (New York: The Library of America, 1986), 1157.
  13. DuBois, *The Education of Black Folk: Ten Critiques*, intro. Herbert Aptheker. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 6.
  14. DuBois, "Dusk of Dawn," found in Huggins, *Writings*, 600.
  15. John Elias, *Studies in Theology and Education*. (Malabar, Florida: Robert Krieger Publishing, 1970), 168.
  16. Margolis, "Leftist Ideology," 252.
  17. This "self/other" interdependent concept is, of course, not new. As an example, we may take note of how Marcus Aurelius recognized the productive tension residing in a self/other polarity:  

Think often of the bond that unites all things in the universe. All are, as it were, interwoven ... their orderly succession is brought about by the operation of the currents of tension. (Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, trans. Maxwell Stanforth. [New York: Dorsett Press, 1986.] )
  18. Jonas Salk explored this individual/social theme in a way that sheds light upon the thought of both DuBois and Freire:  

Man needs to become increasingly conscious of what he is part of so that he may function fully, though individually as an element of the whole ... This requires getting to know oneself so that one can be true to oneself and to others, if more harmony is to develop in the human condition. (Jonas Salk, *Man Unfolding*. [New York: Harper and Row, 1972] , 118).
  19. DuBois, "Prayers for Dark People," intro. Herbert Aptheker. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 59.
  20. DuBois, *Dark Princess: A Romance*, intro. Herbert Aptheker. (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1974. Reprint, 1921), 42.  

This DuBois' literary metaphor has comparative connection to Freire's statement that when "the people get their history in their hands ... the role of education changes to an education that enlarges and amplifies the horizon of critical understanding." (Freire and Myles Horton, *We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change*. [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990], 219-219).
  21. DuBois, *The Autobiography of W.E.B. DuBois*. (New York: International Publishing Company, third printing, 1988), 281 and 423.  

Freire has also noted the importance of the activist's "dream:" "Dreaming is not only a necessary political act, it is an integral part of the historical social manner of being a person. It is part of human nature which within history is a permanent process of becoming." (Pedagogy of Hope. [New York: Continuum, 1995], 90-91). "The dream that moves us is a possibility for which I must fight ... The gradual overcoming of all forms of discrimination is part of the dream of liberation." (*Letters to Cristiana: Reflections On My Life and Work*. [New York: Routledge, 1996], 151 and 177).
  22. The word, praxis, is here defined as "reflective, thoughtful, considered action." This is a dialectical process which involves reflection prior to action, then reflecting on the action taken, leading to further action. Freire

- has noted: "Liberation is a praxis: the action of men and women upon the world in order to transform it." He speaks of problem-posing education as a "humanist and liberating praxis," and further defines the process as "people's actions upon reality." (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 60, 67, and 87.)
23. DuBois' writings frequently refer to the triple responsibilities of work, service, and sacrifice. In one example he exhorted Fisk University graduates in 1898 to "gladly work and sacrifice and serve." (in Huggins, *DuBois Writings*, 839).
  24. Freire notes that "banking" education turns students into containers and receptacles to be filled by the teacher. "Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor ... The students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat." (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 53).
  24. Freire wrote in a similar vein: "In the learning process the only person who really learns is s/he who is able to apply the appropriate learning to concrete situations." (*Education for Critical Consciousness*. [New York: Continuum, 1996].
  26. DuBois, *Education: Ten Critiques*, 94.
  27. Ibid. 78.
  28. DuBois, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. DuBois*, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Aptheker. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), 174.
  29. DuBois, *Autobiography*, 222.
  30. DuBois, *Souls*, 139.
  31. DuBois, *Mansart Builds a School*. (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1976. Reprint, n.d.), 31.
  32. DuBois, *Souls*, 225.
  33. Ibid., 123. Note the comparison to a statement attributed to the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus: "Teaching is not filling a pail, it is lighting a flame."
  34. Ibid., 71.
  35. William Miller, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Life, Martyrdom, and Meaning for the World*. (New York: Weybright and Tally, 1968), 266.
  36. DuBois, *The Quest of the Silver Fleece*, intro. Herbert Aptheker. (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1974. Reprint, 1911), 50.
  37. Ibid. Note a comparison to Freire's statement that "the awakening of critical consciousness leads the way to the expression of social discontent." (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 18.)
  38. Ibid., 226 and 245.
  39. DuBois, "Prayers," 37.
  40. DuBois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry Into the Part Which Africa Played in World History*, an enlarged edition, thirteenth printing. (New York: International Publishers, 1983), 42.
  41. DuBois, *Mansart Builds a School*, 86.
  42. DuBois, quoted in Philip S. Foner, ed., *W.E.B. DuBois Speaks: Speeches and Addresses - 1920-1963*. (New York: Pathfinder, sixth printing, 1988).
  43. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, intro. Donald B. Gibson. New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 71.
  44. DuBois, *The Crisis*, January , 1912. Found in Huggins, *Writings*, 1139.

45. DuBois, *World and Africa*, 37.
46. DuBois, *Against Racism: Unpublished Essays, Papers, Addresses, 1887-1961*, ed. Herbert Aptheker. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 235-236.
47. Freire, *Critical Consciousness*, 34. For help in critically “reading the world” from the point of view of the powerless see Howard Zinn, *A People’s History of the United States*. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990).
48. DuBois, *Correspondence*, vol. 3, 379; and *Education: Ten Critiques*, 111.
49. Here one should be aware of H.L. Mencken’s admonition, “For every complex problem there is a simple solution, and it is always wrong.”
50. DuBois, *The Crisis*, October, 1922.
51. Both DuBois and Freire wrote of the distinction between student-as-object and student-as-subject. For both a theological and an educational articulation of this subject/object distinction see Martin Buber, *I and Thou*. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958).
52. Bary Kanpol, “Critical Theory and Liberation Theology,” *Educational Theory*, Winter, 1996, 106.
53. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 65 and 77.
54. DuBois, “Against Racism,” 252.
55. DuBois, *Education: Ten Critiques*, 14.
56. *Ibid.*, 13.
57. DuBois, “Darkwater,” 204.
58. Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, 19.
59. DuBois, “Fisk University commencement address,” June, 1888, quoted in Huggins, 832.
60. Freire, *Critical Consciousness*, 34-35.
61. DuBois, *Annals of the American Academy of Science*, November, 1928, 9.

**AESTHETICS: THE AUTHENTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR TEACHER EDUCATION**

Stanley D. Ivie  
Texas Women's University

**Introduction**

The 1910 Flexner Report revamped medical education in the United States. Medical schools were upgraded (or closed) and placed on a scientific foundation. A low status occupation was transformed into a high prestige profession. Science was instrumental in working the miracle. Educators cast an envious eye toward medicine. Why not reform teacher education along similar lines? After all, there wasn't anything wrong with teaching that a good dose of science wouldn't cure! Educators eagerly jumped on board the scientific bandwagon. The language of the classroom took on a decidedly scientific resonance. Teachers found themselves talking about S-R bonds, contingencies of reinforcement, behavioral objectives, and diagnostic and prescriptive teaching. Researchers, according to Eisner (1979), hoped to discover laws of learning that would "do for educational practitioners what the work of Boyle, Einstein, and Bohr did for physical science ... eliminating the chancy and undependable, and replacing them with rule, procedure, and method" (p. 270).

After a century of emulating the sciences, what do educators have to show for their efforts? Gage's (1978) thoughtful little volume, *The Scientific Basis of the Art of Teaching*, characterizes the results derived from attempting to apply the scientific method to the study of teaching as being "a record of premature hopes dashed upon the realities of inadequate scientific bases" (p. 43). If the dream of transforming teaching into a science has eluded us, where does that leave teacher education as we enter the twenty-first century? Gage offers us two suggestions: First, educators might as well own up to it and admit that teaching is more like the arts than it is like the sciences. "As a practical art, teaching must be recognized as a process that calls for intuition, creativity, improvisation, and expressiveness--a process that leaves room for departures from what is implied by rules, formulas, and algorithms" (p. 15).

Second, even if educators admit that teaching is an art, researchers are still free to investigate the "scientific basis for the art of teaching" (p. 23). Gage fears that unless teaching is provided with a scientific foundation "every teacher must use his or her personal common sense, intuition, insight, or art with no guidance from any relationship or regularities that may have been laid bare through scientific method" (p. 24).

Is Gage correct? Either we cast our lot with science or we are cast to drift aimlessly on the sea of pedagogical confusion? Fortunately, our choices are not as narrowly circumscribed as Gage would have us believe. There is at least a third possibility. What is there to prevent educators from establishing an aesthetic basis for the practice of teaching? Researchers have already devoted a century to trying to establish a scientific foundation for teaching. Why not devote an equal amount of time and energy to providing teaching with an aesthetic foundation? If teaching is indeed an art, then aesthetic inquiry might just prove to be more fruitful than what has been passed along to us in the name of science. Eisner (1979) believes "the model of the natural sciences on which much educational research is based is probably inappropriate for most of the problems and aims of teaching, learning, and curriculum development" (p. 265).

**Artistry in the Classroom**

If science is not the answer to the ills of classroom teaching, where do we have to turn? Eisner (1979) offers educators a sweeping proposition: "most of those who teach--indeed, even those who study teaching scientifically--often regard their own teaching as an artistic activity" (p. 153). The majority of public school teachers view their classroom activities as being more "art-like" than "science-like." If we accept Eisner's assertion as valid, we are faced with two related problems: (A) What are the ways in which teaching is like the arts? And (B) how can schools of education increase the aesthetic side of teacher education? In order to address these questions, the following discussion has been organized around four aesthetic criteria drawn from Eisner's *The Educational Imagination*.

**First: Teaching as an aesthetic experience**

Eisner (1979) believes teaching "is an art in the sense that teaching can be performed with such skill and grace that, for the student as well as for the teacher, the experience can be justifiably characterized as aesthetic" (p. 153). The aesthetic quality of experience can be witnessed in the dialogue taking place between the teacher and his or her students. It is also present when the act of teaching "provides intrinsic forms of satisfaction" (p. 153). Rubin

(1985) in *Artistry in Teaching* arrived at a similar conclusion. "Fine teaching, which stimulates children's intellectual growth, carries its own intrinsic rewards" (p. 6). Rubin believes teachers "who find great personal satisfaction in their work, tend to view teaching not only as a job, but as a means of satisfying the demands of the spirit as well" (p. 20).

What are the characteristics that make for artistry in the classroom? In his investigation of great teachers, Rubin (1985) discovered such qualities as "skill, originality, flair, dexterity, ingenuity, virtuosity, and similar qualities which, together, engender exceptional performance" (p. 156). Artistic teachers are masterful at conceiving, planning, and executing lessons with unusual imagination and brilliance. Artistry in the classroom, Rubin contends, is more than motivation and dramatization. "It is an extraordinary level of performance, bred out of personal commitment which elevates the state of the art" (p. 159).

Collingwood (1938/1971) in *The Principles of Art* tells us that aesthetic experiences carry with them an emotional component. "The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one's emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language of art" (p. 275). Broudy (1962) in *Building a Philosophy of Education* expresses a similar view. "We realize aesthetic value whenever we perceive an object as a unified expression of meaningful feeling" (p. 202). Andrew Wyeth, speaking of his own painting, says: "When you get far enough along in a thing you feel as though you're living there--not working at a painting--but actually working in that valley" (Meryman, 1965, p. 114). When the artist is successful in achieving his or her ends, Broudy (1962) believes, "the whole picture, poem, or play feels like something--the feeling seems to be in the work of art itself." (pp. 218-219)

The most difficult thing in producing a work of art, Broudy (1962) contends, is creating an overall design or motif. "The design is what makes sense in a work of art; without it, an aesthetic object is non-sense, and instruction that does not look for design also approaches non-sense" (p. 218). Design, when it is properly executed, gives rise to "unity of feeling, meaning, and imagery" (pp. 218-219). Dewey (1934) in *Art as Experience* describes the unitary quality of an aesthetic experience in the following way: "In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character" (p. 36). Collingwood (1964) in *Essays in the Philosophy of Art* expresses a similar idea.

Beauty is the unity or coherence of the imaginary object: ugliness its lack of unity, its incoherence. This is no new doctrine; it is generally recognized that beauty is harmony, unity in diversity, symmetry, congruity, or the like. (pp. 62-63)

Aesthetic unity is an intimate part of everyday experience, though we frequently fail to recognize it. One sphere of human activity in which unity can be readily seen is in the field of sports. When an athlete is performing at his or her best, there is a sense of unity or oneness between the athlete and his or her activity. Who can forget Nadia Comaneci's performance on the uneven bars? Her youthful, supple body became poetry in motion. What of Bob Beaman's record setting jump at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City? Every aspect of his jump was perfectly executed. Beaman never jumped that far ever again. Runners like Jesse Owens and Michael Johnson seem to glide effortlessly down the track. They are one with sprinting. And what of Michael Jordan? He seems to defy gravity as he sails toward the basket. Jordan possesses an uncanny, sixth sense of oneness with the basketball. He seems to always know where the ball is going to be on the court. Even the presence of a super star like Michael Jordan, however, is not enough to produce a winning team. Phil Jackson (1995), coach of the Chicago Bulls, writes in, *Sacred Hoops: Spiritual Lessons of a Hardwood Warrior* that although most people are inclined to attribute the Bulls' victories to the outstanding performances of Michael Jordan, "the real reason the Bulls won three straight NBA championships from 1991 to '93 [plus three later championships] were that we plugged into the power of oneness instead of the power of one man" (p. 6).

"It is an old saying," Dewey (1933) reminds us in *How We Think* "... that unity in variety marks every work of genuine art. Certainly the art of teaching bears out the saying" (p. 53). One of the principal tasks of every teacher is to create a sense of unity within a classroom composed of discrete and different individuals. How can a classroom filled with separate individuals be welded into a working unit? Each classroom has its own distinctive personality. A sensitive teacher can feel the make up of a group of students the minute he or she sets foot in the classroom. Teachers use different techniques for creating a sense of unity or bonding with their students. Speaking of Marva Collins, the African-American teacher who operates her own private school in Chicago, Tamarkin (1990) in *Marva Collins' Way* writes: "There was an incredible bond between her and her students" (p. 12). The bond was one of mutual respect

and trust. "Marva could lead with her eyes and her voice, winning control by a look or an inflection" (p. 23).

Jaime Escalante, who was the subject of the motion picture, "Stand and Deliver," was equally adept at creating a bond with his students. Escalante was able to teach calculus to the disadvantaged youth of East Los Angeles because he discovered how to forge the Mexican-American family spirit of togetherness into an academic tool. Mathews' (1988) book, *Escalante: The Best Teacher in America*, says Escalante came to appreciate the force of togetherness as a way of motivating his students. Students developed a cult of hero worship around Escalante. Registering for his classes became fashionable. "Escalante made calculus into a religion. Students followed his idiosyncratic ways because he amused them and made them feel part of a brave corps on a secret, impossible mission" (p. 217).

**Second: Teaching as making emergent judgments**

"Teaching," according to Eisner (1979) "is an art in the sense that teachers, like painters, composers, actresses, and dancers, make judgments based largely on qualities that unfold during the course of action" (p. 154). Qualitative judgments are used to select such factors as pace, climate, and tempo that influence the flow of learning. The teacher "must 'read' the emerging qualities and respond with qualities appropriate to the ends sought" (p. 154). Rubin (1985), like Eisner, emphasizes the qualitative aspects of teaching. The best teachers "exercise a considerable amount of personal judgment" (p. 159). They count heavily on intuition and inspiration as signposts for guiding their students through the maze of learning experiences.

"The tasks of teaching," Eisner (1979) contends, "are far more demanding than discursive knowledge can explain" (p. 272). If teachers were required to base all of their classroom activities on scientifically verified information, "most of educational practice would come to a standstill" (p. 272). Fluid intelligence is the hallmark of effective teaching, which, incidentally, is also the quality of intelligence used by a stand-up comedian. "For the stand-up comedian to function effectively," says Eisner, "he must be able to 'read' the qualities emanating from an audience" (p. 272). These qualities--tone, tempo, timing--change rapidly from one moment to the next. The comedian has to grasp these changes immediately. There is no time to stop and deliberate. "A line one second late falls flat" (p. 272). Teachers, like comedians, must develop a feel for their audience (students). The whole quality of a teacher's performance depends upon his or her sense of timing.

How are teachers able to tune themselves to a classroom full of students? Teaching is as much a matter of intuition as it is of intellection. Intuition or feeling is an essential tool for tapping into a group's energy. "Teaching," Eisner (1979) reminds us, "is not an act modeled after the sequences of a highly efficient assembly line" (p. 161). Time-and-motion studies have little or no meaning in a classroom setting. The teacher's role is far more like that of a coach who challenges his or her players to go out and give it their best. What can be accomplished with any group of students depends upon the groups' collective sense of identity. How do the students see themselves? Some groups are warm and responsive; others are cold and standoffish. One group may like to race ahead; the next will prefer to plod behind. Some groups find textbooks a bore; others cling tenaciously to the printed page. One group will have an open sense of humor; the next will be close minded and easily offended. Teaching and learning are directly tied to the groups' collective psychology.

Based on his work in teacher education, Rubin (1985) found that beginning teachers are frequently "urged to place blind faith in the prevailing 'best way' and to disregard their own insight and ingenuity" (p. 165). Though there are general principles underlying sound teaching practices, nevertheless, "there are times, in fact, when pedagogical laws can be broken to good advantage" (p. 159). Skilled teachers frequently abandon conventional practices for ones they have devised for themselves. "Teaching, in the richest sense of the art, is far more than rule-following" (p. 159). The way in which a teacher uses a particular strategy is more important than the strategy itself. "This 'feel' for the right thing at the right time is the benchmark of expertness" (p. 5). Rather than advising new teachers to play it safe and follow the rules, schools of education should encourage prospective teachers to develop "their capacities for innovation, spontaneity, perception, and intuition. These, in the final analysis, are the yeast of artistry" (p. 165).

Teaching is sometimes spoken of as an activity where the teacher learns to fly by the seat of his or her pants. Jackson's (1968) *Life in Classrooms* makes the point that there is "an inevitable quality to the teacher's work, a quality that places severe limits on the usefulness of a highly rational model for describing what the teacher does" (p. 167). Teaching is a complex undertaking that fosters a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity. Consequently, the teacher must content himself or herself with "doing not what he knows is right, but what he thinks or feels is the most

appropriate action in a particular situation. In short, he must play it by ear” (p. 167).

Dewey’s (1916/1960) classic work, *Democracy and Education*, tells us that teachers are persons whose work requires them to make qualitative judgments. The teacher’s judgments are similar to those made by an artist. Dewey believes “the method of teaching is the method of an art, of action intelligently directed by ends” (pp. 199-202). The practice of a fine art, however, is more than extemporized inspiration no matter how imaginative. Teachers, if they wish to develop artistry in their classrooms, must study “the operations and results of those in the past who have greatly succeeded” (pp. 199-202). Beginning teachers, however, should guard against blindly adopting techniques used by others who are already experts in their fields. “Handing out to teachers recipes and models to be followed in teaching,” Dewey believes, has produced lamentable consequences. Teachers should always be encouraged to exercise their own intelligence. Techniques used by others “are of worth or of harm according as they make his [the teacher’s] personal reaction more intelligent or as they induce a person to dispense with exercise of his own judgment” (pp. 199-202).

Marva Collins is an example of a teacher who makes her own decisions, qualitative judgments. What explains Collins’ remarkable success in the classroom? Tamarkin (1990) believes it is Collins’ relationship with her students. “One had to watch Marva’s students in the classroom to see the full effect of her energy and her conviction that children can learn” (p. 180). Collins demands high standards from her students, convincing them they can succeed. Collins (1990) believes the quality of education a child receives is tied directly to the quality of the teacher in the classroom. “Everything works when the teacher works.... It’s as easy as that, and as hard” (p. 187). Collins believes a caring teacher is the key to turning children on, motivating them to want to learn. “If a child sensed a teacher didn’t care, then all the textbooks and prepackaged lesson plans and audiovisual equipment and fancy, new, carpeted, air-conditioned building facilities weren’t going to get that child to learn” (p. 26).

Mathews (1988) contends that both the schools and the public are best served when teachers like Escalante are permitted to go their own eccentric ways. Nothing useful is accomplished by trying to force them to conform to established practices. School administrators have to learn to trust the judgments of their best teachers. Gifted teachers should be allowed to conduct their classes in the manner they see fit. “Teachers who bring students up to high standards are precious commodities. Leave them alone--as Escalante insisted be done when his schemes violated protocol or conventional wisdom” (p. 288). If artistic teachers ask for help, give them the help they request. That and nothing more! “Teachers who work hard and care for their students will produce better results than ten times their number dutifully following, the ten best recommendations of the ten latest presidential commissions on education” (p. 288).

### **Third: Teaching as creative imagination**

Eisner (1979) contends that teaching is like the arts in the sense that “the teacher’s activity is not dominated by prescriptions or routines but is influenced by qualities and contingencies that are unpredicted” (p. 154). Though prescriptions or routines may be drawn upon from time to time, they do not dominate or rule the teacher’s decision making process. Rules or principles provide a foundation for the automatic responses that are part of the teacher’s repertoire. These habits of thought and action, however, operate in such a way as to free the teacher to become inventive. “Without automaticity and the ability to call on stock responses, energies are lost and inventiveness is hampered. Yet, if responses are too automatic or routine, if they become too reflexive, the teacher’s ability to invent is hampered” (p. 154).

Collingwood (1938/1971) endorses the idea that a genuine work of art must reflect technical skill. “No work of art whatever can be produced without some degree of technical skill, and other things being equal, the better the technique the better will be the work of art” (p. 26). A genuine work of art, however, successfully combines technical skill and creative imagination. Whitehead (1929/1960) in *The Aims of Education* informs us that: “Fools act on imagination without knowledge; pedants act on knowledge without imagination” (p. 98). The teacher’s art is one of balancing knowledge (rules) with imagination (intuition). Rules and prescriptions for teaching, Rubin (1985) believes, serve a useful but limited role. “They serve as a guide for neophytes and as a point of departure for those more experienced. The routinization of teaching, nonetheless, would do more harm than good” (p. 159).

“Art,” according to Collingwood (1964), “is at bottom neither more nor less than imagination” (p. 45). Imagination is one of the striking qualities of human intelligence. It is also an essential element in every creative activity. Broudy (1972) in *The Real World of the Public School* contends that “art uses imagination to keep the past significant and the future promising” (p. 169). A work of art is measured by the quality of imagination that it

represents. Collingwood (1964) says: "To imagine is to be an artist; to imagine well is to be a good artist; to imagine superlatively well is to be a great artist" (p. 195). Imagination is also one of the qualities of a great teacher. Rubin (1985) holds that "imagination gives birth to the uniqueness, idiosyncrasy, and personalized style which are the wellspring of artistry" (p. 19).

Much has been written about teaching and learning styles. Most of the literature, unfortunately, speaks of style as if it were encoded in the teacher's or the student's genes. (Rita Dunn's work represents a case in point.) Rarely is style treated as something requiring years of painstaking effort. Style, according to Whitehead (1929/1960), is the exclusive privilege of the master craftsman. Style is "an aesthetic sense, based on admiration for the direct attainment of a foreseen end, simply and without waste" (p. 24). Style calls for attainment and restraint. An artist with style achieves his or her end and nothing but that end. Nothing detracts from the cohesiveness of the whole. "To my mind," says Andrew Wyeth, "the master is the one who can simultaneously give the effect of simplicity and restraint--yet you can go right up to it and explore it endlessly with the greatest joy" (Meryman, 1965, p. 112). The cultivation of a sense of style is the final stage of artistic achievement. When a person has style, Whitehead (1929/1960) maintains, it pervades the whole of his or her being. "The administrator with a sense of style hates waste; the engineer with a sense of style economizes his materials; the artisan with a sense of style prefers good work. Style is the ultimate morality of mind" (p. 24).

Teachers--like painters, dancers, and singers--are equally distinguishable by their styles. "Every great teacher," Rubin (1985) writes, "hones a natural style through continuous experimentation" (p. 165). Style, like a glove, must fit the hand of the person who wears it. "Artistic technique," Rubin contends, "cannot be transplanted at will. Each teacher, must, in one way or another, develop a collection of devices which work" (p. 5). Jackson (1968) believes teachers are as concerned about the "stylistic qualities of their own performances" as they are about whether "specific goals are reached" (pp. 167-168). Teaching inevitably wears the stamp of the teacher's style.

Marva Collins has developed her own distinctive teaching style. Tamarkin (1990) provides the following description of Collins' artistry in front of the classroom:

She had an exuberance, an energy about her that was both captivating and contagious. She was constantly in motion about the class, patting heads, touching shoulders, hugging and praising her students. Marva managed to give each child personalized attention. She didn't just teach them, she nurtured them. (p. 12)

A teacher who has style will invent imaginative ways of presenting lessons to his or her students. Mathews (1988) describes how Escalante presented a lesson on fractions to a class in basic mathematics. "He lined several apples up on a cutting board on his desk. With a meat cleaver in his right hand, he pulverized one bright red fruit in a few seconds, bringing laughs and rapt attention" (p. 94). Then Escalante carved the other apples into thirds, halves, fourths, and fifths. Though Escalante tried to make learning mathematics interesting, he was not always a jolly-good-fellow. When the occasion demanded it, he could become as tough as nails. "Students who stepped over Escalante's invisible line--failed to produce homework or disappeared for more than a day--saw Escalante the friendly clown suddenly change to something out of a drive-in horror movie" (p. 121).

#### **Fourth: Teaching as process directed activity**

Eisner's (1979) holds there is an "in process" nature to both teaching and art. "Teaching is an art in the sense that the ends it achieves are often created in process" (p. 154). Eisner regards the idea that all educational objectives should be clearly stated (preferably in behavioral terms) in advance of instruction as simply naive. Intentions and actions often occur concurrently. "Teaching is a form of human action in which many of the ends achieved are emergent" (p. 154). Eisner believes there is an inherent danger in trying to prescribe standard routines for the teacher to follow. Prescriptions diminish the teacher's ability to make critical judgments, shackling his or her creative imagination. Lockstep methods of instruction are antithetical to artistry in the classroom.

Eisner (1979) maintains that both art and teaching draw from "inexpressible forms of consciousness that recognize the feel of things and sense the qualities that lead to closure and consummation" (p. 273). Dewey (1934), commenting on the artist's feel for closure, says:

Until the artist is satisfied in perception with what he is doing, he continues shaping and reshaping. The making comes to an end when its result is experienced as good--and that experience comes not by mere intellect and outside judgment but in direct perception. An artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things. This sensitivity also directs his doings and makings. (p. 49)

Andrew Wyeth's paintings reflect the quality of sensitivity that Eisner and Dewey are describing. Wyeth, speaking of his own work, says: "I start every painting with an emotion--something I've just got out" (Meryman, 1965, pp. 108-112). Raw emotion, however, must be shaped and formed by the skilled hand of the artist. A work of art is a delicate balance of feeling and technique. The artist has to be on guard, however, not to allow his or her technique to dominate and overshadow the work's feeling. "You've got to watch out," says Wyeth, "that the technique isn't all you see. If you clean it up, get analytical, all the subtle emotion that caught you first goes sailing out the window" (Meryman, 1965, pp. 108-112).

Artistic teachers have a sensitivity, a feeling for how things are going; and, when necessary, they do not hesitate to make changes while in the middle of a lesson. Artistic teachers, Rubin (1985) believes, "are distinguished by their ability to cope: to modify one thing or another and circumvent problems" (p. 160). They have learned how to compensate for unforeseen difficulties. Artistic teachers are "sensitive to what is needed at a given moment, and follow their instincts more than formula" (p. 21). Artistic teachers do not follow rigid lesson plans; indeed, according to Jackson (1968), they "seem to be guided by certain rule-of-thumb considerations that are constantly being modified by the specifics of each classroom situation" (p. 163).

Jackson (1968) refers to teaching as an "opportunistic process" in which neither the teacher nor the students can predict exactly what will happen during any given lesson. "Plans are forever going awry and unexpected opportunities for the attainment of educational goals are constantly emerging" (p. 166). Artful teachers seize upon these opportunities and use them to good advantage. If, for example, a discussion is going well, the teacher may extend it into the next period. Or, if a test is going poorly, it may be canceled and the remainder of the period may be devoted to review. Times and schedules are constantly changing. Experienced teachers accept this state of affairs as natural. "They know, or come to know, that the path of educational progress more closely resembles the flight of a butterfly than the flight of a bullet" (pp. 166-167).

Artful teachers have learned how to tap their students' emotional energy and transform it into excitement about learning. Tamarkin (1990) says about Collins' teaching: "Learning in Marva Collins' class was clearly an exciting, shared experience. The children were eager to learn. They waved their hands and jumped up and down in their seats, asking her to call on them" (p. 12). Collins (1990), speaking of her philosophy of education, says: "There is no such thing as the way to reach a student. Anyway is the way as long as it works for the individual child" (p. 106). Artful teachers are able to improvise, to draw upon what their students already know. Collins reflects this kind of flexibility when she says: "I draw a large part of my curriculum from these [her students'] errors, not from teaching guides. One child's errors become a lesson for the whole class" (p. 43).

Escalante, when he was teaching at Garfield High School, undertook the task of humanizing calculus. "Escalante," says Mathews (1988), "knew he had to soften calculus's granite-hard image. His principal device was humor, nonchalance, and an appeal to the team-spirit" (p. 115). Escalante called upon a number of unorthodox techniques in order to stimulate his students' interest. Sometimes he would "pick fights with them over dress, or tardiness, or anything that might engage their anger, and then their interest" (p. 84). Escalante, like any artful teacher, "never settled on one method. He improvised, using different devices with different students" (p. 191). Escalante developed his own idiosyncratic approach to teaching calculus. The language of mathematics became infused with a multilingual vocabulary drawn from sports, television news, and soap operas. "Face mask" meant an error had been made at the beginning of the problem. The student needed to go back and start over. "Marching band" indicated the solution was easy. The student was to keep going. "Secret agent" recognized a minus sign in front of the parenthesis. The solution would be difficult, perhaps impossible. Escalante's strange and colorful vocabulary, says Mathews (1988), helped his students to remember calculus, "and its obscurity gave them the special feeling of being part of a secret society--a gang without graffiti or violence" (p. 196).

### **Conclusion**

Is teaching truly and art? An impressive array of thinkers--philosophers, artists, educators--align themselves with such a proposition. Eisner's four criteria--the ways in which teaching and art are similar to one another--are endorsed by a plethora of other authorities. Even those who favor a scientific approach to teaching will have to agree that there is more than a little art involved in the classroom performance of a gifted teacher.

Rubin (1985) offers us an interesting model (metaphor) for thinking about how we prepare teachers. Suppose, he says, we think of the classroom as a theater and of the teacher as an actor. (A good teacher is frequently a bit of a ham.) The use of such a metaphor changes everything. Scientific formulations (Thorndike's three Laws of

Learning, for instance) are thrown out the window. What remains is pure art! Rubin argues that scientific research has taken teaching down the broad, primrose path to a nasty place. "Our present system of teacher preparation is not likely to produce excellent practitioners" (p. 165). Too much time is devoted to methods that are "too far removed from contemporary classroom life" (p. 165). Even if an aesthetic approach to teacher education should prove fruitless, Rubin believes, it would be better "to err on the side of artistic embellishment that enables individuals to teach in ways that give pleasure, and reward" (pp. 169-170).

Should teacher education restrict itself to following the letter of the law (scientific research) or should it broaden its horizons to include the spirit of the law (aesthetic studies)? Given what has been said up until now, there should be little doubt in anyone's mind how the author would answer that question. Researchers should stop lamenting the fact that teaching is so unscientific and start celebrating the fact that it is truly artistic! Educators do not have to settle for a willy-nilly profession. If we expand educational research to include more than scientific studies, who knows, we just might wake up one morning to discover that the authentic knowledge base underlying teacher education is right where it has always been, in aesthetic disciplines.

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**R. FREEMAN BUTTS' "CIVIC EDUCATION REVISITED"**

Fred D. Kierstead  
University of Houston-Clear Lake

"When we see men of worth, we should think of equaling them.  
When we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and examine ourselves."  
Confucian Analect

"The chief condition of happiness is the life of reason.  
We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit."  
Aristotle, Ethics.

**Introduction**

Ten years ago in 1988 R. Freeman Butts suggested in an article that the best way to build good citizenship was to follow William James' suggestion to "inflame the civic temper with the moral equivalent of war."<sup>1</sup> Instead of conscripting people into the military as we have done earlier to solve international problems, both James and Butts have suggested that inflaming civic temper should mean inflaming a social temper. Americans should learn civic responsibility in school, they contend, but it would require much more work than what we do in our schools today. By 1998 several "civic lessons" have been provided on TV and the media; e.g., the Iran/Contra Affair, Watergate, Confirmation hearings of Judges Thomas and Bork to the Supreme Court, and the invasions of Granada, Iraq, and Panama. Some lessons had military solutions in nature and, some did not. They may or may not have been our best effort in resolving issues in relation to one's civic responsibility and duty. In fact, the public was not consulted in any of these actions. Recent interest in the conduct of our elected officials in public and private life may also be related to the issue of civic responsibility and moral courage.

Are we mere pawns in the media war for our viewing time and keeping us "informed" of social progress? Are there considerations to make of the tangled web woven by ethics of government practice and public talk? Is there an expectation that our students in school need some preparation for civic life and civil responsibility? This author suggests that there is a need for revitalizing civic education because it is the basis of moral dialogue and deliberation. R. Freeman Butts has suggested an agenda for such a revitalization. He calls his agenda "The Twelve Tables of Civism" after the Roman Republic's "Laws of the Twelve Tables" and Aristotle's paradigm of the later Greek republics.<sup>2</sup> Not only are the "twelve" moral precepts important for a civics class, but they are our common responsibilities as educators in general. Civics lessons in civics classes aside, all educators are in the "civics education" business.

**The American Scene and Moral "Diversity"**

In 1988 Freeman Butts argued that our political, social and educational underpinnings were weakening because of moral decay. Besides the political and military intervention our government used to respond to the rest of the world, our schools promoted citizenship more through the study of cultures and diversity rather than any unity of purpose. Butts states:

"In short, I believe that the civic mission of American education can better be served if the schools and colleges concentrate on those values we share as democratic citizens rather than simply trying to stress those moral or character traits that some individuals share with other individuals who are linked in particular groups based on race, ethnicity, kin, religion, party, class or life-style."<sup>3</sup>

He concludes that the best way to build moral character is to reflect civic values underlying democratic ideals and practice. We must have closure to the issue of diversity and add to it the sense of unity.

In 1998, some contend America has come loose from its moral underpinnings, and hence our major social institutions are shells of what they used to be when it comes to civil life and ethical deliberation. Robert Bellah's *Habits of the Heart* (1985) reminded us that maybe Alexis de Tocqueville might be right and wrong today. Our civic organizations protected us from "tyranny of the majority" and linked all of us across social and ethical lines. Civic organizations were an integral part of our social determination. Now we're beginning to forget those protective habits we have carried over the years through our civic organizations and tend toward isolation and separatism and

litigation fired by political correctness.

A decline in voter participation, an increase in teen violence, “cocooning” in one’s home rather than in public, a rise in divorce rate, and a marked increase in public dissatisfaction with student performance in our public schools are just a few examples of “uncivil” actions and social upheaval requiring civility to solve them. For example, it is not “civil” to answer school issues with private education. It is not “civil” to hide oneself in his home to avoid social conflict. Robert Putnam suggests that Americans are doing less of just about everything together. Our distrust of government and each other may be more pervasive than we thought. Our “social capital” is being depleted at an alarming rate, according to him.<sup>4</sup> Our social inventions are lagging badly behind our technological inventors. We try to solve social problems with technical gadgetry rather than the infrastructure necessary to assess outcomes of such technology. Social institutions require civility and a sense of whole, rather than “what’s in it for me.”

Alan Wolfe, professor at Boston University in *One Nation After All* suggests Americans have not lost their belief that morality is important, but rather that other people’s morality is none of their business. There is a real danger of this kind of moral relativism. People taking this position believe morality to be personal preference or just a matter of choice. The danger lies not in our differences of opinion, but rather the belief that we don’t need to agree about our values and how we should treat each other, and that dialogue or consensus is unnecessary. Without moral universals, American society floats in a sea of uncharted opinion. Recent dialogue about President Clinton’s behavior, centering on privacy, obstruction of truth, or freedom of action might be an example of this notion of “whose business it is” to judge another’s action. Relativists would be the first to say individual rights are important. Without a unifying theme for all of us to have as a “code of conduct” along with our plurality as individuals is the crux of the problem.

Having moral “diversity” suggests there may be no need to come to any consensus about our treatment of each other. Nothing could be farther from the truth. A society like ours needs a strong consensus about our beliefs and must reflect the desire to meet those “givens,” as well as protect our individual rights.

**R.F. Butts and His Tables of Civism.**

Figure 1 is a recreation of Butts’ Twelve Tables of Civism as it appeared in an article in the American Journal of Education in February, 1988. (with apologies for some license in its depiction).<sup>5</sup>

Figure 1:  
TWELVE TABLES OF CIVISM FOR THE MODERN AMERICAN REPUBLIC  
By  
R.F. Butts

PLURIBUS The Obligation of Citizenship		UNUM The Rights of Citizenship	
Corrupted Forms	Corrupted Forms	True Forms	True Forms
anarchy	1. “Law and Order”	Justice	7. Freedom
unstable pluralism	2. sameness; conformity	Equality	8. Diversity
privatism; privatization	3. totalitarianism	Authority	9. Privacy

4. "majoritarianism"	Participation	10. Due Process	"soft on criminals"
5. plausibility; half-truth	Significant truth	11. Property	"property superior
6. chauvinism;	Rights to humans"	Civic Virtue;	12. International
xenophobia	Patriotism	"cultural imperialism" human rights	Democratic Civism

Each one of the tables (schema or arrangement of words and meanings or set of facts/ideas in a comprehensive form) is explained by Butts in more detail in his cited article, but in summary he describes each in the following ways. The "unum" tables are numbers 1 through 6; the "pluribus" tables are numbers 7 through 12.

Justice – fairness in the social contact. He agrees with John Rawls that it is the first virtue of social institutions. Accepted principles or "givens are necessary in any society." It requires strong moral sentiment and good intent.

Freedom – equal basic liberties; the right to dignity, self-fulfillment, and security; the right and opportunity to think, express, inquire and believe without arbitrary constraint.

Equality – equal rights, treatment and opportunity.

Diversity – having a "pluralistic integration." Cultural boundaries are permeable, but cultural nuclei (identity and substance of a culture) are respected. We must recognize the need for a common culture – a stable pluralism, but at the same time have pervasive confidence in a composite system of laws and politics.

Authority- as opposed to mere power. Legitimate authority requires sanctions by customs, law, constitution or morality.

Privacy – as opposed to privatism or excessive privatization of public services; the right for individuals to live life in dignity and decide what they want to communicate to others. Children have some rights of privacy, but parents and schools have responsibility to protect them as well.

Due Process – the right to a hearing and face accusers.

Property Rights – ownership is a basic right and responsibility and a rudimentary concept of "what is yours and what's mine."

Participation – sovereignty of "we the people" or a social contract. Direct and representative democracies require this.

Truth – Butts defends the idea that we must know the difference between significant truth and plausible falsehood or half-truth and seek truth in public venues.

Patriotism – civic knowledge and commitment to the democratic process or a balance between rights and obligations.

Human Rights – universals of value that promote moral conduct; Recognition of global interdependence rather than moral relativism or moral neutrality.<sup>6</sup>

R. F. Butts suggests that our schools must be training grounds for moral deliberation; i.e., moral prescription (what people should be doing), and moral description (stating facts that reflect judgement about what humans stand for and what fundamental values people hold.) Merely showing students cultural differences may be a moral lesson lost when it comes to being other – regarding. Respect for human dignity and concern for Butts' twelve tables is a starting point for moral description, prescription and dialogue. From it teachers can begin to teach the lessons of civility so important for democratic life.

#### **The Teacher's Role in Presenting the Twelve Tables of Civism.**

Butts' dream is to promote justice, equality, legitimate authority, participation, significant truth and civic virtue (patriotism). These are all part of the unifying nature of our civic duties, or what he refers to as our "unum" or unity. The need for freedom, diversity, privacy, due process, property rights, and international human rights are part of the "pluribus" or individual rights we must all protect as well. Both of these sides are necessary if indeed our

students are to learn the social contract of getting protection along with individual rights. The role of our teachers must be one of describing and prescribing our duties and rights, for without these twelve and possibly others, the experiment in social consensus will fail.

Thomas Hobbes reminds us that there is a delicate balance between individual liberties that are absolute and rules of law that control us so we don't kill each other. Too many laws or rules and we have totalitarianism. Too many individual liberties and we have chaos in a social setting. The result is liberty with limits – certain individual liberties are given up in order to ensure protection for all and provide a forum for consensus. This is a social contract all people face within their societies. The questions are: “How much is freely given up to belong?”; “Is the price of safety too high to pay?”<sup>7</sup> The role of a teacher in this interchange requires educators to be the starting point for moral deliberation, reflection of “right” behavior and practice in moral dialogue to reach consensus and a balance of personal rights and social obligations.

Children are not miniature adults--they need answers to their questions and guidance about their actions. The “Twelve Tables,” Butts suggests, are a starting point to show the dual nature of civic and moral conduct. The individual is important because of the need for principles like independent thought, privacy, freedom, and due process. But schools have another “customer” besides the student – the public. Justice, equal opportunity, legitimate authority, truth and participation require people to see themselves in a social context and take responsibility for all our benefit. Schools are the most common forum for that kind of experience.

### Conclusion

Mr. Butts has given us a relatively simple example of the kinds of terms and rules our society needs if we are to return to civility in our public lives. We could add to his list interdependence, honesty, patience, and trust just to name a few civic virtues. Teachers also have special moral obligations, including the protection and safety of their students, ensuring equal opportunity to learn, respect for basic human dignity, and fairness in judgement and treatment of their charges. These are “special” because they are expected to be the reflection of professional conduct of educators. They also are moral and civic lessons all teachers must know and teach themselves. There may be additional topics future teachers may need to understand, but at least these moral precepts give us a place to start in the recognition of our additional responsibility besides subject matter and skill acquisition. Because our other social institutions have not grown at the same rate as before, giving us other places to learn civic responsibility, the schools must take up the slack.

Perhaps a more important part of Butts' analysis is his description of corrupted forms of these terms he suggests we as educators must help students understand and practice. Freedom rather than anarchy, justice rather than “law and order,” significant truth rather than plausibility, and international human rights rather than “cultural imperialism” are helpful in the discussion of what constitutes good conduct and definition of responsible moral behavior. Truly his suggestion that good moral deliberation and conduct can be integrated within not only civics classes but also the preparation of all teachers is a valid and critical part of having our schools to be places for citizenship education. It's a good way to remind all of us that there are already agreed-to principles we as a democracy have espoused and that we must help students practice these principles as well.

In closing, if teacher educators were able to convince all future teachers that these “tables” were important principles or “givens,” we would be well on the way to return civic education to its proper importance. Without an understanding of both individual protections and social expectation, we will continue to “teach” as if the individual was the customer and not the society. Both are our customers, and hence there is a need to regard both in moral deliberation and conflict resolutions. R. F. Butts gives us a step up on the long ladder of civic education. We owe it to him and ourselves to look at his suggestions again – not because it was the 200th anniversary of the Constitution's signing, but because it reminds educators that we all have an obligation to produce good citizens.

### ENDNOTES

1. William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War.” American Association of International Conciliation, Doc. nr. 27. Feb. 1910. P. 19.
2. Twelve Tables of Roman Republic can be found in Paul Monroe, ed. *Source Book of the History of Education for the Greek and Roman Period*. New York: Macmillan, 1908. P. 344-6.

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

3. R. F. Butts, *The Revival of Civic Learning*. Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, 1980. See also R.F. Butts, "The Moral Imperative of American Schools ... inflame the civic temper." *American Journal of Education*, Vol. 96, M.2, Feb. 1998, p. 168.
4. See Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone." *Journal of Democracy*, Summer, 1995.
5. R. F. Butts, "The Moral Imperatives of American Schools ...", p. 165.
6. With apologies to R.F. Butts, original analysis, this summary is better depicted in R.F. Butts, "The Moral Imperatives of American Schools..." pp. 167-87. *Passim*.
7. F. Kierstead and P. Wagner, *The Ethical, Legal and Multicultural Foundations of Teaching*. Madison, WI: W.C. Brown, 1993. Pp. 53-55.

**A PROACTIVE RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL REFORM  
MOVEMENT'S CALL FOR CHANGING SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR  
TRAINING PROGRAMS TO MEET THE DEMAND OF THE NEXT MILLENNIUM**

Jack Klotz  
University of Southern Mississippi

Since the issuance of the national report, *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform* (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), which cited a number of criticisms regarding the overall conditions of public education in the United States, other reports have surfaced to fuel the fires of educational reform. Among these national reports have been: (1) *Tomorrows Teachers* (Holmes Group, 1986), (2) *A Nation Prepared* (Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986), and (3) *Leaders for America's Schools* (National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration, 1987). The first two focused their findings on the arena of upgrading teacher education programs and the restructuring of the roles and responsibilities of teachers, while the third report focused its findings specifically on the issue of educational administrators and their role and responsibility in managing the school reform efforts. Indeed, this last report raised a number of questions regarding whether administrator preparatory efforts needed to be redesigned, to what extent should policy makers at the federal, state, and local level be involved, and more specifically, to what extent should institutions of higher education be involved in these reform efforts.

Since the issuance of the preceding reports, the literature within the domain of educational leadership has not been without additional commentary regarding the needs and specifics for the reforming of preparatory programs for educational administrators. Ashbaugh & Kasten (1992); Daresh & Playko (1992) and Murphy (1992) have pushed for reforming the focus, scope, and content of such preparatory programs. While other organizations such as the Council of Chief School Officers (1996) and the National Policy Board for Educational Administration (1993) have identified specific competencies in which educational leaders should be required to demonstrate proficiency before being allowed to apply their skills and knowledge in field settings.

Murphy (1992) stated, "It is difficult to analyze the state of affairs in administration programs without becoming despondent ... [W]e must be about the business of changing things dramatically" (p.137). This contention that change in how future administrators were trained is necessary seemed well support by the National Association of Secondary School Principals (1985) when they called for, "the need for: more direct and immediate linkages of preparation programs with the field; coordination of developmental activities through some broader agency; and attention to the social-political environments that tend to inhibit change" (p.1). Review of the following pieces of literature: *School leadership preparation: A preface for action* (American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education, 1988); *The licensure of school administrators: Policy and practice* (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1992); *Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium standards for school leaders* (Council of Chief State School Officers, 1996); *The professional development of school administrators: Preservice, induction, and inservice application* (Daresh & Playko, 1992); *Elementary and middle schools: Proficiencies for principals* (National Association of Elementary School Principals, 1991); *Principals for our changing schools: Knowledge and skill base* (National Policy Board for Educational Administration, 1993), and *Educational Leadership in an age of reform* (Jacobson & Conway, 1990) all addressed the preparation and training of educational leaders for the new millennium either through the establishment of policy and/or the implementation of instructional delivery models.

Daniel, Gupton, and Southerland (1998) noted that among the previously identified documents a number of commonalities existed. As an example, most recommended a shift away from managerial to human-centered oriented training experiences, that additionally reflected movement from the macro-level of a smooth-running organization to the micro-level of the learning needs of the individual student. Furthermore, it was noted that these various approaches also shared other common factors, namely: ...." (a) a continued focus on the importance of a "knowledge base" that is best learned via traditional academic preparation (i.e., college or university courses), (b) a strengthening focus on learning by doing (via problem-centered and problem-based learning, simulations, and enhanced field experiences), and (c) a renewed focus on the importance of personal and professional characteristics of the administrator (e.g., emphasis on the affective qualities of leaders, calls for a return to "moral" or "ethical" leadership)" (p.8). Concomitantly, Merseth noted:

Educational administrators intending to practice in the twenty-first century need professional preparation that helps them work effectively in a world characterized by accelerating change, exploding knowledge, growing diversity, galloping technology, and increasing uncertainty. Such demands require preparation that not only equips administrators with cutting edge knowledge but also with the capacity and appetite to continually improve their practice. It was within that context that the Department of Educational Leadership of The University of Southern Mississippi began its efforts during the 1996-1997 school year to develop, evolve, and implement a new and innovative preparatory program for training school site educational leaders for the next millennium. In order to effect such an outcome, the Department chose to involve not only its faculty but also practicing field and central office administrators from within its service delivery area, K-12 classroom teachers, on-site graduate students, and three nationally recognized consultants within the field of educational administration. A program specific "Leadership Advisory Board" (LAB) was created to represent district organizational patterns and configurations, with the intent of providing insight and corroboration in developed various instructional programmatic areas. Early on, the Department committed itself to evolving an instructional delivery program that embodied the concepts of: (a) instructional blocks, (b) student cohort groups, (c) faculty cohort instructional delivery, (d) integrated thematic instruction, and (e) problem-centered and problem-based learning, simulations, and enhanced field experiences. Merseth (1997, p.1)

In order to ensure that students would not be placed in an awkward situation of having to choose which masters program in Educational Leadership they wished to be a part of, the Department in September of 1997 established a self-imposed cessation of master's level admissions. This complimented the establishment by the Mississippi Department of Education of an expectation that licensure as a school administrator would not be honored under previous program requirements after September 1, 1998.

#### **Vision of School Leadership**

Effective school leaders are strong educators, anchoring their work on central issues of learning and teaching and school improvement. They are moral agents and social advocates for the children and communities they serve. Finally, they make strong connections with other people, valuing and caring for others as individuals and as members of the educational community. (Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium [ISLLC], 1996, p. 5)

This vision of what constituted an excellent administrative preparatory program as stated by ISLLC was fully shared by the Department of Educational Leadership and Research of The University of Southern Mississippi and indeed, became the underpinning of its vision for its administrator preparation program with its targeted mission of student success. What follows in the remaining portions of this descriptive paper is drawn from the Department's Program Proposal: Principal Preparation for Value-Centered Leadership. Given this commitment to K-12 student success, the USM program for training administrators for the next millennium could be viewed as resting on a bedrock of what Thomas Sergiovanni calls a "covenant of shared values" about teaching and learning. Thus, foremost among faculty and practitioner partners was the belief that the success of all students was the primary purpose of all K-12 leadership. With this overarching belief, a set of core beliefs related to educational leadership were established for the new master's program and these consisted of the following six programmatic core beliefs, namely:

**Core Belief #1** Schools are the primary focus of educational change and therefore building principals are the key facilitators of educational change for growth and school improvement. They must be able to initiate, implement, and maintain positive changes for insuring student success.

**Core Belief #2** The governance of schools will increasingly be a shared endeavor among all stakeholders--principal, teachers, students, and parents-- with more accountability for student success required of all players, particularly at the school level. Principals must be especially well-skilled in mobilizing teams of varied people and players to accomplish collaboratively the school's goals.

**Core Belief #3** The pluralism of students, staff and community requires school leadership appreciative of and capable of working with diverse cultures, ethnicities, and perspectives with particular understanding, sensitivity, and commitment to a concept of inclusivity for meeting the cognitive, social, emotional, and physical needs of an increasingly diverse student population.

**Core Belief #4** Today's school leader must be committed to moral, ethical leadership that sets the tone for establishing school as a "community of learners" wherein mutual respect, trust, and concern for each other

characterize the climate and culture.

**Core Belief #5** Today's school leader must be skilled in reflective practice earmarked by decision-making and problem-solving based on a well-examined belief system--an acquired, readily referenced core of values, which Steven Covey calls a state of "centeredness" that can guide one through difficult decision-making and crises.

**Core Belief #6** Today's school leader must be knowledgeable about child growth and development including cognitive and affective dimensions, guiding principles, and best practices of teaching and learning. Furthermore, he or she must embrace a much broader concept of what constitutes human intelligence than schools have traditionally acknowledged.

### **Philosophy of Leadership Preparation**

As stated earlier in this paper, there have been during the past decade numerous calls for reform of preparatory programs for educational leaders. These calls for reform have tended to focus on basically four factors, namely: (a) a move away from a managerial to a human-centered perspective and from the macro-level of a smooth-running organization to the micro-level of the learning needs of the individual student, (b) a continued orientation on the importance of a "knowledge base" that is best learned via traditional academic preparation, (c) a strengthening orientation on learning by doing, and finally, (d) a renewed orientation on the importance of personal professional characteristics of the administrator.

These foci served as a general philosophical framework upon which the Department of Educational Leadership and Research's new master's program evolved its "academic preparation program." Secondly, learning by doing has become a hallmark of this new master's program. These "reality-based," constructivist learning opportunities have been planned to take many forms, such as group problem-solving assignments, case studies, simulated principal in-basket activities, development of authentic products and documents, interviewing and "shadowing" of administrators, and personalized, performance-based practica--to name but a few. Finally, this new leadership program has emphasized the affective domain of learning, with activities designed to explore and develop the attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, and values of students.

### **USM's EDA Program Goals and Objectives**

The Department of Educational Leadership and Research's ultimate goal in preparing educational leaders has emerged from the belief that student learning and the learning environment are central to its work.

The University of Southern Mississippi's Principal Preparation Program exists to provide Mississippi with principals capable of proactive, positive leadership for schools in the 21st century. Graduates of our program will be equipped with the knowledge, dispositions, and skills to enable all students and staff to be successful. (The University of Mississippi Principal Preparation Model for Values-Centered Leadership) In order to operationalize this goal, the department developed the following program objectives for its new Masters of Educational Administration degree for principals, namely:

**Program Objective 1.** To work collaboratively with school districts and the State Department of Education to recruit, attract, and admit students with excellent leadership potential, strong instructional backgrounds, and high moral character.

**Program Objective 2.** To assist each student in developing and completing an individual program plan that will best meet his or her needs in becoming a skilled, visionary, moral leader as defined in the standards set forth by the state and prominent national groups including, ISLLC, NCATE, and NPBEA.

**Program Objective 3.** To provide a program that demonstrates and instills the values of reflective practitioner, transformational leadership, student-centeredness, and ethics.

**Program Objective 4.** To provide a well-rounded curriculum with content that includes experiences and opportunities for students to acquire the knowledge, dispositions, and skills essential for outstanding school leadership.

**Program Objective 5.** To employ constructivist program delivery processes based on the following: (a) collaboration between and among students and student cohorts, faculty, universities, and school districts, as well as state and local agencies; (b) extensive use of problem-solving, constructivist activities (including both problem-based and problem-centered approaches); (c) developmentally appropriate, field-based experiences strategically planned and placed throughout the program beginning in Block 1 and ending with a year-long internship experience to meet the needs of individual students and cohorts in synthesizing the knowledge base and honing leadership skills through application; d. more reliance on authentic, performance-based means of assessing students in

which their knowledge, skills, and dispositions are demonstrated rather than merely written and articulated.

**Program Objective 6.** To work as partners with school districts to provide schools in USM's service area with a pool of proactive principal candidates capable of providing moral leadership for student-centered schools essential for maximizing student potential and success.

**Program Features**

USM's Principal Preparation Program was conceptualized to reflect essential, significant shifts in the basic premises on which schools and leaders have operated. The following assumptions have formed the undergirding of the USM program design and development, namely:

- a. Schools should be open, caring, collaborative communities of learners involving all stakeholders in their operation.
- b. Schools should cultivate healthy risk taking and positive change for growth of children and adults.
- c. Principals must be transformation leaders.
- d. Principals must be PROACTIVE.
- e. Student success should be performance-based and central to the school's operation.

**Conceptual Model of USM's Program of Principal Preparation**

The University of Southern Mississippi's Principal Preparation Model for Values-Centered Leadership (see next page) has illustrated the interrelationship among the program's key components and grounding principles beginning with (1) an admissions process to screen for qualified candidates, (2) an integrated approach to organizing program content, (3) reliance on selected processes for effective program delivery, (4) an emphasis on selected values in leadership, and (5) the use of four major domains of principal proficiencies recommended by the National Policy Board for Educational Administrators, which have guided the program's development.

The program's visual model has illustrated the interaction of program content and process with the content based on the knowledge, dispositions, and skills identified by the Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium (ISLLC), the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) and by the state in its Mississippi Administrators' Standards and Indicators document as being essential for today's principal. The Department's program's processes have broken with traditional programs of principal preparation by having relied on many forms of internal and external collaboration including University-school district partnerships, team-teaching among faculty cohorts involving adjunct faculty as "clinical professors" in organizational blocks rather than in courses, organization of a program around cohort groups of students, more reliance on constructivist approaches to curriculum and pedagogy, field-based experiences strategically and developmentally placed throughout the program from the first semester through the year-long internship, and greater regard for performance-based assessment of students. While these characteristics have broken with traditional programs preparing administrators, they have remained consistent with and supportive of the recommendations contained in Mississippi's Administrator Preparation and Certification Program Development Principles.

This new program was designed to consist of 36 semester hours of course credit with an additional requirement of an internship of 6 to 12 semester hours. The first full-time cohort student group will begin with the fall 1999 semester in which a group of students not currently employed full time (maximum of 25) enrolls in the first of three blocks of integrated program content (Block 1), followed in the spring semester 2000 by Block 2, in the summer 2000 by Block 3, followed by the internship occurring in the second year (2000-2001) over both fall and spring semesters. The part-time program options have been scheduled to begin with a cohort group of students enrolling in Block 1 in the summer 1999 semester, Block 2 in the fall (1999) and spring (2000) semesters, Block 3 in the summer 2000 semester, followed by the internship occurring over a full school year (2000-2001) through fall and spring semesters. The two programs were designed to be identical in content, sequencing, structure and delivery with the only difference being that Block 2 for the part-time student cohort is to be spread over two semesters rather than one semester as in the case of the full-time cohort program. The part-time cohort program has been scheduled to allow students who have continued to be employed full time to take heavy loads in the summer and lighter loads in the fall and spring semesters. The integrity of the program has been designed to be maintained in both cohort student group experiences.

**Core Curriculum**

Consistent with the department's vision and mission, USM's Principal Preparation Model for Values-Centered Leadership has targeted the development of proactive principals who will have evolved into

student-centered, reflective, ethical/trustworthy, and transformational leaders. Again this has been illustrated in the model, these themes have provided basic grounding and design principles recommended by the state which have been tread throughout the program, facilitated its integration, and were embedded in the four major domains of principal proficiencies described by the National Policy Board for Educational Administration as the interpersonal, the contextual, the programmatic, and the functional domains. These domains were defined in "Principals for Our Changing Schools: The Knowledge and Skill Base" (1993), a document intended as a "flexible design ... or template for preparation, inservice, or certification programs. Although the domains were not intended as separate courses, the authors contended that "they can be tapped as strands of a cross-disciplinary program, or for a problems-of-practice approach" (p.xv).

In the USM program of principal preparation, the domains were integrated throughout the program with individual domains of Contextual, Programmatic, and Functional providing a curriculum focus for each of the three blocks of the Department's integrated program content with NPBEA's fourth domain, the Interpersonal, being unilaterally emphasized throughout the program.

#### **Organization and Sequencing of Integrated Curriculum Blocks**

**Block 1** - The Landscape of Leadership (12 semester hours of credit) This block's focus was on students more fully understanding themselves as potential leaders, becoming a cohort team, and further development of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes which an educational leader has been expected to possess in order to deal with changing school and community environments. Students have been expected to gain insight into the school and community environments and into various contextual factors that have influenced the educational setting. Concepts that were explored within this instructional block included leadership theory, organizational oversight, self-understanding, educational philosophy, and research consumerism.

**Block 2** - The Principal as Instructional Leader - (12 semester hours of credit) The second block built on Block 1's emphasis on the landscape of leadership by focusing on the heart of principals' work, i.e., increasing students' skills and ability to plan and implement school improvement and a program of instruction centered on student learning, achievement, and success. Concepts included in this block of integrated instruction to facilitate students' understanding were: improving teaching and learning; curriculum products, processes, and issues; professional development; targeting student success through measurement and evaluation; and action research.

**Block 3** - The Principal as Manager - (12 semester hours of credit) The third block of instruction targeted students' understanding and skill in managing key organizational processes for facilitating the instructional program and nurturing teaching and learning in the school community. Developmentally, this block served as a synthesizer of the preceding two blocks by focusing on management functions as tools for principals, as instructional leaders, to operationalizing the goals and central mission of the organization of the school, i.e., student success. Central concepts that have been dealt with in this instructional block included leadership accountability; human, fiscal, and material resource management; school improvement; school law; and educational equity.

**The Internship** - Year Two - (6 to 12 semester hours of credit) The second year of this preparatory program was designed for students to develop their skills and further apply and synthesize theory and the knowledge base through more intensive, individually constructed field-based experiences facilitated by a team comprising a practitioner-mentor, a University advisor, and a designated field-based supervisor. The internship has been viewed as prescriptive and thus, has been designed to be somewhat flexible depending on the needs of the individual student.

The ordering of the instructional blocks was sequenced developmentally to accommodate increasingly complex program objectives. In addition, each block contained developmentally appropriate field-based experiences to further facilitate students' full understanding of each block's knowledge content (i.e., making observations in a district and shadowing a principal in order to complete a written contextual analysis of a district in Block 1; actually assisting a district with personnel functions in the summer in Block 3). Because of the importance of the field-based experiences from the outset of the program, in the first semester students have been expected to be paired with a practitioner-mentor who will be expected to work with the student and university advisor throughout the program in developing the student's individual program plan and further facilitating the field-based experiences of the student.

The various block's conceptual themes have flowed from content topics that facilitate each block's learner objectives. Thus, the curriculum has maintained a strong student-centered focus. The block's instructional teams were strategically assigned to match the expected student competencies and skills related to each block.

#### **Instructional Procedures and Methodology**

The processes for USM's content delivery has significantly differed from more traditional programs of administrator preparation as reflected in the program's model, the constructivist, student-centered delivery of the program has relied heavily upon collaboration, problem-solving, site-based experiences, and performance-based assessment. Individual program plans are to be developed by each student and his or her support team, i.e., practitioner-mentor, university advisor, and on-site supervisor during the first semester, updated regularly and kept as part of each student's portfolio, and used as a monitoring tool throughout the program.

#### **Collaboration**

Because adult learners in particular can learn much from each other's varied experiences and perspectives, students in this program will have many opportunities to work as members of a team, to share ideas and work loads, and to experience participative leadership as members of a group. Students are expected to enroll as members of a cohort team for the entire program and are further expected to work as members of the cohort team as well as members of smaller ad hoc groups to enhance their skill, understanding, and appreciation of the benefits and power of group input and decision-making. Additionally, students will also have had the opportunity to experience collaborating with school districts on varied field-based projects as individuals and as teams throughout the program.

The department's commitment to collaboration for program delivery also has been manifested in its overall team-based approach to instruction organized around semester blocks rather than in traditional courses. Professors on campus along with clinical professors (part-time faculty who have continued to function as practicing administrators) and field-based mentors will have continued to work together to deliver each instructional block of the program and to further provide team-based input and support for each cohort student.

#### **Site-based experiences**

Traditional instructional strategies such as lecture, class discussion, and examinations have not been eliminated from the program but will be significantly diminished in light of the reformed program's emphasis on constructivist teaching and learning. Both in-class and field-based assignments and projects will be utilized in nurturing more active, hands-on, real-world experiences in the principalship.

Beginning in the first semester and continuing throughout the two-year program, students will have experienced developmentally appropriate, field-based assignments designed to extend and enhance their knowledge and skill base. The field-based component of each block was not conceived separately from the course content but rather as a part of the total 12 semester hours of integrated content curricula. Each block's field-based assignments were sequenced to incorporate increasingly more complex skills and concepts. An increasingly greater portion of each block's time has been designated to involve field-based experiences, leading up to the full-year personalized internship. Site-based experiences are to be planned to and facilitated by the student and the student's support team and the instructional team of each program block.

#### **Technology.**

An essential part of any program designed to prepare today's educational leaders must incorporate sufficient attention to and appropriate use of technology (1) in delivery of the program through instructional applications of technology; (2) through technologically enhanced program management; (3) through up-to-date curricular information and training in the use of technology to support cutting-edge school leadership. The block descriptions have reflected the incorporation of technology in the curriculum and program content; but in order to deliver this program as conceived, the department has requested a technologically-enhanced laboratory for various media interactive activities, enhanced instruction, as well as for facilitating faculty, student, and cohort use of the Internet, E-mail and listservs, computer-based programs, and simulations.

Distance learning via satellite transmission was already in place to facilitate coordination of the Hattiesburg and Gulf Coast campuses. Satellite transmission should further enhance the work of the department in collaborating with other universities and school districts as this technology becomes more widespread across the state.

#### **Assessment of Students**

Student assessment in USM's principal preparation program has reflected a focus on higher-order thinking by emphasizing performance-based assessments in addition to more traditional modes for assessing mastery of content material relative to a professional knowledge base. Instructors within each block are expected to determine a given set of assessments for each set of block experiences. Although traditional measures such as tests of the knowledge base, research papers, and a summative comprehensive examination are planned to be utilized, team-based, collaborative portfolio development and analysis procedures and performance-based assessment rubrics

to assess students' knowledge, attitudes, and skills have been planned to become more of the focus in monitoring students' development. These processes are expected to capitalize on student self-reflection, peer assessment, personal responses and interactions during clinical experiences, and performance-oriented activities during clinical activities in the first three blocks as well as the internship experiences in accordance with the program goals and the student's individual learning plan.

The Individual Diagnostic Profile of Principal Proficiencies, developed by the department and based on NCATE's standards, has been identified to assess individually each student's skills beginning in Block 1 and will be one means of monitoring students' growth and development. The instrument will be kept in the students' portfolio along with documented evidences of skill attainment related to each proficiency. Additionally, this diagnostic profile has been designated as a major component to be used to construct a customized internship at the end of the program's first three blocks of instruction. Summative assessment of students at the end of their entire program will be based on the final student portfolio and the results of the master's comprehensive examination.

#### **Assessment of the Program**

Accountability of the total program has been viewed as an ongoing process based on input from students, faculty, and the Leadership Advisory Board. Pre- and post-graduation surveys of students, student evaluations of faculty, annual state/NCATE reviews of the program, and student success rate on the new Principal Licensure Assessment have been designated to serve as sources of data for determining the program's success. Moreover, each block instructional team has been charged with annual review of content and activities so as to assure maximum effectiveness in the instructional product offered to students in each block. The students' portfolios, although intended in this program initially to benefit students tracking their own growth and development, should also be of help in the department's overall program assessment. To this end, the portfolios will be reviewed by a team of faculty and L.A.B. members on an annual basis to look for strengths and weaknesses of the program based on its goals and objectives.

In accordance with the Mississippi State Department of Education Process and Performance Standards for Educational Leadership Programs, individual student records will include (a) standard application/portfolio packets, (b) record of preselection interview results, and (c) an individualized program of studies consistent with NCATE standards as delineated by the Educational Leadership Licensure Consortium. In addition, the department will monitor the results of the performance of program graduates on the Principal's Licensure Assessment to assure that the state-required minimum of 90% of students score at or above the required proficiency level. Other State Department of Education Process and Performance Standards as may be implemented by the state will be incorporated into the department's annual review process.

#### **Conclusion**

This new reform program for the preparation of school administrators has brought together a number of ideas, models, and delivery formats to create a totally different approach from that which has been in operation at the University of Southern Mississippi. It is recognized by the department that this program is an evolving one, which over time is expected to continue to modify itself as a result of both ongoing internal and external assessments. What level of success will the program achieve is not yet known; however, the anticipation and expectation within the department is that this program will be responsible for creating school administrators fully ready and capable of affecting quality instructional opportunities and settings well into the new millennium.

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**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

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**EXPECTANCY THEORY: ITS EVOLUTION  
AND IMPACT ON EDUCATIONAL DELIVERY\***

Jack Klotz  
University of Southern Mississippi

**Background**

Learning expectancy beyond the current research orientation as reported previously has existed and influenced the delivery of education to American students since as early as the eighteenth century and has during that time passed through three distinct periods. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the significance of each of these periods and their impact on the way in which teachers and school systems mixed educational expectations for students with actual educational delivery in the field setting. To this end each area will be explored by examining nine selected components. These nine components consist of the following, namely: (1) the learning concept of each era, (2) the research base for each era, (3) the learning assessment measures employed in each era, (4) the actual learning expectancy associated with each era, (5) the role of the teacher during each of these eras, (6) the role of the learner during each era, (7) the evaluation strategies that were or are in place relative to each strategy, (8) the primary focus or method of teacher evaluation efforts in each era, and finally, (9) the emphasis, methodology, and orientation associated with the determination of remuneration for teachers in each era.

For the purpose of this paper, the eras of expectancy have been divided into three distinct time frames. Each has a distinctive level of expectancy that for all intents and purposes directly influenced or as in the case of Era Three should be influencing the manner in which current educators go about delivering education to today's students within the K-12 environment. For the purposes of this paper, these three eras are identified by the following time frames and brief expectation for student performance, namely: Era One - 1837-1909 (Little learning from many), Era Two - 1910 - 1975, (Much learning from many and little from others), and Era Three - 1976 until the present (All children can learn and all children will learn). Finally, much of the general foundation and emphasis for this paper is based upon the work of Glen Robinson, retired Executive Director of the Educational Research Service.

**Era One (1837-1909)**

This initial phase (era) of expectancy was grounded in the learning concept that children should be disciplined and taught the three R's. It additionally held to the expectation that the student population attending school pupils could be identified as being part of two groups or classes, i.e., those who would learn and those who would not. Indeed, those students identified in the latter group were associated with the term, "laggards"; such students were easily identifiable by their often conspicuous placement in the corner(s) of the school classroom. Indeed, these discriminated students had their identities further reinforced in their minds by often being forced to wear a "dunce cap" in front of their peers for a specified period of time. The research base for such an expectation and educational delivery style was rooted in both tradition and religion. Specifically as early as 1647, whenever a colony was formed, its citizens were expected under the tenets of the "Old Deluder Satan Act" to provide for the establishment of an educational setting designated to provide instruction of the populace in the area of reading. This requirement was grounded in the belief that such training would enhance the probability that the populace would develop a good moral character, which would further enhance the well-being and continued growth of the colony.

Learning assessment measures employed during that time centered around two dominant processes, i.e., individual recitation and demonstration of skills acquired. Hence overall this era held to the expectation that "a little learning" was expected from many of the pupils who were enrolled in educational settings. As a result of this basic expectancy, the educational culture of the school house emphasized basic literacy and values believed important for the continued growth and development of the newly formed republic. To achieve these purposes, teachers functioned in roles associated with such descriptive terms as taskmasters, proctors, and school keepers. Consequently, students attempted to meet such learner role expectations within the confines of the school house as being obedient, memorizing identified material, repetitive representation of instructional material, and movement from one identified learning task to another. Learner assessment during this era was simply based upon the students passing or failing to

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pass selected educational tasks.

Teacher evaluation practices that were in place throughout this era were often simplistic and of an arbitrary nature. Headmasters were held responsible for evaluating the quality of a teacher's efforts based upon their (headmasters) views of the teacher's moral character, disciplinary control, and their command of the three R's. Salary practices were generally arbitrary and discriminatory, with males receiving larger salaries than females and secondary teachers receiving more than elementary teachers.

#### **Era Two (1910 - 1975)**

Transition from one era to another, while associated with a specific year, did not occur overnight. Indeed, such transition often spanned several years. Yet, specific incidents often led to the effective transition from one expectancy era to another. In 1904, Alfred Binet was approached by the French government and was asked to develop an instrument for their use within the French educational system for the sole purpose of identifying "dull" students; thus resulting in the 1905 the Binet/Simon "Scale of Intelligence." In 1910, Louis Terman, a professor at Stanford University translated this instrument into English and normed it on a population of American youth, thus, giving rise to the "Stanford Binet Intelligence Test and more important, Era Two Expectancy. A significant factor associated with this particular era has been the reality that most of today's practicing educators, either received their formal training as educators or were themselves educated in the K-12 environment during this period of time. Thus, they have been influenced by the base expectation of "much learning from some students and little from others."

This second phase of expectancy evolution saw the influence of the utilization of achievement test data in determining placement of students into discrete instructional groups, i.e., homogeneous grouping patterns became a dominant force within the educational arena. The learning concept for this expectancy was that pupils differed in their capacity to learn. Indeed, some students were held to be "good" learners, while others were identified as "poor" learners. The research base for this expectancy was grounded in the early studies of intelligence that equated student aptitude with the capacity to learn and further implied that student aptitude was normally distributed within any given population. As identified earlier, this era was pervasive in its utilization of student grouping practices based upon the outcome of various learning assessment measures that evolved around norm-referenced and normally curved tests, which were designed to identify and rank students and their abilities. Indeed, if the base utilization of normative data was not sufficient in itself to identify and rank students, educators also had at their disposal percentile scores, various standard scores, stanine scores, and quartile scores to facilitate the desired rankings. Instructional groups often were given titles, such as red birds, blue birds, sparrows, pigeons, ... , etc., each title covertly conveyed an expected student performance level.

Again, the learning expectancy of this era was that "much learning was to be expected from some students and little learning was expected from other students." Within this context, the emphasis was on the opportunity for students to learn. Teachers were for the most part expected to be "presenters" of the curriculum content and graders of student performance. Within this context then, students were expected to listen, study, take tests, and receive grades. Learner assessment evolved around the distribution of grades based upon arbitrarily curved and normally distributed outcome expectations, designed to identify, sort, and label students from "good" to "poor." Conventional wisdom held that if a student was misplaced within a higher homogeneous instructional group, the simple remedy was to move the student to a more appropriate lower instructional group. Yet, if the perception surfaced that a student may have been placed in an inappropriate lower instructional group, hesitancy existed relative to moving the student immediately to a higher group without sufficient further observation and data collection.

Teacher evaluation practices during this era first attempted to identify, quantify, and design instruments based upon the identification of characteristics and traits associated with good teaching practices and environmental factors. Indeed, teachers were evaluated on the basis of their knowledge of the curriculum content they were assigned responsibility for conveying to students, their skill in methods of instructional delivery, and finally, their ability to maintain student discipline within the classroom environment. Finally, it was during this era that teacher remuneration moved from discriminate and arbitrary determination to the current salary determination practices evolving around single salary schedules based upon educational preparation and years of service in education.

#### **Era Three (1976 - Present)**

The third and current phase of learning expectancy surfaced generally around 1976 and continues today. The era was born as a result of the initial work of Benjamin Bloom and his efforts to bring forth upon the educational stage the concept of "mastery learning," which was significantly influenced by the work of John Carroll - *A Model of*

*School Learning* (1963). Consequently the learning concept that has been associated with this era has held that “All pupils *can learn* and all pupils *will learn* given sufficient time and appropriate assistance. The concept here has been that there exist some students who are capable of learning material faster than other students, not as previously held the existence of “good” and “poor” students. Support for this expectancy has been in the form of studies that have shown that aptitude predicts the rate of learning, not the level or complexity of learning. Indeed, the findings that have grown from the extensive research under the heading of “effective schools” have significantly supported this expectation.

Again, the learning expectancy associated with this era supports the position that much learning should be expected from all students. As a result of such expectations on the part of teachers, administrators, and parents student performance and instructional growth “will” respond accordingly. Here, unlike in Era Two where the emphasis was on the student’s opportunity to learn, the emphasis/obligation is squarely placed on the shoulders of teachers to “teach.” To this end, learning assessment measures have been urged to be objective referenced, diagnostic, and mastery oriented designed to measure student progress toward predetermined and communicated learning objectives.

Under this era of expectancy, teachers have been expected to be educational analysts and facilitators, capable of assisting “all” students to achieve identified learning objectives. Fortunately, the means to achieve the expectancy has existed. In fact, research findings concerned with teaching practices and how they impact on learning have revealed that teachers can help all students learn, even those labeled at-risk, assuming the teachers possess certain instructional skills and receive support from their principals. In order to achieve this degree of expectation, teachers and administrators should be expected to be grounded in such areas/skills as: student learning styles, teacher learning styles, various principles of learning, higher level thinking and questioning strategies, the belief and skills associated with all teachers being teachers of reading and writing, and the ability to impart to students appropriate study skill strategies, to name but a few. In the main, the problem of retaining students in schools can be diminished if students learn how to participate actively in their academic growth and development.

Within this era the student’s role expectation should be moved from one of static receptor of information to one who is more involved actively in the process of studying, participating, taking tests, and, where necessary, restudying until the desired and specified learning objectives have been attained. Indeed, learner assessment must be moved to a higher plane of ascertaining the degree to which a student has mastered/achieved predetermined objectives, rather than being oriented to identifying and sorting students into groups under such labels as “good” or “poor.” Thus, based upon previously identified teaching skills and proficiencies teachers can help prevent the loss of more students by teaching reading, writing, thinking, and study-skills alongside their content subjects. Doing so can significantly equip students with the means to be key players in their own learning. This then can become a living, breathing adaptation of true student empowerment.

Consequently, as a result of the institutionalization of such an expectation, teacher evaluation should be oriented to verifying individual teacher competency, performance, and productivity in assisting all students to attain identified learning objectives/proficiencies that have been adopted by school districts. It has been within the context of this era of expectancy that additionally a call for reforming the manner in which teacher remuneration has surfaced. Indeed, the call has voiced the desire for attaching teacher remuneration to a joint consideration based upon a basic salary scale coupled with productivity incentives.

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**WEIGHTED EDUCATIONAL NEED AS A BASIS FOR FULL-STATE FUNDING OF SCHOOLS:  
ONE PROPOSAL**

John J. Marshak,  
University of Southern Mississippi

**Introduction**

The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of public education, per se. The Tenth Amendment, however, states all powers not vested in the federal government remain with the states. Thus, school finance is a function of the state. Every state's legislature has the responsibility of devising a system of creating revenue for the support of the public school system and a system for disbursing these funds.

Historically, legislatures have delegated the entire responsibility to local school districts. They have done this by establishing local boards of education which were empowered to hold referendums to determine the extent to which the people within their jurisdictions wished to tax themselves to support schools. The taxes were on private property within the district's boundaries. The unit of taxation was usually the mill, one thousandth of each dollar of assessed valuation of property. The total number of mills approved by the voters times the total assessed property value within the jurisdiction (adjusted based on historically developed collection rates) produced the dollar amount for the running of local schools. Dividing this amount by the number of students to be serviced produced a number representing the dollars supporting each child in the district. This per pupil expenditure is meaningful for comparison purposes. This system served its purpose for many, many years.

The amount of money to support education was thus dependent upon the willingness of taxpayers to support schools and the value of property within the jurisdiction. Over time, the value of local property varied greatly, some included industries, others expensive homes while still others were rural or inner-city. The concentration of students increased in some areas, especially in poor, urban areas. Such poor communities, even if they wanted to, could not tax themselves at a rate high enough to produce the same amount of money per child the rich districts did. Thus, the disparity in financial support per child was created.

**State Subsidies**

At varying times across the country, states recognized that inequity had crept into their funding programs. In the last twenty years, variations of two basic funding plans have been dominant in legislatures' choice of funding plans, i.e., the Flat Grant and Power Equalization. The flat grant and its variation, Foundation Program, assure every pupil a minimum level of per pupil expenditure. The state determines a dollar amount of support for per pupil units or instructional units. What it does not say is that it guarantees each pupil unit or instructional unit the same level of support. In most of the affluent districts, local effort can, and frequently does, exceed the state-defined minimum level. They are thus not eligible for flat grant funding. They are, however, supporting students at a higher level than those that are.

The Power Equalization model attempts to equalize the dollar amount generated by the locally determined tax rate. Known variously as Guaranteed Tax Base or Guaranteed Tax Yield, they will pay the difference between the dollars generated by local effort and some arbitrary standard per mill. In an ideal world, this would be the rate of the most affluent district and every mill is support in this way. However, states have seen fit to select a significantly lower value. Furthermore, there may be a cap, such as the first twenty-five mills, that will be supported. Again, those districts with significant industry can vote themselves a high millage rate, most of which the industry would be forced to pay. A state subsidy would not be necessary. Their students will be supported above the state supported level.

It would be remiss if mention was not made of one significant exception: Hawaii. They are the only state in the union that has full state funding. It is also a statewide school system. In this way, their schools are funded from a statewide tax.

**Current Forces for Change**

Mary F. Fulton, Policy Analyst for the Education Commission of the States (April 1997), ascribes the current forces for change to three factors: 1) Obsolete funding systems, 2) Slow growth in state aid, and 3) equity-based lawsuits.

Legislatures are typically monuments to the status quo. As such, financial aid distribution programs have

not kept up with the changes in the demographics of the student population. Enrollment in public school has significantly increased and more students have been categorized as eligible for high cost programs (at-risk, vocational education, etc.).

Tax revenues have not grown at a rate corresponding to the demand for state services. The recession of the 1990's greatly reduced the rate of growth in dollars available for distribution by legislatures. Demands for increases in funding for health care and prisons notably compete with schools for dollars. This has allowed local revenue contributions to schools to increase faster than state aid. Subsequently, the gap between the rich schools' and poor schools' spending per child has widened. Courts, in the search for equity, want to see the gap closed and the shift be in favor of greater state participation than local contribution.

Another aspect of legislative reluctance to spend more dollars on education is the public and political attitude toward an education system that does not produce better results. Unless school can demonstrate that they are putting out a better product, the attitude could be described as resisting the temptation of "throwing good money after bad."

The most compelling reason for change is the direction of recent court decisions. There has been a rash of lawsuits in state courts questioning the fairness, specifically the equity and adequacy, of state funding of programs. Since 1989, eleven state funding systems have been ruled unconstitutional based on one clause or another of the states' constitution. Six more have been ruled constitutional. Most recently, courts have sided with the plaintiffs.

Traditionally the courts have returned the problem to the legislature. Within a limited time, the legislature is to come up with a system for court review before it becomes law. Some courts have taken it upon themselves to define equitable and adequate education, as well as set guidelines for improving state funding systems.÷(Fulton, 1997, p. 1) This may be due to legislatures' propensity to argue and drag their feet in coming up with an acceptable plan.

Attached is a list of fifteen recent states' school finance changes mainly from court decisions or the threat of lawsuits. In some cases, they were prompted by changes in the state's policy objectives.

#### **Origin of weighted pupil plan presented here**

In 1968, the State of Michigan was facing a crisis in school finance. At the same time a select committee appointed by the governor was conducting public hearings on the matter, a group of professors of school administration met to develop a plan based on the classroom unit. It was their intent to create a plan that could withstand any judicial scrutiny. The product of their deliberations was a publication with a title of the same as their plan: The Equal Quality Plan (Task Force, 1969). Shortly after its publication the governor's committee made its report. It advocated a programmatic approach that contained many features of the Equality Quality Plan.

In October of 1969, then Governor Milliken made detailed recommendations to the Michigan Legislature based on this concept. He did, however, tie it to a statewide property tax. This was quite progressive for the time. The 1970-71 school year was to continue with the prevailing system because time was needed to develop the support necessary to pass a constitutional amendment that would permit the statewide property tax. It was not until November 1972 that a compromise amendment went before the voters. It was soundly defeated by the Michigan electorate. A number of political reasons were assumed to be the cause, one of which was none other than the potential busing of metropolitan Detroit students to the suburbs to address de facto segregation. The classroom unit approach, advocated by the Equal Quality Plan and supported by the Governor was, thus, never implemented.

With the flurry of activity in the field of public school finance today, it is time to show renewed interest in a plan which was designed to withstand the kind of scrutiny being applied today.

#### **Equal Educational Services for Students of Equal Educational Needs**

This funding concept has as its basic tenet to provide all school districts in the state with the resources to provide sufficient numbers of classroom teachers, support personnel (professional and nonprofessional), supplies and facilities. In this way each student of the same educational need would be afforded an education commensurate with his or her need. Furthermore the concept provides that these would be the same regardless of the district in which he or she resides. It recognizes that students do not all have the same needs and therefore, apportions educational resources accordingly. This is accomplished by a state supported program budget based on the classroom unit for each district. It establishes that an instructor, plus the necessary supporting staff, materials and facilities, is required for each pupil in regular classrooms. All other areas of educational need are assigned fewer students per unit.

Following an assessment of the educational needs of a district's student body, a count of those qualifying

for each need area is made on the basis of full time equivalence. Once this is done, each need area count is divided by the corresponding class size. Summing the classroom units needed for all the need areas produces a number which is the total number of classroom units for the district and also the number of teachers that a district will find desirable to hire.

Based on this number, the program budget for an individual district is developed. First, the number of teachers is multiplied by a regional salary average, including the cost of fringe benefit programs. Twenty percent is added to allow for the salaries of non classroom professionals such as administrators, counselors, diagnosticians, etc. This amount is the Professional Salary Allowance (PSA). All other budget line items are expressed as a percentage of PSA. They are presented in Table 2.

Thus, the total budget for a district would be determined by adding the Professional Salary Allowance and 48% of it or simply multiply 1.48 times the PSA.

The Equal Educational Services for Students of Equal Educational Needs budget is a program budget in that it relates the costs of each item to the purpose it is to serve. Budget categories are closer to being true outputs than traditional object function classifications. It permits cost-utility analyses for measuring the relation of dollars input to educational outputs. Such allocation decisions are subject to revision. Furthermore, as this budgetary system is refined, its logical extension is planning programming budgeting evaluation system (PPBS). Since both business and government make extensive use of PPBS to produce greater efficiency in money management. This is a desirable direction for education in today's accountability-minded times. (Marshak, 1985)

**Conclusion**

This is a budget-developing strategy. It does not specify how the dollars to support it are to be derived. A combination of state support and local effort, the most common system in use today, is possible. However, as the title of this presentation states, it is best considered in the light of full state funding. In order to withstand the kind of judicial scrutiny that is being applied today, any chance of local support producing inequity would only weaken its viability.

The class sizes and percentages present here were developed in 1985 to reflect the actual expenditures of the State of Michigan at that time. This was necessary to make its adoption politically attractive. Part of the "salesmanship" was to demonstrate, at least at the outset, this new program was not a radical departure from present practice.

Should this program catch the attention of a state's senate or house school finance committee, these would be the basis for a lengthy debate as to what is appropriate for their time and place. Politicians, in their love to debate even the most obvious, would have a "field day" considering the parameters of this plan.

**Table 1**

The Equal Needs Plan's  
Suggested Classroom Unit Size

Kindergarten	20 (per half day)
Pre-school	20
Special Education	8 to 15
	(based on PL 94-142, etc.)
Compensatory Ed	15
Migrant Ed	15
Elementary	25
Secondary	23

Expressed in students per class

**Table 2**

The Equal Needs Plan's  
Additional Budget Line Items Expressed in Percentage of Professional Salary Allowance

Non-Professional Salaries	20% PSA
Non-Salary Expenses	20% PSA
Community Service	4% PSA
Inservice	1.5% PSA
Research & Development	0.5% PSA
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>48% PSA</b>

**Appendix Current Innovations**

**Alabama (1996)**

- \*Increased state aid to poor districts and reduced state aid to wealth districts
- \*The state must still redesign the funding formula to respond to a 1993 court ruling which declared the funding system unconstitutional

**Arkansas (1995)**

- \*Imposed penalty of 10% income tax surcharge on taxpayers in districts where voters reject minimum tax rate of \$25 per \$1000 of assessed property valuation
- \*Amended state constitution (through voter approval) to establish a 25-mill uniform property-tax rate for schools and allows the state to equalize property tax by redirecting funds from wealth to poor districts

**Colorado (1994)**

- \*Increased base student funding level
- \*Added an at-risk student adjustment (11% above the foundation level)
- \*Developed a cost-of-living adjustment factor
- \*Placed strict limits on district spending

**Kansas (1991)**

- \*Enacted a statewide property tax of 32 mills and established a single, statewide system for collecting and distributing taxes for all school districts
- \*Enacted a provision allowing the state to recapture taxes that districts raise above a specified level and redistribute these revenues to other districts
- \*Allowed districts to raise local money above the foundation level, but capped excess revenues at 25% above a district's spending level
- \*Set a minimum per student Finding level of \$3.600 and included adjustments for at-risk students, low enrollment, facilities and transportation

**Kentucky (1989)**

- \*Increased base student finding level
- \*Added an at-risk student adjustment (.25 pupil weight)
- \*Placed strict limits on district spending
- \*Allowed school boards to go beyond basic foundation level
- \*tier one does not require voter approval and is equalized
- \*tier two requires voter approval and is not equalized
- \*Provided additional dollars for professional development, educational technology and integrated services
- \*Provide fiscal rewards to schools for performance gains
- \*Reforms funded by one-cent sales tax increase and changes to federal income tax filing policies

**Maine (1995)**

- \*Included local income tax and cost-of-living factors in calculating a district's fiscal capacity (which then determines the state aid level)

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

\*Set aside dollars for property-poor districts (\$2 million)

**Massachusetts (1993)**

\*Increased the base student funding level to \$5,500 by the year 2000

\*Increased the state contribution to education

\*Specified a minimum amount that local governments must appropriate to schools in order to participate in the state aid program

\*Reforms funded through economic growth, state budget cuts and phasing-in the changes

**Michigan (1994)**

\*Replaced power equalizing funding formula with a basic foundation program

\*Set base student funding level at \$4,200, increasing to \$5,500 after five years

\*Provides districts with power to raise additional property taxes with voter approval but places restraints on spending increases

\*Beginning in 1997-98, district enhancement levies become a regional enhancement levy, therefore creating a tax-base sharing system among neighboring districts

\*Increased state support for education from 30% to 80% of total budget (due to local property tax relief and state tax increases)

\*Increased state funding for at-risk student programs by \$205 million

\*Included a provision that removes accreditation and withholds some state aid from schools that do not meet performance standards

\*Reforms funded through: increase in sales tax, cigarette tax, real estate tax and a 6-mill statewide property tax; on average, local property taxes were cut by one-third

**Minnesota (1993)**

\*Increased basic student aid

\*Limited the supplemental and referendum levy revenue that districts could add beyond state aid allocations

\*Created debt service equalization program to assist poorer school districts with paying the principal and interest on school facility bonds

**Missouri (1993)**

\*Required a minimum local tax effort to participate in state aid program

\*Held wealthy districts "harmless" to ensure that no district received less money than the prior year

\*Substantially increased state funding for education

\*Provided additional dollars for transportation, special education, at-risk students and a teacher career-ladder program.

**Montana (1993)**

\*Required all districts to spend between 80% and 100% of an "optimum" funding level

\*Restricted districts from spending more than the standard

\*Equalized school building funds and includes a special education component that the state pays to each district

**North Dakota (1995)**

\*Redirected dollars to poor school districts by deducting state aid previously received by wealthy districts, (this will be an annual deduction plan)

\*Created a \$2.2 million supplemental fund to provide more state aid to poor districts

\*Redesigned the special education funding program to provide a lump-sum payment, or block grant, based on special education students they enroll

**Tennessee (1992)**

\*Established a base student funding level driven by the cost of "essential components" for schools factors that are updated annually (rather than a funding level based on available revenue)

\*Included adjustments for variation in local cost differences (wage-based) and for variation in local funding capacity

\*Allocated funds for educational technology and class-size reduction (especially for at-risk students)

\*Authorized incentive funding for schools that exceed performance goals and sanctions for schools that fail to measure up to standards

\*More recently, State Supreme Court mandated the equalization of teacher salaries among school districts

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

\*Reforms funded by a temporary one-half cent sales tax increase and a professional service fee

**Texas (1993)**

\*Required wealthiest districts to choose one of five options for sharing their property wealth with neighboring, poorer districts (districts cannot exceed a tax base level beyond \$280,000 per student)

\*Placed levy cap of \$1.50 per \$1,000 valuation on school property taxes (exclusive of debt financing)

**Wisconsin (1995)**

\*Imposed revenue caps on all school districts (specific dollar amount or rate of inflation)

\*Committed to increasing state K-12 education support from 45 to 67 percent

\*Provided property tax relief, without raising taxes (accomplished through revenue growth, cigarette tax increase, reduced spending and an advance on property tax credit)

\*Replaced two-tiered guaranteed tax base funding system with three-tiered formula intended to create greater equity and allowing high-spending districts to participate in the formula

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LEADERSHIP, ETHICS, AND GOOD SCHOOLS

Spencer J. Maxcy  
Louisiana State University

**Introduction**

When we reflect back upon teaching-learning occasions of which we have been a part, invariably such memories are situated. Some image of a place seems to be involved in the recalling of the experience. The school is typically the site which forms an image for the occasion, while the transaction is viewed in positive or negative ways relative to the impact/importance of the teaching-learning exercised there.

Leadership too, occurs within spaces. Educational leadership is most often specific to educational sites, like classrooms, laboratories, and so forth. Educators exercising educational leadership are thus impacted by both the logic and language of leading, as well as the site specific nature of the occasions of leading. We recount the leader-like acts in terms of text, while relying upon a sub theme of image. Talk and image become linked in memory.

The good-making or bad-making characteristics of leadership transactions may be moral-ethical in nature. Where we attribute 'good' or 'bad' to the leading, we engage in an assignation behavior that colors the exchange and results in our valuing or not the business done. Yet, the space and place wherein the "moral-ethical" leadership takes place also impacts the decision to regard the act as "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad." Context is important, whether it be a culture or society, club or clique. The environment conceived of as a 'place' dedicates certain defining characteristics to the quality of the inter-change aimed at moving a child, class, or entire school toward some goal.

The notion that the upshot of any leadership transaction ought to be a 'good,' has a fundamental meaning for the changed shape of the setting. This is to say that efforts to make educator leading more ethical has attached to it a kind of context (space and place) that lends itself to that approbation. We are, in the last analysis left with a change in our text and our context, if all goes the way we wish.

Yet, most of the research and writing on educational leadership, ethics and good schools, misses the image side of the matter. We are left to feel our way, blindly toward the 'Good School.' The present essay is an effort to lift the scales from our conceptual eyes, and so to lead us to understanding the good school as a place (and not merely a concept).

**The Importance of Place**

"Place is all over the place, not just here or there, but everywhere," writes Edward Casey (1997, 337). Beginning with Kant, and continuing through Husserl, Whitehead, and Merleau-Ponty, 'place' has come to be connected to the human body (332). Casey tells us Luce Irigaray's arguments regarding the place of body and place in postmodern culture open us to a new understanding of the role of images in educational orchestration and direction. And, Shusterman (1997) states: "Of course, as Foucault reminds us, the body is not free from the imprint of society's rationalizing practices. But it remains (as he also recognized) a promising place where discursive reason meets its limits, encounters it other, and can be given a therapeutic shock towards redirection" (129).

Owing to a recent interest in the human body as a biological, rather than mere psychological locus of consciousness, we have shifted from a concern with Aristotle's 'space,' to a postmodern interest in 'place.' This shift has also impacted our current confusion over the interpretation of the meaning of schooling. The importance of identity and gender relative to the vision of education is informed by views of school as place. The legacy of our postmodern revolution started us on a long adventure into the compression of space-time such that we are forced into seeing ourselves and our institutional world in new ways (Turkle, 1995; Bertens, 1995).

The question of why we have dogmatically held to seeing educational leadership and ethics as a methodological and epistemological problem, rather than as a problem of image and imagination arises out of this change. Most often good schooling proposals are cast in narrative form. Terms like "restructuring," "effective," "efficient" are used, rather than imagological renditions. Words rather than pictures are used. Subtle translations of text to imaginative snapshots are everywhere. For example, Sergioivanni (1992) reassures us that: "...the evidence from research on school effectiveness ... and school culture ... increasingly suggests that effective schools have virtuous qualities that account for a large measure of their success (99)." Statistically relevant concepts (e.g.,

'effective') re-place the image of virtuous praxis.

Educational Administration scholars are so committed to their inquiry tools, few are willing to try out images as descriptors. And, thus we find the same old authorities cited for moral-ethical leadership practice located within the research literature on the subject of school reform and governance. Hence, educational leadership becomes a reflection of received theoretical frames and mind-sets, as well as the rationalizations of present practice: all text based rather than image specific.

### **The Engine of Desire**

The explanation for this dogmatism may be located in a number of places. The fact that beneath all efforts to organize humans into groups is to be found the engine of desire (Fukuyama, 1995). The desire for aggregation, collectivity, commonality, communication, and so forth is as we have seen set against the desire for personal aggrandizement, and so on. And, within public spaces these struggles yield a variety of successful or unsuccessful forms of organization, from clubs and cliques to nations and states. Yet, this desiring is also directed at rational description, logical derivation, and systemic ordering, vs. the creative and imaginative imagological.

Democratic organization as one type of organized living, operative at a number of levels and in a variety of guises, colors school spaces. Here, while the child of desiring, this desire may be false. Guy Debord, writing in *The Society of the Spectacle* in 1967, characterized democratic cultures like those found in France and the U.S. as "democracies of false desire." For Debord, in such democracies persons cannot intervene in the spectacle of modern life, even if they wished. Choice occurs only between variations of the same thing, with a resulting illusion of freedom embedded in the monotony of repetition (Debord, 1967/1994). Hence, democratically arranged spaces called 'schools' need not necessarily liberate or free up the population encapsulated there.

As a corrective, another thrust of the desire may be to commit to a model of caring as it may be attached to organization. However as Gould (1993) warns, the notion of care as a model for social arrangements may be seriously limited, particularly within democratic institutions. Caring takes a variety of forms: It may be non reciprocal (e.g., maternal paternal) or reciprocal (e.g., love), or communal (common concern for family members). Since a democratic community "... is based upon reciprocal relations among equals who share authority by virtue of their equal rights to participate in decision making ...,"(407) the caring model democratic community, particular schools so arranged, fails the test of partiality.

Today's school reform proposals reflect this illusion of freedom when choice is restricted to received bounded categories. Even where reform projects are aimed at re-shaping poor schools into good ones and possess the possibilities of creating wholly new educational spaces, they wind up mirroring an image in which each educational act becomes a spectacle, a media-enhanced public event, which is alienated from itself (Debord, 1967/1997).

### **Two Sources of Ethics in Educational Administration**

Educators get most of their ethics from two sources: Individual experience and the culture at large.

**Personal Experience.** Certainly one of the forces of this half century has been the search for the self. Self-realization remains the desire of most worth for most Americans. We have but to look at all the self-help and pop psychology books on the shelves to note the benefactor of our increased affluence has been a near obsession with ourselves. It is not uncommon for personal advancement to come into conflict with communal goals. Writing in the 1950 John L. Childs noted the change: "Our schools have long been torn between two moralities --- the morality of individual success as measured by pecuniary gain in the private competitive system, and the morality of individual success as measured by socially useful work consciously directed to the welfare of the whole community. It is time education made up its mind as to the kind of America it wants, and sought to educate the young on the basis of that integrated morality ...." (236) In the last fifty years, the close face-to-face communities of the agrarian past, have been displaced by giant corporations with corporate philosophies and corporate morals. In the face of this overwhelming organization of human productivity, individuals have been driven to try to preserve the minimal self (Lasch, 1984).

When we viewed the schools as organizations, it is possible to see this same impulse impacting school goals and decisions. Individuals --- educators, parents, students --- feel at the mercy of what the school organization may value. Efficiency, productivity, and large-scale mass instruction replace the individual attention and personal caring desired by individuals (Noddings, 1984). As a backlash to this lack of personal say-so in the moral-ethical directions of organizations, James Q. Wilson (1993) argues that each person is their own moral compass, possessing a "moral sense" of right and wrong. There is a responsibility for individuals to exercise the moral sentiments of sympathy,

fairness, self-control, etc., and we all know what the right and virtuous is, if we but pay attention to our conscience.

**Culture.** Of these two sources, the organizational culture of schooling, from preschool to university, is marked by disagreement as to what 'good' in general, and 'good school' in particular, may mean. While personal experience issues confusion and illogic relative to what 'leading' may be in the search for good living. Any worthwhile moral-ethical philosophy ought to identify culture with the individual person's vision of the good --- the good life, the good organization, and so on. One of the potential points where educators gain an understanding of morals and ethics as they connect up with educational organizations is in professional preparation programs. Typically, in these programs, school administrators-to-be are exposed to a curriculum and texts aimed at making them credentialed principals or superintendents of schools. Too often these formal training sessions are sorely lacking in moral and ethical philosophy (Strike & Ternasky, 1993). At best, leaders-to-be may have a section of a course or a single course which deals with ethics and administration or management. Ethics, if treated at all in their mainstream Educational Administration textbooks, is relegated to a few pages or a chapter. "Professional readings" texts, supplemental to the hard-core school administration bestsellers, are not much better for they may treat ethics or leadership, but rarely both. Yet, these paltry cultural values sources are critical to our school based moral-ethical decision making (Bull, Fruehling & Chattergy, 1992).

Yet, little effort is made, where leadership ethics and school reform are dealt with seriously, to focus upon recent dynamic transformations in the cultures of advanced nations and the demands such changes make upon our theoretical and practical grasp of the changed moral-ethical character of schools. Entire genres of Educational Administration research and writing have overlooked these culture shifts, in the vain hope that old-fashioned ways of thinking and writing about values and education will continue to serve us. Increasingly it is evident that such standard moral-ethical training fare will not do; that educators, school board members, parents, and increasingly students, recognize these as outdated prescriptions, and, they see that Educational Administration "experts" are simply "preaching to their own choirs."

Within the social sciences, a study of the deep and subtle layers of a emerging cultural change pits advocates of this old-fashioned 'modernism' against a newer 'postmodernism' (Rosenau, 1992). As this debate filters down to controversies surrounding school reform, dialogues reveal new efforts are underway to reconceptualize schools; to understand and re-specify the interplay between moral-ethical theory and practice; and to test the practical outcomes as these confront school reform proposals (English, 1994; Maxcy, 1995).

Except for a brief period prior to World War II, Educational Administration scholars in this century have always striven to make school keeping into "a science of management," with a variety of sociologies and psychologies attached to it (Callahan, 1961; Foster, 1986; English, 1992 ). Unfortunately, the moral and ethical dimension dropped out quite early, so that by the 1990's ethical administration had become an oxymoron (Murry, 1995; McKerrow, 1997).

Today, where moral-ethical recommendations for improved school governance are set forth, they tend to be general in nature, and only applicable to abstract practice (Beyer, 1997). Set in linguistic form and relying upon mathematical-logical moves, academic conceptions of moral-ethical problems-solutions celebrate plural "theory-based" interpretations, easily defer to quasi legal codes of conduct, or simply appeal to the passion to care for and nurture others. Meanwhile, the objects of uplift --- students and teachers --- gather their models of morality and ethics from TV and films. Enchanted by soap operas and blockbuster movies, and more recently the Internet, power and control blur the distinction between compassionate caring and sexual harassment, date rape and courtship, academic dishonesty and "getting ahead." Images of morality are increasingly drawn from "life on the screen," rather than from reading Aristotle or Kant (Turkle, 1995).

### **Three Approaches to Ethics and Educational Leadership**

Educational Administration experts disagree about the place and role of ethics in school leadership. A competition, often subtle but nonetheless real, exists between published visions of leadership ethics. Three approaches are event: Ethics for leadership, ethics in leadership, and ethics of leadership.

**Ethics for Educational Leadership.** One approach is to take historical ethical theories and simply graft them onto school leading. Here homely theories of ethics are applied to school administration practice (often idealized). It is assumed that all that is needed to make leadership more moral-ethical is to teach administrators-to-be lessons drawn from the works of Aristotle, or the McGuffey Readers (Finn, 1991; Bennett, 1989). If we scratch the surface of this approach, we find a single-minded dedication to a set of classic philosophic principles. We may term

“perennial” owing to the fact that they continue to be applicable to every historic period. These theories are easily specified and often run to a set of rules or standards of ethical practice. It is assumed that if an educational leader adopts this kit bag of old saws, s/he will operate effectively in any moral-ethical crisis.

**Ethics in Educational Leadership.** A second group of experts, enamored of scientific administration, sees the solution in how schools ought to hook up to leadership ethics in an “ethics in educational leadership.” It is taken for granted that leadership ethics may only be discovered through administration research. Once accumulated, data and its cultivation will form a “knowledge base” of school leadership practice: Good schools will result in merely applying these facts to reform. Called a “normative” approach, this tact assumes that descriptions of organizational leadership characteristics will also serve as recommendations as to how we ought to lead schools in the future.

The difficulty here is that current best practices of ethical administration stand in for future recommendations as to how leaders ought to be ethical. The assumption is an engineering one, in which ethics may be studied scientifically, theories specified, and schools changed, in much the way we may build a space shuttle. Ignoring culture and individual dynamics, the ethics in education approach is always out-of-date.

**Ethics of Educational Leadership.** The third approach to leadership, ethics and good schools, proposes an “ethics of educational leadership.” In this approach ethics is seen to be an integral part of leading, while such leadership is always contextual (Duke, 1998). There is a high regard placed on a concept leadership underwritten by a sense of place. Leading never takes place in a vacuum. It follows that we should neither import wholesale an historic (and remote) ethics from outside the cultural context of schooling, nor should we seek our ethics, as Duke (1998) would recommend, in the study of “the immediate context” in which leadership is found.

School issues calling for ethical leadership are easy to detect: Questions of justice and equity, freedom and authority, honesty and integrity, and so forth, form the template upon which ethics of leading must be played out. To that extent every ethical leading in an organization is normative. However, beyond this, we must ask how leadership is to operate such that there is a recognition of multi-cultural contexts of organizations, an understanding of competing points-of-view, and the location of practical means for the resolution of moral-ethical conflicts where diversity is prized (Maxcy, 1998).

Certainly, ethics and leadership are related in many ways. Of these three approaches, it is important to see that when we factor in the two sources of leadership ethics (individual experience and the culture), an ethics of educational leadership must situate ethics within leading as a practical art.

#### **Art, Ethics and Leadership Spaces.**

If contemporary school reforms are something of a “spectacle,” it is the kind of spectacle that recurs and reoccurs. School Choice advocates sound like Horace Mann. The essential details may differ, but the moralistic jargon and moral realism remain. School reform has become high theater, with Superintendent and School Board fighting it out on Cable TV. So image driven is this spectacle that we cannot locate answers or redemption in the techno-scientific language of standard educational research reports. The words fail to capture the color and vibration of the scene. The result is that parents and school reform followers are lulled into assuming that what is said is what is seen.

The idea of the “good school” is cloaked in a variety of proposals for school reform which seem to pivot on conceptions of ‘the institutional good’ where ‘institution’ is equated with ‘school,’ and ‘good’ is equated with ‘effective,’ ‘productive,’ ‘achievement-oriented,’ etc. (Finn, 1991). However, in the past rarely was a good school seen as the moral or ethical school. This tendency to identify good with productive value, and moral-ethical with humanistic value has been corrected by some recent researchers in Educational Administration (Jackson, et al., 1993; Murry, 1995; Roy, 1996). Jackson et al. demonstrated that morals-ethics were both overt as well as subtle and pervasive aspects of classrooms. Murry’s (1995) research found that being a moral leader in an urban school translated into a number of different strategies. Roy discovered that the “moral elementary school” was both explicitly moral and implicitly moral. Principals were studied by Roy (1996). Her study focused on their disciplinary acts as moral expressions of their values, however, they also communicated moral-ethical values in a myriad of actions taken, from greeting students in the morning to rearranging the furniture in the lounge. In these studies, the good school comes into view as a unique kind of community, in which individuals are bonded by moral-ethical values.

Despite these ground-breaking studies, the tendency remains for researchers to reduce good schooling to financial frugal schooling. The good school, for it to be the ‘virtuous school,’ must be structured around a

cost-effective school. Teachers and administrators, qua leaders, are assumed to be 'stewards' of the good; moral monitors of the educational community now seen as a kind religious organization. It is their task to 'serve,' 'respect,' 'purpose,' to establish and retain 'shared values.' Unfortunately, this means the "good school" is collapsed into the "effective school," while leadership is elevated into a trans-cultural norm and practice of ministering the holy word. We have not come very far from Ellwood Patterson Cubberley's school manager as Puritan.

Determining 'the good' in education, whether it be as an orchestrated set of teaching strategies or a vision of planned school organizational configuration, has serious implications for students, parents, teachers and administrators. For, out of these alternative conceptions of 'good schooling' has arisen a variety of reform efforts, like the search for "educational excellence," "school restructuring," "effective schools reforms," etc., which have occupied civic attention and drawn down upon financial resources. It is not entirely clear however, whether such reform sub movements have any potential importance or bearing upon raising our consciousness regarding the place of context, leadership, or ethics as guiding norms in educational change. Rather, such sub reforms are typically attached to assumed organizational configurations that are both modernist and positivist in architecture and processes.

As Beyer and Liston (1992) point out, "... one of the prerequisites for any sort of social transformation is a moral and political vision of how things might be different and better ... " (389). Unfortunately, the current direction in educational reform is to mask the moral-ethical image of good school and to push to the front a rationale for technical mastery over costs. If it is dangerous to subsume the moral-ethical reforming of schools under religious redemption, it is equally wrong to subsume it under financial cost cutting. This is to clothe a moral argument in economic garb.

Finally, the desire to shuck it all and simply return to the pleasures of the hearth and home is also dead ended. Hearn (1997) tells us today the problem does not reside in barriers to a withdrawal into private life and the search for a "morally dense solidarity," in strong families and vibrant neighborhoods, but is rather in "... the deterioration of private life as a place set apart from the social capital destroying forces of modernity (132)." Any emphasis on retreat, say to "home schooling," from the communal space of institutions like schools, makes of individual rights without social obligations an unsatisfactory and impractical solution. Leadership disappears behind a philosophy of "right."

#### **Applying Leadership Ethics to Good Schools Reforms.**

In answer to our original question, "Of what practical use may competing notions of 'leadership ethics' be to those interested in reforming schools in the United States today?, we must note, following Plato, that leadership must be defined never by power, but always in terms of the problematics of the search for the good." (Neville, 1989).

While it may be maintained in our increasingly postmodern culture, that images are a kind of text, they are perhaps more difficult to understand and interpret than standard print. In writing about women and the book in the Middle Ages, Smith and Taylor (1996) point out that it is problematic "... just how visual images can be understood and explained ... to what extent they can be relied upon, rather than simply [be] used as prompts ... "(15). Nevertheless, we must move to deal with the vast cultural production of images as the datum of educational experience, and hope that our means of making sense of these will improve with practice.

While there is a shift in mode of inquiry, there is also a need to go beyond the polar traps of objectivity and relativism. This latter move is likely to produce a new moral high ground from which authorities will come to judge the multivalent imagological forms of the good school. Moving from a modernist reliance upon print to the postmodern world of images does not reduce the risk of iconoclastic vision. However, we are duty bound to continue to push the boundaries beyond the settled pluralism, and into the future.

And, although we have been content in pressing for better schools using linear arguments, and schools are increasingly coming to be understood as socially contested pieces of geography; the imagological programs and deciphering skills are largely undeveloped. Fortunately, this generation of professional educators-to-be taking up the study of schools and their leadership are fresh from the image-based experiences. It may be trusted that they will drive the reforms in moral-ethical leadership in the future. And, even though we lack the critical insights to make good on this promise to render schools as imagological 'moral-ethical places,' within modernist patterns of current Educational Administration research, we need to continue to try alternative imaging.

**Art, Ethics and Good Schools Reform.** When all is said and done, we have seen that the new importance of images over text is both a fact of our culture and a stimulus to rethink the ways in which we "see" value dilemmas

and communicate their moral-ethical solutions. If good schools research has stressed the monetary and production side of schooling while neglecting the school as icon and place; we need no longer overlook the fact that for moral-ethical leadership to work, it is necessary to shift our perspective from time to time --- to come to see the school as a place which provides both the problems of disvaluing as well as the locus of leading to new value.

If 'leadership,' is taken to be an image rich correlative to practice, and if the correlation is between the individual and the group viz-a-viz desired goals, then the postmodern school as a place --- rather, a "good place" --- that place may be taken to be both a catalyst for seeing things differently, as well as an element in the artistry of a learning life itself. After all, to follow the aesthetic is the proper ethical ideal, and that ideal should be the criterion for the assessment of the good school.

### Conclusions

There is certainly a major shift in the ways in which we understand organizations and their operations. This essays has sought to demonstrate that an image-based view of leadership, ethics, and 'good schools' is superior to the textual renditions that have dominated discussions to date. We stand on the brink of new ways of seeing schools as places of experiencing and understanding. Pupils, teachers, and school administrators are increasingly impacted, not by texts, but by images of the kinds of actions. What counts as leading, and of new ways of painting the significance of aesthetic-moral-ethical value in the mix of theory and practice, sets the task before us. There is a likelihood that one of these competing notions of 'leadership ethics' will connect appropriately to the quest for the "good school." It is anticipated that only an ethics of leadership offers the richest potential pattern, when viewed against the professional training practices engaged in today, and the postmodern cultural image rich institutional conditions emerging at this time. A fully articulated ethics of leadership presents intriguing possibilities for redesigning schools, and ourselves in the process.

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**REARRANGING THE DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC:  
HAS THE MEDIA REALLY BECOME THE MESSAGE? \***

Karen McKellips  
Cameron University

The most discussed, most written about event of my year as President of the Society actually occurred in 1912. As one whose interests, research and pedagogical activities usually focus on historical, rather than contemporary, events, I should have found this to be reassuring. I have not. There has been too much "rearranging of the deck chairs on the Titanic" to suit me.

Assured by everyone we know, young and old, male and female, at all levels of educational accomplishment, and holding a wide spectrum of metaphysical and esthetic views, that *Titanic* was a great movie, my husband--a technophile, scientist, and adventure movie buff, and myself--a technophobe, humanist lover of the quiet "relationship" movie, went to see it. WE hated it. All the way home from the theater, we took turns describing what was wrong with the thing. Obviously, no one in America, in the entire world, agrees with us... in spite of the fact that it is the first thing we have agreed about in thirty years.

Its records are astounding--over \$1.5 billion at the box office. It is the number one all-time movie in Mexico, China, and who knows how many other countries. Its soundtrack album is the fastest selling of all time, and its making-of-a-movie-tie-in-book is the only one ever to make the *New York Times'* best seller list.

While one viewing was enough for me, and usually only 2% of a movie audience are repeat viewers, 20% of *Titanic's* audience are there for at least the second time.<sup>11</sup> On the television talk show *Lisa* on the day of the Oscar awards, a staff person admitted to having seen it eighteen times. *Newsweek* reported a sixty-three year old man saw the movie three times, taking a roll of toilet paper to "stanch his sobs."<sup>12</sup>

The website for the movie received 4 million hits in one day. America On Line reported a message posted about Leonardo DiCaprio, the male star, every ten seconds.<sup>3</sup> DiCaprio t-shirts were sold in every tourist shop I visited in Greece this summer. People pay \$250 a plate to attend dinners serving the same meal as the final one served on the Titanic. People are having "Titanic weddings," copying the clothing and Kate Winslet's hair style, and using *Nearer My God to Thee* as wedding music! Just as "a rising tide raises all ships," in February there were six Titanic books on the *New York Times'* best seller list, including Walter Lord's 1955, *A Night to Remember*.

The movie lasts thirty-four minutes longer than the time it took the real Titanic to sink. For much of that time, Jack and Rose are running, and occasionally swimming, in icy water as if in a heated swimming pool. Hypothermia is not allowed to get in the way of the romantic repartee. When Jack is handcuffed to a pipe in the bowels of the ship, as the frigid water rises to drown him, Rose puts down the axe which will eventually chop through his bonds, and they exchange witty *bon mots*.

Although Kate has a life jacket at the crucial moment she needs one, most of the time she is not so encumbered. One suspects the film makers did not wish to cover her most attractive bosom. Perched on the very tip end of the ship's bow which has risen perpendicular to the water preparatory to its plunge into the icy depths, the lovers show no fear but calmly discuss the fact that this is the exact same spot where they met.

Gloria Stuart's Academy Award nomination for her role mystifies me. It is not that her acting is bad, but that the role is. Ms. Stuart is a very well-preserved eighty-seven year old who looks much younger. Indeed, I admire her wearing contact lenses at her age; I gave them up as vanity before I was thirty. They are very evident in her close-ups. (I didn't know they had contact lenses in 1912.) And her ability to climb on the ship's rail to pitch over some very valuable jewelry is also impressive at age eighty-seven. The script calls for us to believe that she is 103!

Explanations for the popularity of the film fill the media. Most often heard is the explanation that men love the movie for its action, the swashbuckling aspects of DiCaprio's character, and the scenes of great destruction visited upon the huge, beautifully appointed ship. The computer-generated people falling off the sinking ship are more convincing than the little figures destroyed by King Kong or crunched by the original Godzilla, (not the new one.) Women are said to like the romance... Jack's sacrifice of himself for his lady love after freeing her from the clutches

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\* A version of this paper was delivered as the Presidential Address at the 1998 Meeting of the Society of Philosophy and History of Education.

of her upper-class, selfish family and starting her on a life of feminist self-actualization.

Perhaps these explanations are accurate. But underlying both the action and the romance, lies the superb technological achievements of a computer-based presentation which allows the suspension of reality and transports us into a world of what "should have been," instead of what was, in a real, historical event, the sinking of the S.S. Titanic on 2:20 a.m., April 14, 1912, with the loss of 1,503 lives.

The power of technology to transform reality in the entertainment industry does not concern me as a member of this society. The power of technology to transform reality in the academic world does. Is the media now *really* the message, as Marshall McLuhan said it was a generation ago?

I am sure that my concern that academe is about to be utterly and forever changed by technology is related to my advanced age. I am a member of a group which I created and named myself. I am a charter member of "Hippies Hanging On." The first, and so far only, chapter of the organization is located at my institution, Cameron University. For a time none of the members, except myself, knew they were members, but recently I have shared with a few of my colleagues the fact that they belong, and none seem offended. If some of you would like to start a chapter, I would be happy to install you as the first President of your own group.

From my university catalog, I extracted the names of people who have been at the university since the 1960s. Anyone employed as a faculty member or librarian in 1969 or earlier, I, without their permission, made a member of the Hippies Hanging On Society. I presume everyone else wishes we would quit hanging on and make room for new people, but some of us just keep hanging on. The new technology will probably push us out of the university to make room for the new generation who are more competent with, and enthusiastic about, the current technological revolution. Like Rose and Jack, we will be pushed from the warm comfort of our own *Titanic*. Some of us, like Rose, may survive in a transformed state. Others, like Jack, will not.

It seems that my style of teaching is doomed by technology. Occupying a room with 20 to 40 students, lecturing, questioning, discussing, laughing, relating to one another, in the flesh, is about to vanish. Anything that is done that way can be done just as well, or probably better, via marvelous electronic means. Each student will very soon be able in his or her own space, at his or her own convenience, to learn just as much or more regarding those things now taught in the classroom mode that I love. Virtual reality, world-wide-web, interactive distance learning will enable every student enrolled in a class to interact with the teacher and with classmates, ask questions and get answers regarding subject matter, take tests, tap into libraries all over the world, without ever leaving home, hiring a babysitter, scheduling work hours around class time, etc. This is supposed to be a great advance in that it will aid those for whom coming on campus, even for a few hours a week, is a hardship.

I see that as only one way of looking at it. Another way of looking at it is that it increases the gap between educational experience of the haves and that of the have-nots. The elite can come on campus, go to class, interact in person with each other, enjoy the social life and camaraderie of the classroom while others can be educated in isolation, at home, after an eight hour work day, while caring for a house, three children, and a dog. An article in my campus newspaper described Oklahoma's "Electronic Campus," the 600 courses which are now offered electronically by Oklahoma's twenty-five colleges and universities, under the headline, "Electronic Campus Makes Learning Easier." I suspect it would have been more accurate to have entitled the article, "Electronic Campus Makes Learning More Accessible."<sup>4</sup>

There will be no need for there to be twenty institutions in Oklahoma offering English Composition I, or College Algebra, or Social Foundations of Education. The best teacher of each of these in the entire state can develop and teach the course to students over the entire state. Enormous amounts of tax money can be saved this way. The computer will do all the drill, testing, providing of examples, etc. One professor can develop and monitor the course. Transferability will no longer be an issue.

Our university's recently completed science building may be an anachronism, as were our dormitories. Cameron's dormitories were opened in 1969 with the presumption that our move from junior college to four year college status would result in a flood of eighteen-year-old single students. Enrollment did rise, but most were middle-aged, married students with families, and the dormitories were doomed never to be filled with sleeping students. They became a fiscal burden rather than an asset... buildings built for an out-of-date vision of higher education. Who now will use a science building when students take science in their homes with courses taught by Oklahoma University professors "on-line?" Perhaps the courses will originate from the lowest bidder institution, an obscure but minimally accredited institution operating from a website in the Bahamas.

Selfishly, I don't want it to be that way. When I was an undergraduate student, one of my favorite professors, a teacher educator, said to my class, "Don't go into teaching if you aren't somewhat of a ham. Only a person who wants positive feedback from his or her students, i.e., audience, will be a good teacher. The positive response of the people-to-people interaction in the classroom is what keeps a teacher working, adapting, improving."

While I agree with what she said, I'm afraid that only we Hippies Hanging On do. Perhaps I am guilty of wanting to be the "sage on the stage," instead of the politically-correct, "guide on the side."<sup>5</sup> The next generation of college professors will get the same thrill from making a machine respond that I get from making people respond.

It seems that the machine people have convinced the taxpayers and politicians that learning accomplished by technology is not only cheaper, but also better. They may be wrong. Technological advancements often go in directions not envisioned by their creators and those originally enthusiastic about them. One hundred three years ago, Roentgen discovered x-rays. Some early enthusiasts poisoned themselves, having to have limbs amputated or dying of radiation-induced cancer. One entrepreneur applied for a patent for women's underwear with a lead lining. It was to be marketed on the basis that it would prevent men with hand-held x-ray machines from being able to see through women's clothes. Jack did not have to have a hand-held x-ray machine to see Rose unencumbered by clothes.

While I am basically unenthusiastic about the technological revolution overtaking the university, I know that even if the worst happens, it won't be very bad when viewed within the broad scope of human history. I have recently listened to two books on tape which are helpful in keeping perspective... *All Quiet on the Western Front* and *Their Eyes Were Watching God*. The lives of Remarque's heroes in the muck of World War I trenches and Hurston's depression-era woman working in the muck of Florida's tomato fields make my concern that most of us in this room are soon to be replaced by technology and one incredibly computer-literate instructor in the Bahamas laughably trivial.

Incidentally, I hope you noticed my saying that I listened to these books on tape; I didn't read them. I no longer have time to read because technological advances in the area of data gathering have allowed faculty time to be almost totally consumed with individual and committee work relating to assessment, putting course material on-line, updating university websites, and compiling accreditation reports. If one chooses to spend time on traditional concerns such as

preparing for classes, meeting face-to-face with students in one's office, or doing research, there is no time left for such activities as reading. One must listen to books on tape as one does laundry or drives to the university. (While the students can participate in classes from the comfort of their homes, faculty members are still expected to be at their university cubicles so that they can simultaneously keep their required office hours and respond to students on-line and in person at the same time.)

When the Hippie generation was beginning its time in academe, technology wasn't sophisticated enough for the agencies which control a tax-supported university to be able to demand, and get, the massive amount of data from the campus that today they can, and do, demand. Technology has made it possible for massive amounts of minutiae to be gathered and stored--so it is. Most of such minutiae I, being a Hippie, see as bureaucratic response to political pressures. It is stuff that has to be done if funding and accreditation are to be maintained, and I admire those who do it well and cheerfully. I do it most uncheerfully.

There are those who say that advances in technology will make our lives less stressful because we will be able to get our work done faster and more easily and will have more leisure time. I doubt that. We will just be expected to do more because more is possible, so that the stress and time requirements of our lives won't be less, just different.

Those of you in administrative roles will have many new tools to help you evaluate faculty productivity. You can use "cookies" to keep records of your faculty members' response to students' queries once they are all done electronically, rather than through face-to-face classroom encounters. How many student-teacher interactions occur, the quality and accuracy of faculty responses, how long it took a faculty member to respond, the students' evaluation of the faculty member--all such data will be available instantly for use in faculty evaluation. It will also be available, of course, to higher level administrators, regents or trustees and the staff who work for them, state senators whose daughters didn't make an A, and the attorneys representing any person or group wishing to right a wrong committed upon your watch. You can be held accountable for the collision with the iceberg since constant monitoring of those you supervise is now possible.

I recently attended a conference entitled, "Washington and DuBois in the 21st Century." It was a most enjoyable experience where I was able to interact, formally and informally, with such people as Washington's granddaughter,

DuBois' stepson, Julian Bond, Lewis Harlan, Charles Pace, Nikki Giovanni, and many others most highly respected in the American civil rights movement. Soon it seems, personal attendance at such events will be replaced by contact through electronic means, with none of us having to waste taxpayer money by leaving our cubicles. Video-conferencing technology and virtual reality will bring us together without our being together. SOPHE won't just *have* a website; it will *be* a website.

At my conference I collected material--brochures, maps, the lesson plans and bibliography offered by a high school teacher who uses primary source documents, the thoughts of the resource director studying the slave population at Monticello. I shared this material with my class in Multiculturalism and American Education by making copies for my students and discussing them in class. In the future, I will be expected to locate and distribute such material on-line, with students down-loading and printing on their home computers whatever they can use.

Actually the task of a faculty member in the technological future will probably be to build a class of such gathered, assembled, edited material which is placed on the class website. Students will access it, e-mail questions about it, take multiple choice tests on-line, perhaps even cut and paste a term paper from material they have downloaded from various websites or bought from a provider located by their search engine, and get their grades and course credit. Such a class could be used forever... even after its developer is dead. The multimedia specialist/telemarketer in the Bahamas could take over at any time, providing a form of Lancastrian education with a machine replacing student monitors.

An article in the May issue of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* described the attempt of the University of California at Los Angeles to induce all faculty members to establish web pages including syllabi and other material now supplied as hard copy in their classes. U.C.L.A. provides "technology assistants," a luxury many institutions cannot afford, to construct and maintain web pages for professors who cannot, or prefer not to, construct and maintain their own. Some U.C.L.A. professors find the web pages to be valuable tools and enjoy constructing and updating them and communicating with students via e-mail. One professor includes Italian rap music, whatever that is, as background music for her rock video--I mean her syllabi. Other faculty members resent what they see as a violation of academic freedom and express fear that the university will market the materials professors have spent much time and effort developing. Intellectual property rights as a law speciality certainly has a bright future. A Northwestern University law professor claims that, "Virtually everything that I have written has been stolen and stuck on somebody's web site."<sup>6</sup>

Students have mixed reactions to the U.C.L.A. system. Most protests center on the fee they are assessed to pay for the service.<sup>7</sup>

Submitting papers by computer disk or e-mail is already standard operating procedure at many institutions, as is the practice of contacting instructors by e-mail for personal help with a course. One of my students, who can't afford a computer, now has to find a babysitter for her children so she can come to the university computer lab to type her papers on disk since many professors won't accept her term paper typed on her trusty IBM Selectric typewriter.

Now that students can e-mail questions to their professors, will they expect overnight responses to their queries? How many hundreds of students can an instructor serve in this way? How many times will the instructor answer the same question in these one-on-one interactions? One U.C.L.A. student who praises their program was thrilled by having posted a question on the professor's web page at 4 a.m. and receiving a personal response before 8 a.m. the same morning.<sup>8</sup>

Have we really established systems that will assure that the student whose work we are reading or whose test we are grading is Jack, and not Leonardo DiCaprio? (I am quite aware that much cheating goes on under the old-fashioned system of taking classes under the gaze of the instructor, but I do think I would notice if a new face showed up on test day.)

Francis Schrag said that in the last great technological leap, that from oral instruction to print instruction, "technological advance increased student passivity and dependency on authority."<sup>9</sup> Will this also result from increased use of computer technology? In *Atlantic Monthly*, Todd Oppenheimer reported a number of examples of students' uncritical acceptance of any information communicated or conclusions reached via computer, no matter how in conflict with human "real world" experience they were. At an earlier conference of this society, Mario Benitez spoke quite eloquently, as he does on any subject, of his reactions to his first experience with virtual reality. If Mario can be transported into an "attack mode" via technological magic, I shudder to consider its effect on an undergraduate student.

I have found in enrolling advisees, now that it is done on-line from my desktop computer, students accept with little protest the computer telling them they are ineligible to take a certain course or that the class section is full. Before enrollment was done by computer, they would argue vociferously with a human being who told them they could not get in such classes.

We old Hippies are probably just crotchety because we feel what we have accomplished has been devalued in the current educational climate. However, the concerns which I am trying to articulate seem to be congruent with thinking which has a long history in this society. Bill Fisher, in his 1984 paper for the society, chose to quote Bill Drake's 1961 paper for the society in which Dr. Drake said,

The mastery of the scientific and technological information which is to lay the groundwork for the new social order, even though involving assimilation of great quantities of data, can be accepted as a simple task when compared with the problems confronting man as a moral and political being. There will be constant pressure for efficiency, precision, adjustment and conformity as contrasted with the need for love, understanding, personal freedom, self-esteem and a sense of self worth.<sup>10</sup>

I am still excited about educational history and my ability to get my students interested in it. I enjoy the give and take of a classroom in which eye contact, gestures, body language are a part of the communication among the people in the room. I enjoy informal casual discussions with individuals and small groups of students. Such events seem to me to be important to student development in areas deemed valuable by Drs. Drake and Fisher. None of what I do seems valuable anymore unless it can be done on-line. My successor need not know what I know, or be able to do what I do. The faculty member who replaces me need only to be highly computer literate and able to create bombshell multi-media presentations which can reach maximum numbers via distance learning. Looking like Kate Winslet or Leonardo DiCaprio won't hurt either. Students rate attractive "talking heads" higher than unattractive ones. Faculty teaching in our interactive t.v. program were given tips on what sort of clothing broadcasts best. One of my friends who teaches in the program found two giggling young women peering into one of her on-campus classes one day. When she asked them in, they blushing admitted they were taking her "talk-back t.v." class and wanted to see what she looked like in person. She said she thought they might ask for her autograph. I would rather see Jim Van Patten's or Martha Tevis' face than DiCaprio's or Winslet's, but I have had the advantage of knowing them without the mediation of a machine.

Surely no one still views the purchase of computer hardware as a capital investment. Purchases are obsolete as soon as the funds necessary to approve their purchase make their way through the approval processes necessary to pay for them. University budgets look unlikely to be able to afford the constant upgrades required to keep technology current without greatly increasing faculty "productivity." Productivity increases of the magnitude needed can only be accomplished at a university through reduction of the number of human beings to be paid, insured, etc. The elimination of support personnel and the increasing of credit hour production per faculty member would appear to be the major avenues to shift funding from other functions to support the expense accompanying constant technological upgrading.

Public school boards and personnel realize that even when grants provide funding to purchase hardware and/or software, the resulting technology may be obsolete in just a few years. As technology budgets expand, students are bused on ancient, unsafe buses to old buildings suffering from years of neglected maintenance. Drivers' education, music and art classes are often sacrificed to find money for technology. A poll of public school classroom teachers ranked computer skills and media technology as more essential than study of European history, biology, chemistry, or physics.<sup>11</sup>

To secure a federal grant which would pay 90% of the cost to Oklahoma City Public Schools for such items as file servers and network software, the district found it would have to spend \$7.1 million to place computers in all classrooms plus \$5.1 million to upgrade electrical systems to handle these computers. For a district with buildings built as long ago as 1894, whose officials report the need to spend \$10 million on an aging bus fleet, and who estimate they have more than \$100 million in deferred maintenance needs, the decision to spend over \$12 million to qualify for the \$7 million grant which would make Internet access possible is a difficult one. The decision is complicated by the fear that the system has a sort of built-in obsolescence.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps we in higher education do not need to be concerned about these problems since we don't perform the "babysitting" service that public schools do and thus have no responsibility to provide bus service, or even classrooms, once distance learning is perfected. Actually, the only reason in the future to have a campus will be to

have a place to practice and play football and basketball.

Can you get all the information you need on-line? Can you write without visiting archives or libraries? Are you willing to devote massive amounts of time to preparing documentation of what you know and do and what your students know and do to satisfy the desires of accrediting agencies and government bureaucracies seeking to determine what you are teaching is in line with politically-correct objectives and externally established “standards?” Are you willing to accept the fact that just as soon as you are comfortable with hardware or software being used at your university, it will be “upgraded” necessitating your spending hours, and your university spending all its faculty development budget, learning to use the new, “improved” version? These are the job skills which will make you a valuable employee. Since students will be able to “shop” for courses from many institutions regardless of where they live, scholarly accuracy may have to be sacrificed for a pleasing, exciting presentation format, just as the *Titanic* movie had to sacrifice scientific and historic accuracy in the interest of attracting an audience.

The view of the technological future held by young people at our conference should be, and probably is, more positive than mine. You young folks have the comfort of knowing that some of us old Hippies Hanging On are going to let go and make room in the lifeboats for you. As we sink below the technologically-enhanced virtual reality waves, we Hippies Letting Go may borrow the words from a movie of a technologically primitive era, long before Stephen Spielberg, James Cameron, et al, made the world of make believe real. As Margo Channing (Bette Davis) said to Eve (Anne Baxter) who had just replaced her as the reigning queen of the theater (sort of a “sage on the stage” giving way to a “guide on the side,”) “Fasten your seat belts. It’s going to be a bumpy ride.”<sup>13</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

1. *Newsweek*, 23 Feb. 1998, 60.
2. *Ibid.*, 62.
3. *Ibid.*, 8 June 1998, 72.
4. “Electronic Campus Makes Learning Easier,” *The Collegian*, 6 March 1998, 4.
5. Todd Oppenheimer, “The Computer Delusion,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 280 (July 1997): 48.
6. Dan Polsby, quoted in Kendall Hamilton and Karen Springer, “Beyond the Year 2000 Bug: A New Wave of Lawsuits,” *Newsweek*, 23 March 1998, 12.
7. Jeffery R. Young, “A Year of Web Pages for Every Class,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (15 May 1988): A29-A31.
8. *Ibid.*, A30-31.
9. Francis Schrag, “Education and Historical Materialism,” *Philosophy of Education 1984, Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1985, pp. 225-263.
10. William H. Fisher, “Educational Ferment and Jacksonian Democracy,” *Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society*, 1985, p. 209. See also, Fisher, “Humanistic Philosophy and Education,” *Indian Sociological Bulletin* (April 1968): 146-155.
11. Oppenheimer, p. 45.
12. Bobby Ross, “Schools Computing Internet Offer Terminals Not Part of Government Program,” *The Daily Oklahoman*, 23 Feb. 1998, 1-2.

13. Joseph Mankiewicz, screenplay for *All About Eve*, Darrell F. Zanuck, producer, 1950.

DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE KANTIAN CONNECTION

Tyrone J. McNichols  
The University of Missouri-St. Louis  
Clayton Missouri School District

**Introduction**

American public education is an institution built upon the premise that an educated electorate is essential for the perpetuation of a democracy.<sup>1</sup> The American notion of democracy is a fusion of ancient Greek and Roman approaches to government and the Enlightenment ideals of human freedom and dignity. In the United States the ideal of freedom and dignity are grounded in the Bill of Rights, which was intended to protect the individual from the majority. Within the Bill of Rights is the First Amendment which, among other freedoms, speaks to freedom of speech--in its broadest sense, *thought*. The Founding Fathers implicitly answered this question with the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted as freedom of thought.<sup>2</sup> As a protection of the individual from the majority, the Constitutional notion of freedom of speech maintains that no government has the license to impede the inherent right of citizens as individuals to construct their own ideas about the world. If this is the case, then as a government-sponsored institution, the public schools should essentially emphasize those ideas that are consistent with freedom of speech.<sup>3</sup> That intellectual foundation for freedom of speech (thought) could be traced back to at least the Enlightenment discourse.

**Kant (1724-1804) and the Enlightenment Discourse**

The intellectual foundation of the Enlightenment was built on the philosophical works of many, but it is the work of Immanuel Kant that has prevailed as the archetype of the Enlightenment discourse.<sup>4</sup> In *What is the Enlightenment?*, Kant contended that the Enlightenment was indicative of man's liberation from hegemonic institutional forces or from man's "self-incurred tutelage."<sup>5</sup> In this illustration Kant recognizes the need for individuals to possess or construct free thought or self "truth." Because of this need, he proposes a particular method for determining "truth" so that all could be liberated. That method was based on certain Kantian metaphysical assumptions. At base Kant assumed that human judgment could objectively determine "truth." Building upon this presumption, Kant searches for the metaphysical *a priori* principles that universally and objectively informs human judgment. It is Kant's methodological assumption regarding human judgment that is the foundation for his three famous critiques and for both modern philosophy and thought, which has become known as Modernity.<sup>6</sup> In this study Modernity is defined as the institutional policy and practices used to differentiate facts from values.<sup>7</sup> Kant's human judgment provided an explanation to the intellectual dilemma faced by the contributors of the Enlightenment discourse that being the separation between facts and values.

**Kant's Human Judgment**

Kant reasoned in his three critiques that human judgment could (1) provide understanding of a phenomenon by rationally interpreting, synthesizing, and categorizing transcendental ideals; (2) render a practical reason for an action by contrasting the effects in light of free will, desire, and the moral imperative; and (3) permit judgment to act as a mediator between understanding and reason utilizing the aesthetic notions of pleasure and displeasure.

Kant's rational judgment is key to this inquiry and to modern philosophy and thought because it provides a legitimate scientific method for comprehending notions absent experience. Moreover, it created a potential threshold for man's liberation. For it is Kant's judgment that acts as the bridge between the two discourses of the Enlightenment: that of values (the humanities) and that of facts (science).

The American Democratic notion of free speech exemplifies the infinite expression of values characteristic of the humanities; however, in Modernity values are hegemonically controlled through institutional policies and their concomitant practices. Jean-François Lyotard, a popular contemporary French philosopher and a critic of Kantian thought, agrees that Kant's notions of judgment serve as the foundation of both institutional thought and practices in Modernity.<sup>8</sup> Yet Lyotard argues that the role of judgment is different. For Lyotard, all judgments are based on values instead of facts, as Kant would argue. If this is the case, then a fundamental question raised regarding the relation between the American democratic ideal of free speech and modern public education policy is the following: are the discursive practices of modern educational policies consistent with the democratic notion of free speech in its most

nascent state, *thought*? Yet, specifically for this inquiry, the critical question sought is; “Do the *ideas, ideal* and implementation discourse of Constructivism, a current popular educational policy, promote the American democratic ideals of free speech?”

If Kantian judgment is the foundation of modern institutional policy and practices, then it is incumbent to this study that one: (1) identify those elements of constructivism that correlate to Kant’s “rational” judgment; (2) analyze these corresponding elements in light of Lyotard’s use of Language Games; and (3) determine if these elements of constructivism promote the democratic ideal of free speech.

### **The Critique of Judgment**

The third critique, the *Critique of Judgment*, represents a fusing of the fundamental principles that ground the first and second critiques. For this study, it is the application of the *Critique of Judgment* that is vital. Kant asserts that there are two means by which to know concepts. These avenues are through “the concept of nature and the concept of freedom.”<sup>9</sup> The concept of nature is a “pure cognition” or transcendental idea grounded upon a *a priori* principle, which are used to understand nature. The categorizing or synthesizing of transcendental ideas for the sake of understanding is what Kant calls “pure reason.” The concept of freedom, as it relates to nature, is a notion grounded upon a moral *a priori*. This moral *a priori* of freedom acting with the use of *will* expands or discovers the essence of a concept. Kant calls this explanation or discovery process “practical reasoning.” Based on these two methods for acquiring knowledge, Kant argues that we should divide philosophy into two domains (i.e., theoretical and practical).<sup>10</sup> The first domain, theoretical or *natural philosophy*, derives its concepts from understanding. The second domain, practical or moral philosophy, derives its concepts from reason.<sup>11</sup> Kant argues that there is a third domain of philosophy that acts as a mediator or regulator between the first and second domains; that domain is judgment. The *a priori* principle of judgment for Kant is the “*feeling of pleasure and displeasure*.”<sup>12</sup> For Kant, pleasure and displeasure are principles that operate between understanding (the cognitive powers) and reason (the power of desire). In this regard pleasure and displeasure are functions of judgment that “must” operate as *a priori* concepts. As a function of judgment, pleasure and displeasure “must” have a necessary connection to the power of desire and to cognitive power.<sup>13</sup> This being the case, judgment logically fits the role as a mediator between understanding and reason.

Kant argues that it is judgment which allows one to generate a concept from an idea or experience. For Kant a judgment derived from a given universal principle is called a *determinative* judgment. Opposite to determinate judgment is *reflective* judgment. A reflective judgment introduces a given idea, which does not necessarily correlate to an established universal principle.<sup>14</sup> Kant explains that a determinative judgment, which is conditioned by an *a priori* principle of understanding, can only identify and categorize an idea into its specific position. Reflective judgment, which begins with a particular concept and searches for a universal principle, establishes a unifying principle that is systematically transferred and communicable. For Kant, this process of reasoning, (which Kant illustrates in detail in his explanation of sublime judgment) when applied to reflective judgment establishes a law for a novel experience.<sup>15</sup> Building upon this premise, Kant contends that when a concept becomes comprehensible, embedded within its existence is the origin of its *a priori* concept or what Kant calls the element’s *primary purpose*.

The link between Kantian metaphysics and a Modern education policy, such as Constructivism, is that all ideas and concepts, which are represented in Modernity as knowledge, are explainable in *nature*. That is, ultimately there is an objective explanation for *all* phenomena. Kant’s aesthetic judgment and more specifically reflective judgment are essential to modern educational practices because they provide a methodology for how human judgment can be objectively employed in the synthesization of nature.

### **Framework**

The framework used to deconstruct constructivism applies generally to Modernity. The framework was based on Jean-François Lyotard’s notion of language games and his critique of Kantian judgment. This inquiry describes how discursive practices become policy and how policy establishes norms which are generally perceived to be objective, transcendent *laws*. This being the case, the method for determining the legitimacy and justness of a policy is by researching the embedded narratives and scientific discourses found within the policy, which in this study defines the nature of knowledge. The legitimacy and justness of a policy and its concomitant practices can be deconstructed by analyzing the equivalency of the discursive narratives between the *idea, ideal*, and the implementation tactics. The notions of *idea* and *ideal* parallel Lyotard’s notions of a “multiplicity of justice” and a “justice of multiplicity.”<sup>16</sup> The logic of the deconstruction is that justice endures at the place where the unimpeded generation of the multitude of

*ideas* clashes because of the “incommensurability” of *ideas*. Lyotard refers to this clashing as a *differend*.<sup>17</sup>

The *differend* allows for the possibility of a *ruse*, a tactic or strategy that has the potential to provide for a new narrative or “language game,” defined as a relationship between an addressor, an addressee, and a referent to any particular discursive interaction.<sup>18</sup> Ideally an “open arena” would allow for an unbounded, open, infinite proliferation of a multiplicity of *ideas*, independent of any particular transcendental *ideal*. Under such conditions, a *differend* would ultimately arise. This idea of an open arena is the essence of politics in a democratic society and what constitutes justice and has the potential, at least, for maximizing *access*. This quest for justice and *access*, which is a fundamental characteristic of the American democratic *ideal*, is vital not only to the application of a schooling policy, but also to those notions that define Modernity (contemporary thought).

### **Constructivism**

Constructivism is a theory about knowledge and learning. Embedded in this theory are the notions that (1) meaning, which is represented as knowledge, is based internally in the learner; (2) the acquisition of knowledge is the responsibility of the learner; (3) knowledge is achieved from the learner’s experiences and values conditioned by reflection, inquiry, and cognitive dissension; (4) learning is an internal process, which is enhanced through the consensual negotiation of ideas; (5) the outcome of knowledge is a pragmatic process; (6) and the assessment of learning is naturally connected with the learning process.<sup>19</sup>

The idea embedded in the discursive practices of constructivism is that learning takes place inside the student and that meaning is “constructed” from both internal and external stimuli. Constructivists, building upon the work of Jean Piaget, argue that it is imperative that the addressor (teacher) begins instruction for each addressee (student) at their appropriate “developmental stage.” In this light the teacher acts as a “guide” to the student. This guiding process elevates the student’s sense of disequilibrium, which enhances awareness. For the constructivist like Piaget, it is the heightening of awareness that increases a student’s ability to solve individual problems abstractly and procedurally that are consensual to a group goal or norm.

Constructivism goes beyond the teacher/student diad. In respect to school reform, constructivism is an ideology that attempts to change the social fabric of society. The framework that guides constructivism’s reform discourse parallels John Dewey’s notion regarding science, democracy, and education. Dewey’s pragmatism, at base, is grounded on the inferential method of judgment, which Peirce operationalized as an inferential hypothesis. This method of analysis is the fundamental base of Dewey’s scientific methodology and is the foundation for constructivism.

### **The Deconstruction**

There are three reasons why this study is a deconstruction of constructivism. Deconstruction, a method of analysis, must begin and end with the present. First, it is currently a very popular educational reform. Second, the elements that characterize the epistemological foundations of constructivism are embedded in many current education reform policies and practices, such as national standards and outcomes-based assessment of student progress. Third, essential for any public school policy is its consistency with the purposes of the schools. For this study that purpose is defined as “access.” Access is important to public education and to this study because the explicit goal of American public schooling, according to Thomas Jefferson, is to foster and maintain democratic ideals. For Jefferson, this meant that the role of public schools is to prepare students to be critical and reflective citizens in a democratic society. What does it mean to be a critical and reflective citizen in a democratic society? As implied by the Founding Fathers and interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Courts, to be a critical and reflective citizens mean that an individual has freedom to construct their own thoughts or self “truth.” If this is the case, then the outcome of constructivism as a policy and practice of public education ought to reflect this same ideal.

To fully deconstruct or analyze constructivism, it was necessary to do a genealogical trace regarding the epistemological foundation of constructivism. This genealogy revealed that constructivism is based on John Dewey’s pragmatism and on Jean Piaget’s notions of equilibrium (pleasure). Both Dewey’s and Piaget’s work, born in Modernity, is grounded in Kantian metaphysics. The Kantian notion of judgment is important to this study because many authoritative discourses regarding constructivism are grounded upon John Dewey’s pragmatic ideals. A genealogical trace found that Dewey’s ideals are rooted in Kant’s notions of human judgment.

The application of Lyotard’s notion of language game to constructivism revealed several *differends*. Constructivism is introduced as an *idea* of justice (freedom of speech) and ethics, which functions as a process for preserving a democracy. In its implementation discourse constructivism prescribes educational methods grounded on

the discursive practices of scientific knowledge, which in this study is interpreted as a technique (an *idea* operating as a meta *ideal*). This *ideal* regulates the interaction of *ideas* between the teacher (addressee) and the student (addressor). This interplay between the *idea* and *ideal* represents a *differend* because incommensurable language games of prescription and efficiency are operating simultaneously. Although constructivism is a promise of justice, it is a process seized and legitimated by a consensual discourse. Considering the democratic ideal of free speech, permitting *ideas* (thoughts) to be “sanctioned” by a consensual discourse demonstrates another *differend*. This *differend* happens when an *idea* of justice (an attribute of the prescriptive language game) is given legitimacy through the discursive practices of scientific knowledge (an attribute of the denotative language game) as a policy for acquiring *progress*. The transformation of constructivism from a humanity discourse of access to a discourse of science repositions the role of the participants from one that is just to one that is hierarchical or privileged, which is typically expressed as a characteristic of efficiency.

### Summary and Implication

As stated earlier, the general purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between Modern American public school policies and practices and the Constitutional ideal of free speech. To this end three specific tasks completed: (1) a genealogy of those core elements of constructivism that correlated to Kantian “rational” judgment; (2) an analysis of these corresponding elements in light of Lyotard’s Language Games; and (3) a reporting of those elements of constructivism that differed from democratic ideal of free speech.

Specifically for this study, the embedded *ideas*, *ideals*, and implementation discourse of constructivism raise some important philosophical questions regarding access to the democratic *ideal* of freedom of speech (thought). If the purpose of public schooling in a democratic society is to promote the democratic *ideals* by educating students to be critical and reflective citizens where dissention is openly accepted, then are we achieving this promise if public schooling reflects a consensual process for acquiring homogeneity of thought? That is, “do contemporary educational practices, such as constructivism, provide students with the discourse needed to maintain free thought or does it restrict free thought by guiding students toward a privileged *idea*?” To be true to the original intent, contemporary educators who believe in the embedded ideas expressed explicitly in a Modern education policy, such as constructivism must ask the question regarding the policy’s consistency to free speech.

Although the notions of constructivism were used to illustrate the general framework and method of deconstruction, both the framework and method are applicable to other education and/or reform policies rooted in the epistemological discourse characterized in Modernity. For example, implicit to the notion of national “standards” is that such standards will require judgment regarding “what counts as truth” before the content of the standards are taught. This, of course, bounds discourse before students are able to judge in light of free thought. Likewise, for outcomes-based assessment, “what counts as truth” must be determined before teaching takes place to determine the outcome.

It is incumbent on those who have significant voice in shaping educational policies and practices not to put *efficiency* above *effectiveness*. Before schools can be efficient, they must first be effective at achieving the purpose. That historical grounded purpose is to prepare students to be citizens in a democratic society that prizes freedom of thought. This study offers a practical framework for policy makers to use in examining their proposed policy considering the fundamental purpose of American public education.

### ENDNOTES

1. This notion has been covered many times in the literature. For one of the earliest arguments for public education, see Thomas Jefferson’s, “Preamble to a More General Diffusion of Knowledge,” in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, Vol. II, Federal Edition (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), 414-426. Cited in Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, *Public School Law*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (St. Paul, MN: West, 1986), 24-25.

2. “One’s right to life, liberty, and the property, to *free speech* [emphasis added], a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcomes of no elections. . . . If there is any fixed star in our constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other *matters of opinion* [emphasis added] or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now

occur to us. . . . We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the *sphere of intellect* [emphasis added] and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.” *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*.

3. The uniqueness of the American democratic ideal is that political power resides with the people; that is, the People are the government. If this is the case, then what we imply in the notion of freedom as it relates to education, is that educational institutions ought to prepare students to be reflective, critical citizens who acknowledge and respect the inherent freedom of others.

4. The intellectual foundation of the Enlightenment is rooted in the work of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Denis Diderot (1713-1784), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

5. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing company, 1987).

6. Isaiah Berlin, the widely recognized authority on the Enlightenment, contends that the quest for *truth* becomes problematic when the primary ideas that we seek appear diverse but are really parallel. In this regard, what represented *truth* changed depending on the hegemonic forces of the time. These forces included “philosophers of an earlier age, the prevailing moral, religious, and social beliefs of the period, the state of scientific knowledge, and . . . the methods used by the scientist of the time(p. 12).” Berlin maintains that the progress of both science and philosophy has historically emerged from the empirical and rational fields of thought. Despite the progressive contribution of both science and philosophy, *truth* remains a fundamental quest. (p. 13) This crusade for *truth* has become so orthodox that as branches of “human inquiry” achieved prominence, the techniques used by these societies were co-opted by various disciplines including philosophy. The most successful technique to arise from this crusade was “the mathematical method.” (p. 14) As metaphysics appropriated the structural design of the *mathematical method*, specifically that of the physical science, philosophy began to resemble a natural science. In short it became a “kind of scientific psychology; . . . [or] an early version of behaviorism (p. 19).” Philosophy as behaviorism reigned from Descartes until Kant. During this span of time philosophers attempted to answer the metaphysical question from either the traditional rational or empirical perspectives. See, Isaiah Berlin, *The Age of Enlightenment: the 18th Century Philosophers*, (New York, New York: Meridian, 1984).

7. As expressed by Madan Sarup, Modernity is “the progressive economic and administrative rationalization and differentiation of the social world.” Madan Sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism*, (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1993), 130.

8. Sarup, 130.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing company, 1987), 5.

10. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 9.

11. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 9.

12. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 16.

13. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 171.

14. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 18.
15. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 19.
16. Jean-François Lyotard, and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1979) 100. Originally published as *Au Juste*
17. Lyotard, and Thebaud, 100.
18. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis, MN; University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 10. Originally published in 1983, in France as *Le Differend*.
19. See Jacqueline Grennon Brooks and Martin Brooks, *In Search of Understanding: the Case for Constructivist Classrooms*, (Alexandria, Virginia: Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development ASCD, 1993), 9. John McNeil, *Curriculum: the Teacher's Initiative*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995), 3. Frank Betts, "What's All the Noise About? Constructivism in the Classroom," *ASCD Curriculum/Technology Quarterly*, 1, no. 1 (Fall 1991), 1. Catherine Twomey Fosnot, *Enquiring Teachers, Enquiring Learners: A Constructivist Approach for Teaching*, (New York, New York: Teachers College Press, 1989) 19-20. Deborah Walker and Linda Lambert, *The Constructivist Leader: Learning and Leading Theory: A Century in the Making*, (New York, New York: Teachers College Press, 1995) 17.

**THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE BREAKDOWN OF MODERN SOCIETY CONTRASTED WITH THE AFRICAN WORLD VIEW AND INTELLIGENCE IN ANCIENT KEMET<sup>1</sup>**

Bartley L. McSwine  
Chicago State University

In his book *In The Absence of The Sacred (The Failure of Technology & the Survival of the Indian Nations)* (1991), Jerry Mander describes America as a society in the throes of moral and ethical breakdown, a society out of balance primarily due to the loss of sacred traditions and the resultant rise of technology. Pointing to some major failures of modern society Mander quotes from Lawless' (1977) book *Technology and Social Shock*: "Among his list [of failures is] thalidomide, which causes birth defects; hexachlorophene, the "wonder soap," which causes cancer; phosphate detergents, which kill fish; asbestos, which causes lung disease ... [and] herbicides, which cause malformations in newborn children . . ." When one couples this list of failures to the air pollution of modern cities, water pollution, the destruction of the rain forest, and the breakdown of the family (60% of marriages end in divorce), it becomes clear that Mander is correct. This paper will look at the breakdown of modern society and attempt to analyze the source of that breakdown. Additionally, implied throughout will be solutions to the crisis of modern society based on what the ancient world has to teach us. One question that an assessment of the current crisis of modern society should raise is what does the society that we have created say about intelligence and how it has been defined and utilized in Western society.

**What Went Wrong**

Marimba Ani argues in her book *Yurugu* (1994) that most of what's wrong in modern society can be traced to Plato and the emphasis on rational thought that later had such a tremendous influence on the development of European society. She says that "Plato distinguishes the compartments of "reason" and "appetite" or "emotion." Reason is the higher principle or function of woman/man, while appetite is "more base." They are in opposition to one another and help to constitute ... what has become one of the most problematical dichotomies in European thought and behavior. This opposition results in the splitting of the human being. No longer whole, we later become Descartes' "mind vs. body." The superiority of the intellect over the emotional self is established as spirit is separated from matter (Ani, 1994, p. 32)." Then she goes on to say that "for Plato, self-mastery, like justice in the State, is achieved when reason controls . . ." Therefore, in *The Republic*, Plato writes:

... in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise; but when owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse --- in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled ... look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the words "temperance" and "self-mastery" truly express the rule of the better over the worse ... the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are the lowest and more numerous class.... Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few and those the best born and best educated.... These two ... have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few (Ani, 1994, p. 32).

This duality and dichotomization, many believe, led directly to and heavily influenced the Enlightenment and one of its principal philosophers, Rene Descartes. John Shand in his book *Philosophy and Philosophers* (1994) says that "the importance of Descartes in Western philosophy can hardly be overestimated; he shaped the kinds of questions and answers which were to dominate Western philosophy for many years ... " Shand says that the question Descartes wishes to answer is, Can we "have *objective* knowledge of the world; knowledge independent of the way we happen to be biologically constituted; disinterested knowledge that aims to divest itself of our perspective, and that tells us how things really are in the world? ... To be objective our science must be sense-independent, and derived from *reason* [my emphasis] or the faculty of understanding (Shand, 1994, p. 77)." Shand then goes on to say that Descartes creates a system of philosophy that uses doubt to establish truth. Anything that can be doubted (through rational logic) can be eliminated from the system. What remains in Descartes' system that cannot be

doubted, according to Shand, is *Cogito ergo sum*: I think, therefore I am. Shand says that “Descartes believes that he is a thinking thing: ... ‘I necessarily exist whenever I think’ [Descartes says] ... [therefore] ‘I am necessarily only a thing that thinks.’” Mander (1991), Ani (1994), and more recently Edward Wilson (1998) and others would then argue that this type of thought became so heavily embedded in the institutions of the West that we are still trying to recover from its influence.

### **The African World View**

Africa today is really a shell of its former self. Devastated by colonialism, imperialism and slavery, it has a long way to go before it can fully stand on its feet in the modern world. Made up of 55 countries with over 3,000 ethnic groups that speak more than 1,000 languages, Africa today epitomizes diversity. Nevertheless, despite this diversity, Diop argues in his 1978 book *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* that there is an underlying cultural unity. The manifestation of this underlying unity would be reflected in what anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1976) refers to as the prevalence of high context cultures.<sup>2</sup> High context cultures he says are characterized by an emphasis on orality and the spoken word that has many contextualized meanings as opposed to Low context cultures that place a strong emphasis on the both the written word as well as the literal meaning of the written word. Additionally, nonverbal communication is much more heavily emphasized in High context cultures along with an emphasis on communalism as opposed to individualism.

Malidoma Som`e, in his 1994 book *Of Water and The Spirit* gives us a vivid and comprehensive description of a prototypical pre-colonial African culture that has survived virtually intact into the modern world. It is a good example of what Hall would call a High context culture and gives us a fairly complete picture of its structure and value system. Som`e writes that: “In the culture of my people, the Dagara, we have no word for the supernatural. The closest we come to this concept is Yielbongura, ‘the thing which knowledge can’t eat.’ This word suggests that the life and power of certain things depend upon their resistance to the kind of categorizing knowledge that human beings apply to everything. In Western reality, there is a clear split between the spiritual and the material, between religious life and secular life. This concept is alien to the Dagara (Som`e, 1996, p. 8).” Earlier, in a 1994 interview Malidoma and his wife Sobonfu discuss intimacy in the Dagara culture. They make a point of saying that in the Dagara language there is no word for sex. The closest they come is the use of the word “intimacy” but this means something that is much more all-encompassing than a physical act between two people. For example, it means a close emotional connection between the two people which extends to their immediate family members, their extended family (or tribal community) as well as to their ancestors in the next world. Thus, the physical act of “sex” is contextualized within the structure of the total community and a violation of the marriage by either partner means a violation of that total community.

### **Maat, Spirituality and Morality in Ancient Kemet**

When one examines other African countries, and particularly ancient Kemet (Egypt), one also sees a similar syntonic contextual structure between spirituality, society, values and behavior. Karenga (1990) argues that the concept of Maat is fundamental to ancient Egyptian life. That in order to fully understand ancient Egyptian life, one must include a discussion of Maat. He defines it as “the fundamental principle of the divine, natural and social order established by Ra (God) at the time of creation (Karenga, 1990, p.23).” Quoting Henry Frankfort, Karenga says that Maat is “a divine order established at the time of creation and it is manifest in nature as the normalcy of phenomena ... in society as justice and ... in an individual’s life as truth (Karenga, 1990, pp. 23-24).” He then goes on to say that:

The rulers and nobles of Egypt clearly saw in their achievement, evidence of both divine favor and a similarity to the divine in their ability to create. They thus had an expanded vision of the human person which to many Egyptologists seems both arrogant and starkly different from the view of humans in their Judeo-Christian anthropology ... Maatian [philosophy] or the Kemetic conception of the human personality is grounded in several fundamental propositions. These include: 1) the divine image of humans; 2) the perfectibility of humans; 3) the teachability of humans; 4) the free will of humans; and 5) the essentiality of moral social practice in human development ... Finally, the Maatian stress on moral social practice is rooted in the assumption that self-realization of humans is best achieved in morally-grounded relations with others. As with other African anthropologies, Maatian anthropology asserts that the perfectibility and authenticity of the human person lies in her/his sociality, i.e., rooted in social relations and practice ... One must do Maat, i.e., speak truth, do justice and walk each day in the way of righteousness.

If one closely analyzes ancient Egyptian society and culture, he or she will quickly come to understand that the

view of Egypt presented in the King James Bible is a very limited and, perhaps, even distorted one. At most we are talking about a period of 400 to 600 years which in the course of ancient Kemetic history is a very short time span. Today, most anthropologists and historians generally agree that recorded Egyptian history began about 3,000 years before the birth of Jesus the Christ. At best this represents only about one fifth of its history. Manetho, the ancient Egyptian historian, however, argued that the history of ancient Egypt goes back some 36,000 years. And, indeed, recent discoveries about the Sphinx place its age at closer to 10,500 B.C. than earlier estimates of about 2500 B.C.

Cheik Anta Diop argues in *Civilization or Barbarism* (1991) that “the term “Christ” is not an Indo-European root. It came from the Pharaonic Egyptian expression *kher sesheta* [which means] “he who watches over the mysteries,” and was applied to the divinities Osiris (Asar) and Anubis etc. It was applied to Jesus only in the fourth century ... (Diop, 1991, p. 312).” This is important for two reasons. First, it implies that the Christ principle existed in Kemet long before the birth of Jesus the Christ, and, secondly, it gives insight into how the ancient Kemetic people viewed human potential. The ancient Egyptians believed that the Universe and everything in it was created by a divine intelligence. They gave this divine intelligence different names at different times in their history, e.g., Atum, Amen, Ra, Ptah, etc. They further believed that human beings had inherited this intelligence from their creator. Therefore, in their ancient Mystery System of Education, we see reflected an educational process by which humans could reach full self-actualization or their full divine potential. The purpose of education was to actualize spiritual potential not to achieve secular goals. In addition to this, James (1976) says that “the Mystery System offered salvation of the soul [and] placed great emphasis on immortality. Quoting Pietschmann, James says the Mystery System “had three grades of students 1) The Mortals, i.e., probationary students who were being instructed, but who had not yet experienced the inner vision; 2) The Intelligences, i.e., those who had attained the inner vision, and had received mind or nous and 3) The Creators or Sons of Light, who had become identified with or united with the Light (i.e., true spiritual consciousness).” (p.27) One question that people consistently ask about ancient Egypt (particularly after they have visited the temples and pyramids which are still standing today) is how did a people existing 3,000 years before Christ accomplish such feats of architecture and acquire such knowledge? That question will continue to puzzle most people until they come to see time in the nonlinear way most ancients viewed time. Secular time flowed for them in the linear way we view time today but sacred time and all knowledge was revealed in the stillness of eternity.

#### **Kemet, Intelligence and The World of The Goddess**

According to Joseph Campbell, this (ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia) was the world of the Goddess, a world that existed long before the rise of the patriarchy.<sup>3</sup> Indeed the concept of Maat is always depicted as a female with a feather in her headdress. More recently Christiane Northrup in her book *Women’s Bodies, Women’s Wisdom* (1998) refers to the patriarchal myth and how it has influenced Western civilization. Arguing that the historical abuse of women is connected to our Judeo-Christian legacy that connects the downfall of mankind with Eve, she goes on to say that women’s culture and women’s intelligence have long been devalued because of this legacy. “For the last five thousand years, Western society has believed that a linear, left-brain approach is the superior mode of communication and that a woman’s more embodied way of speaking and thinking is inferior and “less evolved”(p. 33).” She contrasts linear thinking with multi-modal/relational thinking which women exhibit and which she feels is much more holistic. In other words, the mind/body division exhibited and advocated by Plato and Descartes would no longer exist. This in turn would make for a healthier person that in-turn would make a healthier society. Northrup writes:

The mind and the Soul which permeate our entire body, are much vaster than the intellect can possibly grasp. Our inner guidance comes to us through our feelings and body wisdom first --- not through intellectual understanding. When we search for inner guidance with the intellect only --- as though it existed outside of ourselves and our own deepest knowing --- we get stuck in the search, and our inner guidance is effectively silenced. The intellect works best *in service* to our intuition, our inner guidance, soul ... or higher power ... Once we have acknowledged that we are *more* than our intellect and that guidance is available to us from the universal mind, we have accessed our inner healing ability. (p.31)

Then she goes on to say that:

Women have the capacity to know with their bodies and with their brains at the same time, in part because their brains are set up in such a way that the information in both hemispheres and in the body is highly available to them when they communicate. In school I was taught to distrust my own thinking process because it never fit

with the dualistic way in which education is set up. On a multiple-choice test, for example, I could always find a reason why almost every choice given might be correct. I could always see “the big picture,” and I could see how everything was related to everything else. In going over my answers, my teachers often told me, “You’re reading too much into it. The correct answer is obvious.” It was not always obvious to me. Now that I have learned to appreciate how intimately my thoughts, emotions, and physical body are connected, I have begun to reclaim my full intelligence ... I have learned that like most women, I speak and think in a multi modal, spiral way using both hemispheres of my brain and the intelligence of my body all at the same time. (p.32)

Jean Houston, in her book *The Passion of Isis and Osiris* (1995) takes us even further into this multi modal use of intelligence by describing how the ancient Egyptians used thought and intelligence. She says that long before the theory of relativity was conceived, the sages of Egypt knew that material reality consisted of movement, measure, and proportion. In Egypt a dualistic vision of the universe did not produce uncertainty and doubt because they felt that behind everything in the material world was an underlying spiritual reality. She goes on to argue that a key to understanding how intelligence was conceptualized in this ancient world is to look at the way they used language. She says:

The ancient Egyptians did not use language as we do --- with sounds or symbols linked in fixed associations, which in turn evoke sequential patterns in the brain. Instead, it was the Greeks who gave us our use of language. From the Phoenician alphabet the Greeks created a language of abstract forms, in which words stood for concepts. Such a language gives us a certain science, a certain distancing of self from nature, a certain dialectical interplay between self and nature, and a belief that we can control nature as if it were separate from us. Then she goes on to say that:

Schwaller de Lubicz reminds us that there are two distinct traditions of knowledge. On the one hand, there is Aristotelian logic, which is deductive and scientific and which focuses on form rather than on content. On the other hand, there is Pythagorean philosophy, which synthesizes perceptions of form into an overriding unity of content. Pythagoras derived his philosophy of the spiritual meanings of numbers while studying with the Priests of Egypt ... The hieroglyphs ... remained the primary vehicle of transmission of the wisdom texts through the priesthood [and] remained intact from the beginning of Egyptian civilization to its end.<sup>4</sup> (p. 116)

Finally, in thinking about what all this means for modern society, one can wonder with Jean Houston what would happen in education if children were taught to think symbolically and to connect the mystery of their own lives to the mystery of the universe. If they were taught math and science through the use of nature rather than through sequential principles that are not connected to the world around them. It appears to me that if we are to ever heal modern society of its current ills that we must go back to the beginning and relearn all that has been forgotten in order to return to a different place than that which we have reached today.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Egypt is the name the Greeks gave to this North African country. Prior to Greek colonization, the indigenous people called their country Kemet and referred to themselves as Kemites ( the black ones). The name Kemet means “the black settlement” or “the black land.” In this paper I use both Kemet and Egypt to refer to the same country. Most of the pyramids and temples in Kemet were built prior to Greek colonization.
2. See Hall’s book *Beyond Culture* (1976) for a comprehensive analysis of high and low context cultures.
3. This statement comes from a video called *Love and the Goddess* which is program five in The Power of Myth video series. The Power of Myth is a series of interviews that Bill Moyers did with Joseph Campbell in 1988.
4. In chapter 2 of his book *Sacred Science*, R.A. Schwaller De Lubicz gives a comprehensive analysis of how and why the Greek use of reason was a deviation from the approach to knowledge that had been used in ancient Egypt.

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**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

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THE VALUE OF URBAN SEMINAR IN RURAL TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAMS

Joseph Nwoye and Suzanne Rose  
West Liberty College

This project stems from the review of available information on teacher preparation programs. According to the information gathered prior to this project, by the year 2020, minorities will comprise 48% of the nation's children from five to seventeen years of age, and yet only 5% of school teachers are expected to be members of the under-represented groups (Pallas et al, 1989). Gay (1995), echoed similar sentiment, she pointed out that while public school students are becoming more ethnically, racially, and linguistically diverse, prospective teachers continue to be pre-dominantly middle class, European Americans; a phenomenon that is nation wide. Banks (1991, 1994) argues that even if those charged with the responsibility of preparing teachers are successful in increasing the percentage of minority teachers by 85%, there will still be predominantly white teachers working with students who differ from them culturally, racially and with regard to social class status. It is therefore critical that those in the business of preparing teachers do whatever they can to increase the number of minorities in the teaching profession.

State mandates, school districts, and certifying agencies, such as, NCATE, are increasingly requiring teacher education institutions to imbue urban/multicultural experiences in their teacher preparation programs. Similarly, AACTE and NEA mandated those institutions of teacher education design programs that help prepare future teachers for working with more ethnically and culturally diverse student populations. Lomotey (1992) asserted that the deterioration of academic achievement among minority students over the last twenty years has revived the theoretical yet practical call for culturally relevant curriculum. This deterioration of academic achievement has been attributed to teacher preparation, teacher attitudes, and inequitable facilities in minority urban communities.

In view of this situation, and the recognition that the place and nature of multiculturalism in teacher education programs continues to be contentious and problematic, and that our students from rural and suburban areas are white, from middle class families and often unprepared to teach minorities, we, in the Department of Professional Education, have to ensure that teachers graduating from our programs are prepared to effectively teach in a multicultural setting. I believe that urban seminar programs will certainly contribute to the improvement of the quality of teacher preparation programs. Because of this concern, West Liberty State College, together with Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Lock Haven University, University of Wisconsin, and other notable research and progressive institutions across the United States and Britain, are increasingly turning to urban seminar experiences.

The Urban Seminar is a learning-centered program in which participating students are given first-hand experiences with ethnically and racially diverse students under the supervision of well trained cooperating teachers, school administrators, and college professors. Through this comprehensive program with the community, participating students are provided with opportunities to get a better understanding of inner city schools and, more importantly, gain a comprehensive experience that will enable them to teach effectively any student irrespective of his/her culture, social economic class and other conceivable differences.

The urban experience program gave pre-service teachers the opportunity to collaboratively work with urban students, teachers, and administration, past urban participants, parents, civic leaders, and their counterparts from other universities. Below is the schedule of the urban seminar program activities. The program lasted for two intensive weeks, and the activities were as follows:

**Week 1, May 18 to 22**

**Monday, May 18, 1998**

9:00 a.m. Arrival, Tour of Community

Noon Luncheon, School Library

1:00 p.m. Orientation Program, Auditorium

Topic, Urban Education and Ogbots School Reform, Principal and Language Equity Issues Director.

3:00 p.m. Tour of Schools

7:00 p.m. Icebreaker Activity Topic, Ethnography and Journal Writing Presenter, University Professor Study Group Assignments, University

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

**Tuesday, May 19, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. First Day in Schools
- 3:30 p.m. Community Service- Taller Puertorriqueno, 10th Street Snack
- 4:30 p.m. Presenter-Tony Lake - Office of Curriculum Support School District of Ogbota
- 8:00 p.m. Large Group Meeting "First Impressions" University

**Wednesday, May 20, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. School Assignments
- 4:30 p.m. Workshop Session Topic, Stereotyping  
Minorities Presenter, Lisa Penn, University
- 7:00 p.m. Learning Forum

**Thursday, May 21, 1998**

- 8:30 a.m. School Assignments
- 3:30 p.m. Workshop Session Topic - Multicultural Appreciation Presenters, Kim Onyema and Miracle Ebony,  
Cultural Institute 20th Street
- 7:00 p.m. Large Group Discussion of "An Asian Perspective" Presenter, Wey, University

**Friday, May 22, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. School Assignments
- 3:30 p.m. Group Project Meetings for Presentation
- 6:00 p.m. Puerto Rican Experience Presenters, Sr. Ngozi, Lorie Anderson, WCM Neighborhood Center
- 7:00 p.m. Ethnic Food, Assignment of group projects for Saturday
- 8:30 p.m. Tour of Historic Cultural Area

**Saturday, May 23, 1998**

- 9:00 a.m. Service Learning Projects Presenters, Sr. Ifeoma, Joyce Stanson, Location, WCM Neighborhood Center
- 12:00 Noon Lunch
- 1:00 p.m. Service Learning Projects
- 4:30 p.m. Ethnic Meal and Traditional Music Location, Community Garden at CM Square
- 8:00 p.m. CM Cultural/ Entertainment Activities

**Week 2, May 24 to 29**

**Sunday, May 24, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. Optional Field Trips Student Group Selection
- 8:00 a.m. Community Religious Options Location, First Baptist Church of Northville
- 2:00 p.m. Tour of Central Mall Topic, "Using Primary Resources for Lesson Development" Presenter, Jim Timko  
Special Curriculum Coordinator School District of WCM

**Monday, May 25, 1998**

Memorial Day, Schools are closed. Tours of Historic and Cultural Areas

**Tuesday, May 26, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. School Assignments
- 4:00 p.m. Teacher, Principal Panel
- 7:00 p.m. Small Group Meetings for Group Presenters

**Wednesday, May 27, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. School Assignments
- 3:30 p.m. Conflict Resolution Presenters, Ms. Lourie Johnson Uche, Former Student Teacher Komo High School  
Students - University
- 8:00 p.m. Learning Forum

**Thursday, May 28, 1998**

- 7:30 a.m. Last Day in Schools
- 7:30 p.m. Group Presentations

**Friday, May 29, 1998**

- 7:00 a.m. Checkout, University
- 12:00 Noon Departure

Although the program lasted for only two weeks, it has had a meaningful impact on participating students;

children in urban schools are sharing a new and more accurate perspective about life in rural and suburban environments. The program exposed our students and those from other participating schools, to real children, their caring parents and the community as a whole, in a manner that certainly gave the students first hand knowledge of the urban environment, contrary to the misconceptions, they had developed from the media. First-hand knowledge of the urban environment, its students and the community, was expressed by a participating student of the seminar: "As result of my teaching experience in WCM school district, I have gained more insight on the plight of urban students and I therefore now have compassion towards students in an urban environment." The student continued: "Although I am familiar with a wide variety of research regarding urban education, no amount of research, reading and classroom activities could have prepared me for the experience and knowledge I gained from the urban experience." Another student expressed his view this way: "I think the urban seminar should be compulsory for every student, particularly those in the teacher education program, because the program enables pre-service teachers to get a better understanding of their students and thus be able to move their students from where they are to where the teacher ultimately wants to get the students. Everyone who wants to teach should consider the urban seminar experience."

If we truly believe in preparing competent teachers, who would be able to teach all students, whether they are poor or rich, from urban, rural or suburban areas, we must commit ourselves to providing these prospective teachers with urban seminar experiences. In addition, since most available teaching positions are in urban schools, it is imperative that those in the business of preparing teachers provide their students with the knowledge and experiences they need to secure teaching jobs in urban environments and effectively perform well.

Besides the enumerated advantages, urban seminars have clearly demonstrated how this innovative program breaks the barrier of fear and misunderstanding among our rural populations. This program provides students the opportunity to critically study and analyze the issues teachers must face in the new millennium by emphasizing the merging of research, theory and experience.

The West Liberty State College Grant Foundation, who made this experience possible, enabled students to have the opportunity to critically evaluate the misconceptions they may have about urban areas and to be more realistic and better prepared to teach all children irrespective of their cultural orientation. The assessment of the project from pre-service teachers, cooperative teachers, and college supervisors are presented here as a partial insight with the value of urban seminars. Although the urban experience lasted only two weeks, the pre-service lived in a culturally different environment from the one they were familiar with and this new environment provided them with cross cultural competencies in cultural diversity with regard to race, gender, socioeconomic class, disability and nationality. The pre-service teachers had experience teaching culturally different students in neighborhoods where the housing conditions were non-livable. One participant expressed the knowledge of the urban environment, the students and the community, as follows: "As a result of my teaching experience in Philadelphia, I have gained more insight and compassion toward students in an urban environment." This statement by one of the participants is not unique in the Philadelphia seminar. For example, Zeichner (1993) notes that in debates about field experiences, student teachers refer to urban experience as the most valuable part of their educational training.

Cooperating teachers are carefully selected based on their ability to merge current research and theory on cross-cultural competency (including attitudes, social interaction, ethnic group, bilingual education, etc). Teachers who understand the need for equity and justice in education in terms of curriculum, pedagogy, verbal and non-verbal communication, and the impact of equity and justice on children, often demonstrates strong beliefs about the need for culturally and pedagogically oriented curriculums. They are familiar with misconceptions about urban children, and that helps them to deal with the adjustment that rural students eventually face. With their experiences, they are able to advise pre-student teachers on various aspect of teaching and learning so that they become more effective teachers. Participating faculty pointed out that the urban seminar project has proven to be helpful with student teachers in that the knowledge gained enabled them to develop a quick rapport and relationship with their students.

Teacher educators believe that competent teachers are able to teach all students, Native Americans, Black, White, Latino, Asian, rich or poor, and from urban, rural or suburban areas. Since many teaching positions are in urban schools, it is imperative that those in the business of preparing teachers provide their students with the knowledge and experiences they need to secure teaching jobs in the urban environment.

Although the research in the area of urban seminars is limited, research in multicultural education can support the impact of urban seminars in teacher preparation, and eventually make the urban seminar a compulsory unit in teacher training programs. Bruer (1993) notes that meaningful learning occurs when the learner links his/her prior

experience to new information and this experience will improve the quality of service trainee education. Teacher educators should therefore provide more training for cooperative teachers to ultimately improve the quality of service provides to service trainees.

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HOW TO SUFFER PREDJUICE AS AN HONORARY MINORITY MEMBER

Martin Schoppmeyer, Sr.  
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

The most permanent memory of my first trip to the South was the sight of white and colored water fountains. The colored fountains came right from the pipe while the white was refrigerated & separate, but unequal.

As years passed while being in the South, I became used to the rather ridiculous situation of segregation. It accounted for the fact that I could not eat with a fellow employee who was black. It also came home to me with a vengeance one night while I was in the Army returning from a pass on an empty Greyhound bus. I spotted the large seat in the rear and went to be on it and catch 40 winks. The driver stopped the bus and came to eject me with the warning that I was in the colored section. Except, that was not the word he used to describe it.

Segregation in its hey day was mostly an ego trip on the part of white citizens. They had someone they could be superior to. Blacks had to learn their place and never try to be uppity. The whole system was to warm the hearts of whites, who themselves were being exploited, by allowing them to bully a whole race.

Starting with Rosa Parks and led by Martin Luther King, the Civil Rights movement began to change all of segregation. No more of back of buses, lunch counter inequity and the whole gamut of sights of enforced second-rate status. These disappeared to be replaced by things like affirmative action. However, even though the overt signs of its presence disappeared, segregation in more subtle forms remained. It lives happily, but not overtly, to this day.

In 1992 a small black school district in the Arkansas Delta, called Lake View, brought suit against the state for equity on the state finance plan. Lake View was receiving far less money per pupil than the state average. The suit sat on the shelf for two years, and that is when I became involved with it. The attorneys for Lake View were also all black, and two of them were members of the state legislature. I was asked to help rephrase the complaint. I did so, and it would seem that it was at this point that I was first lumped in with the plaintiff lawyers.

In September 1994, the suit was heard in the Chancery Court in Pulaski County. I testified at length and was more of a part of the plaintiff team. Finally in November, the Judge rendered her opinion and declared the state school finance system to be unconstitutional. She then gave the state two years to develop a Constitutional system.

As of the start of 1995, the legislature was in session. It had created in early 1994 a study commission that was supposed to develop a new finance plan; its report was delivered. However, the Governor wanted nothing to do with it and claimed to have developed his own plan. The problem was the details of the Governor's plan changed from week to week. An impasse set in. Finally in order to get some plan into law, the Speaker of the House announced that no appropriation bills would be considered until there was a school finance plan. Therefore, the legislature ran beyond its proposed ending date and a compromise was reached. Act 917 became law and a new finance plan indeed existed.

The Lake View plaintiffs immediately challenged the law. The case was to be heard at the end of 1996. However, in the meantime the trial judge ran and was elected to the state supreme court. This compressed her available court calendar. A group of intervenors to the case claimed that they had too many witnesses to be heard in a short period of time so the judge turned the case over to a new chancery justice.

That judge scheduled a hearing for April 1997. At this meeting, no evidence was heard but the case was scheduled to be heard in January 1998. The contesting parties were told to seek a settlement. Meetings were held between Lake View and the state throughout 1997. The lengthy delay in hearing the case seemed due to prejudice against Lake View attorneys more than any real reason. The state had paid its attorneys, witnesses and consultants. However, the winning Lake View side was paid nothing. I was regularly promised payment but the court would never allow it.

The reason seemed to be pure racism. Had the plaintiff's attorneys been white or from some prestigious Little Rock law firm, they would have received payment early on. But because they were black, their rights were cancelled. I suddenly found myself as an honorary black and I began to feel as minority members feel being discriminated against.

The situation became more obvious during 1998. A hearing was set for February 18. The settlement reached by the two parties was presented. The judge then gave until early March for comments. In March, the ACLU

complained that they did not have enough time to prepare a statement. The time was then extended to April 1. On that date the Judge threw the plaintiff-defendant agreement out and accepted the ACLU position that there was now an entirely new finance system and the suit should be thrown out. However, at the same time, the Judge approved a 7 million dollar fee for the Lake View attorneys. This represented a lesser amount than the 10.25 million requested.

However, since April 1, the Judge has refused to sign the order actually releasing the funds. When asked about it he says that he should never have had to take over the case. The logic of such a position seems difficult to fathom, save that one excuse to be prejudicial is as good as another.

The final blow was delivered on August 17. On that date the judge dismissed the case and further stated that no legal fees would be paid to the plaintiff's lawyers. Since my fees were included therein, I too was declared out-of-luck.

Although even the President realizes that racism is alive and well, it takes a situation like this to bring the point home. This particular case is a good example. Blacks are not accorded the same professional treatment as whites. Therefore, accidentally, I have had to learn how it feels to be a victim of prejudice. Evidently my next move is to join the NAACP. I certainly qualify.

I wonder what the rate for honorary membership is.

**JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF THE DOGMATIC THINKER:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEACHER\*\***

Douglas J. Simpson  
Texas Christian University

**Introduction**

Those who are familiar with the writings of John Dewey know that he had a great deal to say about thinking. Indeed, two of his most respected books are entitled *How We Think* (1933) and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938). In these and other works, he described several different kinds of desirable and undesirable thinking and the attitudes and habits that are often associated with them. He also wrote extensively of people who think in these different ways and characterized them according to the dominant traits and attitudes that he thought he could identify. For example, there are people who can be described as uncritical thinkers (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 16), rudimentary thinkers (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 206), empirical thinkers (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 192), and dogmatic thinkers (MW4, 188). His preferred kind of thinker, however, is the reflective one (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 3) and received the most attention by him and students of his thought. Relatively speaking, it is safe to say that the other types of thinkers have been neglected.

Perhaps it is appropriate that the “reflective,” “scientific,” “experimental,” or “laboratory thinker” has been more carefully examined by scholars since Dewey himself devoted much of his time to describing and cultivating this kind of person. This focus is also somewhat understandable if one assumes that it is more important to understand and practice reflective thinking than to understand and avoid dogmatic thinking. Of course, studying one of the two sets of activities—reflective thinking or dogmatic thinking—easily leads into a study of the other. Ideally, engaging in reflective thinking diminishes dogmatic thinking. On the other hand, one may argue that understanding and avoiding dogmatic thinking enhances reflective thinking in ways that studying reflective thinking alone—if such is even possible—does not. Thus, studying either kind of thinker may advance an understanding and development of the reflective thinker. Understanding those practices and attitudes that Dewey wanted educators to discourage may help them facilitate an understanding and practice of those qualities and attitudes he wanted to nurture.

To appreciate the import of Dewey's objections to dogmatic thinking, one need only study a few of his works, such as *How We Think* or *Democracy and Education*. But studying only a few of his works could be somewhat misleading, for Dewey's adamant opposition to the dogmatic tendencies he identified in individuals, schools, and society probably needs to be seen in the wide-ranging and lifelong comments he made on the subject. He spoke scathingly of dogmatic opinions and propositions, be they assumptions (LW4, 146), preconceptions (LW11, 440), beliefs (MW4, 176), convictions (Dewey, 1934, p. 319), assertions (MW13, 57, 321), or denials (MW13, 57, 221). He opposed dogmatism whether a person was arguing for or against a position. Dewey, therefore, had little tolerance for the sets of dogmatic statements he found in metaphysics (LW6, 303), social philosophy (LW13, 320), moral theory (MW11, 348; MW14, 147; LW4, 32), history (LW11, 61), religion (MW4, 166), theology (MW4, 30, 228, 242; LW2, 86, 166, 388), politics (MW3, 200; MW12, 171), and pedagogy (MW13, 321). He was equally unfriendly to dogma and the dogmatic attitude found in or associated with specific creeds (MW13, 304; LW11, 460) and theories (Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 22).

Dogmatic thinking that was rooted in *laissez-faire* individualism also concerned him (MW11, 141; LW11, 366). He specifically mentioned dogma in connection with thinking about natural rights (MW13, 310), self-interest (MW13, 339), the omniscient individual (MW13, 338), self-love (MW14, 97), perfect social unity (LW1, 311), social predestination (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 317), ends in view (EW1, 85), and ipse dixitism (MW14, 147). He also noted scientific (LW6, 275), theoretical (LW7, 317), political (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 117), Christian (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 46), and democratic dogma (MW13, 338). He was careful, moreover, to warn of dogmatic attitudes (MW12, 262; LW2, 8), appeals to authority (LW11, 454, 456, 459), habits of mind (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 16), and

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A version of this paper was delivered as the Drake Lecture at the 1998 Texas Educational Foundations Meeting.

habits of thought (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 39). Thus, in *A Common Faith*, he argued, “There is no special subject-matter of belief that is sacrosanct” (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 39). Science, religion, politics, culture, art, education, and democracy were open to his intellectual analysis. Facts, speculations, theories, ideologies, and practices had nowhere to hide.

His harshest words, however, may have been directed at dogmatic philosophy or philosophical dogmas (MW 12, 222). He claimed, on one occasion, that the “dogma of [the] immaculate conception of philosophical systems” was particularly troublesome (LW 6, 17) and that philosophical dogmas retard democracy and its accompanying fruit (LW 15, 274). He was comfortable describing absolutists (LW 16, 355), Marxists (LW 11, 439), and socialists (LW 6, 170) as dogmatists and declaring that materialism (MW 2, 194), positivism (MW 2, 209), skepticism (MW 2, 234), rationalism (MW 7, 220), fundamentalism, (LW 5, 72), progressivism, and traditionalism (Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 22) were—or could be—unquestioning, unreflective systems of thought. While Dewey is probably noted for opposing traditional and conservative ideas and social proposals, he also objected to the dogmas of the left (LW 16, 362) and communism, claiming that the latter’s position was based upon “a body of dogmas as fixed and unyielding as that of any church” (LW 5, 356) and that its faith was a dogmatic, unthinking one (LW 9, 92). His criticism of classicism in art was no less stinging: “Its vice, as an ‘ism’, is that it turns the mind to what is given; the given is taken as if it were eternal and wholly separate from generation and movement” (Dewey, 1958, p. 377).

In the spirit of an experimentalist, Dewey claimed in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*:

The “settlement” of a particular situation by a particular inquiry is no guarantee that that settled conclusion will always remain settled. The attainment of settled beliefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry. It is the convergent and cumulative effect of continued inquiry that defines knowledge in its general meaning. In scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be settled, or to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is available as a resource in further inquiry; not being settled in such a way as not to be subject to revision in further inquiry. (LW 12, 16)

Logic was not for Dewey, as it was for Russell and many at the time, either a branch of mathematics or the study of propositions. Rather, as his use of “thinking” and “inquiry” in his titles suggests, it was a larger study of “how we think,” particularly when we are doing it well and being successful as thinkers. This interest in the larger context of thought perhaps explains why he was essentially at cross purposes with and outside the mainstream of philosophical studies of logic. One interesting point that he made about dogmatism in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), is that the experimental method leads to “hypotheses directive of practical operations, not truths or dogmas” (LW 12, 505).

Dewey, then, thought dogmatic thinking both dangerous and widespread. But why, given his admiration for democracy, confidence in education, and faith in humanity, did he believe that dogmatic thinking was so prevalent? Why does it exist? How is it cultivated? His answer to these questions is multifaceted and involves, in part, his understanding of philosophical anthropology, evolutionary science, and social theory.

### **The Causes of Dogmatism**

Identifying causes is a risky, perplexing endeavor. The difficulty is in part attributable to the complexity of causation and is compounded by the fact that some interpret causes in a mechanistic fashion. There is also the problem of our seeing with particular lenses and offering explanations that are somewhat perception determined, because, as Dewey noted, no one ever brings a virgin mind to any intellectual problem (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 125). Even if we follow Dewey’s advice and are “reborn into the life of intelligence” as he understood the matter, it is not clear that this problem is overcome (MW 15, 7). Indeed, there are those who argue that we would merely be trading our meta-narratives for his worldview.

Regardless of our conclusions concerning the aforementioned questions, it is important to recognize that Dewey saw multiple causes of dogmatism and dogmatic thinking, including natural inclinations, cultural conditions, emotional needs, unsettling circumstances, instinctive tendencies, organizational success, and empirical thinking. Thus, he made numerous observations about the etiology of dogmatism. To begin with, he seemed to believe that there are natural propensities as well as cultural conditions that influence people to avoid thinking reflectively. He asserted in *Experience and Education* (1938): “Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities” (Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 17). In *How We Think* (1933), we find statements such as there is a “primitive credulity” and “a natural tendency to believe anything unless there is overpowering evidence to the contrary” (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 24). Earlier in *Democracy and Education* (1916), Dewey had argued that natural inclinations drive people to

irrational, unscientific thinking and that such thinking seeks the comfort and support of dogma:

Men still want the crutch of dogma, of fixed beliefs by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their activity by thought. They tend to confine their own thinking to a consideration of which one among the revival systems of dogma they will accept. (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 339)

Dewey, of course, was not confounded or dismayed by natural propensities and argued in "Does Human Nature Change?" (1938):

If human nature is unchangeable, then there is no such thing as education and all our efforts to educate are doomed to failure. For the very meaning of education is modification of native human nature in formation of those new ways of thinking, of feeling, of desiring, and of believing that are foreign to raw human nature. (LW13, 292)

Of course, if the tendency to dogmatic thinking is innate, the conditions and occasions which give rise to its exercise are environmental and so open to change. In *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), Dewey identified social factors that influence people to be dogmatic. In particular, he observed that living in an unpredictable, even precarious, world has "compelled" people to look for security. In fact, Dewey said that "perfect certainty is what man wants" (LW4, 17, 32), in part, because humankind has a "need for security in the results of action" (LW4, 32). The need, therefore, easily leads to "acceptance of dogmatic rules as bases of conduct in education, morals, and social matters" (LW4, 32). In turn, orthodox or traditional thought of all kinds contributes to the growth of dogmatism (LW4, 35; LW8, 271).

For Dewey, the desire for certainty, unpredictable environmental conditions, and human nature seem to collaborate to shove a person toward thinking dogmatically. Dewey elaborated on these forces and added another—the tendency to confuse a feeling of certitude with a public rationale for certainty—when he wrote:

Tendency to premature judgment, jumping at conclusions, excessive love of simplicity, making over of evidence to suit desire, taking the familiar for the clear, etc., all spring from confusing the feeling of certitude with a certified situation. Thought hastens toward the settled and is only too likely to force the pace. The natural man dislikes the dis-ease [in original] which accompanies the doubtful and is ready to take almost any means to end it. Uncertainty is got rid of by fair means and foul. Long exposure to danger breeds an overpowering love of security. Love for security, translated into a desire not to be disturbed and unsettled, leads to dogmatism, to acceptance of beliefs upon authority, to intolerance and fanaticism on one side and to irresponsible dependence and sloth on the other. (LW4, 181, 182)

On the partially related topic of prejudice, Dewey elaborated on his view of human nature, contending that "the instinct of people" expresses itself in "foolish and unwise judgment" and "precedes ... prevent[s] and distort[s]" genuine judgment. Consequently, he concluded that prejudice divides nations, races, people of different color, religions, sects, classes, groups (LW5, 396-397). His words and commitments are dramatic: the "irrational part of our nature" or the "old animal barbarian" struggles against civilization (LW5, 397). When the "old animal barbarian" combines with the fear of losing prized beliefs, the mind is clearly hampered in its development (LW5, 118). With this orientation, it is easy to see why he would conclude that "the mass of people refuse to look facts in the face and prefer to feed on illusions" (LW9, 77).

Even in better circumstances, however, people may be influenced to think dogmatically. Successful leaders may intentionally or unintentionally nurture a cult of the "infallibility of leadership" and, thereby, cultivate dogmatism in their organizations (LW9, 91). Even great thinkers, organizational leaders or not, may have their ideas "frozen" in time by those who admire their ideas and may eventually have their creative and unorthodox insights turned into "dogma" that cannot be challenged by present or later generations (LW13, 320). Moreover, Dewey maintained that what he named "empirical thinking"—ad hoc thinking rooted in personal experience which is not reflectively and critically analyzed—has three basic disadvantages, including its "most harmful" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 193) tendency to "engender mental inertia and dogmatism" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 192). In turn, intellectual "laziness, unjustifiable conservatism, are its probable accompaniments" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 193). Furthermore, an unreflective emphasis on past experience often means that failures to agree with the usual order are slurred over and cases of successful confirmation are exaggerated. Since the mind naturally demands some principle of continuity, some connecting link between separate facts and causes, forces are arbitrarily invented for that purpose. Fantastic and mythological explanations are resorted to in order to supply missing links. (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 194)

But people may also tend to be dogmatic because their experience is too parochial or limited or is not informed

by discussing ideas with others. He asserted in the essay "Context and Thought" (1931) that:

Dogmatism, adherence to a school, partisanship, class-exclusiveness, desire to show off and to impress, are all of them manifestations of disrespect for experience: for that experience which one makes one's own through sympathetic intercommunication. They are, as it were, deliberate perpetuations of the restrictions and perversions of personal experience. (LW6, 21)

If dogmatism is as important as Dewey claimed, but largely avoidable if conditions are right, we seem well advised to understand more than its dangers and etiology. A request for a clarification of the nature of dogmatic thinking, then, seems eminently reasonable: What does it mean to be a dogmatic thinker or to think dogmatically? What kind of thinking should educators and schools then discourage? How can we recognize the characteristics of the type of thinking that Dewey so greatly disliked?

### **The Nature of Dogmatic Thinking**

While there have probably always been people who defended the educational and social value of dogma and dogmatic thinking for social, religious, and political reasons, Dewey was not one of them. He consistently criticized both from his earliest through his later writings. The reasons for his critical opinion have been partially implied heretofore, but understanding more about his view of the nature of dogmatic thinking will further clarify why he objected so strenuously to it.

### **The Roots of Dewey's View**

Writing in 1891, around the time he was abandoning many features of his Christian faith (Ryan, 1995, p. 29), Dewey indirectly revealed some criteria for understanding and describing dogmatic thinking. While not utilizing the words dogmatic thinking, Dewey wrote:

It is hardly necessary, I suppose, to profess the deepest respect for the Golden Rule, but this is not inconsistent with recognizing that if it were not held open to reflective criticism, to analysis of meaning and bearing, it would surely degenerate into a mere external command. That it, or any other rule, may be a workable tool, that it may give aid in a specific case, it must have life and spirit. What can give it the life and spirit necessary to make it other than a cramped and cramping petrification except the continued free play of intelligence upon it? (EW3, 101-102)

In this early statement, Dewey appears to have attributed four qualities to the kind of thinking he later termed dogmatic: 1) it does not allow reflective criticism of cherished beliefs, 2) it does not allow ongoing analysis of ideas for their meaning and relevance, 3) it does not nurture internalized and reflective regulations, and 4) it has a stymieing and deadening influence on intelligence. Conversely, Dewey seems to have believed that reflective thinking may (1) be consistent with holding a deep respect for religious and other rules of conduct, 2) involve a reflective criticism of the most revered beliefs, and 3) entail a free play of the intellectual abilities.

In 1893, writing for the Monthly Bulletin of the Students' Christian Association of the University of Michigan, he revealed more of his thinking about dogmatism, religion, and philosophy when he argued that religion and all other aspects of life are legitimate fields of investigation for the philosopher. He also suggested a line of division between doing philosophy and scientific inquiry and thinking dogmatically:

Religion is one phase of all our human experience, and hence is in the region of philosophic investigation. As soon as any fact of life is said to be outside scientific investigation, philosophy is no more and dogmatism has begun. Religion is the subject-matter of philosophy the same as anything else is. Either theology and philosophy have no relation, or theology is philosophy. It is the business of philosophy to go on till it has got to the radical, living unity, which it calls God. From the standpoint of philosophy no two things can do the same work. So far as any one sets out to be a philosopher, and sets aside any portion of life which he says is entirely beyond further interpretation and knowledge, he fails to accomplish his end. He may be much better than a philosopher; I do not want to argue that question. Philosophy acknowledges nothing outside or above it. (EW4, 366)

This fully packed quotation tells us a great deal about the young Dewey and his view of dogmatism. In it, he seems to have laid out the ground for positions he would later develop more fully. He believed that certain claims, particularly assertions such as 1) a belief is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, 2) there is nothing new to learn about a subject, and 3) there are not any legitimate and alternative interpretations of controversial matters, are rooted in dogmatic thinking. This stance may illuminate in part why Dewey moved from idealism to instrumentalism, supernaturalism to naturalism, and theism to atheism. The particular manifestations of the former three isms that he

encountered apparently left him intellectually and emotionally dissatisfied.

In his middle years, Dewey's ideas about the nature of dogmatic thinking seem to have been less systematic than implicit in his treatment of many different subjects, sprinkling brief comments and insights throughout his publications. His criticisms were numerous but, if his ideas about dogmatic thinking were evolving, his opposition to it was not. He claimed, on one occasion, that there is a tendency for dogmatists to multiply conceptual distinctions within their dogmas (MW1, 155) and seemed to suggest that there are degrees and different kinds of dogmatism. He spoke of people being "dogmatic in the extreme" (MW1, 155) and the danger of "undue dogmatism" (MW2, 58). Subsequently, in both his middle and later works, he used such adjectives as "hard" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 39), "old" (LW4, 153), "rigid," "authoritative," "irresponsible and indiscriminate," "absolute," "traditional" (MW12, 163, 171, 222, 267; MW15, 47; LW5, 28), "harsh" (LW1, 322), "extraneous" (LW2, 24), and "dead" (LW17, 530) to describe dogma and dogmatism.

One shift in his thinking about dogma and the dogmatist may have occurred when he wrote of "brute dogma" or "something to which no canon of verification can be applied" (MW4, 69). The assertion is open to at least two interpretations. First, he may have been arguing that a belief frequently held by people—namely that certain ideas are outside the realm of public inquiry and therefore sacrosanct—opens them to the charge of being dogmatic. If a person claims his or her ideas are beyond the realm of reflection, we have grounds for believing he or she is a dogmatist. This is a familiar argument, i.e., dogmatists sometimes do not want to argue the merits of their beliefs so they think or claim that their ideas cannot be questioned by anyone. But, second, he may have been making a different claim, namely that the dogmatist's beliefs actually are outside the realm of public, debatable criteria for evaluating warranted or unwarranted assertions. If he was making the later claim, he was essentially making a claim about the verifiability of certain beliefs, arguing that some thinkers make dogmatic assertions that cannot be supported and proved but neither can they be discredited and disproved. Being impossible to substantiate or refute, they are essentially private. These private beliefs, so it may be argued, may be held reflectively and flexibly or unreflectively and inflexibly. Holding beliefs that cannot be supported or discredited, therefore, does not appear to be dogmatic per se. So it appears that the genuinely dogmatic person would have to hold dogmatically his or her beliefs regardless of whether they are private or public beliefs.

In addition, Dewey described what may be viewed as the evolutionary or progressive nature of dogma. His own words are that an idea may sometimes "harden into formal dogma" (LW17, 528) and that "old knowledge" may degenerate "into dogmatic doctrines received on authority, or ... decay into superstition and old wives' [sic] tales" (Dewey, 1920/1957, p. 34). When ideas evolve or devolve into dogmas, of course, the result is a fixity of ideas (MW1, 157). In time, a person's dogmatic thinking probably evolves beyond specific, isolated beliefs into a "closed system," a position that is comprehensive and resistant to external questioning (MW2, 295).

Perhaps in anticipation of more recent accounts of the blinding effects of the author's, reader's, and viewer's perspectives, Dewey described the dogmatic thinker as a person who uses her or his "closed system" to give a "prompt interpretation of every new shock into terms of some well established habit" (MW4, 119), refuses to "use intelligence" in evaluating personal beliefs (MW7, 61), upholds a position "at all cost" (MW13, 34), assumes many "unquestioned" propositions (MW4, 96), and refuses to make causal connections that are antithetical to one's system of thought (MW8, 140). Ultimately, he contended that the dogmatic thinker resists open, public, impartial, and multi-perceptual examinations of her or his ideas. Thus, it is easy to understand why Dewey would apply what he said about religious dogmatists to non-religious ones:

It is the essence of all dogmatic faiths to hold that any such "showdown" [the testing of claims by "common tests"] is sacrilegious and perverse. The characteristic of religion, from their point of view, is that it is—intellectually—secret, not public; peculiarly revealed, not generally known; authoritatively declared, not communicated and tested in ordinary ways. (MW4, 172-173)

Arguing against some of the tendencies of certain communists and tenets of communism in "Why I am Not a Communist" (1934), Dewey made a couple of exciting distinctions between the dogmatic and the reflective thinker. First, he implied that the dogmatic thinker is so steeped in her or his own beliefs that the facts cannot be examined without "changing [them] ... to suit ... special purposes" (LW9, 92). On the contrary, the reflective thinker should be characterized by "fair-play, elementary honesty in the representation of facts and especially of the opinions of others." Moreover, he insisted that these qualities cannot be simply dismissed as "bourgeois virtues" (LW9, 94). In an essay published in the same year, Dewey argued further that the scientific mind needs to be cultivated along with

the learning of information in schools. Students need to be brought to the point that they “adopt into the very make-up of their minds those attitudes of open-mindedness, intellectual integrity, observation and interest in testing their opinions and beliefs that are characteristic of the scientific attitude” (LW9, 99).

### **The Development of Dewey’s View**

In Dewey’s later writings, he reiterated many of his earlier thoughts about the dogmatic thinker (such as her or his “unwillingness to submit a case to inquiry” [LW2, 216]) as well as amplified his concept by noting some of its complexities. He seems to shift the emphasis from the way a person holds a specific belief to a person’s disposition toward beliefs in general and questioning attitude toward life. For instance, he elucidated his idea by combining the word dogmatic with other terms, such as “dogmatic and uncritical” (LW1, 303) and “fixed and dogmatic” (LW2, 8). Similarly, he spoke of literalism and dogmatism (LW2, 166). He reiterated that the dogmatic thinker is likely to hold to “unexamined fundamental premises [and] unquestioned assumption[s]” and added that she or he may be “hostile to the theories” that run counter to personal beliefs (LW3, 319). He also spoke of the “dogmatic attitude” (LW2, 8) and the “hopelessly committed” (LW3, 305), implying, perhaps, that there are emotional inclinations and attitudinal tendencies which support the cognitive tendencies of the dogmatic thinker.

Scattered additional ideas in his writings seem to form no particular gestalt until they are placed in the development of his overall thinking. He spoke of “an unquestioning [emphasis added] dogmatism” (LW7, 268) that seems to suggest that not only do dogmatic thinkers not allow others to question their prized opinions but that the dogmatic thinker does not question them either, suggesting that the dogmatic thinker is not inclined to live an examined life in important respects and areas of thought. In this case, the idea that dogmatism is fatal to inquiry can take on a double meaning: the intellectual lives of both the friendly inquirer and the committed dogmatist are mortally wounded (LW16, 325). Unhappily, the thinking of the dogmatist in this situation can never be modified (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 39) and she or he is without intellectual power for growth (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 57).

But it is not only individuals’ lives that are in question. Dewey also believed that dogmatism, like skepticism, is an emotional indulgence that serves neither the individual nor society well (LW4, 182), and that it “separates means from ends” (LW11, 259) as well as arrests “choice of means” (LW13, 321). In 1937, Dewey moved beyond the idea of dogmatism arresting the choice of means to claiming that testing hypotheses is also negatively influenced:

All dogmatism is by its nature an economy of scarcity, scarcity in forming a hypothesis and entertaining alternative ideas. Any liberal creed, on the other hand, must be an economy of abundance in a freedom of developing hypotheses. (LW17, 444)

Perhaps the events leading to World War II influenced him to see as political and social what might have remained largely a logical and epistemological point. In 1938, Dewey may have made his best known summative statement on the dogmatic thinker in *Experience and Education*. In this work, he argued against the weaknesses of both progressivism and traditionalism, noting that either can be based upon dogma and dogmatic thinking. It is not the belief which is dogmatic but how it is held and the attitude and disposition behind it. The dogmatic thinker, in short, is any person who is not inclined to question his fundamental or most prized opinions, tenets, theories, feelings, beliefs, practices, and convictions:

It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against. For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles. (Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 22)

To obtain an even clearer picture of Dewey’s concept of the dogmatic thinker, it is useful to note some of the terms, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors he associated with this kind of person. At a minimum, his derogatory and pejorative associations are enlightening. To begin, there is the association of dogmatism with “narrow-minded, partisanship” and “provincialism” (EW3, 52-53). Similarly, he appeared to associate particular orientations—orthodox interpretations and schools of thought—with dogmatism or dogmatic tendencies (MW4, 82, 92) or with the strong possibility of doctrines becoming dogmas after they are handed down from one generation to another (MW6, 296). Moreover, he seemed to throw dogmas, superstitions, chance opinions (MW8, 62), cultic thought (LW1, 53) and guesswork together (MW10, 327).

His idea of associating certain frameworks with dogmatism went further, however, as he called intellectual paranoia (LW1 229) and intolerance the children of dogmatism (MW13, 308). He also mentioned “blind empiricism,” “worship of fact-finding” (LW17, 445), “rigidity, prejudice, caprice” (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 124),

“ignorance, ... routine, tradition” (LW6, 146), and the doctrinaire (LW9, 68) in the same context with dogma, dogmatism, or the dogmatic thinker. In “Intelligence and Power” (1934), Dewey charged that dogmatism was “reinforced by the weight of unquestioned custom and tradition, the disguised or open play of class interests, dependence upon brute force and violence” (LW9, 108). In addition to these allies, the dogmatic thinker, Dewey believed, is strengthened in his or her opposition to the scientific attitude by “prejudice, ... class interest, external authority, nationalistic and racial sentiment, and similarly powerful agencies” (LW13, 274) and “the pressure of immediate circumstances” (LW13, 283). The allies, companions, and friends of the dogmatic thinker, therefore, were something less than desirable characters in Dewey’s mind.

### **Dogmatism in Education**

Dewey had a strong faith in both humanity and education. This “faith in education,” he believed, signifies nothing less than belief in the possibility of deliberate direction of the formation of human disposition and intelligence. It signifies a belief that it is possible to know definitely just what specific conditions and forces operate to bring about just such and such specific results in character, intellectual attitude and capacity. (MW13, 318)

Yet, he warned in “Education as a Religion” (1922), that faith “becomes insincere and credulity injurious ... when aspiration and credence are converted into dogmatic assertion” (MW13, 321). Accordingly, he objected to a “dogmatism and intolerance” that forbid discussion of ideas (LW14, 234) and a pedagogy that always pushes for “a certain view as the correct one” and has a “tendency to develop closed minds” (LW9, 160). He farther warned against “an atmosphere of fundamentalism” in scientific, economic, and political matters, arguing that such an “atmosphere has penetrated the schools” (LW9, 162).

Unsurprisingly, Dewey expressed great concern about and disdain for dogmatism in all education and in schooling in particular. Speaking of the dogmas that are passed on in schools and educator preparation programs and the classroom teacher’s difficult, complex, and critical roles in directing, stimulating, informing, and feeding the student, he cautioned:

The teacher ... has to avoid all dogmatism in instruction, for such a course gradually but surely creates the impression that everything important is already settled and nothing remains to be found out. He has to know how to give information when curiosity has created an appetite that seeks to be fed, and how to abstain from giving information when, because of lack of a questioning attitude, it would be a burden and would dull the sharp edge of the inquiring spirit. (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 40)

Dewey also warned saying:

In some educational dogmas and practices, the very idea of training the mind seems to be hopelessly confused with that of a drill which hardly touches mind at all—or touches it for the worse—since it is wholly taken up with training skill in external execution. This method reduces the ‘training’ of human beings to the level of animal training. Practical skill, modes of effective technique, can be intelligently, non-mechanically used only when intelligence has played a part in their acquisition. (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 63)

Dewey specifically attacked dogmatic instruction when he found it in moral education (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 66) and claimed that such instruction destroyed “the spirit of wonder” in children (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 39). Consequently, he asserted that “material should be supplied by way of stimulus, not with dogmatic finality and rigidity” (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 258), while recognizing that the teacher

has to protect the growing person from those conditions which occasion a mere succession of excitements which have no cumulative effect, and which, therefore, make an individual either a lover of sensations and sensationalism or leave him blasé and uninterested. (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 40)

Dewey also appeared to be concerned with the potential of dogmatism in both progressivism and traditionalism when he wrote “Progressive Education and the Science of Education” (1928) (Archambault, 1964/1974, p. 169ff). He warned against a “closed orthodoxy,” “a rigid orthodoxy, a standardized set of beliefs to be accepted by all” (Archambault, p. 172), claiming that closed-mindedness about educational questions means that different sciences of education

are not only possible but also much needed. Of course such a statement goes contrary to the idea that science by its very nature is a single and universal system of truths. But this idea need not frighten us. Even in the advanced sciences, like mathematics and physics, advance is made by entertaining different points of view and hypotheses, and working upon different theories. (Archambault, pp. 171-172)

And he added in familiar words that since:

there is no one thing which is beyond question ... and since there is no likelihood that there will be until society and hence schools have reached a dead monotonous uniformity of practice and aim, there cannot be one single science. (Archambault, p. 172)

Dewey had additional concerns about dogma and dogmatic thinkers in the field of education in ways that touch the teacher's own professional development as much as the growth and education of students. Among these is the concern that dogma, in social settings, may stymie reflection, intelligence, and choice of means or methods in pursuing certain ends or goals. In particular, he contended, "Every arrest of intelligence (and every form of social dogma) obstructs and finally suppresses free consideration and choice of means" (LW6, 290). He saw intelligence similarly arrested if a specific kind of indoctrination became a tool or means of a dogmatic educator or an educator in a dogma-driven education system. Arguing that the resulting kind of indoctrination is

the systematic use of every possible means to impress upon the minds of pupils a particular set of political and economic views to the exclusion of every other. This meaning is suggested by the word "inculcation," whose original signification was "to stamp in with the heel." This signification is too physical to be carried over literally. But the idea of stamping in is involved, and upon occasion does include physical measures. I shall discuss this view only as far as to state, in the first place, that indoctrination so conceived is something very different from education, for the latter involves, as I understand it, the active participation of students in reaching conclusions and forming attitudes. Even in the case of something as settled and agreed upon as the multiplication table, I should say if it is taught educatively, and not as a form of animal training, the active participation, the interest, reflection, and understanding of those taught are necessary. (LW11, 415)

Again, Dewey saw logic and epistemology entwined with social and political philosophy. In "Panel Discussion: Education Today," (1937), Dewey elaborated on his objections to indoctrination when he said:

I do not think that indoctrination regarding a new social order is either desirable or possible. The wisest person in the world does not know what that new order is going to be, and the best way to get ready for it is to take care of the present. (LW11, 574)

He added:

schools have been guilty of a great deal of indoctrination of a bad kind—indoctrination in nationalism, miscalled patriotism. Everybody ought to have public spirit, but the indoctrination of "patriotism" has given us a narrow, vicious type of nationalism and party strife. (LW11, 574-575)

In *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935), Dewey warned too of the dangers of "meeting dogmatism with dogmatism" (LW11, 58), propaganda (LW11, 51), and "the fruit of dogma," interestingly choosing as his example belief in the inevitability of social progress (LW11, 55). In 1938, Dewey tied together some of his thoughts about propaganda, indoctrination, and dogma in a brief essay entitled, "What Is Social Study?" In the essay, he argued for the integration of studies and a social perspective within various studies rather than for discrete realms of inquiry, concluding that his argument

has a definite bearing upon what is called indoctrination, or, if one prefer, teaching, with respect to preparation for a different social order. Social studies as an isolated affair are likely to become either accumulations of bodies of special factual information or, in the hands of zealous teachers, to be organs of indoctrination in the sense of propaganda for a special social end, accepted enthusiastically, perhaps, but still dogmatically. (LW13, 341)

### **Safeguards against the Dogmatic Thinker**

Though he wrote of a utopia without schools, we might expect Dewey to recommend a society with schools and other educational entities that is ultimately antithetical to the dogmatic educator, teacher, politician, and parent. Unquestioningly, the dogmatic thinker would not be at home in Dewey's ideal society. But what can society do to inhibit the growth of dogmatic thinkers?

Of the many ways Dewey's society would guard itself against dogma, dogmatic education, and dogmatic thinkers there is one endeavor that supports and furthers all others, namely the unending pursuit of new information and understanding. More precisely, like Bacon before him, he believed that we must encourage new knowledge if for no other reason than to ensure that old knowledge does not become blinding beliefs:

Continued progress in knowledge is the only sure way of protecting old knowledge from degeneration into dogmatic doctrines received on authority, or from imperceptible decay into superstition and old wives' [sic]

tales. (Dewey, 1920/1957, p. 34)

In "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth" (1907), Dewey argued that the "essential difference between truth and dogma" is that truth is "to some extent remade" while dogma is not (MW4, 74). "Indeed," he added, "it is only through such application and such remaking that truths retain their freshness and vitality" (MW4, 74). As a result,

If we put ourselves in the attitude of a scientific inquirer in asking what is the meaning of truth per se, there spring up before us those ideas which are actively employed in the mastery of new fields, in the organization of new materials. (MW4, 74)

So we find that Dewey argued in favor of understanding the field of philosophy so that both professional and unofficial philosophers contributed to the development of society. What was needed was "the candor, courage and sympathetic insight of minds which move outside any technical fold," mind characterized by "a spirit free from petrification and wooden literalness" (LW3, 345). Overall, then, we find that he wanted society and schools to emphasize an instrumentalist view of truth (MW4, 75).

A second way of contributing to an overall answer to how we guard against becoming or cultivating dogmatic thinkers is to examine Dewey's notion of the reflective or experimental thinker or the activity of thinking. In "The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education" (1908), he explained how his view of education could be operationalized and also clarified a crucial difference between the dogmatic and the experimental mind:

Instruction carried on upon this basis would teach the mind that all ideas, truths, theories, etc., are of the nature of working hypotheses. One of the chief obstacles to the progress of the race has been the dogmatic habit of mind, the belief that some principles and ideas have such a final value and authority that they are to be accepted without question and without revision. The experimental habit of mind, that which regards ideas and principles as tentative methods of solving problems and organizing data, is very recent. An education based upon the pragmatic conception would inevitably turn out persons who were alive to the necessity of continually testing their ideas and beliefs by putting them into practical application, and of revising their beliefs on the basis of the results of such application. (MW4, 188)

Thus, "the dogmatic character of the assumption" in what is thought to be known is abandoned in favor of "the experimentally tested character of the object known in consequence of reflection" (LW4, 146). Consequently, all claims become "hypothetical, non-dogmatic" (MW7, 144). It is easy to see why Dewey found it

worth noting that the capacity (a) for regarding objects as mere symbols and (b) for employing symbols instrumentally furnishes the only safeguard against dogmatism, i.e., uncritical acceptance of any suggestion that comes to us vividly; and also that it furnishes the only basis for intelligently controlled experiments. (MW4, 95)

The stimulation, cultivation, and practice of reflection, becomes an important objective and means for the school and society: "Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends constitutes reflective thought" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 9). But in nourishing reflection, it was important from Dewey's perspective or orientation that there must be a rejection of "formal logic, with its creed of absolute certitude," for it "abhors the very mention of adventure and risk, the life-blood of actual human thinking, which is aroused by doubts and questions, and proceeds by guesses, hypotheses and experiments, to a decision which is always somewhat arbitrary and subject to the risk of later revision" (MW7, 133).

If development of the reflective thinker is a safeguard against the emergence of the dogmatic thinker, then what some call academic freedom is a necessary condition. He argued before the American Federation of Teachers in 1929:

Freedom of mind, freedom of thought, freedom of inquiry, freedom of discussion, is education, and there is no education, no real education, without these elements of freedom. An attack upon what is called academic freedom is an attack upon intellectual integrity, and hence it is an attack upon the very idea of education and upon the possibility of education realizing its purpose. (LW5, 332)

Consequently, "the highest testimony that could be given to an educator" is that a student had an intellectual awakening, developed the "power to think," and had learned "to face facts and to face them regardless of the consequences" (LW5, 333). To develop in students "habits of doubt" through philosophical study, then, is to be admired (LW6, 272). Or we could say that the development of "the laboratory mind" or "attitude of experimentation," as Peirce would say, is a desired outcome of philosophical study and a deterrent to dogmatic thinking (LW6, 276). Importantly, Dewey believed that the experimental attitude views a generalization differently

than the non-experimental perspective, seeing it as an instrument for further inquiry or as “a hypothesis, not a dogma” (LW7, 343).

The implications of these rather abstract thoughts and directives for the teacher are somewhat complex and not necessarily obvious. Certainly, an empty, knee-jerk skepticism, misinformed by some knowledge and the tools of inquiry, is no help. Indeed, it may engender anti-educative tendencies. But it is clear in *Education and the Social Order* that one goal is the development of

a spirit of curiosity that will keep the student in an attitude of inquiry and of search for new light. If the result is simply to leave the student with the idea that there are two sides to the question and there is a great deal to be said on both sides, the effect may be only a new version of the right answer affair; there are now two sides instead of just one. But the open mind is a nuisance if it is merely passively open to allow anything to find its way into a vacuous mind behind the opening. It is significant only as it is the mark of an actively searching mind, one on the alert for further knowledge and understanding. The basic trouble with much teaching, which on some grounds is excellent, is that it does not create wants in the mind, wants in the sense of demands that will go on operating on their own initiative. (LW9, 180-181)

For Dewey, then, schools and educators in a democracy do have a role in countering and avoiding dogmatism:

A democratic system of education cannot go the length of prescribing conclusions. It leaves no room for dogmatism in this sense. In the end it must rest its case on faith in intelligence. In some instances this faith will presumably be disappointed. With some persons the invitation to rely on their own intelligence will doubtless be met with refusal. With others the attempt to apply intelligence will perhaps result in serious perturbation or even panic; and the conclusion may be reached by these that intelligence, apart from some higher authority, is unequal to the task of devising acceptable principles of conduct. Still others may be expected to lay down certain absolutes, such as racial superiority or instincts, as a justification for undemocratic modes of behavior. If earnestness and sincerity may be presupposed, then all such persons must be accorded a full measure of freedom in thinking, unless our profession of faith in intelligence is to be reduced to a mere sham. A truly democratic system of education must be content to encourage proficiency and sincerity in thinking, amid surroundings that furnish social incentives, without assuming responsibility for the conclusions that may be reached. It will proceed in the faith that in the main, reliance on intelligence under such conditions will vindicate itself progressively by producing flexible personalities within a genuine democratic social order. (LW11, 559)

Given this perspective, we are not surprised to find that Dewey made several claims regarding the advantages of his general position and stated: “They rule out all dogmatism, all cocksureness, all appeal to authority and ultimate first truths; they keep alive the spirit of doubt as the spring of the work of continually renewed inquiry” (LW11, 484). Thus, he argued against censorship and for “the discussion of a wide variety of opinion, unorthodox and orthodox, with an intelligent teacher in the classroom” (LW14, 373). This kind of discussion, he felt, is

the best protection the schools can afford against our students being later misled by unscrupulous propagandists of one doctrine or another. It is surely better for our young people to face controversial issues in the open atmosphere of the schoolroom, than to seek out what is forbidden in some dark, unwholesome corner. No thought is so dangerous as a forbidden thought. (LW14, 373)

In what may sound like—or even be—a contradiction, Dewey claimed that the “only ultimate protection against dogmatism” is a scientific attitude that displays a willingness to reconsider, to examine alternatives, and to question existing and emerging possibilities (LW17, 443). Or as he stated it elsewhere, “Absence of dogmatism and prejudice, presence of intellectual curiosity and flexibility, are manifest in the free play of the mind upon a topic” (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 286). This scientific spirit, then, he characterized as a new approach to thinking which had already resulted in “new methods of inquiry and reflection [that] have become for the educated man today the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and intellectual assent” (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 31). Ultimately, then, Dewey argued that each person should come to think for her- or himself although he noted that such language is tautological, for “any thinking is thinking for one’s self” (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 258).

### **Conclusions**

We have now reached a point where we may wish to raise a variety of questions about and objections to Dewey’s descriptions and claims about the dogmatic thinker. We may wish to query Dewey about, for instance, his (1) explanation of the causation of dogma and dogmatic thinking, (2) conceptual boundaries for the idea of a dogmatic thinker, (3) association of nearly the entire universe of negative outcomes with dogmatic thinking, (4)

philosophical anthropology in view of his evolutionary theory, and (5) instructional practices given his pedagogical theory. But, most important, most basically we may wish to ask if Dewey made an absolute and, eventually, a dogma out of reflective thinking. Does his emphasis on the idea lead blindly to asking questions that minimize and depreciate intuitions, feelings, and instincts? Conversely, we may wish to apply and extend his views about dogmatic thinking, an atmosphere of fundamentalism, and cultic thought to present-day controversies. This study will conclude with an exploration of another question or related set of questions: Was Dewey himself a dogmatic thinker by his own definition? If he was, is being dogmatic an inescapable intellectual, attitudinal, and dispositional evil?

In answering these questions a person may somewhat easily draw the conclusion that he was a dogmatic writer if not thinker. He was fond of using terms and making statements that have a ring of absolutism and finality about them. He did, after all believe in what he advocated. He also wished to reform schools and society and to convince others that he was right. One could, by way of illustration, make an interesting study of how often and in what ways Dewey used the word only to describe the options he perceived on a variety of topics. Even in *How We Think*, he was not shy about using the four letter word: "Only when things about us have meaning for us, only when they signify consequences that can be reached by using them in certain ways, is ... deliberate control of them possible" (Dewey, 1933/1960, p. 18; see also LW1, 4). Many of his "only statements" appear to suggest that his ideas cannot be legitimately questioned or debated and that he is not asking himself questions that are unsettling.

His socially, economically, and politically oriented writings sometimes leave a similar impression. Steps to Economic Recovery (1933) illustrates this point in its opening paragraph: "I propose this evening to concentrate attention upon one step, a step absolutely fundamental to permanent recovery of the sick patient as distinct from remedies that dope the patient into a temporary hectic burst of activity; a step so simple and so basic as to be generally neglected" (LW9, 61; italics added).

Indeed, Dewey could write on nearly any topic in each period of his life and leave the impression that he was dogmatic. Aware of this, he attempted to offset how his writings sounded to others by providing a rationale for what he considered merely a perception. As early as 1897 when writing "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," he said that the material in the essay was presented "in somewhat dogmatic shape" because of constraints of space and inadequate time to qualify his thoughts (Archambault, p. 108). Even so, he hoped that the shape of the discussion would not lead to the conclusion that he was "dogmatic in spirit" (Archambault, p. 109).

In the same year (1897), Dewey made both a space and a pedagogical defense of dogmatism, claiming that:

From limitation of space, I can only state salient points quite dogmatically, and cannot undertake to prove what I have to say. But the dogmatic statement may at least serve to put the reader in possession of a point of view which is a possible alternative. (EW5, 413)

Dewey also attempted to disarm his readers when he admitted, as he did in 1906, that he "may seem dogmatic" about his theory of knowledge at times but really was not when his views were well understood (MW3, 112). Later (1922), he acknowledged that he wrote "somewhat dogmatically" when recapitulating his criticism of a position but did so because he was not making an argument as such for or against the position. He was merely synthesizing previously stated objections (MW13, 51). Four years later in 1926, he made a related admission saying that he had "written somewhat dogmatically" to save space (LW2, 68).

While writing against unquestioning ideas of human history in "Social Absolutism" (1921), Dewey went beyond a pedagogical defense of making a point to the reader to asserting that seeming to be dogmatic and, thereby, making a point might cause an opponent to question his own dogmatic or "absolutistic point of view" (MW13, 312). This defense sounds curiously like fighting "dogmatism with dogmatism" (LW11, 58). But fighting epistemological dogmatism with pedagogical dogmatism appears at least somewhat different from fighting epistemological dogmatism with another form of epistemological dogmatism. Conversely, pedagogical dogmatism seems to run some of the same risks as epistemological dogmatism under certain conditions: When a reader or listener is unaware of a writer's or speaker's intentions or teaching style she or he may be inclined to accept ideas dogmatically or, alternatively, reject them because of the writer's dogmatic tone.

Dewey, of course, was aware of the accusations of his critics as he showed in his defense of instrumentalism from Royce's charge of absolutism. In essence, he dismissed Royce's charge by saying that Royce's "own conception of instrumentalism is logically compatible only with absolutism" (MW7, 65) but that his viewpoint led to no such conclusion. His extensive response to the charge that pragmatism has preconceived and dogmatic ideas of

particular outcomes that are good as follows and clarifies a shift from a common sense, everyday use of the terms pragmatic and instrumental to his technical uses of the terms:

We conclude with a brief reference to the bearing of the account upon pragmatic method. Critics have often stated that the pragmatic test implies a prior conviction or judgment that certain consequences are good. Hence the working of the pragmatic method implies a prior judgment which is non-pragmatic: the conclusion certainly follows if the premise is sound. But it is not. The uncritical pragmatism of ordinary life doubtless often falls into an assertion that some consequences are intrinsically good and to be unhesitatingly asserted or acquiesced in. But it does so in virtue of departure from the pragmatic method. The latter says that it is good to reflect upon an act in terms of its consequences and to act upon the reflection. For the consequences disclosed will make possible a better judgment of good. Thus the good of foreseen consequences or of attained consequences is not final nor dogmatically determined. It is good as a "better than"—better than would exist if judgment had not intervened. The case is similar with that other dangerous epithet, "instrumental." It is not meant that reflection is instrumental to preconceived and pre-existently determined consequences, much less those of bodily needs or economic success or even social betterment. It is meant that reflection is instrumental to the creation of new consequences and goods when taken in its integrity—or experimentally. Being the sole agency of transformation of old goods into new ones, the agency is continuous with the ends, and hence like them is, esthetically and morally speaking, an intrinsic good. But we must distinguish between its strictly intellectual structure and its esthetic and moral value, which are personal and immediate. To say that knowledge in its cognitive quality is instrumental is not inconsistent with holding that in its direct and personal aspect it is a thing of beauty and delight. (MW13, 27-28)

In summary, then, one may conclude that Dewey appears to have been dogmatic at times. On some of these occasions, he contended that this was only appearance because of time or space considerations or for pedagogical reasons. On other occasions, he explicitly rejected claims that as an instrumentalist or pragmatist he was blind to his own preconceived epistemological and moral beliefs or that he was as dogmatic as any other person who assumed some fundamental ideals. His writings, of course, are strewn with dogmatic sounding propositions that appear to come from the typewriter of a dogmatic thinker. But he offered no disarming qualifications on some of these occasions. Whether Dewey was successful when he did offer defenses and explanations remains debatable. Given that he wrote and spoke so much on so many topics for so long under a such variety of conditions, it seems rather futile to argue that each example of claimed dogmatism is nothing more than the perceptions of his critics. Yet, one may appreciate many of his ideas, pedagogical and otherwise, without claiming that he was exceptionally good at practicing what he recommended. History seems to support the claim that nearly every great thinker has had habits or practices that deviated from her or his values and ideals.

Two further points need to be made. First, it seems safe to say that Dewey like Froebel expected his followers [and critics?] to exhibit their following [and disagreeing?] by continuing his own study of contemporary conditions and activities, rather than literally adhering to the plays [and ideas] he had collected [and developed]. Moreover, it is hardly likely that Froebel [or Dewey] himself would contend that in his interpretation of these games [or claims] he did more than take advantage of the best psychological and philosophical insight available to him at the time; and we may suppose that he would have been the first to welcome the growth of a better and more extensive psychology [and philosophy] ... and would avail himself of its results to reinterpret the activities [and practices], to discuss them more critically, going from the new standpoint into the reasons that make them educationally [and epistemologically] valuable. (Dewey, 1980, p. 84) Whatever Dewey or Froebel may have said, this comment certainly does not reflect a dogmatic attitude.

Second, critical insight into Dewey's overall understanding of the dogmatic thinker is provided by what may be termed his paradoxical epistemology. While he held that philosophical, political, religious, economic, and social doctrines and beliefs—and, perhaps, absolutes—could and often do influence people to think and be dogmatic, they need not. The person's attitude toward and the way she or he holds doctrines, assumptions, and opinions are the pivotal considerations. That is to say, will the person genuinely allow or encourage criticisms by others as well as by him- or herself? Will she stop others from questioning? Will he keep on reflecting? Does the person keep learning, questioning, and considering? Does the person keep asking her- or himself uncomfortable questions? For these and other reasons, Dewey's epistemological paradox is well summarized in *A Common Faith* (1934):

A "creed" founded on this material [the experimental method of intelligence] will change and grow, but it cannot be shaken. What it surrenders it gives up gladly because of new light and not as a reluctant concession.

What it adds, it adds because new knowledge gives insight into the conditions that bear upon the formation and execution of our life purposes. (Dewey, 1934/1962, p. 85)

Dewey may well and understandably leave the impression that he was dogmatically committed to experimentalism or to an instrumentalist creed which was unshakably rooted in naturalism. Perhaps he was. Then again he may have been just as willing to abandon his instrumentalist faith as he was his Christian one if there were sufficient and warranted reasons for doing so. Then again, maybe his non-virgin mind was incapable of such an intellectual and emotional move. If he kept raising uncomfortable questions about his experimentalist faith, it seems that he cannot be rightly called a dogmatic thinker—or at least not said to have been characterized by dogmatic thinking. It is important to distinguish between a thinker, writer, and speaker who is sometimes dogmatic and a thinker, writer, and speaker who leaves behind a dogmatic gestalt.

One final question: Does it really matter whether Dewey fully practiced what he recommended and encouraged? To some, any inconsistency between Dewey's ideal and his practice is extremely important. Certain critics may hope to discredit his ideal by noting an inconsistency. To others, his inability to practice what he preached is revealing of a logical problem. But our question can be better stated: Should it matter if Dewey was sometimes operationally inconsistent with his theory? Perhaps it should, especially if the inconsistency helps educators demonstrate how difficult it is—or philosophers to demonstrate how impossible it is—to be reflective rather than dogmatic. On the other hand, Dewey's perceived or real inconsistency does not automatically and seriously discredit, much less give cogent reasons for completely rejecting, his ideal. Other grounds and arguments will be needed before many people will feel intellectually compelled to abandon many important features of his ideal. And those who abandon some aspects and particulars of his general position need not conclude that educators and students should be encouraged to be unexamining, unquestioning, unreflective, unthinking, and uncritical people.

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**Documentation**

Two kinds of documentation appear throughout the text. The first is the one created by the editors of Dewey's works at Southern Illinois University Press. Their Index provides references to the early, middle and later works by employing, for example, the simple indicators of EW5: 289 to refer to the Early Works, volume 5, page 289. Their system has been modified slightly, namely the colon is replaced with a comma (EW5, 289). For other sources, the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (4th edition) is followed.

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JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

David Snelgrove  
Oklahoma City Public Schools

The problematic in John Dewey's concept of freedom involves the dilemma of the social lives of people who are all connected within the framework of the society in which they live as opposed to the autonomous life of the individual. Dewey is known for his focus on the social aspects of our lives, on community, on shared experiences, on democracy, and on open communication. Dewey's social psychology focuses upon the acquisition of habit and moral structure in the day-to-day lives of people and the importance of schools in that acquisition. Such an emphasis on the associated lives of people seems to leave little room for the free lives of individuals within the larger society. As we read Dewey's work, it is important for us to understand his ideas about the place of the individual, the meaning of freedom and liberty and the relationships among individual freedoms, democratic society, and morality. By searching out instances where Dewey dealt with the idea of freedom, we can gain a clearer understanding of its place in his thought.

Allusions to freedom as a concept are found throughout Dewey's works. For Dewey, freedom had three components, "(i.) It includes efficiency in action, ability to carry out plans, the absence of cramping and thwarting obstacles. (ii.) It also includes capacity to vary plans, to change the course of action, to experience novelties. And again (iii.) it signifies the power of desire and choice to be factors in events."<sup>1</sup> The concept of freedom is so important in Western Civilization and American society that we are inclined to think of it as a part of human nature, separated from our social lives and idealized in our history, laws and literature. Dewey rejects that kind of dualism between the individual and the social. For Dewey, freedom, correctly conceived, is the intelligent social behavior of individuals within a cultural framework.

In *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 1920, he called "(t)he long-time controversy between rights and duties, law and freedom ... another version of the strife between the Individual and Society as fixed concepts."<sup>2</sup> In his 1939 book, *Freedom and Culture*, Dewey explored the philosophical underpinning of the relationship between the absolute freedom of the autonomous individual in the abstract and the limited freedom of the individual within the social environment or culture. Dewey asks why the abstract idea of freedom has such value and about its relationship to human nature. Then he investigates the psychological connection between free behavior and its consequences, and between the necessity of social equality and the dilemma of freedom versus security. He also explores the sociological effects of individual freedom on the solidarity of the society and provides a pragmatic (or, if you prefer, instrumental) investigation of freedom as ends or means. Politically, Dewey investigates the relationship of the tradition that "freedom is the goal of political history; that self-government is the inherent right of free men and is that which, when achieved, men prize above all else."<sup>3</sup> How individuals fit into the social-cultural environment indicates their own understanding of their cultural lives and how well they align their actions with them.

Dewey was dismayed in 1939 that free institutions in so many nations were being willingly abandoned to powerful leaders for reasons of national pride and economic security. These nations lacked a history of free political and legal institutions to limit the powers of political leaders and a system of social habits strong enough to overcome the promises of powerful leaders. He calls these legal institutions, "barriers ... erected to keep persons who get into positions of official authority from encroachments that undermine free institutions."<sup>4</sup> Once in power such leaders gained control of political institutions, economic relations, and the arts and sciences and thereby the total control of their citizens lives.

Dewey was not, on the other hand, deluded by the idea that American society had found all the answers to economic and political organization. He said, "The idea of a pre-established harmony between the existing so-called capitalistic regime and democracy is as absurd a piece of metaphysical speculation as human history has ever evolved."<sup>5</sup> He asked that scientific investigation into the conditions of industrialization and commercialization move beyond the economic aspects to include the impact upon the private and social lives of the people. In his words, "The facts bring out in sharp outline that as yet the full conditions, economic and legal, for a completely democratic experience have not existed."<sup>6</sup>

Dewey's analysis of political behavior was based on his psychological model of individuals living in modern societies. In analyzing the political activities of the people in society he held that "It is better, if possible, to start

from (human activity) and see if we are not led thereby into an idea of something which will turn out to implicate the marks and signs which characterize political behavior.”<sup>7</sup>

Among the strongest of psychological forces are, for Dewey, the habits developed as the individual begins to function in society. He said “Without habit there is only irritation and confused hesitation. With habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is conscious search.”<sup>8</sup> Habits also contain moral elements, “... the problem of moral judgment is one of discriminating the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which are to be *specifically* cultivated and condemned.”<sup>9</sup>

For Dewey, “Individual human beings may lose their identity in a mob or in a political convention or in a joint-stock corporation or at the poll.”<sup>10</sup> “Individuals still do the thinking, desiring and purposing, but *what* they think of is the consequence of their behavior upon that of others and that of others upon themselves.”<sup>11</sup> Or, even stronger, “Habit does not preclude the use of thought, but it determines the channels within which it operates. Hence the idea that men are moved by an intelligent and calculated regard for their own good is pure mythology.”<sup>12</sup> What individuals think, then, is a product of their own social development, determined by their experiences with their surroundings. Dewey simply said, “Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction.”<sup>13</sup>

Of course, for Dewey, experience is a very complex idea. It includes objective experience of the environment, an existential appreciation of problems as physical, biological, cultural, and so on which gives rise to thinking, which terminates when it has existentially solved those problems. Dewey believed that experience also includes all ideas as well as sensations. Existence is itself the ideas. We formulate ideas about experienced objects. Ideas enable us to recapture whatever we experience and, at the same time, they indicate a direction for us to take, plans of operation. Ideas are hypotheses to be held until they must be abandoned by further information. Abstract ideas and ideas like mathematical ideas can be put to “existential use” in the form of symbols as a means of overcoming limitations of observation or as an extension of reasoning.<sup>14</sup>

Experience is also a guiding method for philosophy.

“Dewey points out that we experience things at two different levels. At the *primary* level, things are encountered, undergone, suffered, enjoyed, but not known. At the *cognitive* level, there is an effort to know what is undergone, and to that extent, it is abstracted. The cognitive level has only one character, and that is functional.... (W)e know only when we discover the ways and means of controlling what we experience.”<sup>15</sup>

For Dewey, Kant’s *a priori* assumption of freedom is something innate, a human birthright, and the classical liberal notion of freedom as liberty from governmental restraint were insufficient. Dewey rejected the idea that human nature has anything to do with the amount of freedom that exists within a society. The Kantian notion of freedom, according to Dewey, revolved around the overt, explicit assumption that,

... either freedom is something antecedently possessed or else it is nothing at all. Yet we cannot separate power to become from consideration of what already and antecedently is. (But) ... capacity to become different, even though we define freedom by it, must be a present capacity, something in some sense present. The fact that we can reduce changes that occur to certain uniformities and regularities does not eliminate this original element of individuality, of preference, bias. In short, anything that is has something unique in itself, and this unique something, enters into what it does. The fact that all things show bias, preference or selectivity of reaction, while not in itself freedom is an indispensable condition of any human freedom.<sup>16</sup>

He reasoned that the variety of cultural forms indicated that human nature is affected more by the culture than it affects the culture making the drive for freedom as an aspect of human nature an untenable idea. He wrote,

...whatever are the constituents of human nature, the culture of a period and group is the determining influence in their arrangement; it is that which determines the patterns of behavior that mark out the activities of any group, family, clan, people, sect, faction, class. If we take all the communities, peoples, classes, tribes and nations that ever existed, we may be sure that since human nature in its native constitution is the relative constant, it cannot be appealed to, in isolation, to account for the multitude of diversities presented by different forms of association.<sup>17</sup>

The interaction of culture and human nature Dewey called morals. He said that “the actual ‘laws’ of human nature are laws of individuals in association, not of beings in a mythical condition apart from association.”<sup>18</sup> The incongruity of the moral structure of society with the nature of man poses a problem to the freedom of individuals. Social and institutional lag leads to the function of a society’s moral rules as an “agency of class supremacy.”<sup>19</sup>

In rejecting the classical liberal conception of freedom as a lack of interference in or control of personal affairs

by government Dewey said,

The real fallacy (of classic Liberalism) lies in the notion that individuals have such a native or original endowment of rights, powers and wants that all that is required on the side of institutions and laws is to eliminate the obstructions they offer to the “free” play of the natural equipment of individuals.<sup>20</sup>

People in society are not equally blessed with what is required to exercise their individuality. Dewey put it thus,

The notion that men are equally free to act if only the same legal arrangements apply equally to all--irrespective of differences in education, in command of capital, and that control of the social environment which is furnished by the institution of property--is a pure absurdity, as facts have demonstrated.<sup>21</sup>

Others find freedom in the concept of operative power, might makes right, in which the natural rights of individuals consist of the ability to do whatever they have power to do. But Dewey thought, “... man in his original state possesses a very limited amount of power ... (people) are but parts ... of the whole of Nature to which they belong.”<sup>22</sup>

Hegelian and Marxian ideas about freedom are no more attractive to Dewey than the Kantian or classical liberal notions. Since Hegelian freedom is growth, something to be attained, not an original possession, it is obtained, said Dewey, “... by idealization of institutions and law and the active participation of individuals in their loyal maintenance, not by abolition or reduction in the interests of personal judgments and wants.”<sup>23</sup> But Dewey believed that,

The power, the ability to command issues and consequences, that forms freedom must, it should seem, have some connection with that something in personality that is expressed in choice.... (T)he essential problem of freedom is, ... the problem of the relation of choice and unimpeded effective action to each other. A choice which intelligently manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and this enlargement in turn confers upon our desires greater insight and foresight, and make our choices more intelligent.<sup>24</sup>

Dewey believed that Marx’s dialectical materialism leaves little room for either individual or social freedom but recognized that the economic relationships of any society have a profound impact upon the members of the society. Dewey’s idea of liberty was closely related to the structure of the society. He said, “... effective liberty is a function of the social conditions existing at any time ... as economic relations become dominantly controlling forces in setting the pattern of human relations, the necessity of liberty ... will require social control of economic forces in the interest of the great mass of individuals.”<sup>25</sup> Dewey was not rejecting the Marxian analysis of society so much as he was rejecting a Marxian social science based solely upon economic relations.

Unwilling to say that the understanding of the economic system alone would provide us with sufficient information for the understanding of the entire society, Dewey thought the consequences of economic behavior so complex that their isolation as *the* cause of *all* social change oversimplified the causative forces that drive the continuously evolving reproduction of social systems. Indeed, he believed Marxism to be an absolutist, “... social theory which reduces the human factor as nearly as possible to zero; since it explains events and frames policies exclusively in terms of conditions provided by the environment.”<sup>26</sup> This, said Dewey, was

... expressed in the formulation of a single all-embracing law ... that of the existence of classes which are economically determined, which are engaged in constant warfare with one another, the outcome of which is direction of social change toward the liberation of producers from the bonds which have kept them subjugated in the past. Final creation of a classless society is to be the outcome.<sup>27</sup>

For Dewey,

Marxism is “dated” in the matter of its claims to be peculiarly scientific. For just as *necessity* and search for a *single* all-comprehensive law was typical of the intellectual atmosphere of the forties of the last century, so *probability* and *pluralism* are the characteristics of the present state of science. The inherent theoretical weakness of Marxism is that it supposed a generalization that was made at a particular date and place ... can obviate the need for continued resort to observation, and to continual revision of generalizations in their office of working hypotheses.<sup>28</sup>

Dewey found this reduction unpragmatic:

“... freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as well as the scientific method.... (T)he lesson to be learned is the importance of ideas and of a plurality of ideas employed in experimental activity as working hypotheses.”<sup>29</sup>

It is not that democratic systems do not have problems. For Dewey, corporate civilization leads to a hegemony of a collectivized, homogenized social orientation in which an individual's identity, submerged in an increasing consumptive trend, loses the freedom for autonomous action. In anticipation of modern mass communication, he especially noted the impact of corporatization on leisure activities, amusements, and sports. "Our colleges," he said, "... make athletics an organized business. The radio, the movies, the motor car, all make for a common and aggregate mental and emotional life, and ... the press is the organ of amusement for a hurried leisure time, and it reflects and carries further the formation of mental collectivism by massed methods. Crime, too, ... is organized and corporate."<sup>30</sup> "For the chief obstacle to the creation of a type of individual whose pattern of thought and desire is enduringly marked by consensus with others, and in whom sociability is one with cooperation in all regular human associations, is the persistence of that feature of the earlier individualism which defines industry and commerce by ideas of private pecuniary profit."<sup>31</sup>

He said that we have the "... unceasing glorification of the virtues of initiative, independence, choice and responsibility, virtues that center in and proceed from individuals as such," and that these are "conceived of in terms of their least significant manifestation, exercise in the economic area. Instead of independence, there exists parasitical dependence on a wide scale. Servility and regimentation are the result of control by the few of access to means of productive labor on the part of the many."<sup>32</sup>

Dewey challenged the role of the schools in perpetuating the acquisitive nature of society as well as the restrictive status or class relations that they reproduce as they function as a social institution instead of working to expand students' opportunities. It seems that governmental systems, whether totalitarian or democratic, work in subtle as well as obvious ways to control citizens. Instead of instilling habits of the thoughtful sensitivity, democratic dispositions, and use of intelligence, Dewey said,

The inert, stupid quality of current customs perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment. Education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom.<sup>33</sup>

... If our public-school system merely turns out efficient industrial fodder and citizenship fodder in a state controlled by pecuniary industry ... it is not helping to solve the problem of building up a distinctive American culture: it is only aggravating the problem ... (caused by) the money-motif of our economic regime. Most of those who are engaged in the outward work of production and distribution of economic commodities have no share--imaginative, intellectual, emotional--in directing the activities in which they physically participate.... (T)he subordination of the enterprises to pecuniary profit reacts to make the workers "hands" only. Their hearts and brains are not engaged.... and the result is a depressed body and an empty distorted mind.<sup>34</sup>

He found freedom from restriction, freedom from the enslavement to old ruts, "... as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation."<sup>35</sup> Here too the schools were not seriously involved in developing this freedom for power.

In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey said,

This state of affairs must exist so far as society is organized on a basis of division between laboring classes and leisure classes ... the clash of aims manifested in different portions of the school system; the narrowly utilitarian character of most elementary education, and the narrowly disciplinary or cultural character of most higher education. It accounts for the tendency to isolate intellectual matters till knowledge is scholastic, academic, and professionally technical, and for the widespread conviction that liberal education is opposed to the requirements of an education which shall count in the vocations of life.... The school cannot immediately escape from the ideals set by prior social conditions. But it should contribute through the type of intellectual and emotional disposition which it forms to the improvement of those conditions.... To oscillate between drill exercises that strive to attain efficiency in outward doing without the use of intelligence, and an accumulation of knowledge that is supposed to be an ultimate end in itself, means that education accepts the present social conditions as final, and thereby takes upon itself the responsibility for perpetuating them.<sup>36</sup>

... The continually increasing importance of economic factors in contemporary life makes it the more needed that education should reveal their scientific content and their social value. In schools, occupations are not carried on for pecuniary gain but for their own content, they supply modes of experience which are intrinsically

valuable; they are truly liberalizing in quality. Active occupations represent things to do, opportunities for scientific study ... their educational significance consists in the fact that they may typify social situations including both play and work.<sup>37</sup>

Ultimately, Dewey said that, "The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgement exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while."<sup>38</sup> This use of intelligence meant, for Dewey, the application of science. But social science, for Dewey, should not try to seek universal laws like the physical sciences. The process of social science must necessarily recognize that the inquiry undertaken "... is in fact a part of the social process itself, not something outside of it."<sup>39</sup> "(I)ntelligence treats events as moving, as fraught with possibilities, not as ended, final. We use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activity. In this use of desire, deliberation and choice, freedom is actualized. Intelligence becomes the method of the, "... remaking of the old through union with the new, ... the conversion of past experience into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in the future and that indicate how to realize what is desired."<sup>40</sup> Freedom through "Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it and accept responsibility for consequences."<sup>41</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

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RECLAIMING OUR CHILDREN: THE AESTHETIC AS TRANSFORMING AND EMANCIPATING

Sam Stack  
West Virginia University

**Introduction**

Last spring while reviewing student portfolios, an English education major who had just completed student teaching made an inspiring and intriguing remark about her students. In describing her classroom experience, she expressed concerns about curriculum mandates, such as what and how to teach, and felt her students found no meaning and little relevance in these prescribed activities. The students, conditioned by years of schooling, simply did as they were told. Commenting on this situation, the student teacher believed that we, as educators, were doing little to stimulate the imagination of the children. This insight and observation piqued my interest in light of my own concerns and work in aesthetics.

If this student teacher's observation is correct and I believe it is, we should be very concerned. Such a concern is much more important to our democracy than back to basics, accountability, or comparing apples and oranges through the latest TIMMS. Many educators outside the formal school setting are more than willing to nurture the imagination of our children, channeling imagination and desire into consumerist behavior. These educators, most without training in pedagogy or educational psychology seem to understand the interests and desires of our children better than we do. They seek to shape and control interest and may use it to exploit them.

One of the chief mechanisms by which these educators socialize our children takes the form of the aesthetic, as they attempt to define for our children and us what is of value, and what constitutes the beautiful. In a sense, these educators have coopted the aesthetic. They understand the power it has as an educational tool, a tool we often sideline even if our students convey in numerous ways its importance. I believe a flexible theoretical framework which combines essential elements from pragmatism, Marx and critical theory, existentialism and postmodern thought can help us better understand how the aesthetic is being used in contemporary society and most important why it should be so important to us as educators and democratic citizens. Through this analysis I hope to advance a more ethical, caring, compassionate, meaningful and transformative narrative.

Traditional philosophy defines aesthetics as "the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of art and the character of our experience of art and of the natural environment."<sup>1</sup> It might relate to the philosophy of art that includes questions of taste, beauty, imagination, creativity and expression. First, I wish to explore Dewey's conception of art, and his theory of aesthetics in light of his democratic pedagogy and how his theory of the aesthetic may be helpful in developing the foundation for this narrative.

**John Dewey and the Aesthetic**

Dewey's view of the aesthetic is best located in *Art as Experience*, written in 1934 in the midst of the depression. From a philosophical point of view, Dewey shows great concern about the traditional view of aesthetics, grounded in taste and beauty which was often separated from real human experience. He wishes to explore the aesthetic to enhance and nurture imagination, creativity, expression and communication; all traits linked to democratic character. Historian Robert Westbrook claims, "at the heart of Dewey's aesthetics was an effort to break down the barriers erected by many philosophers between art and the rest of experience and to trace the continuities between the work of art and the doings and under goings of everyday life."<sup>2</sup> Dewey sees art as a form of praxis or purposeful action, where diverse human experiences can be viewed and ideally communicated in totality, with experience defined as some sort of interaction in the environment. In the case of the aesthetic, it is best viewed as a type of transaction or sharing of experience, much like the artist and the perceiver of art. Dewey wishes to convey there is art in all human experience, not just through the traditional forms of art in the experience of artists.

Dewey contends, life, like art, is "an ongoing transaction between an organism and its environment"; [one of course might substitute the word experience for transaction]. A significant life is one in a continued process of growth, learning by experience, or what some might say learning by doing. Dewey believes the real work of art is the "building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions."<sup>3</sup> Art provides a tool by which we search for meaning and it differs from science in this way. While Dewey sees the method of science as one of the best means to know or perhaps understand via inquiry, it cannot through method ascribe meaning. In fact, he views science as art.

Failure to understand the transforming nature of art is often a facet of education. Dewey deals with this critique of education and traditional approaches to subject matter in *Experience and Education* (1938).<sup>4</sup> Subject matter, what Dewey might describe as a collection of human experiences, is conveyed simply for its own sake and gauged through some sort of scientific [fair and objective] assessment. When a student poses the question, “Why do I have to know this?”, they are taking the first step in growth. In essence they are seeking some form of interaction with the subject matter to make sense of its relationship to their experiences. In an aesthetic sense, the student is seeking meaning through comparing their experiences with those of others. They seek to interact with the subject matter, yet this is also the moment when we often arrest the growth, create a miseducative experience and anesthetize them to learning.

Education as art gives us insight into our own experiences and understanding; it helps us find self. Maxine Greene’s recent book *Releasing the Imagination* stresses this point. When a child’s imagination is not released, that child may have difficulty locating self and ultimately the role of self in society.<sup>5</sup> Without a basic understanding of self, what Dewey might call self-realization, the notion of empathy and democracy as ethical association have no meaning and cannot exist.<sup>6</sup> Self-realization and empathy form the basis for democratic community, a place for the nurturing of expression, creativity, imagination and communication.

In light of this concept of democratic community, Dewey links imagination with aesthetics, with imagination being the chief instrument of the good.<sup>7</sup> While Dewey gives only rare glimpses of what he sees as the good society, he clearly offers imagination as the key to possibility. The freedom to imagine, to reflect, to analyze, to gauge a situation, ultimately leading to praxis through creativity and problem-solving forms the basis of Dewey’s theory of democracy as ethical association. The aesthetic by its very nature has the capacity to stimulate the imagination to the potential of problem solving. This is an aspect of its communicative capacity, yet this communicative capacity can be distorted and disrupted.

One mechanism where communicative capacity is disrupted occurs is what Dewey calls a “museum conception of art,” a characteristic of modern society and capitalism. Capitalism and capitalist societies foster the collection of fine works of art “as signifiers both of their wealth and of their capacity to commit themselves to something more refined than the accumulation of capital which absorbed them in everyday experience.”<sup>8</sup> Art as a commodity limits communication and thus imagination. The museum conception of art creates walls which interrupt the sharing of experience. This type of art often finds itself class based, something that belongs to an elite. Relating to *Experience and Education*, the traditional treatment of subject matter as separated disciplines and outside the realm of student experience also creates barriers to the sharing of experience.

Continuing the discussion of art and the efforts of the capitalist market, Dewey engages in a discussion of the differentiation between labor and work. Dewey’s concerns about work and the aesthetic at times resemble Marxian aesthetics.<sup>9</sup> To work in the traditional sense was meaningful in itself; a natural thing for human beings to do. Taking the intrinsic satisfaction away creates a type of alienation and frustration, related to self-realization and one’s role in the community. As Dewey claims in *Art as Experience*, “The psychological conditions resulting from private control of the labor of other means for the sake of private gain rather than any fixed psychological or economic view, are the forces that suppress and limit aesthetic quality in the experience that accompanies process of production.”<sup>10</sup>

### **Marx and the Aesthetic**

Although Marx did not specifically articulate a philosophy of the aesthetic, it is a critical component of his work. Perhaps the best source for grasping Marxian aesthetics is through the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* written in 1844.<sup>11</sup> Here we find Marx’s economic theory driven by basic aesthetic concerns. This economic theory is based upon “what real people in real social settings spend most of their time doing ... and it is in the economic realm that human nature is most graphically and constantly displaced.”<sup>12</sup> Simply put, we are what we do. What does this have to do with aesthetics?

Marx and Dewey believe that human creativity is central to labor and productivity, ideally creating those things necessary for our sustenance and through free, conscious activity. Sounding much like Marx, Dewey claims: “Art is not secure under modern conditions until the mass of men and women who do the useful work of the world have the opportunity to be free in conducting the processes of production and are richly endowed in capacity for enjoying the first of collective work.”<sup>13</sup> Marx believes that language, knowledge, values, cultural identity and social institutions are all due to our creative practice. The problem arises when we lose our capacity to create freely, our desire to create being suppressed, denied or coopted. Simply put, capitalism creates a situation where the product controls the producer; where the creation rules the creator, and the creators can become victims of their own creative powers.<sup>14</sup>

The suppression of this creativity results in alienation, a feeling of being lost or separated and confused. That which is produced finds its values in the process of exchange, it may have monetary value but at the same time loses its aesthetic value.

Marx believed that bourgeois culture is fundamentally an acquisitive culture; we live in order to acquire. This desire to acquire dominates us and it has an incredible capacity to feed itself and exploit humanity and the environment worldwide. Capitalism must continually feed the beast and create new desires for acquisition and may seek workers in developing countries willing to work for low wages to do so. Unfortunately, Marx separated art in a high and low culture dichotomy. He did not believe great art was possible under capitalism because everything was tied up in the means of production, the economic order. For Marx and some members of the Frankfurt School, culture, including art, is nothing more than a manifestation of the ruling class under their control. Obviously this view fails to see the aesthetic as a tool for subversion which Dewey, some members of the Frankfurt School and some postmodernists think possible. Both Marx and Dewey attempt to convey the importance of the aesthetic, something we do in free and self-conscious environment. When we lose the freedom "to do," and this does extend beyond economic production, we lose a part of what it means to be human.

### **The Frankfurt School and Aesthetics**

Interested in why the proletariat had refused to become agents of revolution, the Frankfurt School paid close attention to what they termed mass culture, a culture with a strong aesthetic character. During their exile from Europe, during the 1930s and 1940s, they witnessed a transformation in mass communication, culture, rising consumerism, and the growing power and influence of the broadcast media. The growth of radio and its use for political and advertising and also the entertainment industry quickly drew their attention. Erich Fromm in *Escape from Freedom* and *The Sane Society* discussed his concerns about the culture industry, critiquing mass culture, advertising, and political manipulation. Fromm claimed the "methods of advertising are essentially irrational; they have nothing to do with the qualities of the merchandise, and they smother and kill the critical capacities of the customer like an opiate or outright hypnosis."<sup>15</sup>

For Adorno and Horkheimer, mass culture was nothing more than a rationalized, administered culture, the new culture industry being controlled by the dominant elite. The culture industry was nothing more than an extension of domination and ideological mystification.<sup>16</sup> Adorno, for example, critiqued the faddish growth of jazz during this period as music which he felt exemplified this facet of domination. For Adorno, jazz "was a standardized, commercialized and formulaic as other kinds of popular music and encouraged cultural conformity in its devotees as much as other form of mass culture."<sup>17</sup> Of course, any jazz musician, or for that matter blues, bluegrass, folk, rock, rap, alternative, etc., might bridle at Adorno's characterization. Adorno and Horkheimer and others of the Frankfurt School could not get past the belief that mass culture had fallen prey to rationalization, standardization, or conformity and was just a facet of the administered mass culture. For them and others it represented the triumph of capital in all spheres of human endeavor. Perhaps it had to some degree, but did that totally take away its emancipatory power, its communicative capacity for subversion in challenging the status quo?

A more optimistic and realistic approach to the transformative nature of the aesthetic can be found in Herbert Marcuse's work. Marcuse sees the subversive nature of art as one of its most distinguishing features and believes art, regardless of its ideology or attempt to develop false consciousness still has the ability to transcend and become a means for imagination and transformation.<sup>18</sup> Keep in mind the subversive nature of the aesthetic and its emancipatory potential as we discuss postmodern thought.

### **The Postmodern Aesthetic**

One is hard pressed to clarify a philosophy of aesthetics in postmodern thought due to its variety, although aesthetics is a frequent topic of interest. According to Best and Kellner, one of the goals of the postmodern aesthetic is to "disrupt one's sense not only of the true and false, but of the good and the bad, the present and the past and all other modernist dichotomies."<sup>19</sup> There is the sense of an emancipatory purpose in this challenge to dichotomies and metanarratives.

Current examples of the postmodern aesthetic might include the architecture of Robert Venturi and Philip Johnson, the music by John Cage, the art of Andy Warhol, and movies such as *Bladerunner*, *Blue Velvet*, and TV shows like the *X Files*.<sup>20</sup> The postmodern aesthetic "upholds the vitalistic quest for experience one individualist flight from the disciplinary, normalizing, homogenizing, tentacles of rational culture."<sup>21</sup>

Lyotard praises art for its intensities or feelings it produces rather than for cognitive insight, that art is feeling

something oneself and making other people feel something. However, unlike Dewey and Marcuse, Lyotard does not seem to give art emancipatory power other than through the individual experience of feeling, emotion and intensity.<sup>22</sup> Dewey views art as not only being an individual experience, but hopefully one that can be shared communicatively in the sense that it leads to better ideas. While Marcuse sees art and mass culture as coopted by rationality and capital he still sees it as a possible means to challenge the power and control of the dominant elite.

Deleuze and Guatarri, in their discussion of desire see art and figure as privileged forms of the aesthetic that can be manipulative, yet also disruptive and transgressing. What they mean by disruptive is that art has the capacity to attack order, conception of reason, and characteristics of the modern. Adding a critical theory perspective, Marcuse believed that capitalism and its enormous capacity to socialize created new modes of desire and new sensibilities. For Marcuse, consciousness itself must be emancipated if true radical activity and transformation were to take place.

Frederic Jameson pays attention to the aesthetic integrating the modern and postmodern. While he might champion the subjective and individual postmodern experience the aesthetic offers, he also wishes to emphasize the role capital may be playing in acting out the postmodern and supporting those individual experiences at the expense of the community at large; such as the capitalist support of postmodern architectural projects. Jameson does not view the postmodern as a new style of aesthetic, but an extension of late capitalism, "creating new forms of conscious and experience which predominate over older modern forms."<sup>23</sup> For Jameson, this form of late capitalism extends commodification into all realms of social life, penetrating knowledge and sources of information and even the unconscious. For example, to fully experience peace (a conscious state) and tranquility, and find self, you may be convinced that you need a four wheeler or SUV [sport utility vehicle] to get to the top of the mountain. Perhaps you are fit enough to run up the mountain, but you will need to get a pair of those expensive Nikes/Reeboks to get there. To get this sense of freedom of self you exploit the environment and yes, the third world seamstress who is likely to be a child who sewed your shoes.

Dewey, Marcuse and Jameson see the transformative nature of the aesthetic in challenging the status quo and the dominant elite and they can serve as a source for gaining an understanding of transforming and challenging to meet the needs of democratic society.

### **Concluding Remarks**

By the time most of our children are a few years old they have been exposed to the aesthetic in many forms essentially through visual and auditory means. They are constantly bombarded with sounds, figures and images that convey to them they if they do not desire this or that they must not be normal. This socialization of desire attempts to convert them into indiscriminate consumers with little understanding of the consequences of choice. By early adolescence, this socialization of desire is well entrenched. Why can't we, as educators, learn from what other educators who, working as marketing folk and advertising people, seem to know so much about educating our children? Yes, they do attempt to control and mediate desires, but they also cater to the interest of the child; in many ways an interest they stimulate.

As the student teacher conveyed through her example, earlier in this paper, we do little to foster the imagination of children and in many cases probably stifle it. We do well in the epistemological realm of education, in what Paulo Freire called banking education, transferring information to students although that information may be totally irrelevant.<sup>24</sup> Yet, the kids I know and observe need more than this for it is generally through the aesthetic realm they are seeking to find self and their place in the world. Let's not leave the education of our children to Wall Street and the producers of MTV, VH1, TNN and Hollywood. Let's stop paying homage and quit sacrificing our children to what John Goodlad calls the "god of economic utility," a god typically insensitive to human suffering and often the cause of it. Let's be more critical of how and what we teach our children, let's nurture an understanding of what it means to be part of a democratic society, a critical, reflective and subjective self coupled with an ethical self, one who comprehends responsibility of choice. Our children need to learn to live in the world rather than in the midst of it, integrating Heidegger's *eigenwelt*, *mitwelt*, and *umwelt*.<sup>25</sup> And finally, let's pay attention and listen to what is meaningful in their lives. As Dewey, Marcuse and Jameson so clearly understand, human beings need to express themselves and we will seek various means do so. As educators let's try to create an environment where children can learn tools for survival in a modern/postmodern world and at the same time discover who they are and what has meaning in their lives.

We must try, for there are already those educators seeking to control and educate our children to materialist and consumerist behavior and this form of education has dire consequences for self, society and those less fortunate

throughout the world.

#### ENDNOTES

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7. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 350.
8. Westbrook, *John Dewey*, 399.
9. William Adams, "Aesthetics: Liberating the Senses," *In The Cambridge Companion to Marx*. Edited by Terrell Carver. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 246-274. See also John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (LaSalle: Illinois, Open Court, 1961), 288. Here Dewey discusses his own notion about the aesthetic nature of work.
10. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 346.
11. See Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Robert Tucker *The Marx Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1978), 66-101.
12. William Adams, "Aesthetics: Liberating the Senses," 249.
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21. Robert Antonio and Douglas Kellner, "The Future of Social Theory," in David Dickens and Andrea Fontana *Postmodernism and Social Inquiry* (New York: Guilford, 1994), 140.
22. Jean Francois Lyotard, *Dicscurs, figure* (Paris: Kliencksick, 1971).
23. Kellner, *Postmodern Theory*, 184. See Frederic Jameson "Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* v. 146, (1984): 53-93 and *The Political Unconscious* (New York: Cornell University, 1981), 17.
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25. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Sein und Zeit). Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). Also see Magda King's *Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1964).

**GEORGE S. COUNTS AND THE PROPER PREPARATION OF TEACHERS  
FOR THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC**

George C. Stone  
Lyon College

George S. Counts (1889-1974) was one of America's intellectual giants whose life spanned three-fourths of the 20th century. His work in educational sociology and sovietology rank him among the most important scholars of the 20th century. Some of his books and articles are so penetrating and insightful that they are included among the classical literature in his discipline. Many, if not most, textbooks published today in American philosophy and history of education still consider George S. Counts and his school of Social Reconstructionism as having real educational value. Since few scholars ever reach Counts' level of both intellect and scholarly production in educational thought, it is fitting that we turn to him from time to time to consider what he said about any given topic related to education.

Clearly, few topics in education today are any more under fire in the press and in the halls of government than the education of teachers for our nation's schools, a statement that is so commonplace it needs no documentation. One only need point out that education, including the education of teachers, was the issue of note in the 1998 off-year elections. Most, if not all, national newspapers and news magazines carried stories and editorials about the subject. George S. Counts had something significant to say about the proper education of teachers. This paper will center on his concept of the role of teachers and the education needed for them to realize that role.

The paper will first consider Counts' concept of the purpose of public school education in the Republic, and then, move on to his criticism of schools of education for not adequately preparing teachers to achieve their role in the purpose of public education and then finally to a consideration of his suggestions for the proper preparation of teachers. I turn first to Counts' concept of the purpose of American public education.

**Counts' Concept of the Proper Purpose of American Public School Education.**

George S. Counts understood the central purpose of American public school education as bringing the immature of society into full maturity as responsible citizens in a democratic social order. It is, he thought, much more involved than merely intellectual growth. He said it this way,

A fact never to be forgotten is that education, taken in its entirety, is by no means an exclusively intellectual matter. It is not merely, or perhaps even primarily, a process of acquiring facts and becoming familiar with ideas. The major object of education since the beginning of time has been the induction of the immature individual into the life of the group. This involves not only the development of intellectual powers, but also the formation of character, the acquisition of habits, attitudes, and dispositions suited to a given set of living conditions, a given level of culture, and a given body of ideals and aspirations. Contemporary American society would seem to require quite as much emphasis on moral education as any primitive tribe."<sup>1</sup>

Counts wrote those words in 1934 and they appear as valid today to the mission of public school education as they were then, not only because they describe the proper mission of public school education, but because they provide a focus for his thoughts on the education of teachers. For Counts, teacher education programs were obligated to produce teachers who could promote the fullest and most thorough understanding of society and social institutions possible for children and youth. Teachers he thought, must thoroughly understand the age in which they live. The age in which he was writing, of course, was very different from today. Let me turn briefly to the period Counts was writing to make clear the social problems to which he was referring.

**The Cultural Crisis of the American Republic on the Eve of World War II.** George S. Counts made some of his greatest contributions to American educational thought during the 1920s and 1930s. Suffice it here to merely remind the reader of the state of affairs in the Republic during that period of prosperity and depression, and then, to add the following corollary: Counts was convinced by the late 1920s that America's future had to be a "collective democracy" and was even more convinced during the 1930s that collectivism was our destiny, an idea that seemed entirely plausible during the "New Deal" policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency.

Capitalism appeared unable to revive itself and pull the country out of the worse depression its history. Equally important were the evils assigned to capitalism throughout the 1930s and before. The capitalist system carried little for the masses. The working class had few rights and few fringe benefits in those years. John Steinbeck's classic

work, *The Grapes of Wrath*<sup>2</sup> masterfully depicted the struggles of the working class while capturing the spirit of FDR's "New Deal,"<sup>3</sup> not only for those who lived it, but for generations of Americans who came after. Counts was among those who was in the forefront of the fight for a better life for the working people of the Republic. Had not World War I intervened which, in turn, caused a great and immediate demand for war material which, in turn, revised capitalism in the country, Counts likely read the social situation correctly.

Although Counts believed collectivism was the proper direction for the nation to take, he was concerned that it take a democratic and not an anti-democratic route. A Soviet specialist as well, he was accurately aware that the Soviet Union had moved into a state totalitarian collective system under the Communist Party and he was determined not to allow a "dictatorial collectivism" take root in the American Republic. His fear was that the Communist International under Stalin's dictatorship had infiltrated some of the American unions, particularly the teacher's union, and he worked tirelessly to remove the Communists from the American Federation of Teachers, a move for which he was severely criticized by many left-wing Americans.

#### **Counts Concept of the Proper Culture for the American Republic.**

Counts had a strong faith in the people to build a "collective democracy" that would amount almost to perfect society. Having said that, however, the term must be carefully defined because it really is not the kind of perfect society in Platonic thought. The closest Counts comes to telling us what he means by the perfectibility of mankind and society is found, I think, in his classic work, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order*. Here he tells us that the perfectibility of mankind and society is firmly grounded in both the moral law and social democracy. As for the latter, it is important to remember that we should not identify democracy with political forms and functions--the Constitution, popular election of officials, or the practice of universal suffrage. He writes:

"The most genuine expression of democracy in the United States has little to do with our political institutions: it is a sentiment with respect to the moral equality of men; it is an aspiration towards a society in which this sentiment will find complete fulfillment. A society fashioned in harmony with the American democratic tradition would combat all forces tending to produce social distinctions and classes; repress every form of privilege and economic parasitism; manifest a tender regard for the weak, the ignorant, and the unfortunate; place the heavier and more onerous social burdens on the backs of the strong; glory in every triumph of man in his timeless urge to express himself and to make the world more habitable; exalt human labor of hand and brain as the creator of all wealth and culture; provide adequate material and spiritual rewards for every kind of socially useful work; strive for genuine equality of opportunity among all races, sects, and occupations; regard as paramount the abiding interests of the great masses of people; direct the powers of government to the elevation and the refinement of the life of the common man; transform or destroy all conventions, institutions, and special groups inimical to the underlying principles of democracy; and finally be prepared as a last resort, in either defense or the realization of this purpose, to follow the method of revolution."<sup>4</sup>

Counts says that although these ideals have never really been fully realized or even accepted anywhere in the United States, they do have authentic roots in the past. Indeed they do. One can find sprinkled among his words the teachings of Jesus, the writings of Marx, the thoughts of Locke, Jefferson and Madison, as well as the mind of Dewey, to mention only a few. Without question, Counts' rather eclectic view of the perfectibility of mankind and society is centered in the great values of our civilization. Not surprisingly, we also see similarities and differences with the classical liberalism of Enlightenment thought.

Counts mentions in his autobiography that many who have never read the book criticized it on the basis that the school should not and even could not lead the social order into this perfect society. He responded to the charge by saying the following:

On page 24 I wrote that 'the school is but one formative agency among many, and certainly not the strongest at that.' And on page 37 I defined the goal of the school in these words: 'This does not mean that we should endeavor to promote particular reforms through the educational system. We should, however, give to our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to enlist their loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision. Also our social institutions and practices, all of them, should be critically examined in the light of such a vision.'<sup>5</sup>

Still, with these caveats, Counts strongly believed the public school and the teachers had a definite role to play in building a new social order. I begin that discussion with a bit closer look at why he thought the school "should assume responsibility for the improvement of our society, for the fulfillment of the age-long 'promise of America,'

for bringing our actions in harmony with our professions.”<sup>6</sup>

**The Role of the Public School in Counts Perfect Society.**

Counts realized, as did many others, that there are a number of educational agencies in society, only one of which is the school. The family, he thought, even in spite of its loss of functions in the contemporary world, remains the single most powerful influence on the formative years of an individual. The church and community, too, make serious and significant contributions to the educational growth of a child. He suggested other educational agencies in our contemporary world that shape our intellectual and emotional growth, including the press, movies, television, radio, music, the library, and of course, one’s peers. Among these, he believed the school was probably the least instructive of all the agencies effecting social change. That, he thought, must change. *It is here that George S. Counts makes two of his most important contributions to American educational thought. His research in sociology convinced him that the public school had become a major social institution in the Republic by the 1920s, and as such, it ought to take on a much more dramatic educational role in the social order.* Almost every aspect of Counts’ Social Reconstructionist school rests on those two fundamental points.

Convinced that the public school had become one of the major social institutions in the life of the Republic, Counts realized that it could play a much more dramatic role in the social order than it heretofore had played. He began to urge educational leaders to realize the public school cannot and should not try to maintain complete neutrality in social affairs. The school, he said, “is concerned with a growing organism; and growth must have direction.”<sup>7</sup> It had an important role to play in the highly interdependent, industrial society that America had become by the first quarter of the twentieth century. It was, he suggested, an important social institution that could help reconstruct the social order toward an ethical, collective society. Thus, to George S. Counts the public school had a very important and active social role to play in American cultural life rather than a neutral and passive function as so many believed was its proper function. To do that, however, meant it would need teachers properly trained to the task.

**Counts’ Concept of the Education of Teachers Necessary to Carry Out the Function of the Public School in His Perfect Society.**

Counts was an especially strong critic of schools of education in his day. He thought that they were almost irrelevant to the proper instruction needed by those who would lead American children and youth into the adult social order. He wrote some of his most important thoughts on the education of teachers in *Social Foundations of Education*, published in 1934. Counts said:

The major difficulty seems to be in partial or erroneous conceptions of the nature of the educative process. In the special training schools the emphasis is too generally placed on the mastery of the methods and techniques of teaching and on what is called the science of education. The inevitable result of pursuing such a program of preparation is a narrowing of the intellectual interests of the student and an absorption in the mechanics rather than the substance of teaching. The concept of the science of education seems to rest on the assumption that an objective study of the processes of learning and of administering education will result in the discovery of certain laws of procedure that are largely independent and superior to culture. If this assumption is sound, then a systematic study of American history, institutions, and ideals is quite unnecessary. The difficulty is that the essence of any actual educational program is intimately related to the evolution of a particular culture.<sup>8</sup>

Although he criticized the schools of education for placing too much emphasis on methodology, he was equally critical of the liberal arts colleges for their refusal to recognize an important role in the education of teachers. He went on to say the following:

If one turns to the various special departments of the university for an enlightened form of teacher training, the situation is found to be equally unsatisfactory. If the teacher’s college is lost in the science of education and the cult of pedagogics, the university department, whether it be language, science, or history, is lost quite as completely in its pursuit of highly specialized knowledge. The latter very commonly even prides itself on its devotion to a species of scholarship that has no interest in the practical affairs of men. Then when it accepts the responsibility of training teachers, it assumes that this peculiar academic mentality should be introduced into the secondary and even lower schools. So the prospective teacher is too often compelled to choose between two types of preparation, neither of which represents an adequate conception of the task of teaching. This would equip him for action divorced from deep understanding; the other would prepare him for understanding matters that can have little or no relation to any desirable or probable form of action.”<sup>9</sup>

Does any of this sound familiar? It should. John Goodlad, who founded the Educational Renewal Center at the University of Washington, makes the same argument today as George S. Counts described above in 1934. Goodlad often speaks of the lack of interest and almost outright contempt by some for the proper education of America's teachers that he finds among university presidents and deans of schools and colleges, particularly on major research university campuses. Unfortunately, we have not made much progress in bringing the two programs together largely because faculty in schools of education and faculty in the liberal arts are still committed to the course they were on in 1934. But, lets go on to examine a bit more thoroughly Counts' ideas on the proper education of teachers.

#### **Counts' Concept of a New School of Education,**

George S. Counts' concept of a School of Education rests on at least four principles, namely, (1) the public school is a major social institution in the United States; (2) the public school must take on a much more dramatic role in the life of the Republic; (3) a School of Education must be committed to the study of education as it relates to the major institutions of humankind, particularly as they are focused in the American culture; and (4) the education of teacher as liberally-educated school and community leader committed to building the Great Society. The significance of the first two have already been mentioned. I now take up the third, the development of an institute to the study of education as it relates to the major institutions of human kind in the American culture.

Counts called for a new school of education, an institution that would embody the best features of the liberal arts college and the school of education. He writes

A college for the preparation of teachers should first of all be a center of liberal learning ---a center through which would run the main currents of modern thought. It should be a place for the study of American culture in its historic and world connections, but for a type of study that would not be purely academic in character. In the halls of any institution devoted to teacher training, the past and future should meet; the most profound questions of national policy should be debated and understood. And this should be done, not as an intellectual exercise, but for the purpose of shaping educational programs. Out of such an institution should come persons genuinely qualified to provide American communities with a vigorous, enlightened, and public-spirited type of leadership, ready and competent to challenge the power of selfish interests and to champion the cause of the masses of people. On public education, as on statescraft, the findings and thought of the social sciences should be brought to a focus.<sup>10</sup>

Clearly, the above quotation is at the center of George S. Counts' concept of a proper School of Education. He begins with a reference to such a School as being centered in liberal learning--"a center which would run the main currents of modern thought."<sup>11</sup> Developing that thought more fully, he says that the School should focus on the American culture in its historic and world connections, but rather than being a place solely academic in character, it should be a place where the most profound questions of national policy should be debated and understood for the purpose of shaping educational programs. Graduates of such a School, he argues, should be able to provide the kind of leadership needed in America's communities.<sup>12</sup> Two points here need further development. One is his reference to the School of Education as a place of liberal learning while the second is his reference to graduates as being dynamic leaders in their communities. I turn first to a brief explanation of what Counts meant by the former.

In 1937, George S. Counts wrote "A Proposal for the Establishment at Teachers College of an Institute for the Study of the Historical and Cultural Foundations of Education."<sup>13</sup> He envisioned this kind of institute as providing the focus of liberal learning for any School of Education, not only Teachers College. More specifically he said such an institute would make a "thorough and coordinated study of the historical and cultural foundations of American education, using the term in a very broad sense."<sup>14</sup> He went on to say that "Such a study would help to reveal, not only the larger social tasks and obligations of the school, but also the spiritual and cultural resources of the American people available for grappling with the general social crisis under the principles of democratic procedure."<sup>15</sup> The general social crisis he referred to was, of course, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the catalyst that led to Counts' conclusion that America should become a collective Republic.

The Institute was to be at the center of the School of Education. He went on to say its function "would be: to bring together relevant materials from whatever source; to conduct a coordinated program of original inquiry; to utilize the findings of inquiry and thought in the formulation of educational policy and program; and to train future teachers in methods or research and exposition in the fields and lines of inquiry embraced by the Institute. It is of course understood that throughout the range of its activities the Institute would make education the central point of observation."<sup>16</sup>

Counts suggested that the Institute would perform several basic services. Those are ... the compilation of a comprehensive bibliography of primary sources, original studies, and basic contributions in the fields of American cultural history and social thought, always with reference to education; the preparation of the annals of American education, tabulated in connection with the annals of American law, government, economy, arts, sciences, letters, religious movements, etc; the publication of inaccessible classic works, documents, essays, and state papers relevant to the research projects and the general purposes of the Institute; and, finally, the publication of special studies completed under the auspices and general direction of the institute.<sup>17</sup>

The research program within the Institute would be organized around “seven closely related and interdependent divisions,” including

1. The historical and cultural sources of American educational ideals.
2. The democratic process as it shapes and conditions the American education.
3. American education as it shapes and conditions the democratic process.
4. The expectations of the American people regarding education.
5. The relation of education to social agencies and institutions.
6. The influence of the changing culture on human abilities and social ideas.
7. The increasing demands of society upon the school.<sup>18</sup>

Counts said of his proposed Institute, “Personally I believe it would make Teachers College a most significant institution of higher learning in America and would also change the conception of teacher-training and of education throughout the country.”<sup>19</sup> He enlisted the support of some of America’s most prominent scholars to help him push the proposal through the governance process at Teachers College, scholars such as Charles A. Beard, Merl Curti, Jesse Newlon and the Dean of Teachers College, William F. Russell.<sup>20</sup>

Gerald Gutek posits that Counts’ proposal might have had some influence on founding a separate Department of Social and Philosophical Foundations as Division I of the Foundations of Education in 1938 at Teachers College.<sup>21</sup> Lawrence Dennis mentions Gutek’s argument in Dennis’ biography of Counts but goes on to mention, however, that Russell was not completely in favor of the Counts-Beard approach to educational reform.<sup>22</sup> Undoubtedly without Russell’s approval, the Institute was a dead issue at Teachers College. Nevertheless, Counts continued to argue for such a place that would, in turn, aid in developing a School of Education that would be a center for liberal learning.

I want to turn now to my second point, namely, that a School of Education ought to prepare teachers to become dynamic leaders in their respective communities.

Teachers, he argues, must do more than lead school children toward the new social order. Here he is most certainly thinking of the concept, “community,” as that defined by modern liberals. Modern liberals, including John Dewey, saw “community” as a process, not simply as a synonym for village or town or even a section of a large city. Community to them included those things of course, but it could also include such items as the following: a particular school classroom, the local Kiwanis Club, a local church, a Boy or Girl Scout Troop, or a local 4-H club to mention only a few. Dewey also included what he called “associated communities” in his definition of community. Associated Communities, such as large insurance companies, are organizations made up of members one really never sees but are communities nevertheless since one is in communication with other individuals in the community who have a common focus.<sup>23</sup> One’s ethical role in all of the communities to which one belongs is to treat people fairly and honestly. So, during any given day, as one moves from the classroom as community to the local Kiwanis Club meeting as community and then to the faculty meeting as community one has the responsibility to treat people ethically in each of those places. The same is true as one deals with those in his or her associated communities.

To be sure, Counts sees the role of the teacher in any given community as much more than merely model participant. Rather teachers should be the *leaders* of their communities. Consider the above quotation by Counts once again. Teachers, he said, should be “... persons genuinely qualified to provide American communities with a vigorous, enlightened, and public-spirited type of leadership, ready and competent to challenge the power of selfish interests and to champion the cause of the masses of people.” Using Counts’ modern liberal concept of “community,” he means that selfish interests must be challenged in all communities if the people are to have their fundamental rights protected everywhere. Thus, the education of teachers is commensurate with the education of leaders.

Finding such people, however, is not an easy task. Counts has arrived at the same place Jefferson found himself when the latter was considering locating leaders for a democratic Republic. There must be, Jefferson thought, a

“natural aristocracy” of the most intellectual and therefore the most virtuous white males across all social classes in Virginia to be located and educated for the task of ruling the people. Whether Counts actually believed such an “aristocracy” of leadership existed is not completely certain. But if, indeed, he thought some such element was present in the social order, he would have changed Jefferson’s scheme dramatically. Remembering that Jefferson placed teachers at the second tier of the most intellectual and virtuous white males in his “natural aristocracy” scheme, Counts would argue such a “natural aristocracy” includes both men and women of all ethnic and racial groups equally. He would also argue that the most intellectual and most virtuous would not only be reserved for rulers of the state but for teachers of the Republic’s schools.

Once teacher education candidates demonstrate they have the intellectual ability to become the kind of leaders Counts expected, then the School of Education should make certain they have a liberal education of both breadth and depth that includes the following: “... the nature of the human organism, including basic drives, laws of learning, and the development of personality; the culture; the civilization; the society in which he works.”<sup>24</sup> This is an important departure from 19th century thought on the preparation of teachers, ideas that began with Horace Mann. Mann believed the preparation of public school teachers should focus on how to teach subject matter to the appropriate age child. Emphasis was placed on methodology, not on a liberal education, an idea that Counts rejected.

Counts believed a liberal education would provide teacher education students with the kind of academic breadth and depth they need. He also thought that the social sciences ought to be at the center of their teacher training. Once teachers understand the culture in which they live vis-a-vis the Good Society in which they ought to be living, Counts argues that teachers must be committed to closing that gap between what is and what ought to be in their respective communities. To do so, he realized that teachers must also learn those practical skills, techniques, and knowledge which have been emphasized in the past.<sup>25</sup> In order to accomplish the task, Counts thought the new School of Education ought “... to take the lead in marshalling, integrating, and utilizing the resources of the university for the purpose of developing a great conception of education and teacher preparation appropriate for these times.”<sup>26</sup> He thought that to do so would require the help of faculty from other colleges and schools within the university, particularly those in such social science departments as the following: psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, government and history-<sup>27</sup>

Thus, George S. Counts’ concept of a proper School of Education whose partial task is to prepare teachers for the schools of the Republic has never been realized. Still, I believe, many of his ideas have contemporary merit worth investigating. I hope others will agree, and as a result, that more studies will follow.

**Summary.** George S. Counts, one of America’s leading 20th century scholars and the father of Social Reconstructionist thought, came to the conclusion during the 1920s that the public school had become one of the nation’s significant social institutions. As such, he argued, the school must take on a more active and dynamic role in the social life of the Republic. By the 1930s, Counts had come to believe that America’s future was clearly a collective republic and that the public school, and particularly teachers, had a definite and important role to play in moving the Republic in such a direction.

To that end, teachers, he thought, must be leaders, not only in the school but in their communities. He interpreted “community” to mean far more than merely the local village or town. He defined it as Dewey did. There were two basic types of communities, namely, “face-to-face communities” and “associated communities.” The former refers to members of such “communities” with whom we meet face-to-face on occasion. Such communities include the following local groups: Kiwanis Club, church, Boy or Girl Scout Troops, or the classroom to mention only a few. “Associate communities,” on the other hand, include those organizations to which we belong but members generally do not see each other face-to-face. Examples include an insurance company in which we might hold membership or perhaps a corporation in which we hold stocks. Members of both “communities” must learn to live the ethical life, including treating each other fairly and honestly. As members move from one “community” to the next during the day, those ethical principle should be followed.

Counts believed that teachers as leaders in both the school and the “community” should provide the kind of leadership necessary to help protect the members from the power of selfish interests and to champion the cause of the masses of people who live and participate in their “communities.” Teachers, therefore, must be carefully selected and carefully educated because they will be expected to provide leadership for the people in whatever “community” the teacher finds himself or herself, including the classroom.

Teachers, if they are to do the job Counts suggested, must have the proper education. Counts argued that no

school of education was in existence that could provide the kind of education necessary for teachers, including the leadership training needed to fulfill the teacher's proper destiny. As a result, he favored developing a new school of education that would meet those needs. That school of education, Counts thought, ought to prepare teachers with a liberal education as well as instruction in the skills and methodology necessary to allow the teacher education student to practice the profession well. To that end, he suggested developing a new School of Education.

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**ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE INTELLIGENCE:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM AND CULTURE**

James D. Swartz  
University of Arkansas

**Introduction**

In the field of Educational Technology we embrace the present state of technology and use technology to inform and hopefully to educate people from kindergarten through postsecondary education. Since 1980 when I entered the field, desktop computers arrived and in 1986 the internet appeared. Now, with browsing tools like Netscape and Microsoft Explorer and a modem, personal computer users can retrieve text, graphics, and sound from across the world. Hundreds of thousands of web sites have sprung up in a very short period of time (Rheingold, 1993). According to the popular news media, approximately 220 million people have access to the internet. Educational technologists are looking over the horizon to see what the next innovations will be. We wonder how far away from the average classroom are advanced technologies like virtual reality? How far away are machines that are so intelligent they can carry on a verbal conversation with students as they tutor them in math, science and reading.

What if these machines-to-come could use verbal language symbols fluently? At what point would symbol-using machines become "intelligent?" What is artificial or machine intelligence? Can and should machines be recreations of the human mind? Is there anything about the human mind, even emotions, that is so unique it cannot be duplicated by a machine? If a machine can have self-knowledge, is it a sentient form of life? Another way of asking this question may be, if a machine can be self-aware, is it conscious? These questions are the subject of this paper. In short, what is artificial intelligence?

Although these questions are being asked more now (Clark, 1993; Conte and Cristiano, 1995; Crane, 1995; Dreyfus, 1996; Franklin, 1995; Freedman, 1994; Gelernter, 1994; Haugeland, 1996; Penrose, 1994; Poole, 1998; Robinson, 1992; Schank, 1990; Wagman, 1991), the subject has been on the minds of philosophers for some time. For example, Rene Descartes addressed the issue in his Discourse on Method, published in 1637. According to Hanley (1997), Descartes posed two behavioral tests for personhood: the language test and the action test. In essence, Descartes held that machines could not use language to make meaningful statements which were not prescribed by programmers; nor, could machines execute motions over a broad range of thoughtful situations. Much of the present literature is not, at its core, different from Descartes' thoughts. One of the reasons that the discussions among computer scientists, cognitive scientists and others have expanded recently is the fact that machines are closer to meeting these basic tests at a very crude, but impressive, level (As an aside, I want to point out that there is an excellent book edited by John Haugeland (1997) that contains chapters by many of the people who have pioneered in the discussion and research about artificial intelligence including Dreyfus, Dennett, Minsky, Turing, and others.). David Gelernter, a professor of computer science at Yale, has written *The Muse in the Machine: Computerizing the Poetry of Human Thought*. This book is a very literate discussion of artificial intelligence and most of the questions posited above. I will devote a large section of the paper to summarizing and discussing Gelernter's provocative discourse and his project to produce a program that will "ape" human behavior in some primitive aspects which include emotions. But before I turn to Gelernter, it seems appropriate to offer some tentative definitions of artificial intelligence and to suggest why the topic should be of interest to educators.

**What is artificial intelligence?**

Ryle (1949) referred to the quality of intelligence:

In ordinary life ... as well as in the special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with people's competencies than with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with the truths that they learn.

Indeed even when we are concerned with their intellectual excellencies and deficiencies, we are interested less in the stocks of truths that they acquire and retain than in their capacities to find out truths for themselves and their ability to organize and exploit them, when discovered.

When we speak of the intellect or, better, of the intellectual powers and performances of persons, we are referring primarily to that special class of operations which constitute theorizing. The goal of these operations is the knowledge of true propositions or facts. (p. 26)

If we accept Ryle's argument, intelligence is not only the acquisition and recall of information but also

competence with the organization and application of knowledge independently and, one might assume, over an extensive range of circumstances. An intelligent person can work through problems and can formulate appropriate solutions based on relevant information. We might refer to this process as thinking.

The question is: can machines do this type of thing? Are machines intelligent? There is no consensus. In general, cognitive scientists argue for a very functional idea of intelligence that emphasizes acquiring, organizing, and applying facts under rule-governed situations. This seems to fall short of Ryle's definition. For their own reasons, Gelernter (1994), Dreyfus (1992) and Crane (1995) agree with Ryle that the proposition that computers are or can be intelligent is a problematic one. For example, Crane (1995, p. 116) remarks that expert systems which are sometimes called intelligent may not be. "From a philosophical view, they are simply souped-up encyclopedias." However, the arguments for and against whether the machines we refer to as computers are intelligent is far more complex than this. Crane devoted his entire book to the subject and so did Gelernter (1994). I have chosen to use Gelernter's book because he not only offers an interesting discussion of artificial intelligence but also because he is developing experimental programs in that area of scholarship.

In general, definitions like Ryle's and extensions of his position seem to be common in the literature; this is why Ryle's definition seems a plausible and useful one for this paper. Later, you will see that Gelernter raises the issue that machine intelligence may differ from artificial intelligence; but, for now, the two terms will be used interchangeably.

Why should artificial intelligence be of interest to educators? Stephens & Hutchison (1993, p. 52) give three reasons why educators should be interested in intelligent machines.

- (1) multiplication of the effectiveness and availability of experts;
- (2) freedom of human users from repetitive, tedious, or dangerous tasks;  
and
- (3) preservation of expertise as a valued commodity, too easily lost through human attrition.

The first point is relevant to some extent to the general use of computers in schools. The reason that instructional learning systems (ILS), such as those produced or marketed by CCC, Josten's, and IBM, are purchased by schools, is to multiply the effectiveness and availability of basic skills instruction. These computer systems are distributed to students through computer networks. For example, CCC claims to diagnose student achievement based on student responses to a string of questions, and then adjust the difficulty of instruction to match the results of those student responses. If a child needs more work to reach the standards of his or her grade level the software gives him or her the appropriate instruction. On the other hand, if a student is achieving above grade level standards the software gives the student more difficult instruction in order to challenge his or her ability. While this may be a weak example of expert systems, it is an example of what is available at the present time. Imagine a machine with a pleasant voice that could tutor a child using infinite amounts of patience and a complex array of instructional techniques. This is the sort of instruction that could be introduced through the use of an expert system.

The second point includes freedom from repetitive and dangerous tasks. At its face, this applies to media in general. Certainly, drill and practice personal computer software can handle repetitious instruction in low level math, science and language. Photographs, movies, video, and personal computer programs can all show volcanoes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and even war, from a safe vantage point. Computer-driven robots have been programmed to conduct repetitious scientific tests with great accuracy and to carry out some dangerous testing such as automobile collisions. But, none of this involves intelligent machines. The value of artificial intelligence may be the sophistication of the instruction, simulation or test. Some definitions of intelligence include being able to acquire information, organize it, and apply it under a wide range of different conditions. An example of an intelligent instructional system might be teaching young people to drive by putting them in a three-dimensional, virtual automobile that would simulate the scenery, sensations, repetition, and problems of driving an automobile. The system sees mistakes, logs them, and subsequently teaches students how to avoid driving errors in the future. The system could take students through an entire sequence designed to certify them as safe drivers before they are allowed in an actual automobile. We are relatively close to these systems now, in aircraft flight simulators. However, most flight simulators still require the presence of a highly experienced pilot to conduct the simulations because they are not intelligent enough to create realistic problem sequences, react to innovative student pilot responses, and evaluate the results with the expertise of an experienced pilot. As intelligent as these systems are, they still have a long way to go before human experts are no longer required. It may be many more years before an

expert system can be designed to teach young people to drive, and years after that before such a system can be manufactured at a price schools can afford. As an educator and an educational technologist, I would place a high value on this type of instructional system.

The third point may be most suited to and unique to artificial intelligence. The preservation of expertise as a valued commodity is too easily lost through human attrition. Although we can cast statues of contemporary and historical experts, most statues lack spontaneity. We can film and videotape interviews with and make biographies of people who are experts. Disney World and Disneyland even make animated, full-size representations of famous people. But these are all records. Imagine a full-size representation of Abraham Lincoln that could think and respond to people, places, and situations like he did. What a wonderful educational tool for historians and what an incredible way to preserve his expertise. This possibility alone would be significant enough for most educators to value artificial intelligence as an instructional tool.

Of course, some would argue that if we could produce a lifelike Lincoln, we could produce lifelike teachers to replace human teachers that are tasked with teaching the same thing every year. This brings us to David Gelernter's assessment of artificial intelligence.

### **The Muse in the Machine**

Gelernter introduces the book by talking about imagination as something having to do with mental focus. We imagine things because at the time we imagine them they seem real to us. This type of loose mental focus is the groundwork for something he refers to as the spectrum model. These unexpected transitions from thought A to seemingly unrelated thought B are tremendously important in the construction of analogies and metaphors. For Gelernter (1994), affective thinking is based on just this sort of leap.

Mine is a story of continuity: of one cognitive style unfolding smoothly into another. What the dichotomists miss is merely the crux of the matter: that these two styles are connected; that a spectrum joins them, a spectrum that runs in one continuous, subtly graded arc, from the intense violet of logical analysis all the way downward into the soft slow red of sleep. (p. 14)

The point of the book is that this cognitive spectrum is the central fact of human thought. As a person moves down the spectrum, he or she comes closer to creativity.

What I mean is that thought may generate its own agenda as it goes along, completely abandoning any "extrinsic" agenda ("solve this problem"); setting off entirely "on its own." When our low-focus briefcase thinker finds himself remembering a boat ride or a childhood morning or the concert hall he is designing, these thoughts come to him "by themselves," unsought. I will argue that such excursions are the heart and soul of intelligence. A computer that never hallucinates cannot possibly aspire to artificial thought. (p. 19)

Whereas, a high-focus thinker can put together a bunch of thoughts and examine one aspect of all of them, a low-focus thinker may include only a few shared traits of many instances and therefore not be as discrete in his or her thinking. Metaphors emerge when two seemingly unrelated thoughts become linked. This allows us to move from the familiar into the unfamiliar. Creativity depends on such bounces. Polanyi (1966) also believed that the Gestalt tacit power of moving from thought to thought was indispensable to the discovery of knowledge. Polanyi's description of a "hunch" is somewhat similar to Gelernter's low focus thought.

What Gelernter adds is a powerful account of how he believes this comes about. Gelernter finds the gist of low focus thought in emotion. As focus sinks from high to low, we lose our sharply bounded link from fact to fact and instead we tend to more loosely link from fact to emotion. Instead of thinking we tend to feel our recollections. "As we continue down-spectrum, the affect link becomes a tidal force that makes thought start to flow" (Gelernter, 1994, p.29). Incidental detail frequently replaces focused, deliberate detail. On the other hand, if we were to move up-spectrum, logic would become more dominant and we would be less able to feel our way through a problem.

In chapter two, "State of the Art," Gelernter discusses thinking. Thinking has been normally associated with high level cognitive processes like conceptualizing, symbolizing, analyzing, abstracting. This misses what Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) called intuition, which they explain as understanding that comes effortlessly from sources like previous experience. Gelernter further cites Minsky's comment that emotions are varieties or types of thought. This theme is central to Gelernter theories about artificial intelligence.

Gelernter concludes the chapter:

People have always had the urge to build machines. And people have always had the urge to create people, by any means at their disposal - for example by art. Ordinarily these urges operate in unconnected intellectual

areas, but with artificial intelligence they come together. The drive to make a machine-person is the direct offspring of both. It is the grand culminating tour de force of the history of technology and the history of art, simultaneously. Will we attempt this feat? It is predestined that we will. (p. 48)

This is a significant statement. Gelernter is an art critic for the Weekly Standard as well as one of the central figures in parallel computing. As you read his book, you are struck by the quotation of poetry and allusions to art that he uses to make points about the affective nature of thinking and its pertinence to artificial intelligence.

In the next chapter, Gelernter (1994, p. 49) talks about a cognitive pulse. "So: a current thought gives rise to a probe, the probe to memories, memories to a new current thought, the current thought to a probe, the probe to memories...." Probes could be focused thoughts or unfocused images. His point is that thought is a continuous process. As we shall see later, he uses this sort of process in his computer programs. I do not claim to understand his level of programming skill and experimentation, but a fundamental part of his program appears to be the overlaying of memories rather than the use of nomothetic programming techniques. Gelernter seems to be interested in building mental structures rather than writing traditional computer programs.

Gelernter (1994) notes how the cognitive pulse relates to the spectrum model of thought.

Turn focus up high: the thinker tends to fasten penetrating attention on details, and mentally to investigate their implications. Turn focus lower: he comes at length not to penetrate details analytically, but to experience the whole scene passively. At high focus, the thinker controls his thought stream and his perceptions: sees something interesting; proceeds to investigate. Low focus is accompanied by an unraveling of control and the onset of an all-inclusive, all-seeing passivity. (p. 55)

To read poetry for instance and grasp its literal meaning, affect linking must take place. In this situation high focus reading must be turned off.

Gelernter holds that high focus thought is what makes possible logic, analysis, rationality. Without this sort of thinking, science, mathematics, engineering and rigorous scholarship could not have been achieved. Such thinking must be numb and unfeeling to be effective and efficient. His stated goal in the chapter on high focus thinking, is to tie together "three cognitive feats - abstractions, word meanings, logic - into a single package (Gelernter 1994, p. 67)." The high end of the spectrum model creates the necessary conditions to hold the package together. For example, perception at high focus determines what the color blue is. Even though abstractions can get quite fuzzy, without high focus thought we would live in a world without abstractions. The high focus anchor for language is syntax. Language has a structure that must be mastered before it can be comprehended at any level. The center of high focus thought in logic is the syllogism. Gelernter admits that there is a lot more to reasoning than logic but holds that logic is the basis of reasoning and by extension, high focus thought.

You can formulate syllogisms and apply them by examining memory overlays. Let's say the probe is "snow." Lots of snow-related memories come to mind, and at high focus you sandwich them together and examine the overlay. Of the shared features that emerge, one is cold. Memories that include "snow," that is, are likely to include the detail "its cold" as well. This simple high-focus mechanism has accounted for the formulation and application of the rule at a stroke. The probe (or "premise") "snow" causes you to make the deduction "it's cold" - not by means of formal logic, but as a consequence of ordinary high-focus thought. On the other hand, if "cold" is the probe, the memories that include "cold" do not tend to agree on "it's snowing." Snow will be present in some of those memories and absent in many others. Hence, "snow" makes you conclude "cold"; "cold" does not make you conclude "snow." (p. 71)

It seems that Gelernter wants to merge language and logic and, given his view, it seems a reasonable thing to do. This may in part account for the premise that language and memory have a natural stickiness. What starts out at the high focus end of the spectrum is not always recalled at high focus and a kind of confusion occurs at various levels. At high focus, relationships between words and the memories they represent are clear, focused and logical. However, when the same words and memories are recalled at the low focus end of the continuum, fine distinctions may become less clear, particularly when the link between words and memories is no longer logic to logic, but logic to emotion. Logic to emotion links may blur the relationship but this lack of clarity may also result in intuitive and creative outcomes. Therefore, natural "stickiness" or confusion may be a potentially valuable occurrence.

What Gelernter (1994) refers to as the "affect link" may give rise to creative thought. As we move down-focus, our thoughts become more random and this randomness can have very unanticipated outcomes.

If the solution to a hard problem eludes you, inspiration takes the form of an analogy that allows you to see the

problem in a new light. Put another way, "The creative thinker comes up with useful combinations of ideas that are already in the thinker's repertoire but which have not been previously brought together" (Gilhooly 1988, 186). Or, as Shelley wrote in 1821, "Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of things" (Shelley 1821/1966, 416). (p. 80)

Later he continues with his thoughts about affect linking:

It brings together (couples in your thought-train) memories whose only connection is the particular emotion with which each is associated. Hence, unexpected connections. The space between these two (potentially) wildly different memories is spanned not step by step but in one leap, by a single affect link: hence not gradual approach but sudden awareness. Affect linking occurs at low focus, and low focus occurs exactly when you are relaxing, when you are not concentrating. Hence unconcentration. (p. 86)

Low focus overlays of memories allow a person to discover the synergistic relationships between memories that may not have been previously apparent or possible.

Most machines are what they are, but Gelernter claims that a computer is different. Computers imitate other machines through their programs. By virtue of shuffling numbers back and forth it can be a glorified pocket calculator, a picture painter, a spreadsheet, a robot or a Demented Artichokes Space Game simply by executing its program. "The virtual machine is the embodied machine, the assumed identity taken on by the actual machine.... Within computer science, the power of the idea lies in the fact that virtual machines can be stacked up" (Gelernter 1994, p. 115). The multi-task computers we have on our desks are working exemplars of this design.

But in Gelernter's world there are parallel computers which add another level of complexity. Parallel computers are machines with more than one computer inside. Thinking Machines Incorporated made powerful devices with thousands of computers inside. All of these computers can share one common memory. Each computer can work on one aspect of the same problem simultaneously. This not only increases the speed of processing but also the elegance of the decision making process. With such power and sophistication, how different is the human mind from these super computers? Is the mind like computer software? Gelernter thinks not. He doesn't believe that computer software is like the human mind. One reason among many that he explores in the chapter titled "The Spectrum on a Computer?" is: "When the brain is exposed to some environment, it evolves in response. But a computer does not evolve or respond. To respond requires the initiation of action, but a computer in a state of nature is a purely passive object" (Gelernter 1994, p. 124).

Basically, those who see the human brain in terms of an information processing model make some basic assumptions that do not stand up. Gelernter (1994) explains:

But of course, as I have argued, the spectrum model forces the conclusion that you do not think just with your brain, that you need a body too - because in order to think you must have emotions, and in order to have emotions you must have a body. Let me start by repeating a standard definition of emotion: "a complex state of the organism, involving bodily changes of a widespread character ..." (pp. 124-25)

The chemistry of the body changes. The mind and body serve as an elaborate feedback loop. Each part of the loop changes the other in dynamic ways.

The only possible conclusion is that, ultimately, the fact that the brain itself is a mere information processing device is just irrelevant to the question of whether thought can be accomplished by a computer. The body is interposed between the brain and its world, and the body is indispensable to thought. Your body must respond in a coherent, consistent ways to the world and to your brain, with nerve patterns that are interrelated - that call each other to mind - in exactly the right ways. (p. 125)

The body is not only a source of information about the world but it must react successfully to the conditions it faces in order to survive. The reader should be cautioned that Gelernter's full text is much more complete and complicated than my attempt to abstract his work. His reasons for rejecting the information processing model and some of the propositions put forth by cognitive scientists are extensive and worth reading.

But what about Gelernter's attempts at artificial intelligence? How can he escape his own criticisms? It is Gelernter's intention to make machines that might "ape" human behavior in some limited ways to study basic issues in the operation of a cognitive mechanism. He uses the example of a crash dummy. Crash dummies are not a whole lot like human beings but they have enough similarities to make certain highly specific experiments possible. For certain narrow objectives, crash dummies are adequate. Gelernter views his work in the same way.

He calls his program FGP for the three operations that it performs - Fetch, Generalize, and Project.

The basic currency in the spectrum model is the single recollection, or episodic memory. In the FGP program, a memory is represented by a laughably simple reduction: just a collection of feature-value pairs. A feature-value pair is a feature - like color, age, weather, funny - plus a value - purple, 16, cold and raining, not-very. Thus a "memory" comes down to a terse, sketchy description like "month January, sky sunny and blue, time-of-day morning, place my-backyard, ears cold...." (p. 131)

What does the FGP program do with its crash dummy memories? Its principal goal is (for now) to simulate memory sandwiching at high focus. In other words, the goal is to: (1) fetch memories in response to a probe, (2) sandwich them together and peer through the whole bundle at once, (3) notice the common features that "emerge strongly" in the overlay, and (4) where it's appropriate, pick out interesting emergent details and probe further. (p. 132)

The FGP is not a programming-by-rules approach to computing. You just "shovel" a bunch of memories into the machine and turn it on. FGP program behavior reflects its "memories": as they evolve collectively, the program evolves in its performance. Gelernter points out that it is not deploying abstract rules; it is powered by memory sandwiches.

Let us say that the program has been given a bunch of memories about the characteristics of a certain kind of disease. The program overlays these memories, looking for similarities and differences. On its first pass through the overlaid memories, the program might be able to recognize the diagnosis as being similar to a great many of the memories it has in the overlay. However, there may be a significant number of differences; in which case, the program might make an overlay of the cases which are dissimilar until it can establish the character of those differences referencing the second overlay. The program keeps looking for overlays until it arrives at a conclusion about the characteristics of the memories at its disposal. I do not claim to understand the process or its implications. But this provocative departure from previous rule driven computer programs can only result in remarkable new applications wherever it is applied. What is even more remarkable is that Gelernter believes that "aping" emotions can eventually be part of the program. Wouldn't that sort of program produce moody machines? Machines that might tell us to "buzz off?" Perhaps, but Gelernter thinks it's worth it.

That sort of behavior is an unavoidable side effect of adding emotion to our computers and is not the point. The point of course, is to make lower-focus thinking possible. When we have added emotion, then and only then our computers will be capable of surprising us with an occasional genuine insight. They will be capable of citing a medical or legal or financial precedent that seems a first glance to come out of left field - but proves on inspection to have deep relevance to the case at hand. Such feats are not likely to occur often. But note that the computer, compared to a human expert, for all the crudity of its simulated emotions, has an interesting advantage in generating "creative insight": it has a perfect memory, and that memory is vast. (p. 146)

### **Philosophical consequences**

Although this is not the last chapter in *The Muse in the Machine*, it is the last chapter I will include in this paper.

The noted mathematician Alan Turing, in 1950, posed a test to determine if computers have minds or not. Even though the test depends on the machine's ability to deceive the test administrator, it has currency today. A human interrogator is connected to a machine and to a human, but cannot see or hear either one of them. The assignment for the interrogator to decide which of the respondents is human. In this sort of test, a program has actually won.

So, what are we left with to determine whether machines have minds? Instead of determining whether machines are like us, should there be some sort of test of general intelligence. Gelernter comments:

The question is no longer whether a computer can pass itself off as a person. The question is, instead, whether there are grounds for intelligent communication with a computer despite the fact that it is a computer. The computer is now required to come out of the closet and make the case directly.

My underlying point - that understanding requires experience - occurs in the literature in a number of forms. The philosopher Donald Davidson (1990) discusses the fact that, although a computer may use the same words we do, we have no basis for believing that it understands the same things by those words. "Thought and meaning require a history of a particular sort. We know a lot, in general, about the histories of people, ... but unless we are told, or can observe it in action over time, we have no basis for guessing how a computer came to have the disposition it has" (10). (p. 154)

Gelernter further proposes a test to ascertain whether the computer can understand the same utterance in the

same way. For example, when someone says it is going to rain, does the computer understand the logical properties of the phrase in some similar fashion? He even goes so far as to say we also need an induced emotion test. Rather than proposing a test of understanding, I'll propose a definition. You believe that some other entity understands some utterance (gesture, and so forth) exactly to the extent that you believe that the utterance arouses in this other entity the same emotions that it arouses in you. I'll call this the "induced emotion" definition of understanding. (p. 156)

What about self? Is it possible for an entity without a body to have a sense of self?

Our way of referring to the relationship between the self and its thoughts is cribbed exactly from our way of referring to the relationship between the body and its world. The facts of the matter are captured with vivid, childlike clairvoyance in the medieval paintings that depict the moment of death, of the soul leaving the body, in the form of a body-in-miniature departing the larger physical body. (p. 159)

In the end, Gelernter believes the question is not one of self apart from the human body. The question of consciousness may be one of architecture. In the end he seems to agree with Polanyi (1959, p. 33): "A man's mind can be known only comprehensively, by dwelling within the unspecifiable particulars of its external manifestations." We can, it would seem, understand intelligence only through our own beingness. Perhaps studying artificial intelligence and its related literature will help us to study ourselves in unique ways.

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

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**TEACHING FOR INFINITY:  
LEVINAS AND MORAL EDUCATION**

Michael Taylor  
Oklahoma State University

The question of the limits of responsibility should concern moral educators, for they need some idea of the extent of responsibility in order to intelligently cultivate a sense of responsibility in others. The view developed by Emmanuel Levinas concerning this matter is, I believe, unique in that it assigns limitless moral responsibility to human beings. More familiar views, such as libertarianism, liberalism, utilitarianism, and deontology understand moral responsibility in a much more constrained way.

Libertarians tend to conceive responsibility as a pretty limited business; I am responsible for respecting the rights of others, keeping my voluntary agreements, and not much else. A typical view is that if I don't kill, enslave or steal from anyone and I keep my end of voluntarily contractual agreements then I have discharged my moral responsibilities. Of course, I may generate special responsibilities; if I have children I am responsible for feeding, clothing and sheltering them, at least for some limited period of time. There are other things that it would be nice if I did (give to charity, save drowning children, etc.), and I will more closely approximate a nice person if I do these things; but I'm not morally obligated to do them, and I don't shirk my responsibilities if I don't do them. Should I pass the drowning child by with a muttered "sorry kid, not this time; I'm in a hurry" I don't fail to discharge a moral responsibility, even though others will surely judge me heartless. I may not, however, pause in my meandering to hold said kid's head under the water until he ceases breathing; should I do so I would be responsible for moral wrongdoing, for I then violate the child's right to life, and libertarians hold that we are obligated to respect rights. This is a minimalist conception of responsibility; to contend for even less would be to court moral nihilism.

Liberals usually have a more robust view of responsibility than do libertarians, holding that we must do more than merely refrain from murder, mayhem, larceny, slaveholding, and keeping our end of the bargain. Liberals often believe that we are responsible, at least to some extent (the exact extent varies from liberal to liberal), for assisting others to live, remain at liberty, and even sometimes secure property (some notion of an acceptable minimum is a pretty popular idea here). Liberals may hold that some redistribution of property is justifiable if it is necessary to discharge these responsibilities. The liberal may see the drowning child's plight as making me responsible to render aid if I am suitably situated and such aid represents no great risk to me. The child's right to life makes me responsible for more than merely restraining myself from drowning him.

Both deontological ethics and utilitarianism are thick with responsibility. I am responsible for doing my duty or securing the greatest happiness for the greatest number; both these standards entail quite a bit of responsibility. But even among Kantians and utilitarians there are definite limits concerning the assignment of responsibility. I will not, on Kantian grounds, typically be thought responsible for the willings or actions of others, or situations, events, or states of affairs that I had no hand in bringing about or means of preventing. From the utilitarian perspective, I am only responsible for consequences that result from my actions, or that occurred due to my inaction.

In these familiar approaches, moral responsibility has its limits. The limits are, of course, subject to disagreement; utilitarians might dispute, for example, about just which consequences are due to my actions and which resulted from other influences. Libertarians might conceptualize the idea of voluntary contractual agreements differently; some insisting that all such agreements must be explicit, while others contend for the implicit nature of some contracts. These are not disagreements about whether responsibility is limited or not, but over where to precisely locate the limit. Emmanuel Levinas differs from all of these views, for according to him moral responsibility is without limit. Levinas holds that I am responsible to the other, for all the others; and that furthermore my responsibility is infinite and without limit or boundary. These are difficult notions, and not immediately clear in familiar philosophical language; as I understand them they involve a considerable moral burden so it is important to try to determine what is at stake. I will attempt to explain some of Levinas' central ideas, and then explore the primary significance for teaching that I take them to have.

In developing his notion of infinity, Levinas appeals to Descartes' discussion of the infinite in the Third Meditation; this involves a discussion of an idea of something that cannot be constrained to remain within the limits or borders of its own idea or concept, and as such it eludes complete comprehension. The idea of the infinite, in

Descartes' Third Meditation, overflows its own boundaries. The ego, the subject, the cogito, cannot on its own produce or incorporate such a notion; it must be produced by something exterior, some alterity, some other. The sum or system of what we can gather conceptually, where having the idea or concept involves the principle that consciousness, thought or intellect is adequate to the comprehension of its object Levinas calls totality, or the same. Thought would, ideally, totalize everything in a single system which would encompass all ideas. The same means, in this context, that all of these ideas or thoughts, which comprise a totality, would be the production and possession of an ego, which goes out from itself and returns to itself with that which it can encompass, assimilate, and inscribe within the boundaries of its system. What Levinas primarily means by the infinite is what cannot be included in this system of totality, what cannot be constrained within the boundaries of a concept and assimilated by the ego; and what could not be more of the same Levinas calls the other.<sup>1</sup>

There are several different senses of otherness in the thought of Levinas. First, there is otherness in the sense of other things; the computer in front of me, the critter in my garden, the meteor from Mars are all other in the sense that they exist independently of me. But this kind of otherness does not, in Levinas' view, fundamentally challenge the ego; there is nothing in principle that leads to the intellect being inadequate for a complete understanding of these things. Otherness in this sense is ultimately reducible to the same.<sup>2</sup>

A second type of otherness is encountered in death; death in Levinas' account brings us into relation with the wholly and completely other; it presents us with an absolute, irreducible alterity. Death does not, for Levinas, mobilize me for authenticity; rather, it is what brings an end to my being-able-to ..., death is that which makes projects, authentic or otherwise, impossible.

Death is the impossibility of having a project. This approach of death indicates that we are in relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but of something whose very existence is made of alterity.<sup>3</sup>

In Levinas' thought, then, the approach of death announces an insurmountable and incomprehensible otherness; death is not the author of responsibility, but neither is it something that the self or ego can master or assimilate.

The analysis of death, insofar as such an analysis is possible, begins by acknowledging the alterity of death. Levinas writes:

It is not with the nothingness of death, of which we know precisely nothing, that the analysis must begin, but with the situation where something absolutely unknowable appears. Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light, rendering every assumption of possibility impossible, but where we ourselves are seized.<sup>4</sup>

With death, we meet an absolute other; it is something that takes place outside the light, which means for Levinas that it cannot be an object of consciousness. It marks the end of the ego's powers. The Other that evokes responsibility is similar in that it cannot be captured within or mastered by any totalizing scheme of the ego, but it isn't death that calls forth responsibility. It is rather what Levinas calls the Face, the face of an other person; and this is a different sense of Otherness.

The Other in the sense of another person is not the Same; it cannot be reduced to an assimilable concept or set of ideas that the ego can digest. To attempt this is to do violence to the Other, and if I succeed in my violent attempt then the Other is not vanquished or mastered; it is simply gone. The Other is infinitely beyond my grasp and slips away whenever I try to reduce it to the Same; escaping every attempt of mine to master or capture it. It is neither exhausted by nor incorporated into the Totality; there is more, and that more is otherwise than and beyond inclusion in any Totality.<sup>5</sup>

This Other is, for Levinas, best understood as the Face; it is in being Face-to-Face with the Other that we most revealingly find ourselves gripped by the ethical bond that indissolubly ties us to the Other. In this relation we find ourselves commanded, accused, held accountable. We do not choose the ethical bond with the Other; this is not the realm of freedom or autonomy. This relation is heteronomous; we are confronted with it. We may choose not to respond (to the question ?Where is your brother?? I may choose to remain ominously silent), but I cannot choose whether I am called; election is not up to me.<sup>6</sup> The Good (in the sense of the presence of this ethical bond) is always already there. Levinas tells us, ? No one is Good voluntarily?<sup>7</sup>. We are commanded, held accountable, accused by the Face of the Other; such responsibility is traumatic.

The Face-to-Face is not a relationship of equality; reciprocity and symmetry do not characterize it.<sup>8</sup> The other commands us and holds us to account from a height, and we owe the Other all, up to and including our very lives. It is only in relation with the Other that I can come to understand myself as a (human) self; it is in my being able (and

required) to substitute myself for an Other (without, however, being the Same as or equal to--that is, interchangeable with--the Other) that I find myself to be a genuine singularity.<sup>9</sup> We are not, at our most fundamental level, for Levinas, members of a species, class, or category; each of us is unique. For me to give the hungry the bread from my mouth is one thing; for me to give the hungry your bread is quite another; for me to take the place of the one held hostage is not the same thing as my volunteering you to replace the hostage. It is not in my confrontation with my own most possibility that cannot be outstripped that I first discover myself as individuated from all else, a genuine self; it is in the substitution of myself for the Other. Only I can meet the demand that is encountered in the Face-to-Face. I am the responsible one; I must not wait for you to do your part before I discharge my own responsibility.

The Other that Levinas speaks of as calling us to infinite responsibility is the other person. Of course, the Face of which Levinas speaks is not to be equated with the face that we grasp by means of perception; the anatomical region located above the shoulders that sits on the neck of every (nondecapitated) human body. It is tempting to say that it is not the flesh-and-blood-and-bone face, but that would not be quite right. It is crucial that the Face is made of flesh, blood and bone, for this is an essential feature of human vulnerability; and it is this vulnerability, our exposure to insult, injury and need, that is central in the call to responsibility for the Other. The face is usually presented in its nakedness, and thus its vulnerability and destitution is exposed. Naked and exposed, open to injury or insult; but not identical with an anatomical region, it could be that the Face in Levinas' sense is the slope of the shoulder of one standing in the soup line. But it is important that the kind of vulnerability that Levinas is concerned with is that of an incarnated being; our embodiment, our material flesh and blood and bone existence, exposes us to particular kinds of vulnerability, and it often contains the clue for determining an appropriate response.<sup>10</sup>

We are called to responsibility by the proximity of the Other; not merely those we love, care about and feel most comfortable in assuming responsibility for, but rather the Other as orphan, widow, or stranger. It isn't that we aren't responsible for friends, family, or members of our community; we do indeed have such responsibilities. But our responsibility is not limited to these persons; it extends to the needy, the powerless, and the vulnerable who are not family, friends, or members of our community. We fail as moral beings when we adopt an attitude of indifference toward these latter, when we shrug and say "It's not my problem; let someone else; their family, friends, or government worry about it." We ought not ignore the orphan, widow or stranger; to do so is an evasion of our responsibilities.

For Levinas, justice is not the same as the Good. The Good has to do with the origin of the moral bond, and is a matter of metaphysics; it arises between two, myself and the Other. Ethics in this sense is, as Levinas says, "first philosophy." This metaphysics is inescapably a dualism; it is founded on the relation (proximity) to the Other, and in this relation of proximity the demand of infinite responsibility encountered in the Face of the other confronts us. Here I owe the other all, and if there were only myself and the Other that would be the end of it. But there is someone else; justice enters with the third, and that third must be, for me, an Other as well. This Other, the third, may have just claims on my resources, or against the other Other. But however this may turn out, justice is in some sense regulated and constrained by the Good;

It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge in comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal relation that I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice. Justice, exercised through institutions (which are inevitable), must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relation.<sup>11</sup>

Ultimately, for Levinas, the right or the just does not take priority over the Good as it does in many liberal views; we cannot, ultimately and algorithmically, decide between competing conceptions of the good on the basis of Justice. We should not to use the claims of justice as an excuse to abandon our responsibility. Justice, and the institutions that administer it, must still be evaluated in terms of the more basic metaphysical relation. Ethics is metaphysics, and metaphysics is first philosophy; politics, political institutions, and political theory are subordinate to it.

Levinas does not give his ideas about justice extensive discussion; his thought remains focused on what he takes to be the more fundamental (metaphysical) relation, and we find little consideration of the problems or issues posed by the usual ethics texts or readers. We search in vain for direction regarding many important ethical, social and political concerns; the Face of the Other is, in Levinas thought, the other human being, and so he offers us nothing useful for deciding the extent of our responsibilities toward animals or the environment. If the Other comes in wrath, as so often happens in cases of domestic violence, Levinas seems to offer us cold comfort. Strictly speaking, I owe the Other all, and so I must be beaten, wounded or die. I might claim that I can retaliate or defend myself on the

grounds that to the attacker *I* am the Other, and so my assailant is responsible for me. Levinas' reply concerning whether the Other is responsible for me is, however, "Perhaps, but that is *his* affair."<sup>12</sup> This is not a symmetrical or reciprocal relation characterized by equality; on the metaphysical ground of ethics, the responsibilities of the Other are not mine to decide. Fortunately such cases take place within a context of the state, community, or family, and so there are always the requirements of justice as well; and so we must "compare the incomparable" and decide what justice requires for all those affected. But little is said to give us a hint of what justice does, in fact, require; sustained, or even perfunctory, discussions of standard social or ethical issues such as abortion, euthanasia, censorship, or affirmative action is absent from his writings. In this sense, Levinas could be thought to provide little guidance for the educator concerned with social ethics and its issue-laden agenda. But one would be hard put to find a thinker who has more to say concerning what our fundamental ethical orientation toward others ought to be, or to offer a more exhaustive or demanding account of it.

What in Levinas' thinking could be of value to educators? Could we use his ideas to develop a curriculum designed to bring students to a realization of their infinite responsibilities? Might we create the Levinasian citizen for the liberal-democratic, post-industrial consumer-capitalist society? What would parents, administrators, board members, industrialists, regents and others who control our commodity-driven educational hypermarkets think of that? Perhaps this wouldn't be the most promising way to proceed; a better way might be to take what Levinas writes about teaching and use it as a clue. We can read Levinas as suggesting an orientation that teachers might adopt toward their students. A student is, after all, an Other; and teaching is (still) primarily a face-to-face relationship. Levinas writes:

To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching (enseignement). Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain.<sup>13</sup>

This suggests that in the relation the teacher establishes with the student as Other, it is the teacher who is taught.

Levinas often refers to teaching in his discussions of language, signification, and meaning. Unlike his longtime friend and sometimes critic Jacques Derrida, Levinas does not valorize writing or textuality; instead he holds speech to be the origin of signification and meaning. And speech is, Levinas tells us, a teaching:

As an attendance of being at its own presence, speech is a teaching. Teaching does not simply transmit an abstract and general content already common to me and the Other. It does not merely assume an after all subsidiary function of being midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit. Speech first founds community by giving, by presenting the phenomenon as given; and it gives by thematizing.<sup>14</sup>

We are not left in the dark, mystified by the enchantments of the world, because things have been given us in speech; so thereafter we comprehend a world of objects. But the first teaching of the teacher, according to Levinas, is his presence as teacher from which the representation comes. The teacher who is present can come to the defense, the clarification, the modification, and the development of what is presented in speech.

But it is easier to reduce the Other to a set of familiar and easily managed categories so that she has nothing left to teach us; she is an upper-middle class adolescent female who is fairly bright and somewhat bored, who needs to increase her vocabulary, read faster, figure out how to solve equations, and is easily distracted by stimuli influential on hormonal activity; it is not difficult to identify her parents and ascertain their position in the community, determine who her friends and associates are, what her future aspirations include, her favorite movies and regularly viewed sitcoms, soaps and talk shows. From various experts her I.Q., aptitudes and motivational structure can be found out. All is thus known, encompassed and incorporated; whatever remains is likely to prove inconsequential. Certainly there will be no surprises, however shocking, that will be in principle beyond the reach of the intellect. Next student, please!

Teachers are, after all, the ones who know; they have degrees granted by prestigious institutions of higher education, and so are certified smart! Students need what teachers have so that they can also be smart and know; thus a human relation, primarily ethical according to Levinas, is reduced to epistemology and ontology, being and knowing. Since teachers typically deal not just with the Other, but the third, and indeed the thirtieth as well, they frequently find it necessary to employ concepts applicable to an entire class. It is difficult under such conditions to

avoid thinking of individuals in terms that apply to any or all students, and this is especially so because much that must be confronted in the classroom has to do with justice. The concern with justice is inevitable in educational contexts so long as there are significant questions about how educational goods should be distributed. Each student can demand justice, or it can be demanded on that student's behalf; and sometimes these claims are against other students.

Levinas never permits the luxury of forgetting that when we use our categories and concepts to understand the student, no matter how broad this system of concepts might be or how well-intended our employment of them is, we do not thereby capture the Other; we can never reduce any Other to a set of concepts without at the same time doing violence to the Otherness of that person. As John Lewellyn puts it, using the familiar Platonic reference to Gyges which Levinas uses to represent the inscrutability of the ego,

From the privacy of my house I can, like Gyges in Plato's *Republic*, look out on the world and assume mastery of things without being seen. That appropriative mastery is challenged by mastery as non-appropriative teaching. The lesson taught by the indiscrete face of the Other is "thou shalt not kill" where killing is to be understood in its widest sense as the ethically impossible suppression of the Other's alterity, the reduction of the Other to the same.<sup>15</sup>

When we are in proximity with the Other we are, according to Levinas, in the presence of Mystery; our dominance, our mastery, our very freedom itself is called into question and challenged.

Perhaps the best way to begin a Levinasian moral education would be by trying to practice it ourselves with regard to our students. But why should we accept such responsibility? We may believe that the moral minimum so popular in our culture is not nearly enough; it may be that, as David Purpel puts it,

My belief is that there is an obscene and ghastly degree of unnecessary human suffering not only on a global scale but within our own communities and neighborhoods, that this is mostly a function of those in power (who are among other things usually well educated).<sup>16</sup>

Our educational system might try to generate a sense of responsibility that matches the extent to which its more successful clientele have mastered the analytical and planning skills they so often successfully and devastatingly put to use on their own behalf to achieve their interests. If it were even partially successful in doing so, it could alleviate some of that unnecessary human suffering.

Yet it seems unlikely that a curriculum based on Levinas' philosophy would be well-received or attract a strong following; those with power or influence wouldn't like it, and students would probably reject it if it were presented to them in a thematized form. Some (I am happy to be numbered among them) might take this as a good recommendation. Perhaps the best we can hope is that (some) teachers will be able to respond to Otherness in a way and to a degree (which must of necessity fall short of their real responsibility) that it is recognized by some students to be worthy of emulation. This is, after all, the nature of the ethical bond, according to Levinas; it is the Good that calls human beings, and it is as close as we humans ever get to the Divine.

#### ENDNOTES

1. For his discussion of infinity, see the Preface and first section of Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1961), pp. 21-52.
2. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 21-52; this same section includes Levinas' discussion of the Same and the Other.
3. Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*, Richard Cohen, trans. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 74.
4. Levinas, *Time and the Other*, p. 71.
5. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 79-81.
6. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), p. 11. Levinas writes: "The Good cannot

become present or enter into a representation. The present is a beginning in my freedom, whereas the Good is not presented to freedom; it has chosen me before I have chosen it.”

7. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 11.
8. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillippe Nemo*, Richard Cohen, trans. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 98.
9. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 13.
10. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, p. 86.
11. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, p. 90.
12. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, p. 98.
13. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 51.
14. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 98.
15. John Llewelyn, *Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 97.
16. David Purpel, "Extending the Boundaries of Moral Education?", in *Critical Conversations in Philosophy of Education*, Wendy Kohli, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 151.

## CHARTER SCHOOLS

Paul D. Travers  
University of Missouri-St. Louis

“Instructional privatization” in public education K-12 is resurfacing in the context of a call for restructuring and reform. Privatization is a relative term. Its definition falls on a broad continuum. Because a number of politicians and educators since the mid-1980s have sought increased academic competition, more parental school choice, and greater market influence in public education, the tendency toward privatization has become a viable force. The charter school may be a stepping stone toward privatization. Why has this force gained momentum at this time?

- 1) Many parents believe that public schools cannot meet their needs religiously, morally, or academically;
- 2) Violence and drug abuse in some public schools motivate many parents to pursue private school options;
- 3) Financial destitution in many school districts stimulates school boards to privatize operations;
- 4) Politicians and members of the media have criticized schools severely since *A Nation At Risk* (1983); and,
- 5) Some reform advocates who are reputable in the education community are generating arguments in behalf of such innovations as charter schools.

Advocates of greater accountability believe that academic achievement is enhanced in private or quasi-private structures because the academic mission is basic and clear. They believe that if the school’s organization is free of excessive bureaucratic regulations, student outcomes can receive priority status and be pursued vigorously. Advocates also stress that the staff can be expected to collaborate more effectively to facilitate academic success. Students, as a result of such changes, will view education as a privilege rather than a period of incarceration. Devotees of choice in education see no future with present state/local structure and, as a consequence, they pursue a bureaucracy based heavily upon student performance and behavior.<sup>1</sup> Educational choice has always been a tradition in American education; e.g., home school, tutor, private school, vocational school, parochial education, general education diploma, advanced credit placement programs, performance contracting, and “for profit” schools. Now charter schools can be added to the list. Although a charter school is theoretically a “public” school that is sponsored by a public body and operated legally as a public school, it can be established by private interests. This author believes it is a short step or a transition to private control when schools become completely entrepreneurial. The public school is also a choice among several options, although some would say that socioeconomic status dictates this choice.

Social and political forces have exacerbated school problems and brought them to the national stage. It appears politically speaking that the most dominant vehicle for educational reform in terms of structure and control is the charter school. Although Al Shanker, the late president of the American Federation of Teachers, was one of the first to use the term in 1988, and at that time was a potential advocate, he later recanted in 1991 when Minnesota established a charter school law, by saying the charter school was “a quick fix that won’t fix anything.”<sup>2</sup>

The first time this writer heard of charter schools was by means of two books: John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, *Politics, Markets, and American Schools* (1990) and David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (1991). In the first book, Chubb and Moe state that parental choice implies that “public authority must be put to use in creating a system that is almost entirely beyond the reach of public authority.”<sup>3</sup> They believe that every state should define such minimum standards as graduation requirements, health and safety standards, and teacher certification. Beyond these criteria, the control should shift; consequently, any group can run a so-called public school if these criteria are met. School boards, superintendents, central offices, and state departments become less important in this setting. Public Choice Offices and Parent Information Centers eventually could be created to assist parents in making appropriate educational choices.<sup>4</sup> Although one could say this is still a quasi-public endeavor, it could be a movement toward privatization.

In the second book partly on charter schools, Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government ...*, the authors recommend greater choice, school accountability with regards to academic results, decentralization of control to the school site itself, real rewards for instructional success with students and greater school involvement with parents and local businesses. The authors are dismayed by the fact they see no competition either within or from outside the school system. They strongly oppose the existence of the public school as a monopoly.<sup>5</sup>

Since 1992 the charter school movement has exploded in popularity. It is definitely a new approach to public

education. As of August 1998 there are 34 charter school laws in the United States, with approximately 800 such schools operating in 23 states and the District of Columbia. Over 166,000 students attend charter schools. Types of schools vary widely; e.g., at risk, special education, Montessori schools, multiethnic schools, technical schools, etc. Among those states considered to have “strong,” favorable legislation to foster charter schools are Arizona, California, and Colorado among others, while Alaska, Arkansas, and Mississippi among others are considered to be states with restrictive or “weak” legislation.<sup>6</sup> Strong legislation generally implies a high degree of school independence, no limit on the number of such schools allowed to exist in the state and a strong appeal process. The reverse is true of so-called weak legislation. “Strong” or “weak” legislation is in the eye of the beholder.

Technically, a charter school is one that functions under a contract negotiated by those who have organized and operate the school with a sponsor who oversees the contract.<sup>7</sup> Once the contract is in effect, the school can hire and fire, sue or be sued, award contracts and control its own funds. When the contract expires, it may be renewed if academic gains have been met, no laws have been broken, no mismanagement of funds has occurred, and the school continues to attract students. Why then is it so different from any public school in existence? Primarily because the school focus is on results, which may mean resignation by those responsible for not attaining their goals.<sup>8</sup>

Charter schools possess a relative meaning. They may be preexisting schools within a public school district operating under a charter; they may be new school arrangements operating outside the school district under a special public contract; or they may be private schools operating administratively under public sponsorship. The words “charter” and “contract” are synonymous. Charter schools are considered public. If a private school, for example, seeks a charter, it must follow the same guidelines as a public school; i.e., tuition-free, non sectarian, non selective, and non discriminatory. In this sense, private schools lose their identities as elitist, independent entities and become more publicly accountable. Advocates of charter schools see greater decentralization in that they receive their funding as if they were school districts. The schools truly become more market driven in that they are attracting people voluntarily who expect results. Their survival depends on retention of students who progress in a measurable way. It is hoped the academic successes in charter schools will have a ripple effect throughout the school system which probably granted their right to exist in the first place.<sup>9</sup>

There are ten ideal characteristics which constitute a charter school:

- 1) A variety of persons from the public and private sectors organize and sponsor a proposal;
- 2) A public body besides a local school board desires to sponsor a charter school;\*
- 3) Charter schools are defined as independent legal entities;\*
- 4) Charter schools encompass the characteristics of a public school: non sectarian, tuition-free, non selective, non discriminatory, and accountable to a public body;
- 5) Every charter school is held accountable for its performance by parents and sponsoring public body.
- 6) As a dividend for such accountability, charter schools are exempted from state and local laws beyond those spelled out in the contract;
- 7) Attendance and employment are by choice;
- 8) Student enrollment dictates total operating funds;\*
- 9) In a charter school, teachers are employees, owners or subcontractors. Fringe benefits follow the teachers for a specified time;\* and,
- 10) There are no restrictions on the number of such schools in a state or community.

\* The asterisks above denote which criteria have been politically most troublesome.<sup>10</sup>

It is extremely difficult to generalize about the manner in which charter schools exist among and even within the states. Beyond health, safety, and civil rights laws, charter schools function with wide latitude. The following themes reflect factors that can create much diversity:

- 1) Who operates a charter school varies.
- 2) Who grants the charter differs widely.
- 3) Charter schools vary as to their degree of independence.
- 4) Funding, financial control, and regulation waivers are diverse.
- 5) Status of employment has wide variance.
- 6) Definition of measurable achievement is not standard.
- 7) Variation exists as to the number of schools allowed in a state and the duration of their contracts differ from state to state.<sup>11</sup>

The U.S. Department of Education in "A Study of Charter Schools: First Year Report-May 1997" reported by means of a statistical sample via the Internet that "a lack of start-up funds" was the chief obstacle for both newly created and preexisting charter schools. A "lack of planning time" and "inadequate operating funds" were strong barriers to their success. New schools cited "inadequate facilities" while preexisting schools rated "state or local board opposition" as difficult obstacles. These were major concerns of sixteen cited.<sup>12</sup>

Another interesting finding which the U.S. Department of Education gleaned in their ten-state study of charter schools was that their preliminary research "did not find evidence that charter schools engage in discriminatory admissions practices or that charter schools 'cream' or select 'desirable' students from the overall student population."<sup>13</sup> Although it is difficult to generalize about cultural diversity when a state like California is compared with Colorado, for example, the Department of Education stated that overall in 1995-96, the percentages of all charter school enrollment were: White, 51.6%; Black, 13.8%; Hispanic, 24.8%; Asian, 6.3%; and American Indian, 3.5%.<sup>14</sup> These percentages apparently dispel the myth that charter schools are racist.

The Hudson Institute of Washington, D.C. (an advocate group), recently surveyed students, teachers, and parents by means of four sets of quantitative data, which revealed a partial profile of 50 charter schools enrolling 16,000 students in ten states. The researchers probed into a variety of satisfaction levels; e.g., student comparison of performance with that in previous schools, "likes" and "dislikes" in charter schools, levels of satisfaction by parents, and views of parents and teachers concerning why charter schools are appealing. Even though hard data have yet to emerge, certainly affective factors are positive.<sup>15</sup> Results were also generally positive about perceptions of expectation and performance. Students not thriving in conventional schools were generally succeeding in charter schools. However, as of 1997, no national or state summaries of student achievement scores had existed.

While it is still too soon to determine the quality of the schools, there is no doubt that charter schools are going to have their chance to compete. Apparently they offer a political alternative to private school vouchers in that they are publicly controlled, thus more palatable to those who oppose vouchers. On the other hand, major concerns exist. American society is wedded to the Puritan form of administrative local school district organization and to the idea of state control of the common school curriculum crafted in the nineteenth century. This coupled tradition, despite all its flaws, has helped to make the United States a world power. Why abandon it? To change school boards and state departments to become "buyers" of services, rather than "providers" of services is an extreme notion that could change the relationship a board should have with its constituents.

Another question is how effectively will the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA) cooperate with charter school organizers? This is an open question, especially if teachers lose professional status and rights. The AFT takes a skeptical and cautious position about the role of teachers in charter schools. The AFT insists that all employees in such schools should be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and that teachers must be state certified to provide minimum instructional competency. The essence of control, according to the AFT, also must remain with the local school board.<sup>16</sup> The NEA likewise takes a very cautious position about the employment of teachers in charter schools. It holds that all teachers must be state certified and work under collective bargaining agreements applicable to the local school district.<sup>17</sup> Both organizations are willing to accept the existence of charter schools, but they believe strongly that teachers should be heavily involved in program design, implementation, and governance.

Lastly, just how patient will the public be in context of achievement gains among charter schools if dramatic progress is not evident? The worry this writer has concerning the emergence of charter schools is that motivated adults and youth are turning away from traditional public schools. This exodus can be a serious blow to those public schools. Furthermore, if state and local monies are diverted from existing schools to charter schools without increased funds to support both, it will simply be a process of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." The traditional common school is under siege partly because of socioeconomic forces beyond its control. Why not work to reduce bureaucracy and improve accountability in the schools that already exist. If public school boards of education become "buyers" of services, their historic function will be usurped. While it is valid to criticize some local boards for micro-managing those duties ideally assigned to educational professionals, it is too radical to strip them of their complete policy-making control.

There is also some discussion that local boards of education should abandon traditional functions related to hiring, firing, evaluating, and paying district personnel. In other words, boards would stop running and regulating schools directly and move toward the concept of finding, hiring, and monitoring the performance of independent

contractors. Boards would transfer their traditional responsibilities to the schools themselves and oversee instead the contracts or charters under which each school operates. Policy-making would then pertain to criteria used in soliciting and monitoring charters for all the respective schools. Schools, consequently, would become accountable only to their charters. The overall school system consequently would remain public even though individual schools would become very entrepreneurial. In this sense, the district becomes known as a "charter district." The risk of this arrangement, however, is that the public/private differences over time would become blurred and private interests would prevail. The decentralized concept implied by the 10th Amendment has been a tradition that has kept schools responsive to the communities they serve in terms of accessibility, neutrality and accountability. This configuration should remain intact. Schools can model the business community only in a limited fashion. Educational achievement cannot be viewed simply as test scores or cognitive gains to be attained in a semester or a given year. Educational progress, like the democratic process, is long, slow, inefficient, imperfect, and difficult to measure.

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54.

CHARTER SCHOOLS REVISITED

James J. Van Patten  
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Alternative schools have a long history. The district school, the Latin Grammar School, the academy, the consolidated comprehensive high school, public and private schools systems were all examples of alternative school concepts. Each movement was an effort to meet the needs of changing societal conditions requiring increased options for educating the nation's youth.

With an increasing fragmented society, alternative school systems reflect an effort to meet varying parental concerns. These concerns include curriculum content, values, discipline, rejection of consensus aims in education and distrust of educational policies. Questioning of curriculum content has been intense particularly in Bible belt areas of the country. Intense opposition to teaching methods that focus on socialization, diversity, sexual preferences, and aspects of postmodernism is also reflected in parental call for alternative schools.

Chaddock (1998) noted that when corporate leadership became involved in educational reform their aim often was to start from scratch. It started as a classic top down initiative from Washington, D.C. with business and education leaders touting a new world order for education. Last week *The New American Schools Development Corporation* closed down, and maverick entrepreneurs and charter-school operators differ from the corporate elites who launched whole-school reform. Chaddock notes that George Bush in 1991 called on business leaders to work for public school improvement. They pledged \$42 million and Walter Annenberg added another \$50 million as part of a \$500 million grant to help public education. The goal was to develop new educational designs to help all students meet world class standards in at least five core subjects. New American school designs are currently in use in more than 1,000 schools and 31 states. Chaddock reports that there have been successes but everyone involved in school reform efforts are beginning to realize the complexity of school cultures and the impossibility of solving complex issues through cheap quick technological fixes. Bottom line assessment of student achievement, test scores, and reforms suggest meager results. Throwing money at a problem will not resolve it, some are finding. Perceptions of what needs to be done vary. Louis Gerstner, CEO, of IBM said we can declare some success, but have a system that is failing our children and resisting change. The mood, he continues, in the business community is not good. It is not going toward the reform of U.S. public education but toward its replacement. The performance of our schools is not any better than when we started in 1991. Chester Finn, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, finds two grand strategies—one is systematic reform through a centralized top-down management-style improvement and a competition, diversity and choice strategy. The big national CEOs favor systemic reform while venture capitalists favor choice and competition, but both strategies need to intersect for real change to occur (Chaddock: B 5).

Mellor (1998) found that the June 10 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision upholding the nation's first school choice program against legal challenge may lead to a wider array of choices for parents and students. The Wisconsin program allows up to 15,000 low-income children to use state funds in private or religious schools. The court upheld school choice programs (1) as long as the program is neutral between religious and secular options and (2) parents direct the funds.

Careilli, Mauro, Kronholz (1998) noted that the Supreme Court on November 9, 1998 denied a review of an appeal of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Decision. By denying appeal the high court gave no decision and set no national precedent. The issue is sure to be raised in future litigation. The National School Boards Association and Americans United for Separation of Church and State had supported a challenge of the Wisconsin school choice program. As Careilli noted, supporters of school choice programs are sure to see the high court's denial of review as a green light to expand the voucher plans. Meanwhile Congress is exploring a national voucher program, and legislatures in half the states have considered such programs. Kronholz found that vouchers are central to the Republican education policies at both the state and national level. Although their power has been weakened by Democratic gains in congress, some see the high court's refusal to overturn the Wisconsin Court's decision as a victory for vouchers. Vouchers are government issued tickets that allow children to attend any school of their parents' choosing, with the government paying part or all of the bill. Wisconsin's Department of Public Instruction said 6,100 children are enrolled in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, filling all available seats in the city's 84 participating private schools. But 3,000 of those children had already been attending private schools at their

family's expense. Meanwhile, the city's public schools are losing \$4,950 for each student who didn't enroll in public schools (Kronholz: A 2). As Mauro notes recent Supreme Court rulings have cast doubt on a 1973 decision that struck down a voucher program because public money was used to "subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools."

Although research results vary, independent studies at Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Texas have shown significant improvement in math and reading scores in voucher-supported schools. The ACLU, the National Education Association, People for the American Way, Americans United for Separation of Church and State and the NAACP plan on appealing the Wisconsin decision to the Supreme Court.

Lynn (1998) finds the Wisconsin Court decision strikes a blow against the separation of church and state and a historical commitment to public schools. He also finds that some \$14 million will be diverted from needed programs in public schools. Lynn fears that state dollars may be spent for programs ranging from Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam, Neo-Nazi Christian Identity Groups or local fundamentalist churches. Lynn fears government regulation of religion will come with demand for accountability in the use of public funds.

Baldauf (1998) finds the Wisconsin court ruling to be a significant victory for school choice advocates. Parents and politicians pushing for greater choice in the type and quality of schools, have led some legal scholars to find that vouchers violate the First Amendment's separation of church and state concept. Other court cases are pending in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Maine and Ohio. Shlaes (1998) points out that school choice is not a new idea but academies were formed by New England educators and philanthropists in the early 1800s. When public schools emerged, rural town leaders saw no need to repeat their work and arranged a voucher arrangement with the academies called "tuitioning out." St. Johnsbury in Vermont is an example of such an academy with a 10-1 teacher-student ration, 1,000 resumes from teacher candidates, a tuition of \$7,090 lower than public school costs per student, a vocational program, serving disabled and special education students, students performing at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile on Advanced Placement tests for English, European and American History, and biology, and a larger percentage of the student body going to college than any public high school in the state. School vouchers and choice have a long and often unknown history. St. Johnsbury serves and responds to community needs for facility use as well as for new courses to serve local business and industry needs (Silas 1998).

### **Overview of Charter Schools**

Wood (1998) explores an Arizona Charter School, one of 783 others across the United States. The Center for Excellence Charter High School in Phoenix has no lunch room, gymnasium, or library. For reports, students use a bookmobile that parks blocks away. For an occasional art class, they walk to a nearby elementary school. There is one teacher for every 15 students working in carpeted, quiet rooms. There are no electives but there is an environment that makes it impossible to escape learning. Concentration is on English, math, social studies and science. Wood finds Arizona to be a laboratory for charter schools since their origination in 1994. Supporters cite reduced bureaucracy, restoration of local control, and empowerment of teachers, while detractors cite problems of accountability, questionable standards, elitism and even segregationism. Both supporters and detractors find that Charter Schools have broken the public school monopoly. Some Arizona Charter Schools have been shut down due to various abuses, but the Hudson Institute and the Educational Excellence Network found that Charter Schools may be the most vibrant force in American education today.

Walters (1997), the author of *Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education*, finds such schools challenge the existing power structure. Charter Schools also tap into American values such as opportunity, choice and responsibility. In addition Charter Schools are more appealing than vouchers for private schools. While magnet schools have admission tests and spend more money per student than other public schools, Charter Schools are not allowed to have admission tests and spend exactly the same per pupil as other public schools.

### **Charter Schools-Litigation**

Charter Schools, like all other school systems in our country, are not immune from litigation, a growing problem for educators. Seligman (1998) pinpoints the challenge of proliferation of lawsuits for educators. He provides several examples of current lawsuits that divert funds needed for education. In 1995, Texas adopted a Robin Hood plan which had the legislature providing makeup funds to school districts with below-average resources. Every year since 1995 the plan's adequacy has been challenged, and a report in the *Bond Buyer* indicates the Texas comptroller is now talking of a need for another \$8-\$9 billion to equalize standards. New Jersey had three major lawsuits

challenging its equalization formula. One of the suits has been brought by a coalition of middle-class school districts claiming that the formula is forcing them to raise property taxes to levels far above the state average. New York and Vermont are facing lawsuits dealing with spending disparity. Vermont's plan to shift educational resources from richer to poorer districts is under litigation from poor families who live in rich districts and offering major tax breaks to rich families in poor districts. Seligman notes the 35-year-old Coleman report's conclusion that educational outcomes or what kids actually learn are decisively affected by family background and only marginally affected by spending on schools. Seligman further finds further proof of the validity of Coleman's findings in an article (March 1998) in *The Economic Policy Review* by Eric A. Hanushek of the University of Rochester. Pointing to increased spending and little increase in student achievement, Hanushek found that:

There is little reason to be confident that simply adding more resources to schools as currently constituted will yield performance gains among students. Charter schools will not be left out of our lawsuit mania. *Fister v. Minnesota New Country School* (8<sup>th</sup> Circuit 1998) suggests additional costs in the future for Charter Schools. In this case 12 year old Mary Fister solicited information from classmates to supplement her Internet project focusing on deformed frogs. Subsequently one of the parents of a student who provided Mary a quotation sent a letter to Mary asking that her daughter's quote be removed. Mary posted this letter near her desk near a sign that read Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill. School officials ordered her to remove the letter, but Mary kept putting it back up. She was suspended twice for this behavior and eventually expelled for one year. The District Court's finding that there was not violation of Mary's constitutional right to free speech nor was it a violation of an equal protection claim since there was not evidence Mary was treated differently from other students. These lawsuits come with a cost to the school and will be a financial challenge into the foreseeable future. Charter schools will surely face increased bureaucracy due to these lawsuits and thus lose one of their rationales for existence.

#### **Charter School-Positives**

The following information is based on an article by Mulholland and Bierlein (1997). They report that Charter Schools integrate reform movements and develop highly autonomous and accountable learning environments. Educators are forced to question conventional management and instructional practices. Organizers may be teachers, parents, or others from the public or private sector, and sponsors may be local school boards, state education boards or some other public authority. Each school charter includes instructional plans, specific educational results and their measurement as well as management and financial plans.

#### **Ideally Charter Schools:**

- Enhance educational options
- Encourage true decentralization
- Focus on results, not inputs
- Remain public schools
- Offer new professional opportunities for teachers
- Foster a more market-driven educational system

#### **Charter School Research on School District Impact**

Rofes (1998) conducted a study of Charter schools' impact on school districts in eight states and the District of Columbia and included case studies of 25 school districts affected by Charter Schools. The study conducted in 1997 and published in a 1998 report *How Are School Districts Responding to Charter Laws and Charter Schools*, included the following findings of their impact on schools districts.

School districts lost students and financing. They lost a particular kind of student to niche-focused charter schools. There was the departure of a significant number of disgruntled parents with shifts in staff morale as well as the redistribution of some central office administrators' time and increased difficulty in predicting student enrollment and planning grade-level placement.

Of the 25 case-study districts, almost half experienced either strong or moderate impact from charter schools and slightly more than half had experienced either no impact or mild impact. Large urban districts had experienced significantly less impact from charters than rural, suburban and small urban districts.

#### **School District Response to Charter Schools**

The majority of districts carried on business as usual but some 24% significantly altered their educational programs.

Few superintendents, principals, and teachers in district schools were thinking of charter schools as educational laboratories or were attempting to transfer pedagogical innovations from charters to district schools.

Charter schools and laws may have contributed to statewide reform efforts that had no formal connection to charters, such as new systems of school accountability, drives for site-based management, and changes in school financing practices (p.1-2).

Whether Charter Schools fade away in the future as other educational innovations and experiments have in the past remains to be seen. Charter Schools have provided a historical continuity for alternative schools.

### Summary

Public schools in a pluralistic society based on a consensus require a commitment to universal free education for all of the nation's youth. John Dewey called for continued reconstruction of experience through public schooling. He saw the schools as a reflection of the larger society facing the same kind of struggles, issues and challenges. George C. Stone (1997) finds in Dewey's theory of community the central purpose of education. This purpose is not just individual growth but for individuals to learn that each of us belongs to many communities and that we move from one community to another during any given day. Each person must learn that he or she has an obligation as a responsible citizen in a democratic social order to act ethically as we move from one community to another. By acting ethically we continually build the great community.

Charter Schools may be seen as attempts to build a great community through alternative routes to learning. They may also be seen as the result of a concerted effort to implement an industrial/business approach to learning and education. Conservative groups have varying agendas to deal with perceived failings in public schools including emphasis on diversity, sexual preferences, third world postmodern orientation, sex education, gender issues, and value education. As Thorstein Veblen noted at the turn of the century, "education apes business" (Van Patten and Fisher 1997).

Public schools face challenges not of their own making. The *Imperfect Panacea* notes that the public schools have been asked to solve all manner of religious, social, national, and even intellectual problems. Public schools have been lightning rods for discontented critics of the right and left of the political spectrum. Litigation has influenced educational policy and led to increased costs for education. Universities have been seeking to build status through increasing the amounts of grants. Faculty members frequently use public schools as a research laboratory for grant acquisition and implementation requiring increased teacher time on tasks other than teaching. Central public school administration frequently seeks to implement the latest fad in the field. Currently some elementary school teachers in our city have to start the new year by using three different methods of reading instruction and were required to attend a variety of workshops three to four days before faculty planning days, unpaid, and on their own vacation time. First grade teachers are required to use the latest technology including computers in instruction as well as deal with the latest bureaucratic mandates such as frameworks.

Criticism of public schools can be found throughout our educational history. "Soap and schooling are not as sudden as a massacre, but are more deadly in the long run." said Mark Twain. His opinion of schooling is matched by Margaret Mead's, "My Grandmother wanted me to get an education, so she kept me out of school," and Ralph Waldo Emerson's response to Horace Mann's lecture in 1839 crusading for the public school. Emerson said: "We are shut in schools-for ten or fifteen years, and come out at last with a bellyful of words and do not know a thing." (Gross, 1975). Vouchers and Charter Schools are the result of increased public school criticism. Both vouchers and charter schools are viewed by their supporters as routes to breaking what is seen as public school monopolies. As of September 15, 1998 there were some 34 charter school laws in the United States, with some 166,000 students in 26 states and the District of Columbia. Charter School states with strong to medium strength laws include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Those states that have weak charter school laws include Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wyoming (1998, The Center for Education Reform)

Charter Schools may be a worthwhile experimentation to get away from bureaucratic rules and regulations but the influence of a business community determined to implement competition in schooling leads one to question the viability of Charter schools over time. The business community's ruthlessness is seen every day in the mergers, restructuring, downsizing, and laying off thousands of people. Organizational loyalty to and concern for long time

dedicated workers are things of the past. In turn employees loyalty to their organization is lessened. Charter Schools, however, represent a strength in that they are public schools oriented toward serving young people regardless of economic, cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Charter schools will face increased scrutiny as they become more prevalent on the American educational landscape. Public school teachers may be eager to teach in charter schools with less bureaucracy after having faced an ever growing and incessant level of rules, regulations, mandates, untried, untested, curriculum and programs. These factors are often designed, disseminated and implemented with little if any input by teachers whose support is needed if they are to be successful in practice.

It may be worthwhile remembering Henry Steele Commager evaluation of American Education by stating that no other people ever demanded so much of education and none other was ever served as well by its schools and educators (Pierce, 1975).

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DEWEY AND VIRTUE ETHICS

Wayne Willis  
Morehead State University

Debate in the literature of moral education is often framed in terms of two distinct camps. One camp includes those approaches to moral education that emphasize moral reasoning, open dialogue, and democratic participation. Writers in this camp include, most notably, Lawrence Kohlberg, but also Rheta DeVries, Melinda Fine, Larry Nucci, David Purpel, Robert Starratt, and numerous others. The ideas of this camp are generally understood to be rooted in Kantian conceptions of justice and are presumed to be compatible with Dewey's democratic, experience-based education. In the other camp are more traditional approaches, which emphasize moral behavior, submission to authority, and formation of habits that constitute "character." Notable writers in this camp include Thomas Lickona, Ed Wynn, and Kevin Ryan. These conservative approaches are assumed to be rooted in Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and are presumed to be compatible with more traditional, authoritarian approaches to education in general.

The association of Aristotle with conservative, authoritarian approaches to education is no doubt familiar to us. In the sixth edition of Ornstein and Levine's textbook, *Foundations of Education*, they describe perennialism as follows:

Perennialism is a culturally conservative educational theory centered on the authority of tradition and the classics. It believes that (1) truth is universal and does not depend on the circumstances of place, time, or person; (2) a good education involves a search for and an understanding of the truth; (3) truth can be found in the great works of civilization; and (4) education is a liberal exercise that develops the intellect. (p. 391)

Then they add:

Perennialism draws heavily on realist principles. Since there are educational similarities between idealism and realism, some educational theorists also relate perennialism to idealism. However, leading perennialists such as Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler based their theory of education on Aristotle's realism. (p. 391)

The association of Aristotelian realism with authoritarian theories of education is not new. Indeed it is standard fare in most undergraduate textbooks. (For further examples, see Sadker and Sadker, p. 373 and Johnson, et al, pp. 386-388.) Certainly neither Adler nor Hutchins would object. In Adler's book, *Aristotle for Everybody*, he claims that when it comes to teaching us to think philosophically, Aristotle is the best teacher. In a televised discussion with Bill Moyers, Moyers once asked Adler whose views he was expressing at the moment, his or Aristotle's. Adler answered that they are the same.

While contemporary conservative character educators and perennialist educational philosophers like Adler may embrace Aristotle without reservation, one might seriously doubt whether Aristotle would reciprocate. Indeed both the character education movement and the perennialism of Adler and Hutchins seem to represent the sort of extreme that Aristotle consistently rejected in his search for the Golden Mean. This hypothesized mismatch between realism and authoritarian education may be reflected in the fact that while perennialism in education has waned in the latter half of this century, Aristotelianism, under the name "virtue ethics" is having a revival in philosophy that has captured the attention of even the popular press. Indeed it is the central thesis of this paper that Aristotle, as understood by contemporary virtue ethicists, has much more in common with Dewey's experimentalism than with Adler's perennialism or the character education movement, an irony that will not be lost on this audience.

The revival of virtue ethics is generally attributed to Elizabeth Anscombe, whose scathing attack on Kantianism and utilitarianism in *Philosophy* in 1958 inspired it. (Reprinted in Crisp and Slote, 1997) Both of these, she argued, tried to build a foundation for morality in legalistic notions of obligation, but such notions make no sense unless one assumes the existence of a lawgiver. In a world where such a lawgiver is no longer assumed, ethics must find its foundation elsewhere - ultimately, she argues in the concept of virtue as it relates to human flourishing. By returning to the ancient Greek, particularly Aristotelian concept of virtue, ethics can be founded on a philosophical psychology and, presumably, get us out of the trap of interminable arguments about moral absolutes.

This, it seems to me is the central theme of virtue ethics. A modern ethics should begin, not with the ideas of law and lawgiver, but with the psychological idea of human flourishing. Let's identify people who seem to be flourishing in their humanness and see what virtues they have and how those virtues are exhibited as various

problems enter their lives. Ultimately such an approach to ethics based upon psychology, rather than theology or speculative philosophy, virtue ethicists claim, could allow us to develop an approach to morality that is secular and empirical, but not arbitrary.

Looking back at the virtue ethics project as defined by Anscombe, one might wonder what distinguishes this secular project from thousands of others in the Enlightenment tradition, but the answer is that she doesn't look to that Enlightenment tradition for answers. She looks back to Aristotle. The same Aristotle whom the perennialists nearly deify, the same Aristotle who was baptized into Christian thought by St. Thomas, the same Aristotle whose ideas are manifested in the sacred philosophy of Jacques Maritain, the same Aristotle whom right-wing character educators call their own.

Anscombe sets out to create an atheistic, situational theory of morality, and just when she appears to be constructing a great wall between herself and the conservative philosophical tradition, she unveils it, and it is not a wall but a bridge between the two.

Virtue ethics says if you want to build a morality that will stand up in the face of a secular, situational, modern, atheistic world, look to the tradition of Jacques Maritain, Thomas Aquinas, and Aristotle. We must look particularly to the writings of Aristotle, but, I would add, we must look at them through some other lenses than the bifocals of Mortimer Adler.

And when we do look at them through some other lens, we may find that Aristotle's ethics had more in common with our own world's John Dewey than with his nemesis Adler.

Before pursuing that, let me make a few more comments about virtue ethics:

A virtue ethics approach looks less to rules and more to complex models for insight into moral decision-making. The question is not, "What are the absolute or universal moral rules that we should live by?" but "What would a virtuous person do in this particular situation?" Virtue ethics recognizes that for most of us the moral problem is not so much to figure out what the virtues are, but to figure out how to apply them in a very specific moral situation. Such a model must inform our thinking, but that model is not the superficial "good boy or girl" of the traditional morality tale. The situational focus of ethics that is implied in Aristotle's Golden Mean seems to have less in common with conservative rule-driven, authority-oriented approaches to morality and education than with liberal.

Virtue ethics seems to encourage a multidimensional, non compartmentalized attitude toward morality. A virtuous person is not merely just, or caring, or loyal, or courageous, or, for that matter, obedient, but someone who has all of these qualities at work in his or her life and who has the practical wisdom to weigh them against each other and figure out which is most called for in a given situation. Sometimes the demands of justice and of compassion are at odds with each other, but the virtuous person has the practical wisdom to know which should be administered in a given situation.

Virtue ethics is holistic, seeking to develop all human excellences, not just those that are explicitly moral. This I think is one of the most useful parts of virtue ethics because it allows for self-regarding virtues, and because it's integration of intellectual and moral virtue allows it to function, not just as a theory of moral education, but as a philosophy of education.

Virtue ethics tends to be longitudinal, looking at morality as persistent patterns of behavior over time, not one-shot moral choices. The goal is not just to do the right thing in the face of one moral conflict, but to develop a pattern of life characterized by virtue. One reflection of this is the importance of the concept of habit in Aristotelian ethical theory.

Virtue ethics is also developmental, recognizing the essential role of reason and reflection in mature moral decision-making (*a la* Kohlberg), but also allowing both for appeals to the emotions and more direct instruction of the young (*a la* "character education"). These latter two points are particularly prominent in the appendix to Joel Kupperman's book on Aristotelian ethics entitled, *Character* (1991).

Think about the aforementioned generalizations about virtue ethics and relate them to the categories earlier identified. Is Aristotelianism, as defined by virtue ethicists, synonymous with authoritarian character education? Certainly there are some common themes, like modeling and habit formation, and if Kupperman is right there is a place for authoritarian imposition in Aristotelian moral education. But the fact that virtue ethics is not rule driven and is heavily situational seems to be even left of Kohlberg.

Relate all of this to the Adler/Dewey debate. Does the above description sound more like Adler or Dewey? While Adler might assent to most, or even all of the above assertions about virtue ethics, the focus of his writings,

particularly his earlier writings, do not reflect the balance among virtues, nor the deep appreciation of local context that virtue ethicists say is essential to Aristotelian ethics.

In fact, much of what the virtue ethicists describe as Aristotelian may be better expressed in the writings of John Dewey. This has become apparent to me in just reflecting upon what I generally understand about Dewey's work. For example, virtue ethicists aspired to create a secular, situational, but non arbitrary foundation for morality. So did Dewey. Though Dewey rejected the religious and transcendent absolutes on which western morality had been based, he held dear many of those moral principles and sought a secular basis for them. Virtue ethicists say morality is contextual, but not arbitrary, and they seek to find an empirical basis for it. So did Dewey.

Virtue ethicists reject the compartmentalized life, where one seeks the nurture of something less than the whole self. So did Dewey. And Dewey, of all people, understood the idea of developmental appropriateness, and would surely have shied away from the one-right method approaches of many in both the Kohlbergian and character education camps.

In addition Dewey's objection to dualisms is rather Aristotelian, and upon recently rereading *Experience and Education*, it occurred to me that in many ways the whole book is an exercise in seeking the Golden Mean.

There are some more direct evidences of Aristotelian thinking in Dewey. In fact, Dewey used the words "virtue" and "virtues" more than 730 times in his collected published works. I confess that I have only begun to scratch the surface of those uses, but Suzanne Rice explored some of them in an *Educational Theory* piece two years ago. Though she does not compare Dewey's use to virtue ethics or Aristotle, many of her observations, as well as direct quotations from Dewey to which she calls attention, seem to affirm my claim that Deweyan and Aristotelian ethics have much more in common than is generally recognized in the literature of education.

To me one of the most provocative is the parallel between virtue ethics' focus on human flourishing as the basis for identifying virtues and Dewey's concept "growth." Rice calls our attention to the following quotation from Dewey's *Theory of the Moral Life*:

It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself ... Indeed we may say that the good person is precisely the one who is most concerned to find the openings for the newly forming or developing self. (Quoted in Rice, p. 276)

I think it might be very useful to carefully study the similarities and differences between Dewey's theory of growth and virtue ethicist Philippa Foot's theory of human flourishing (and I plan to do such a study), but on first glance I am struck by similarities between that which is ostensibly anti-Aristotelian and Aristotelian.

In *Human Nature and Conduct* Dewey uses the term interpenetration to talk about how virtues interrelate to each other. Says he,

To check the influence of hate there must be sympathy, while to rationalize sympathy there are needed emotions of curiosity, caution, respect for the freedom of others -- dispositions which balance those called up by sympathy and prevent its degeneration into maudlin sentiment and meddling interference. (p. 136)

I doubt that Aristotle would find a lot to disagree with in that characterization.

In the interest of time let me conclude by just mentioning one other area where Dewey and the Aristotelians have similar views: the role of habit. In fact "habit" is the central theme of at least eight chapters in the book *Human Nature and Conduct*. What is compelling about that is the fact that there is virtually no attention to habit in the literature of moral education by those whose views are typically considered Deweyan. Habit, rather, is the distinctive property of the conservative, character education camp, which professes to be Aristotelian. Perhaps we need redraw some of the maps of philosophy of moral education.

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AN EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

J. Scott Wright  
North Texas State University

The present study was initiated at the suggestion of Jed Arthur Cooper, professor of educational foundations at the University of North Texas. It was his contention that something had happened to the foundations of education since he had received his doctorate in foundations at Peabody College in 1964. He argued that there had been a demise in the importance of the foundations of education and that a study of what had happened over the past thirty years or so would be interesting and valuable. I thus embarked on the present study, which I initially chose to frame within the context of evaluating graduate programs in the foundations of education. If there had been a significant drop in the number of doctoral programs offered in the educational foundations in the United States, I surmised, then possibly further study could be initiated to determine whether this was evidential of broader implications to the study and utility of education and its foundational disciplines.

The study is fundamentally qualitative and essentially general in nature. In fact, it is simply a snap shot of graduate education in the foundations of education in 1976-1977 and 1996-1997. The academic year of 1976-1977 was chosen for reasons of ease of study. The ERIC documents in the UNT library containing university catalogs goes back only as far as that year. Additionally, documents with the prerequisite information from the publishers of Peterson's Guides to Graduate Study only go back to 1976.

**The Problem**

Professor Cooper expressed his concerns regarding the demise of the foundations of education in an address to the *Society of Philosophy and History of Education* at their annual meeting in the fall of 1997. His concern stemmed from his own experiences. After graduating with a Ph.D. in the foundations of education, he "anticipated a joyous career teaching, researching, and writing in the history and philosophy of education."<sup>1</sup> His path eventually brought him to the University of North Texas where he embarked on his teaching career as planned. However, changes were made to the curriculum and the courses in educational history and philosophy were dropped from the schedule. After an extensive time teaching human development, a subject in which Dr. Cooper had "minimal training and even less interest," he was able to find an acceptable niche teaching multicultural education courses which had just been added to the NCAT standards. This was clearly not what he had envisioned for his career in the academy. He laments "it is ironic that one who was so enthused about the historical and philosophical foundations of education and one with excellent training in that area would have so little opportunity to work in it during a thirty-four year career."<sup>2</sup>

These concerns therefore pose the questions. Is the experience of Professor Cooper a common one? Have the foundations of education been minimized in graduate education? Are new foundations faculty being produced? Can they get jobs? What is their role, and the role of the foundations disciplines, to be?

**Defining Foundations of Education**

Let me make clear at this point what the foundations of education were considered to be for the purpose of this study. In considering the evolution of foundations disciplines since 1964, it was clear that one had become prominent: psychology. This was not necessarily surprising due to the emphasis on psychology in society in general and in institutions of higher education. It was obvious that there had been no demise in the role of psychology in the study of education or in teacher preparation programs across the nation. Therefore, psychology was not considered as part of the foundations of education for the purpose of this study. Only history, philosophy, and sociology of education were considered.

**Doctoral Programs in Foundations of Education**

The first consideration as to the health of foundations of education in graduate schools of education was to determine their presence at the top schools in the nation. As a convenient source of these elite programs, the *U.S. News and World Report* list of the top 10 graduate schools of education was used.<sup>3</sup> This list included:

1. Teachers College, Columbia University
2. Stanford University
3. University of California, Berkeley
4. Harvard University
5. University of California, Los Angeles

6. University of Wisconsin, Madison
7. Ohio State University, Columbus
8. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
9. University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
10. Vanderbilt University, Peabody College

The *U.S. News* list was compiled based on five attributes: faculty resources, research activity, student selectivity, and two separate measures of reputation (ranked by academics and ranked by school superintendents).

Catalogs and Internet websites were accessed to examine the degree programs offered at these institutions (see Appendix A). Upon first examination of the programs offered by these institutions, what is immediately clear is the variety of degrees offered including title of the program and the curriculum and courses required. The degrees programs offered (either Ph.D. or Ed.D.) range from the traditional (History of Education, Philosophy of Education, etc.) to more progressive (though cryptic) titles such as Humanistic Foundations or Social Sciences and Comparative Education. However, of the top ten graduate schools of education, nine had doctoral programs in what could generally be defined as foundations of education. Peabody College at Vanderbilt was the only school where no degree program was offered that conformed to this study's definition of foundations of education. At most of these top ten schools, the foundations programs were somewhat multi-disciplinary in nature, where students were able to emphasize areas of particular interest (history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, economics, religion, etc.). When the 1977 program offerings at these same institutions were evaluated, it was found that the same nine schools were offering degrees in foundations at the time. Only Peabody did not.<sup>4</sup>

A broader analysis was then completed of all doctoral programs in educational foundations/philosophy of education in the United States. *Peterson's Guide*<sup>5</sup>, a listing of degree programs in the various disciplines provided by schools through institutional surveys, was consulted for both 1977 and 1997 (see Appendix B). In 1977, 52 institutions offered doctoral study leading to a degree in foundations of education. By 1997, that number had fallen to 47. This is not a large decline (a 10 percent drop), however, and the fact remains that doctoral education in the foundations is being offered at some 47 institutions in 28 states. Additionally, this does not account for the universities that offer master's level programs in the foundations.

#### **Job Availability**

Now that it has been established that doctoral education in the foundations is still available on a wide scale, the question becomes one of employability. Can graduates in the foundations get teaching positions? The job postings section of *The Chronicle of Higher Education*<sup>6</sup> was reviewed over a 15 week period (September 19, 1997 to January 9, 1998) to evaluate the availability of academic positions in the foundations. Job listings that were considered to apply were only those where one or more of the traditional foundations disciplines (history, philosophy, sociology) were specifically indicated in the advertisement. It was found that in this 15 week period some 56 different positions in 25 states were advertised (see Appendix C). These positions varied in rank (assistant professor to full professor) and in Carnegie Classification of institution (Liberal Arts II to Research I). Seemingly, this is a strong number of available positions, although a newly graduated Ph.D. would likely only qualify for entry level positions, probably at the assistant professor level. This evaluation could be misleading because many institutions do not advertise open positions for the fall term until spring. What is clear is that there are jobs available.

#### **Teacher Preparation Program Requirements**

We now know that the graduates of the doctoral programs in foundations do have at least a reasonable chance of getting an academic position in the field. Once they enter the professorate, what will they teach? Do teacher education programs require courses in the foundations or will the foundations faculty members, like Professor Cooper, be forced to teach in areas where they have little training to justify their employment? A cursory examination was completed of teacher education program requirements at the following institutions:

1. University of North Texas
2. University of Texas at Austin
3. Vanderbilt University, Peabody College
4. University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
5. Columbia University, Barnard College
6. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
7. University of Wisconsin, Madison

This examination indicated that of the seven schools listed, five continue to require at least one course in a foundations discipline other than psychology. Only the University of Texas at Austin and the University of North Texas do not require such. Additionally, at the five institutions listed which do require foundations courses, four offer numerous classes to fulfill the requirement. For example, at Columbia's Barnard College, students can choose from Philosophy of Education, History of Education, Contemporary Issues in Education, or Education in American History; at Wisconsin, students can choose from courses such as History of Education in the United States, Modern Philosophy of Education, Anthropology of Education, Social Issues in Education, etc.

#### **Condition of Educational Foundations**

We have established, at least in part, that the traditional foundations of education, are not dead. But there is still, nonetheless, anecdotal evidence to suggest that there has been a move away from an emphasis on history, philosophy, and sociology of education. Art Cooper's experience is surely not isolated; Texas is likely not the only state to discontinue requiring foundations courses in the preparation of its teachers. So, why have the foundations come to mean less? What can explain their slipping influence?

One need not go too far into the past to trace the importance of the study of foundations of education on teacher training in America. Most educators, certainly those with even a cursory interest in educational theory or policy, will give at least lip service to the primacy of the foundations discipline, particularly in teacher preparation. Because philosophy and history of education were the founding disciplines of teacher training programs<sup>7</sup>, it is not unusual to find the exaltation of them and their benefits in introductory textbooks such as the following:

It is through a study of the foundations of American Education that among other things the future teacher becomes aware of the school's role in society and of its responsibility for helping to solve our social problems; develops a understanding of the administration of present day schools; comes to appreciate the historical heritage of education; begins to formulate his own educational philosophy; develops an understanding of curriculum; and becomes knowledgeable of the professional aspects of teaching.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly the authors hold the study of foundations in high regard and estimate their benefits to the future teacher to be great.

Having established foundational studies as crucial to the professional development of a teacher, foundationalists also suggest that a discipline-oriented analysis of educational problems provides the structure for improving all instructional efforts. In his 1968 textbook on the foundations, H.R. White stated "education is a set of problems waiting to be solved and the disciplines are a set of tools waiting to be used;" for it is the use of the tools that tell researchers and practitioners alike "what was" (historical), "what is" (sociological), and "what should be" (philosophical).<sup>9</sup> However, there is a problem inherent in the difference between the researcher (theorist) and practitioners or those who will slave in the trenches of the instructional battleground. Is there real advantage to the study and understanding of the foundations of education, these disciplines that enlighten yesterday, today, and tomorrow for the teacher in the trenches? Is there practical value in the foundations of education?

One could easily argue that the educational establishment has clearly established the need for certain foundational studies. Almost without exception, an understanding of psychology has been emphasized as crucial to the development of professional educators. Few teacher preparation programs exclude courses in human growth and development from their curriculum. Additionally, courses examining the socio-cultural context of teaching and learning are ubiquitous in colleges of education both at undergraduate and graduate levels. Even the University of North Texas, devoid of other foundations courses, requires courses in educational psychology and multicultural education. According to Professor Young Pai at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, "education is a socio-cultural process" and "a critical examination of the role of culture in human life is indispensable to the understanding and control of educative processes."<sup>10</sup> These two disciplines are inherently pragmatic, dealing not with theoretical axioms and historical roots, but with real life problems and answers. Teachers see the psychological difficulties presented to students by disrupted family life and gang violence; principals deal daily with issues of cultural diversity. So, instruction and understanding in these disciplines impacts the practitioner in a wholly un-theoretical, increasingly pragmatic, REAL way. Therefore, it is not difficult to see how the disciplines of sociology and psychology have established themselves as the bastions of foundational studies in most teacher education programs and account for a large number of faculty teaching positions in colleges of education around the country.

The lack of practical value then becomes the key to understanding the slipping influence of the founding

disciplines of history and philosophy. According to R.L. Schnell of The University of Calgary, “as early as the 1930s, Teachers College had established the social foundations of education as a composite educational speciality in an effort to render educational history more relevant.”<sup>11</sup> Yet by the 1950s, “educationalists (still) sought ways to demonstrate (history’s) relevance in teacher education programs.”<sup>12</sup> Even by the 1970s, the foundation disciplines of history and philosophy were still striving to find ways to relate to practical principles.

In Art Cooper’s valedictory address to the *Society of Philosophy and History of Education*, he lamented the bureaucratization of education:

I am concerned that administration in all facets of society has ceased to be a means to an end and has become the end in itself. Large impersonal bureaucracies spend many hours and enormous financial resources in developing unnecessarily large and complex policy manuals, doing strategic planning, and holding administrative retreats which have minimal positive effect on getting the job done.<sup>13</sup>

Professor Schnell certainly agrees with this contention and suggests that this adversely affects the teaching of history and philosophy in teacher education programs:

With the creation of new educational specialities, educational psychology and sociology, and the increased bureaucratization of public systems of schools that require new professionals and concomitant training programs,...educational history lost much of its rationale for inclusion as a requirement in professional education for teachers.<sup>14</sup>

So, no matter how potentially enlightening the study of history can be to the educational process, it has to be justified in terms of its “contribution to the effective management of minimal school programs defined in behavioral terms.”<sup>15</sup>

History is not alone, however, in this search for practical relevance. Philosophy, arguably even more esoteric than history, “deals almost exclusively with fundamental principles and axiomatic assumptions of a non-material reality.”<sup>16</sup> Though we all act out of our own philosophies, whether we know it or not, it is still important to relate such attention to philosophy and theory to pragmatic classroom activity and educational attainment.

In the presidential address to the American Educational Studies Association (AESA), Joan Burstyn of Syracuse University acknowledges the lack of input by educationalists in the conversation on education topics in the United States. She emphasized that members of AESA have “powerful knowledge about history (and) philosophy” which “enables us to grasp the complexities of today’s societal dilemmas.”<sup>17</sup> And yet it became incumbent upon her to “expand members’ outreach to the public...how could we obtain a greater role in the current discussions on education?”<sup>18</sup> She admitted a need for AESA to work within the profession to ensure the inclusion of foundations subjects in teacher education. She also heard from discussion groups that if “we don’t engage ourselves as thinkers in educational practice, others will determine what education does and means on a ‘real’ level (while we claim the weak ideological level and its flimsy verbal power).”<sup>19</sup> There is, therefore, a realization within the disciplines of educational foundations, of the failure to relate to issues of a practical nature. What remains to be seen is whether or not foundationalists will continue to slip in their influence. It is likely that there will always be a nest of educational theorists, historians, and philosophers at the large research oriented institutions. The questions remains, however, whether small liberal arts colleges, regional state universities, and other like institutions will find the need to harbor such dinosaurs in their schools of education.

#### **Further Study Necessary**

What the current study suggests, more than the fact that foundations of education are still alive but in a difficult and slipping position, is that more study is needed. A stronger and more accurate analysis of doctoral programs offered in the foundations and the number of graduates in each is necessary. An evaluation of teacher education programs in the 50 states with a long term trend analysis would also shed much light on the condition of educational foundations over the last 25-30 years. And finally, even a membership analysis of the Society of Philosophy and History of Education would suggest what trends are present.

#### **APPENDIX A**

##### ***U.S. News and World Report America’s Best Graduate Schools* Education School Top Ten Rankings with Doctoral Offerings in Foundations of Education**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Foundations</b>
-------------	--------------------	--------------------

**Doctoral Programs Offered**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Teachers College,<br>Columbia University<br>Religion and Education (Ed.D.) | History and Education (Ed.D, Ph.D.)<br>Philosophy and Education (Ed.D., Ph.D.)  |
| 2. Stanford University  | International Comparative Education (Ph.D.) Social<br>Sciences in Education (Ph.D.) (Anthropology of<br>Education, Economics of Education, History of<br>Education, Philosophy of Education, Sociology of<br>Education) |
| 3. University of California, Berkeley   | Social/Cultural Studies in Education (Ph.D.)  |
| 4. Harvard University   | History of Education (Ed.D.)  |
| 5. University of California, Los Angeles                                      | Social Sciences and Comparative Education (Ph.D.)   |
| 6. University of Wisconsin, Madison   | Educational Policy Studies (Ph.D.)(Comparative<br>Education, Philosophy of Education, History of<br>Education, Social Sciences of Education, Public<br>Policy and Educational Institutions)                             |
| 7. Ohio State University  | Humanistic Foundations of Education (Ph.D.)   |
| 8. University of Michigan   | Educational Foundations and Policy (Ph.D.)  |
| 9. University of Minnesota, Twin Cities                                       | Comparative and International Development of Education<br>(Ph.D.) Evaluation Studies (Ph.D.)  |
| 10. Peabody College, Vanderbilt University                                    | None  |

**APPENDIX B**

**A Comparison of U.S. Institutions Offering Doctoral Degrees in Foundations of Education  
1977 and 1997**

*According to Peterson's Guide to Graduate Programs in Business, Education, Health, Information Studies, Law  
and Social Work*

<b>Institution</b>	<b>1997</b>		<b>1977</b>	
Catholic University of America			X	
Cornell University			X	
Florida State University	X		X	
Georgia Southwestern College			X	
Georgia State University	X		X	
Harvard University			X	X
Illinois State University				X
Indiana State University, Bloomington	X?	X		
Kansas State University			X	

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999

Kent State University				X		X	
Loyola University of Chicago		X		X			
Marquette University					X		
Memphis State University			X				
Michigan State University			X				
New York University				X?		X	
Northwestern University				X		X	
Ohio State University							X
Pennsylvania State University					X		
Rutgers, State University of New Jersey	X?	X					
St. Louis University					X?		X
Stanford University					X?		X
SUNY Albany						X	
SUNY Binghamton					X		
SUNY Buffalo						X?	
X							
Syracuse University						X?	X
Teachers College, Columbia University	X	X					
Texas A&M University				X		X	
Texas Tech University				X			
University of Arizona				X			
University of California, Berkeley				X			
University of Cincinnati				X		X	
University of Connecticut			X		X		
University of Florida					X		X
University of Georgia				X			
University of Hawaii					X		X
University of Houston				X		X	
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign	X	X					
University of Iowa					X		
University of Kansas					X		X
University of Kentucky				X		X	
University of Maryland, College Park		X	X				
University of Massachusetts, Amhearst		X					
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor	X	X					
University of Missouri, Columbia		X					
University of New Mexico				X		X	
University of New Orleans			X				
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill			X				
University of Oklahoma				X		X	
University of Oregon					X?		X
University of Pennsylvania			X?		X		
University of Pittsburgh				X		X	
University of Rochester				X			
University of South Carolina					X		
University of South Florida						X	
University of Southern California		X					
University of Tennessee, Knoxville				X			
University of Texas at Austin			X				

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

University of the Pacific (CA)	X	X		
University of Toledo			X	X
University of Utah			X?	X
University of Virginia		X		
University of Washington	X			
University of Wisconsin, Madison		X		
University of Wyoming		X		
Wayne State University		X	X	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>47</b>		

X? - indicates that the Petersons Guide for 1977 indicated that the institution offered graduate programs in Foundations of Educaiton. The Guide did not specifically signify that a doctoral program was offered. However, based on other institutional data, the likelihood is that these institutions did offer doctoral programs in the field.

**APPENDIX C**

**Chronicle of Higher Education New Job Listings for Educational Foundations Positions**

September 19, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 4				<b>3 positions</b>
Montclair State University (NJ)	2 positions			
Colgate University (NY)		1 position		
September 26, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 5				<b>0 positions</b>
October 3, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 6				<b>1 position</b>
University of Nevada, Las Vegas	1 position			
October 10, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 7				<b>5 positions</b>
United Arab Emirates University	1 position			
Western Oregon University	1 position			
California State University, Sacramento	1 position			
Salisbury State University (MD)	1 position			
Assumption College (MA)	1 position			
October 17, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 8				<b>0 positions</b>
October 24, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 9				<b>4 positions</b>
Whitman College (WA)		1 position		
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee	3 positions			
October 31, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 10				<b>2 positions</b>
University of North Carolina, Greensboro	1 position			
Grand Valley State University		1 position		
November 7, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 11				<b>6 positions</b>
Bowling Green State University (OH)	1 position			
St. Joseph's University (PA)		1 position		
Pennsylvania State University, Altoona	1 position			
Slippery Rock University (PA)	1 position (temp)			
Western State College of Colorado		2 positions		

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION VOLUME 49, 1999**

November 14, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 12		<b>4 positions</b>
California State University, Northridge	1 position	
University of Nebraska, Lincoln	1 position	
Lamar University (TX)	1 position	
Knox Colloge (IL)	1 position	
November 21, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 13		<b>1 position</b>
Gordon College (MA)	1 position	
November 28, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 14		<b>7 positions</b>
University of Rhode Island	1 position	
Milliken University (IL)	1 position	
Grinnell College (IA)	1 position	
Pacific Lutheran University (WA)	3 positions	
Texas Wesleyan University	1 position	
December 5, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 15		<b>9 positions</b>
Troy State University (AL)	1 position	
Georgia Southern University	1 position	
University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire	1 position	
University of Southern Mississippi	1 position	
Brigham Young University (UT)	1 position	
Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville	1 position	
New York Institue of Technology	1 position (adjunct)	
Teachers College, Columbia University	1 position	
December 12, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 16		<b>5 positions</b>
University of Illinois, Chicago	1 position	
Indiana University	1 position	
Utah State University	1 position	
University of Nebraska, Kearney	1 position	
California State University, Los Angeles	1 position	
December 19, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 17		<b>4 positions</b>
University of Illinois, Chicago	1 position	
Huntington College (TN)	1 position	
University of Wisconsin, Whitewater	1 position	
Barton College (NC)	1 position	
January 9, 1997 - Volume XLIV, Number 18		<b>5 positions</b>
St. Bonaventure University (NY)	1 position	
California State University, Los Angeles	1 position	
Central Connecticut State University	1 position	
College of Staten Island, CUNY	1 position	
Mount Union College (OH)	1 position	

**56 positions**

**TOTAL**

**GE almost 4/wk**

**AVERA**

ENDNOTES

1. Jed Arthur Cooper, "Considered Concerns of a Conservative". Speech delivered at the Annual Meeting of the *Society of Philosophy and History of Education*, October 1997, 1, photocopied.
2. Ibid., 4.
3. Brendan I. Koerner, "Education Schools," *U.S. News and World Report: America's Best Graduate Schools*, 1997, 46. Many arguments have been made about the validity of such rankings and their applicability to the real value of education at the institutions ranked. However, the *U.S. News* rankings were a convenient and objective source for the present purposes.
4. It is somewhat ironic that Peabody is the only one of the top ten that does not offer a doctoral degree program in the foundations since this is where Professor Cooper, the initiator of the present study, was trained in the foundations in 1964.
5. *Peterson's Graduate Programs in Business, Education, Health, Information Studies, Law, and Social Work*, book 6, 31st edition. (Princeton, New Jersey: Peterson's, 1997), 912-917 and *Peterson's Annual Guides to Graduate Study*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Peterson's, 1977), 18-47. Used with permission.
6. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, volume XLIV, numbers 4-17, September 19, 1997 - January 9, 1998.  
Robert F. Lawson and R.L. Schnell, eds., *Educational Studies: Foundation of Policy* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), 1, 283.
7. James A. Johnson and others, *Introduction to the Foundations of American Education* (Boston: Allyn and Becon, Inc., 1973), xi.
8. H. R. White, *Foundations of Education: Historical, Sociological, Philosophical* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1968), ix.
9. Young Pai, *Cultural Foundations of Education* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 3.
10. R.L. Schnell, "History of Education: Revolution in Style and Content," in *Educational Studies: Foundations of Policy*, eds. Robert F. Lawson and R.L. Schnell (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1983), 2-3.
11. Ibid.
12. Cooper, 5.
13. Schnell, 1.
14. Ibid, 7.
15. John L. McNeill, "Philosophy of Education," in *Educational Studies: Foundations of Policy*, eds. Roberts F. Lawson and R.L. Schnell (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), 284.
16. Joan Burstyn, "Presidential Address: The Role of a Foundations Scholar in Our Multicultural, Postindustrial Society," in *Educational Studies*, (1996), 308.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 310.

**THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS: A CHALLENGE TO THE FAITH?**

Donna Younker  
University of Central Oklahoma, emerita

From the discoveries of archeology we have learned that civilization and cultures never die.... The more we unearth, the more we see how ancient civilizations have had a subtle but unmistakable impress and bearing upon our own lives today.

--Dr. Paul Ilton

This paper is limited to the discovery and verification of the Old Testament writings found at Qumran.

**The Shepherd Boy Who Discovered the Scrolls**

The desert has always played a prominent part in biblical history. The Dead or Salt Sea lies twenty miles to the southwest of the ruins of Qumran (Khirbet Qumran) at a record 1300 feet below sea level. In the barren wilderness landscape of Khirbet Qumran there is no breathable air in the landscape of stark craggy hills of the Judean desert. The story of the scrolls carefully preserved in earthen vessels in eleven nearby caves are the most significant archeological find of the twentieth century. Some scholars believe many scrolls were brought to Qumran for preservation from Roman legions. The destruction of the settlement by Vespasian occurred in 68 A.D. His son, Titus, ravaged Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Until the discovery of several scrolls by a Bedouin shepherd boy, Muhammad edlh-dhib (Muhammad the Wolf) in 1947, no one knew of the immense library hidden away for nearly 2000 years.

On a usual day, this Arab Bedouin boy was tending his herd. Pursuing a stray goat, Muhammad threw a rock exposing the cave, now known to archeologists as Cave 1. The caves from which over eight hundred different manuscripts were discovered are now numbered in the sequence they were unearthed. Of the eight hundred manuscripts, fewer than a dozen were in any sense intact.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately Arab Bedouin boys, living in the Judean desert as their ancestors have from biblical times, see seasons blend into years and do not possess a Western sense of chronology. Therefore 1947 is the accepted date for the discovery of the scrolls. Although one copy of what is now known as the *Damascus Document* (CD), or series of laws from the Qumran community, had been discovered in a Cairo synagogue in December 1896. The Damascus Document (CD) was taken to Cambridge, England where translation was made by the end of the last century by Solomon Schechter.<sup>2</sup> It is known today that the term "Damascus" was a secret reference to Qumran.

In the year 1947, Israel was in the final days of the British mandate in Palestine. The Jewish quarter of Jerusalem was separated from the Arab or eastern quarter by barbed wire. The priceless manuscripts were in the Palestinian part of the Holy Land, occupied by Arabs. The nomadic Bedouins thought the scrolls, which were originally found wrapped in leather bindings housed in jars, might be of value.

In April 1947, a Bedouin tribal leader took seven or eight scrolls to Bethlehem, which is still under Palestinian control. These scrolls consisted of a complete Isaiah manuscript, a rule book entitled *The Manual of Discipline*, a commentary on the Book of Habakkuk and a manuscript now known as the *Genesis Apocryphon*.

In Bethlehem, a merchant known as Kando operated a general store, cobblers shop and dealt in antiquities. Kando was a member of the Syrian Orthodox congregation and a personal friend of Mar Samuel, the Archbishop of Jerusalem. Mar Samuel, although lacking expertise in biblical Hebrew, recognizing the potential value of the scrolls, bought four for about \$100.<sup>3</sup> He consulted the famous Dominican *'Ecole Biblique et Archeologique Francaise* in East Jerusalem. Through writing and sending manual scrap to Professor William Foxwell Albright of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, the world's leading expert on ancient Jewish scripts, the *'Ecole Biblique* received confirmation in February 1948 that the scrolls constituted the greatest manuscript discovery of modern times.

Mar Samuel's scrolls, after display at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., were then advertised for sale in a blind ad in the *Wall Street Journal*. Through an intermediary, the Arch Bishop's manuscripts were purchased by the State of Israel.<sup>4</sup>

It was destined, however, for Professor Elezar Sukinik, the famed archeologist of Hebrew University, to be the first man to actually read and recognize fragments of the Dead Sea Scrolls. A special structure called the Shrine of

the Book (shaped like the top of the vase in which some of the scrolls were discovered) was constructed to house them at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, Israel. The seven scrolls, including three found by Sukenik, remain on public display.

On November 23, 1947 E. L. Sukenik received a phone call at Hebrew University from an Armenian friend, Levon Ohan.<sup>5</sup> Ohan, the son of a well-known antiquities dealer, represented Kando who was still attempting to validate scrolls remaining at his shop and house.

Sukenik has recorded his version of events in some detail in a diary published by his son, Yigael Yadin, former chief of operations of the HaganaH who later became Israel's most prominent archeologist in his own right.

Upon receiving the phone call, Sukenik agreed to a secret meeting at the gateway to military Zone B. On the other side of the barricade, Ohan removed a scrap of parchment from his brief case and showed it to Sukenik through the barbed wire, Sukenik noticed that the form of the Hebrew letters resembled that of letters he had studied on ossaries--limestone bone boxes that were common in Jerusalem some 2000 years ago.<sup>6</sup> Gazing at the scrap of parchment, this scholar was stunned and amazed. He wrote in his journal:

Today I met the antiquities dealer. A Hebrew book has been discovered in a jar. He showed me a fragment written on parchment. The script was very ancient to me. Is it possible?<sup>7</sup>

Sukenik immediately decided to obtain a pass to go to Kando's store in zone B, the Arab stronghold of Bethlehem. Against the advice of his wife, who thought he was "crazy" to attempt this risky trip, and that of his son who was preparing immediate warfare, anticipating Arab rejection of the United Nations' proposal for partition of the Holy Land. On November 29, 1947, Sukenik and Ohan boarded a bus for Bethlehem.

Although tension was evident because Sukenik was the only Jew on the bus, he arrived uneventfully at Kando's store. After the usual middle eastern exchange of coffee, Sukenik "borrowed" for scrutinization three documents: the Hymn Scroll and the War Scroll Sukenik took immediately to Jerusalem. In December, a partial Isaiah scroll was received.<sup>8</sup>

The Dead Sea Scrolls shed information of great biblical significance regarding the book of Isaiah. The Shrine of the Book now contains a manuscript of the Book of Isaiah, some twenty-four feet in length, and virtually complete containing all sixty-six chapters. Although written by three separate scholars over the course of several hundred years, the Book of Isaiah was contained on that single scroll.

In the year 1969, I personally visited the Shrine of Book which was constructed in the early 1960's in Jerusalem to house the seven original scrolls from Cave 1. 1969 was two years after the Six Day War which gave the State of Israel control of East Jerusalem and all scroll material. At this time the holy parchment of the Isaiah scroll was actually on display. Despite a temperature and light controlled environment, the extreme fragility of this ancient documents has caused the original to now be stored underground. Photographic copies are available.

In 1969 heavy security was then necessary including the search of visitors' belongings, similar to that carried on now at most European museums. Cases containing the Seven Scrolls were programmed to drop many feet below ground in the event of war. This is similar to arrangements made to protect the Constitution of the United States in Washington, D.C.

Khirbet Qumran (the ruin of Qumran) was inaccessible to American travelers in 1969. The Jordanians were firing randomly across the Dead Sea. Early on an August morning at 6 a.m., a Palestinian guide and bus drove us the thirteen miles from East Jerusalem to the Dead Sea where temperatures reached 101°. One cave in the marl terrace of Khirbet Qumran was indicated in the distance. Upon reaching the Salt Sea, where a number of undaunted people were floating, our guides indicated a bullet hole in the bathing pavilion where an American girl had been inadvertently killed by Jordanians on the previous day. Our Palestinian guides then vanished to hide behind the bus for safety.

To complete the discovery of the scrolls in Cave 1 in the Judean desert, it is fitting to quote Professor Sukenik, who began examining the documents on the very evening he reached Jerusalem, November 29, 1947. It was on that evening, November 29, 1947 the United Nations voted for the creation of the State of Israel.

Sukenik's diary entry reads:

This great event in Jewish history was thus combined in my home in Jerusalem with another event, no less historic, the one political, the other cultural.<sup>9</sup>

The Dead Sea Scrolls of the Bible and the creation of the State of Israel, after a 2000 year diaspora, are somehow fatefully linked.

**The manuscripts**

Yigal Yadir, Purchaser of the Scrolls for Israel, said,

Just as a Christian reader must be excited by the manuscripts of a sect who may have been known and influenced early Christians, so a Jew find nothing more deeply moving than manuscripts written by the People of the Book, more than 2000 years ago.<sup>10</sup>

The latest lists of manuscripts compiled by James C. Vander Kam that the biblical books of the Old Testament are represented in the following number of copies (using the common order for books in the Hebrew Bible).<sup>11</sup>

*The Dead Sea Scrolls Today*, p. 30:

Genesis 15	Exodus 17	Leviticus 13	
Numbers 8	Deuteronomy 29	Joshua 3	
Judges 3		Ruth 4	1-2
			Samuel 4
1-2 Kings 3	1-2 Chronicles 1	Ezra 1	
Nehemiah 0	Esther 0	Job 4	
Psalms 36		Proverbs 2	Ecclesiastes 3
Song of Solomon 4	Isaiah 21	Jeremiah 6	
Lamentations 4	Ezekiel 6	Daniel 8	
Twelve Prophets 8			

Esther is omitted because Khirbet Qunram did not recognize Purim as a Hebrew holiday.

If one works with the numbers listed above, the total for the biblical manuscripts is 202 copies, or about one quarter of the 800 manuscripts found at Qumran.<sup>12</sup>

The numbers cited give what appears to be a reliable impression of where the Qumran Yahid (community) placed its emphasis. The Psalms could be used for worship and meditation. The legal books of the Torah--Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy (29)--served as a basis for life under the covenant governing Qumran. The 15 copies of Genesis evidence historical customs followed by the order.

The lack of strict adherence to the law was apparently the main reason the sect split from the Second Temple. The letter of the law is evidenced in the precepts laid down by Qumran's leader: The Teacher of Righteousness. Eschatologically, Qumran lived in end-times. Following the destruction of the Second Temple by Titus in 70 A.D., the book of Lamentations attributes the annihilation of Jerusalem to the fact that impurity and lack of adherence to God's covenant with Moses caused the Lord's anger and vengeance on his chosen people.

Authorities, with the exception of John J. Collins, believe this was an apocalyptic Jewish sect, who had gone into the desert to fulfill the command of the prophet Isaiah:

Prepare the way of the Lord. Make straight in the dessert ... a highway for our God. (Isaiah 40:13).

The fact that the Second Temple no longer had a Davidic priest had deluded Judaism. Hellenism had tainted the Jewish heritage.

The exact nature of the Jewish sect at Qumran is presently disputed among scholars. The January-February *Biblical Archaeological Review*<sup>13</sup> yields a number of hypotheses.

The earliest "standard model" was that of Father Roland de Vaux of the *'Ecole Biblique*, the scriptorium where the scrolls were first examined. The *'Ecole Biblique* was a French Dominican institution in East Jerusalem which was originally Palestinian territory. The first excavation of the Qumran site was headed by Father Roland de Vaux, who believed the community to be Essene.

The confirmation of Essene origin may be found in a new work published this year, 1998, by Hartmann Stegmann, entitled *The Library of Qumran*.<sup>14</sup> The word Essene means the Pious Ones. A letter from the correspondence written by Bar Kochba's group of fighters against the Romans refers to Qumran as the Fortress of the Pious Ones (*mesad hasidim*) D.I.D. 2 [1961]. Hartmann's work, which originally appeared in German, has been praised by Collins, Vander Kam, and Vermes.

Father de Vaux argued that the earliest remains began around 140 B.C.E. and probably flourished during the reign of the Hasmonian High Priest, John Hyrcanus (150-140 B.C.E). At this time the aqueduct that brings water from the hills into the building structure was constructed and upper stories were added to the older structure. The entire complex was then coated with plaster.

Pere de Vaux formed an international team of eight scholars. In 1955, de Vaux published *Discoveries in the*

*Judean Desert. Discoveries in the Judean Desert*, written in French, was to be the first of a series to be issued by the Oxford University press. Unfortunately, too many manuscripts were assigned to too few scholars. There was no deadline for publication of the Oxford press series. Many manuscripts first appeared in journals of biblical archeology.

In 1870, Heinrich Schliemann had discovered the exact location of Troy from reading the *Iliad*. The excavation of Troy developed standard archeological principles of stratifying layers of civilization. Ancient near eastern cities contain different layers of civilization, recognized by distinctive artifacts peculiar to specific dates. Many mounds in Israel which cover cities that have been destroyed and rebuilt on the exact site are called tells. Tells must be excavated by professional archeologists according to Schliemann's procedure.

Qumran was, unfortunately, excavated under de Vaux's direction, principally by Jordanian bedouins, who were ignorant of archeology. These bedouins, aware of the potential value of the scrolls, apparently marketed some to private collectors. The fragility of Khirbet Qumran prevents further digging. De Vaux described Qumran in terms of a monastery containing a scriptorium. His archeological notes, however, were never published except for a few in D.I.D.

Other hypotheses as to the nature of Qumran include that of Professor Norman Golb of the University of Chicago, who has defined Qumran in terms of a fort. According to the *Biblical Archeological Review*, one archeologist holds the unlikely position that Qumran was once a "Villa Rustica" or country home.

One prevalent theory at this time is that the Jewish sect which founded the community was Sadducee. The scholar whose research led to this new probable reason is Professor Lawrence H. Schiffman whose writings are published by the Jewish Publication Society in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.<sup>15</sup> There is a distinct possibility that many of the scrolls were not produced at Qumran, but brought to the caves for safe keeping. No more than two are in the same handwriting. Perhaps a majority were stored in the caves, prior to the destruction of the Second Temple. Similar manuscripts have been found at Masada.

Although Qumran's "Teacher of Righteousness" was attacked and almost killed by the Wicked Priest on the day of Atonement (a commentary on *Habakkuk* 1QP-Hab), there still appears to be some link between Qumran and the Second Temple. It is true that the "Teacher of Righteousness" rejected the traditional Jewish lunar calendar for a solar calendar, felt the High Priest to be of improper lineage and felt that ignoring the laws of Deuteronomy would lead to an eventual final battle between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness (War Scroll).

Yet among the secular scrolls, is the famous Copper Scroll, the only work at Qumran on a material other than leather or papyrus. This text, impressed on two sections of copper, was found in Cave 3, so thoroughly oxidized that it could not be unrolled. The Copper Scroll was taken to Manchester, England, and translated by John Allegro, a graduate student at Oxford. John Allegro believed this scroll to be a list of the locations of the missing treasures of the Second Temple prior to destruction by Titus.<sup>16</sup> The locations of the treasures, although specific, have been obscured by time and the endless change of topography. Although Allegro, the only atheist on the team, was to be repudiated for other sensational publications, the Allegro translation of the Copper Scroll is unquestionably valid. Some scholars, however, believe the Copper Scroll was stored hastily in another part of Cave 3 than that of the Essenes; and is a bit of assets in the Temple Bank, debts later repaid.

### **The Validity of the Scrolls**

The Dead Sea Scrolls impacting upon the study of the Old Testament ... has been phenomenal. J. Julius Scott, Jr.<sup>17</sup>

How fortunate for the faith of both Jew and Christian that the scrolls were discovered in our technological era. In the Twentieth century the carbon 14 method of dating manuscripts is now available. The older carbon 14 method of dating was discovered in 1947, the year the first scrolls were found. However, due to the amount of scroll material that had to be lost in the process only fragments were originally dated.

Since 1990 accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS), a more refined form of carbon 14 dating has enabled Amir Drori, Director of the Israel Antiquities to submit Qumran scrolls for A.M.S. testing.<sup>18</sup> The great Israel Scroll is A.M.S. dated between 202-107 B.C. The earliest scroll, the Dalyleh deed, has survived since 405- 354 B.C.<sup>19</sup>

James C. Vander Kam in *The Dead Sea Scrolls*

Today states unequivocally:

Such information proves that the scrolls come from the last centuries B.C.E. and the first century A.D.<sup>20</sup>

The second means for dating the ancient scripts is paleography. Paleography is the study of ancient manuscripts

or the ways in which scribes shaped the letters they were writing or copying. The styles of letter formation change over time. By observing the style of letter formation, scholars determine where in chronology documents belong.

Frank Moore Cross, Jr. of Harvard University published the standard paleographic study in *The Development of Jewish Scripts* (1960). Another work, *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies*, published in 1958, reprinted in 1980.<sup>21</sup>

*The Development of Jewish Scripts* is the most frequently cited paper in Dead Sea Scroll scholarship. It is a 70-page article with 180 footnotes. Cross discusses the Hebrew alphabet in its various forms in each relevant period [Archaic 250-150 B.C.E.], Hasmonean [150-30 B.C.E.] and Herodian [30-70 A.D.]. By means of paleography, Cross and other scholars have dated the Dead Sea Scrolls often within a range of 50 years or so.

Cross found that a few manuscripts date to the Archaic period [250-150 B.C.E.] such as a fragment of the biblical book of Samuel, but it was not the versions of Samuel to be found in the standard text of the Hebrew Bible, the Masoretic Text. It conformed instead to the Greek translation known as the Septuagint.

Cross describes this moment: "I suddenly realized I had found something that to me and to other textual critics of the Hebrew Bible was earthshaking."<sup>22</sup> Thus, the differences between the traditional Hebrew text and the Old Greek translation for the most part, rested on different textual translations of the Hebrew Bible. Cross's key discovery is that scholars of biblical texts could now have more confidence in the Greek text known as the Septuagint. Its variations from the received Hebrew text could well not be based on errors in translation but on a different Hebrew base text.

Cross found that few manuscripts date to the Archaic period (250-150 B.C.E.). Many more came from Hasmonean period (150-30 B.C.E.) eg. the larger Isaiah scroll and the community's Manual of Discipline from Cave 1, but most of the commentaries were copied in the Herodian age [30 B.C.E.-A.D. 68-70].

Methods for dating actual archeological remains are pottery and hundreds of coins found in the ruins of the settlement. A one-page table of the coins is listed on page 22 of *The Dead Sea Scrolls Today* by James C. Vander Kam. A majority, 143, came from the time of Alexander Jannaeus (103-76 B.C.).

Professor Gaza Vermes of Oxford in 1979 referred to the Qumran Scrolls as the Dead Sea Scrolls as likely to become "the academic scandal *par excellence* of the twentieth century."<sup>23</sup> Professor Vermes was referring to the *monopolization* of the scrolls and to De Vaux's outright refusal to make scrolls at the 'Ecole Biblique's "scrolling" available to any other qualified scholars.

Herschel Shanks, founder and editor of the *Biblical Archeological Review* in Washington, D.C., was sued for his unending attempts to free the scrolls and place them in the public domain. Until 1991, the scrolls remained the personal property of the original international team selected by De Vaux. This unusual exclusivity was then given to trusted successors, graduates of the original universities who would be destined to academic fame. Other scholars such as the respected Ben-Zion Wacholder, professor of Talmud at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio, and the vociferous maverick scroll scholar Robert Eisenman of California State University, who holds highly idiosyncratic ideas, were denied microfilm copies.

Both De Vaux and his successor as chief editor, John Strugnell of Harvard, were publicly anti-Semitic. Pere de Vaux began his ministry in Jordan; East Jerusalem in the years of discovery was Palestinian. His bias is, perhaps understandable in the times of fierce conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians (many of whom were converts).

Strugnell of Harvard was frankly a racist who made numerous negative comments publicly on Judaism. Alcoholism and manic depression illness slowly incapacitated Strugnell, who resigned in 1990, returned to the United States and was rehabilitated by a mental hospital in Cambridge, Massachusetts.<sup>24</sup>

John Strungell had thirty copies of the scroll concordance published in Gottingen, Germany, in 1988 but reserved the copies only, according to the BAR, "for the use of editors."<sup>25</sup> In fact, transcripts of the Dead Sea Scrolls translated by 1960 could have been released that very year.<sup>26</sup>

In 1991 William Moffett became director of the Huntington Library of California funded by Rockefeller money. He made an astounding revelation. Little known photographs in a safe were found containing a complete record of Mar Samuel's scrolls discovered in 1947. These photographs were taken by John Trever in 1949 at the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem, today named the W. F. Albright Institute of Archeological Research in honor of the great John Hopkins' scholar who pronounced these scrolls genuine.

Moffett believed in intellectual freedom. "Free the scrolls and you free the scholars," he said on September 21,

1991.<sup>27</sup> The Huntington Library made available microfilm copies to any scholar.

Thus, the so-called scandal of the scrolls never involved authenticity or heresy, but academia--too few men monopolizing these documents foundational to the Judeo-Christian heritage. At times the international team who held full-time university positions also suffered from under financing. The blame, however, rests squarely on academic vanity rather than any scroll content.

Most scholars totally discredit *The Dead Sea Scrolls Deception* by Michael Baignett and Richard Leigh.<sup>28</sup> In this best seller a conspiracy by the highest Catholic clergy (performing former functions of the inquisition) suppressed the scrolls. The scrolls were thought by Leigh and Baignett to contain explosive doctrine counter to the church.

#### Conclusion

Professor Geza Vermes of Oxford writes beautifully in praise of the scrolls concluding:

Qumran, in other words, has provided the world with the oldest Hebrew writings preserved on leather or papyrus in existence, a priceless library of biblical and post-biblical Jewish literature.<sup>29</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

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2. Ibid., p. 97-98.
3. James C. Vander Kam, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Today* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdman's Publishing Company, 1994), p. 3.
4. Geza Vermes, *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Qumran in Perspective* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 11.
5. Shanks, p. 10.
6. Randall Price, *Secrets of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House Publishers, 1946), p. 40.
7. Kenneth Hanson, *Dead Sea Scrolls, The Untold Story* (Tulsa: Council Oak Books, 1997), p. 20. There are some inaccuracies in this book written for the layman.
8. Hanson, p. 20.
9. Hanson, p. 21.
10. Quoted in Price, *Secrets of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, p. 75.
11. James C. Vander Kam, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Today*, p. 303.
12. Vander Kam, p. 31.
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14. Hartmann Stegmann, *The Library of Qumran* (Brill Academic Publishers: The Netherlands), p. 59.
15. Lawrence H. Schiffman, *Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1994).
16. Allegro, John Marco, *The Treasure of the Copper Scroll*, 2nd ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1964).
17. Quoted in Price, p. 144.
18. Vander Kam, p. 17.
19. Vander Kam, p. 19.
20. Ibid.
21. *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Study* (Anchor: Garden City, 1961; rev. ed. Baker: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1980).
22. Quoted in Herschel Shanks, *The Mystery and Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, p. 43.
23. Shanks, p. 51.

24. Shanks, pp. 52-53.
25. Shanks, p. 55.
26. Ibid.
27. Shanks, p. 57.
28. Michael Bagnett and Richard Leigh, *The Dead Sea Scroll Deception* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
29. Geza Vermes, p. 36.

**HISTORIC AFRICAN AMERICAN LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES:  
EDUCATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS**

Lisa Zagumny  
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

The philosophical foundations of historically black liberal arts colleges and universities had consequences on the lives of the students that provided an impetus for change during the 1950s and 1960s in America. These decades witnessed social revolution stemming from philosophical underpinnings that led to direct action methods primarily carried out by black student activists. Students in these schools were grounded in a Christian theology which stimulated their questioning of contemporary segregationist practices. The content of their studies and the environment of their educational experiences were contradictory to the larger social practices in America at that time. Disturbed by the hypocrisy, students began to challenge and confront traditional ideas and institutions. Atlanta and Nashville were movement centers, and the private historically black colleges and universities in these cities, Fisk University, Morehouse College, and Spelman College, provided a philosophical groundwork for student participants which propelled student activism. A case study of these institutions, focusing on the curriculum from 1954 to 1964, will help to clarify the relationship between the students' educational experience and their activism.

While black activism began prior to 1954 and continued after 1964, notable changes occurred during these years. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled, "in the field of public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place."<sup>1</sup> The *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling sparked optimism in African American communities throughout the nation. Blacks accepted the *Brown* decision, but speculated on the possibilities of its implementation with caution. Ideally, the ruling would promote African Americans and their institutions, but fear that discrimination would continue under the guise of equality filled the thoughts of many. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, shifting the responsibility of school desegregation from the courts to the U.S. Commissioner of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Title IV of this act prohibited institutions receiving federal funds from discriminating in hiring, promotion, and admission policies on the basis of race. While this act did not ensure the end of discrimination, it was a symbolic governmental commitment toward those ends.

Black activism pervaded the ten years between *Brown v. Board* and the Civil Rights Act of 1964: the Montgomery Bus Boycott began in December 1955 and continued through December 1956; the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was founded in 1957; student sit-ins occurred across the South throughout 1960, the same year the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was founded; the Freedom Rides, initiated by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) began in 1961; in 1963, the March on Washington took place and America witnessed violence in Birmingham, and Freedom Summer began in June 1964. Many black activists were college students during this time. Historically black liberal arts colleges and universities provided educational experiences that encouraged social activist thought, but students carried these ideals a step further, transforming the thought into direct action.

The movement centers for nonviolent direct action, Atlanta and Nashville, helped to establish an organizational framework by defining goals and developing strategies. Atlanta was the national headquarters for SCLC and was also home to Spelman and Morehouse Colleges, attended by a number of student leaders.<sup>2</sup> Nashville with Fisk University students also produced a large number of student leaders who were crucial to the Movement. The Nashville Student Movement, which continued the Freedom Rides when CORE declared them too dangerous, worked out of the office of the Nashville Christian Leadership Conference.<sup>3</sup> Many of the student leaders in Atlanta and Nashville later became full time activists in SNCC.<sup>4</sup>

Fisk University and Morehouse and Spelman Colleges are private educational institutions that were founded soon after the Civil War by predominantly white northerners. The primary differences between these private institutions and black public colleges and universities include their funding and their curriculum. The private institutions were funded by churches, northerners, and private philanthropic groups, and had fewer strings attached than publicly funded institutions because of the educational goals of the economic sources. The private institutions stressed a rigorous liberal arts education and did not focus as heavily on career placement or job opportunities. The missionary philanthropists supported classical liberal arts education as a means to achieve racial equality, uplift, and to develop black leadership.<sup>5</sup> The American Baptist Home Mission Society (ABHMS) maintained Morehouse

College and Spelman College, while the American Missionary Association (AMA) founded Fisk University.<sup>6</sup> Spelman College for women was founded by Harriet Giles and Sophia Packard, members of the American Baptist Home Mission Society in 1881.<sup>7</sup> In 1883, the school was moved into former Union Army barracks purchased by the ABHMS, and a year later, the name Spelman was adopted by the trustees of the school because of the donations made by John D. Rockefeller.<sup>8</sup> When Spelman was incorporated in 1888, the charter stated it was intended as, “an Institution of learning for young colored women in which special attention is to be given to the formation of industrial habits and of Christian character.”<sup>9</sup>

The ABHMS also founded Morehouse College, originally the Augusta Institute, for men in 1867. The charter from 1879 states, “The objects of the said corporation are to promote education among the colored people of the South, especially by the training of preachers and teachers of the colored race.”<sup>10</sup> In 1913, the name was changed to Morehouse College, honoring Reverend Henry Lyman Morehouse of the ABHMS.<sup>11</sup>

In April 1929, Spelman and Morehouse united with Atlanta University, founded by the American Missionary Association, in April 1929, to become the Atlanta University Center.<sup>12</sup> This cooperative affiliation strengthened their educational offerings. Students at Spelman could enroll in courses at Morehouse and vice versa. Faculty exchanges were also encouraged. However, the finances and administration of each institution remained separate.<sup>13</sup>

Fisk School was founded on January 9, 1866 by the American Missionary Association and the Western Freedmen’s Aid Commission. It became Fisk University with the signing of the charter on August 12, 1867.<sup>14</sup> Fisk was founded “primarily for the purpose of providing for the colored people of the South the advantages of a Christian education.”<sup>15</sup> According to missionary philanthropists, “education was intended to prepare a college-bred black leadership to uplift the black masses from the legacy of slavery and the restraints of the postbellum caste system.”<sup>16</sup> Moral and religious development permeated the philosophical and educational aims of Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman from the time they were founded through the period of civil rights.

College life for African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s at private institutions was thoroughly religious. Christian beliefs and morality pervaded the mission and curriculum of historically black liberal arts colleges and universities from their beginnings. Addressed in catalogs, religious privileges include ideas like these as exemplified by Fisk’s statement, “The University was born out of self-sacrificing devotion to religious ideals, and through the years it has maintained an atmosphere of intelligent religious idealism, which constantly manifests itself in social action.”<sup>17</sup> In order to promote disciplined and Christian principled leaders, the religious emphasis was central to the philosophical underpinnings of the three institutions.

Religious emphasis included moral character building and a commitment to racial progress and community. Acquiring knowledge was considered important to aiding spiritual and moral development, and community involvement. Education would not only uplift the individual, but the community as exemplified by the mission statement of Morehouse,

Morehouse College aims to assist the student: 1) to develop his character, 2) to develop his mental aptitude, and train it, 3) to acquire scholarly habits of work and study, 4) to acquire ability to read understandingly and to express himself intelligently, 5) to obtain a broad background in the arts and sciences for a life career, 6) to understand the nature of man and his relation to the physical universe, 7) to cultivate an appreciation for the cultural and spiritual qualities of life, 8) to understand, and interpret constructively, current social and economic problems.<sup>18</sup>

The educational aims of the three private black institutions are consistent from 1954 to 1964 and attest to the emphasis on moral character and commitment to racial uplift.

Their curricula also reflected these goals. Leadership development through community involvement and moral character building was repeatedly emphasized. The basic requirements for bachelor degrees were similar to other contemporary liberal arts undergraduate institutions; English Composition, Humanities, Social Sciences, Foreign Language, Mathematics, Physical Sciences, Biology, Physical Education, Philosophy, and Psychology. But, there were also required courses more specific to the particular aims of these colleges including Religion, Philosophy, and Hygiene.

The required religion courses at Spelman, Morehouse, and Fisk included *Comparative Religion* and a course surveying the Old Testament and introducing the New Testament.<sup>19</sup> These courses laid the foundation for basic Christian thought. Fisk offered religion classes even more specific to the philosophy of the university, such as Religion 241-242, *The Development of Christian Social Action* which analyzed the ideal of social action and the

problems pertaining to it.<sup>20</sup> *The Christian Way in Our Society*, Religion 243, investigated the application of Christian principles to family, race, economic, national, and international relations.<sup>21</sup> While the focus of these classes was Christianity, social action as it related to personal relationships, involvement, and commitment enhanced student reflection on activism.

In 1961, six new courses in religion were added to Fisk's curriculum, including *Contemporary Christian Thought* and *Religion and Society* which addressed the teachings of Tillich, Buber, Brunner, and Niebuhr, and *Theology and the Human Situation*, focusing on Sartre, Camus, and Gandhi was introduced in 1964.<sup>22</sup> The new offerings reflect the heightened student interest in contemporary social issues. The philosophical teachings of these theologians were being employed in the civil rights protests of the time. Some activists believed in nonviolence as a philosophy while others used it only as a tactic for demonstrations. The curriculum change attests to the larger social changes and, more specifically, the increased student interest in the civil rights protests.

Philosophy courses offered at these schools were also more specific to the particular aims of Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman. Philosophy 212, *Problems in Human Conduct*, stressed theoretical and ethical problems of medicine, education, law, business, sex, and race, reflecting the philosophy of Fisk.<sup>23</sup> By studying human conduct, students could learn what was considered appropriate and inappropriate behavior according to various philosophies within specific social realms. Social thought including nonviolent action philosophies was the focus of *Social Philosophy* which was added to the curriculum at Morehouse in 1962.<sup>24</sup> This addition attests to the heightened student interest in contemporary African American issues.

Personal habits and hygiene were continually stressed through required courses to inculcate students with proper etiquette, in preparation for their roles as future leaders. Morehouse required *Personal Health and Hygiene* from 1954 to 1964. A statement concerning the standards in the Morehouse catalogs reads, "Correct personal habits are inculcated; cleanliness and neatness are required."<sup>25</sup> The required course at Spelman was *Health and Personality Development* which stressed grooming, poise, and decorum.<sup>26</sup> *Hygiene*, Health Education 102 at Fisk, emphasized "Factors that contribute to personal and community hygiene."<sup>27</sup> While personal cleanliness was a goal of these courses, the emphasis focused on community effects; in order to uplift the community and race, one must possess correct personal habits so that he or she could set the proper example. However, it is interesting to note a second course offering at Spelman, Psychology 302, *Mental Hygiene*, that emphasized "facts and principles that underlie the development of a wholesome personality."<sup>28</sup> This brings to light differing expectations for black male and female students, and black and white female students.

African Americans were pushed toward college not only for economic reasons, but for moral development. However, the rules and regulations for black females were more stringent in order to enhance morality rather than to protect or safeguard them as they were for white female students. The black women had to prove themselves academically and morally because they were expected to acquire genteel habits that they supposedly did not possess upon their entry into Spelman.<sup>29</sup> Social regulation enhanced virtue as suggested by this comment from an alumna at an anniversary celebration, "When a girl comes to Spelman and returns home, everybody can see great improvement in her manners, housekeeping, and in fact in every respect .... One special thing Miss Giles [one of the founders] requires of her girls is quietness, which always shows the mark of a lady."<sup>30</sup> While this commentary predates the focus of this study, these ideals continued through 1964. The dual emphasis on intellect and gentility had lasting effects on black female students, and led to complexities for female protestors in the Civil Rights Movement.

A liberal education was central to the aims of Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman, but within the liberal arts tradition these institutions also offered specific courses focused on contemporary and historical African American issues. These courses reflect the institutions' goal of enhancing student commitment to race and community and the increasing student interest in seeing African American culture reflected in their curriculum. Courses with an African American emphasis expanded from 1954 to 1964 because of heightened student interest. At Morehouse and Spelman these topics included education, English, history, and sociology. In addition to these topics, Fisk's offerings also included anthropology. While courses were listed in either the Morehouse or Spelman catalogs, it is important to remember that students in the Atlanta University Center could enroll in classes at both colleges.

Various education courses at the three institutions emphasized African American issues. The description of Education 355, *Orientation in Education*, in the 1954 Morehouse catalog stated, "It is hoped that each student may grasp such a body of information relating to the work of the schools of the United States (with special emphasis on Negro education) as the citizen and teacher ought to have."<sup>31</sup> This course continued to be offered until 1962 when it

was no longer included in the catalog. *School and Society*, Education 364, also offered at Morehouse, stressed the role of the school in relation to the newer types of education made possible by social change.<sup>32</sup> Education 275, *Education of the Negro in the United States*, offered at Fisk, emphasized the history of African American education, but the title of the course was changed to *Education in the South* in 1955, and in 1956 it became a graduate course.<sup>33</sup> The education courses focused on historical and contemporary African American education. The changing social conditions would include the 1954 *Brown v. Board* ruling and the push for desegregation. As part of the liberal arts core, the education courses gradually became more inclusive of African American issues from 1954 to 1964. In the tradition of liberal arts, English courses at Spelman and Fisk emphasized the customary “classics,” but expanded offerings to include African American literary culture. Fisk offered *The Negro’s Contribution to the Literature of America*, English 238, which became English 280 in 1957. The course description emphasized a chronological approach to the effect of social history on African American thought, but previous to 1957, English 238 did not have a course description listed in the catalogs.<sup>34</sup> In 1960, Spelman added English 312, *Recent American Fiction*, which focused on significant writers in the twentieth century including James Baldwin.<sup>35</sup> Another English course at Spelman, English 321, *Literature in Our Society*, was offered in 1962.<sup>36</sup> This class emphasized African American authors dealing with racial, religious, and economic protest. The traditional liberal arts offerings in English became more inclusive of increasing student interest in contemporary African American issues from 1954 to 1964.

History was another subject where African American concerns were addressed with contemporary and historical issues as the focus. The search for peace was the concluding topic in History 368, *The United States in the Twentieth Century*.<sup>37</sup> *American Constitutional History*, History 479-480, addressed, “the conflict over state’s rights arising out of the slavery controversy.”<sup>38</sup> These courses at Morehouse were supplemented by new additions at Spelman. In 1957, History 331-332, *The Negro in America*, focused on “the history of the Negro in the United States and his place in society today.”<sup>39</sup> This was the first course offering in Spelman’s catalog to make a specific reference to African Americans. This course continued to be offered until 1960 when *Negro History* was offered at Clark College, another Atlanta University Center affiliate.<sup>40</sup> Fisk offered a similar course, *The Negro in American History*, but it was offered prior to 1954 and continued beyond 1964.<sup>41</sup> *Revolution and Response: The Crisis of Our Time*, History 347-348, was also initiated at Spelman in 1957. This course addressed the two great contemporary, revolutionary movements, communism in the Soviet Union and the rise of colonial nations in Asia and Africa.<sup>42</sup> While this interest in international affairs developed prior to the course offering, History 347-348 attests to the institutions’ commitment to student development, and the increasing student interest in national and international affairs affecting African Americans.

The anthropology and sociology departments at Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman not only included the most courses emphasizing African American issues, but also underwent significant changes in curriculum topics during the period 1954 to 1964. Morehouse offered Sociology 367, *Social Control*, which focused on the “devices and agencies by which society regulates the behavior of its members.”<sup>43</sup> Racial and ethnic characteristics of people in the United States and their “divisive influences” were addressed in Sociology 476, *Intercultural Relations*, which changed its title to *American Minorities* in 1958.<sup>44</sup> These two courses stressed the relationship between race and society, and the various methods and aspects of oppression.

A new course, *Main Trends in Modern Africa*, was listed in the 1957 Morehouse catalog. The analysis of contemporary African cultures attests to the interest and involvement in the African freedom movement. Interest in Africa preceded the college’s course offering as evidenced by guest speakers focusing on issues such as “National Development in the Gold Coast and British Policy in Africa” presented by Hylan Lewis, Atlanta University sociology professor, during the fall of 1955.<sup>45</sup> New courses were not offered again until 1962, with the introduction of Non-Western Studies. Six courses focused on the history and present conditions of China, India, and Africa. The course focusing on the contemporary situation in Africa was titled *The Politics of Freedom*.<sup>46</sup> This course was an extension of *Main Trends in Modern Africa*, and it clearly illustrates the increasing student interest in national and international issues affecting and influencing America’s black population.

A similar series of courses was available to Fisk students prior to 1954. African and Caribbean Studies for students interested in the “sociological phenomenon in other cultures” was altered to include Asian studies in 1955.<sup>47</sup> In addition to these courses at Fisk, the sociology and anthropology departments made several adjustments to their offerings in 1957 and 1958. Within sociology, the Race and Culture Contacts program included 205, *Social*

*Economics of the Caribbean Area*; 206, *Social Institutions of India and Pakistan*; 257, *The Negro in America*; 258, *American Minority Groups*; 321-322, *Race and Culture*, and 327-328, *The Natural History of Race Relations*.<sup>48</sup> In 1957, Sociology 205 and 206 were moved to the anthropology department, and 321-322 and 327-328 were transferred to the graduate program.<sup>49</sup>

Fisk also offered an African Studies program within the anthropology department prior to 1954 which offered 205, *Introduction to African Studies*; 207-208, *African Cultures and Institutions*; 210, *Native Peoples and Cultures of Africa*; 212, *European Contacts and Culture in Africa*; 301, *Primitive Society*; 350, *Ethnography of Africa*, and 360, *Social Integration*.<sup>50</sup> In 1957, 205 and 350 were eliminated, and by 1958, only 207-208, 210, and 212 were offered.<sup>51</sup> By 1962, African Studies was completely absorbed into anthropology; the courses were still offered but there was no separate African Studies category.<sup>52</sup> The sociology and anthropology courses included the largest number of classes focusing on contemporary and historical African American issues. The specific racially-focused courses that were assimilated into larger programs illustrate an awareness and acceptance that these previously specialized courses were being integrated into the traditional liberal arts programs. Specific classes did address the student interest in African American issues, but extracurricular activities also spoke to their concerns.

The Atlanta University Center had a lecture series which students were encouraged to attend. Guest speakers addressed current social and racial issues, such as Kenneth Clark's lecture, "Law and Social Change," delivered on December 13, 1954.<sup>53</sup> Dr. E. Franklin Frazier, a noted sociologist from Howard University, was a regular speaker in the lecture series. His lectures included "The Growing Importance of the Middle Class Among Negroes in the United States," "The Role of the Educated Negro," and "Integration and Assimilation of the American Negro."<sup>54</sup> There was also a town meeting series at the Atlanta University Center. In December 1960, ten members of the NAACP headed the town meeting, discussing desegregation and its effects on Atlanta. Nonviolence and social change was also addressed at the 1960 town meeting.<sup>55</sup> Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led the town meeting in October 1961; the subject that evening was "Nonviolence, Civil Disobedience, and the Future of the Negro."<sup>56</sup> The 1963 series included a number of Non-Western lectures and an address by James Forman, who was executive secretary of SNCC at the time.<sup>57</sup> Other guest speakers such as Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall also regularly visited Fisk's campus to address students.<sup>58</sup> The guest lecturers spoke to the concerns of the students. Some speakers were radical while some were more conservative, but the underlying themes of race and social justice were obvious to the students.

The philosophical underpinnings of Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman were reflected in the missions, aims, and curriculum of the institutions. Their educational philosophy promoted the development of a virtuous, moral character for future leadership roles. The education at Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman heightened student awareness of the social hypocrisy of America at that time. While the institutions were not purposely training students to become active participants in the Movement, that is exactly what they accomplished with many students. There was, however, hypocrisy within the institutions themselves.

Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman were promoting these grandiose ideals in the classroom and wanted students to be prepared for the difficulties they would encounter upon graduation, but administrators did not want any problems while these students were still on their campuses. Students were discouraged and, in many cases, penalized for participation in protests and involvement in a variety of civil rights organizations, particularly SNCC. For example, Gwendolyn (Zoharah) Simmons, a Spelman student, was threatened by administrators that she would lose her scholarship and be forced to return home in disgrace if she continued to participate in SNCC demonstrations in Atlanta.<sup>59</sup> These contradictions forced many students to make difficult and complex choices. Students could stay in school and learn about social issues in a classroom setting, or they could learn first hand by joining the Movement. This is not to say that these were the only choices available, but for many students this was their dilemma. Some student activists intimately wedded to the Movement ended up leaving college to become more involved. They needed to be more mobile and able to devote a large amount of time to the various projects, and the time constraints of attending college interfered with their commitment to the Movement. While the students valued education, they saw the struggle as a more immediate concern.

Diane Nash, Ruby Doris Smith Robinson, and Gwendolyn (Zoharah) Simmons were three of many students who left college to work in the Movement. Nash "interrupted her education" to work full time in the Nashville Movement. She was regarded as a leader by other Nashville participants, and she became heavily involved in SNCC.<sup>60</sup> Simmons entered Spelman in 1962 and was quickly confronted with civil rights issues. Some of her classes dealt with the

history of oppression, and she also attended lectures at the Atlanta University Center where radical speakers would often address the audience. During her second year, Simmons began working full time for SNCC, and left Spelman.<sup>61</sup> Robinson, also a Spelman student, felt the need to leave school to become a full time activist in 1961.<sup>62</sup> The choice to stay in school or leave to become more involved in civil rights was further complicated by the expectations of students' families. Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman were prestigious schools with distinguished histories.<sup>63</sup> To attend such an institution was considered a tremendous opportunity by many families, and some students were the first in their family to attend college, so there was an even greater expectation. This was certainly the case for Robinson and Simmons. Simmons was the first person in her family to graduate from high school, and her friends and family were proud of her four-year scholarship to Spelman. Her family was so adamant about preventing her from participating in the Mississippi Summer Project, they literally tried to keep her in the house.<sup>64</sup> Robinson also faced pressures from her family because they were concerned about her physical well-being and her academic career.<sup>65</sup> The fear and embarrassment of jail were also concerns for the families of both women. The student activists, particularly female students, were confronted by a number of complex issues concerning their education, roles as women, and participation in the Civil Rights Movement. The contradictions they faced at school and at home led to a self-awareness that propelled them. The increasing awareness of the effects of fighting racism by student activists is felicitously summarized by Diane Nash, "Expecting my life to pursue a rather quiet course, I was also unaware that I would begin to feel part of a group of people suddenly proud to be called 'black.' Within the movement, however, we came to a realization of our own worth."<sup>66</sup> The full impact of the philosophy of these educational institutions on student participation in the Civil Rights Movement remains unclear. Students at Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman were receiving contradictory messages, yet many became civil rights leaders. The three institutions focused on the development of moral character and leadership potential, and many student activists filled these roles. At the same time, Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman also offered a curriculum in which African American culture was reflected in a variety of courses. While these classes changed and increased from 1954 to 1964, they supported the schools' aims, as well as the increased student interest. The students could not help but to be immersed in contemporary social issues for a number of reasons. They were in the movement centers, Atlanta and Nashville, and the television broadcasts kept students inundated with protest information. Students were being bombarded from every direction with information about the civil rights protests. Fisk, Morehouse, and Spelman were just one more source of information for students to transform into direct action.

#### ENDNOTES

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3. *Ibid.*, 146; and Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 174.
4. Forman, 159.
5. James D. Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 243.
6. *Ibid.*, 240.
7. Florence Matilda Read, *The Story of Spelman College* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 50.
8. Read, 70.
9. *Ibid.*, 103.
10. Jones, 316.
11. Brawley, 10; and Jones, 91.
12. Read, 234; Jones, 113; and Addie Louise Joyner Butler, *The Distinctive Black College: Talladega, Tuskegee and*

*Morehouse* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977), 113.

13. Jones, 119; and Frederick D. Patterson, "Cooperation Among the Predominantly Negro Colleges and Universities," *The Journal of Negro Education* 34 (Fall 1966): 477-84.

14. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 7.

15. *Ibid.*, 8.

16. Anderson, 241.

17. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 135.

18. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 51.

19. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 95; *Spelman Catalog* 27 (April 1954): 41; and *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 108.

20. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 110.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Fisk Catalog* 36 (May 1961): 121; and *Fisk Catalog* 39 (May 1964): 143.

23. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 111.

24. *Morehouse Catalog* 30 (May 1962): 108.

25. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 30.

26. *Spelman Catalog* 27 (April 1954): 39.

27. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 99.

28. *Spelman Catalog* 27 (April 1954): 41.

29. For a thorough discussion of historical perspectives of African American women see Cynthia Griggs Fleming, *Soon We Will Not Cry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 40-44.

30. Read, 143.

31. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 70; and *Morehouse Catalog* 30 (May 1962): 82.

32. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 70.

33. *Fisk Catalog* 30 (May 1955): 79.

34. *Fisk Catalog* 32 (May 1957): 82.

35. *Spelman Catalog* 33 (March 1960): 56.

36. *Spelman Catalog* 34 (March 1962): 56.

37. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 79.

38. *Ibid.*, 80.

39. *Spelman Catalog* 30 (April 1957): 52.

40. *Spelman Catalog* 33 (March 1960): 78.

41. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 83.

42. *Spelman Catalog* 30 (April 1957): 53.

43. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 70.

44. *Ibid.*, 98; and *Morehouse Catalog* 26 (May 1958): 106.
45. *Morehouse Catalog* 23 (May 1955): 34.
46. *Morehouse Catalog* 32 (May 1964): 133; and *Spelman Catalog* 34 (March 1962): 56.
47. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 22; and *Fisk Catalog* 30 (May 1955): 22.
48. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 117-118.
49. *Fisk Catalog* 32 (May 1957): 120 and 143.
50. *Fisk Catalog* 29 (May 1954): 119-120.
51. *Fisk Catalog* 32 (May 1957): 121; and *Fisk Catalog* 33 (May 1958): 128.
52. *Fisk Catalog* 37 (May 1962): 147.
53. *Morehouse Catalog* 22 (May 1954): 34.
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57. *Morehouse Catalog* 32 (May 1964): 34-36.
58. David Halberstam, *The Children* (New York: Random House, 1998), 72.
59. Gwendolyn (Zoharah) Simmons, Guest lecture at the University of Tennessee on 16 April 1998.
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61. Simmons lecture.
62. Fleming, 65.
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64. Simmons lecture.
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66. Diane Nash, "Inside the Sit-Ins and Freedom Rides: Testimony of a Southern Student," in *The New Negro*, ed. Mathew H. Ahmann (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1969), 49.

