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From the Editors

St. Louis and its suburbs represent a Midwestern landscape with which I am familiar, for I was born and went to high school in (and for a long time referenced as “home”) Louisville, Kentucky, a markedly similar city just down the road. The family we went on summer vacations with while growing up lived in St. Louis for a time and, on our family visits for Easter and Labor Day, I vividly recall touring, along with its famous zoo, warehouses of beautiful old architecture, already pillaged, broken down, and sold as salvage when I was barely a teenager. St. Louis is one of our SOPHE cities, where we reliably gather, in part, to puzzle and rail over racial injustices and inequities; it is a place where we recently heard from our local colleagues about St. Louis’ still-apartheid-like racial divide and celebrated brave local folk who challenge it, working out how best to serve all children, all families, all communities in spite of the still-intense racial chasm. But now St. Louis reaches a new, “improved” notoriety as center city to the suburb of Ferguson, where police gunned down yet another Black, unarmed, young man, Michael Brown. And we are left to wonder (and hope) if, once and for all, such glaring, race-based injustice has finally hit a national nerve.

Recently, NPR’s Sam Sanders (2014) asked what it means to be a Black man in today’s America, to which one man responds, “I’ve been a victim of racial profiling in Brooklyn, actually. So I was actually going to the bodega to get an Arizona iced tea...and I was approached by five white officers.” Sanders asks, “Five?,” and the man replies, “Five. Me, I’m 5’8”, 138 pounds. Then they proceed to handcuff me and take me down to the precinct. I asked why. They didn’t tell me why. To actually experience that, I lost hope ’cause it’s like, you know, these people are here to protect us. But they’re killing us.” This in a country that, in 2008, elected an African-American man President, and by his very inauguration allegedly transitioned to a post-racial nation, a term Derrick Bell likely coined 1989, but which did not gain the traction or weight of corresponding belief until the 2008 primary election season.

But, “post-racial” was never meant as a term meaning “beyond racism,” though it has become shorthand for such a colorblind modern mentality, rather it refers to the “flipping” of America, or the approaching—some say past—moment when the U.S. becomes a majority-minority nation. Everywhere the backlash against the seeming

mathematical end of white supremacy explodes from shadows and seeps from crevices, those “angry, white men,” as Michael Kimmel (2013) calls them, making a last stand to uphold their racist birthright, tied to their very notion of masculinity, and, in so doing, erupting not only in hate, anger, and violence against people of color, but in a tremendous resurgence of violence against women: this aspect a vestige of Freire’s (2000) horizontal violence as white, male oppressors come to envision a fictional end of days and reckoning of their own oppression. One such surreal ploy is the Ku Klux Klan throwing in residents’ driveways bags of candy weighting down recruitment flyers in the Hamptons last week (Baker, 2014).

Alice Goffman (2014) recently published a wholly damning, six-year, ethnographic exposé on the lives of Black men on the run from the law in one Philadelphia neighborhood. Her data leaves one aghast at the depth, drive, and dysfunction of the surveillance state in Black inner-cities, its pernicious and pervasive policing tactics, and how these yield a broken society in which men with something so small as unpaid court fines or a failure to appear in court cannot attend their children’s births or families’ funerals. For the police now hang out in hospitals, and routinely video funerals in order to pick up and detain those on the run. These travesties against one’s basic humanity, this robbery of the rituals that make community and family, along with out-of-all-proportion police tactics used to muscle women into telling the whereabouts of their men—sons, fathers, partners, husbands, brothers, nephews, cousins—end in carried-out threats such as repeated, wanton, callous destruction of property, and constructing reasons DCFS should seize and remove children from an uncooperative woman’s home.

Such ritualistic, destructive treatment of inner-city Black folk amounts to nothing short of the manufacture and imposition of abject terror. This terrorism is made possible directly because we *are* a post-racial, savagely color-aware society, and society drives this terror whose dominant group, whites, *still* believe African-Americans less-than-human, uncivilized, savage, and a threat to white majority status. This terrorism arises from the consequences of 250 years of slavery, of the United States’ total dependence on a slave-based economy to rise to the level of superpower and remain there (Coates, 2014), just as today we remain a slave-based economy. And it is past time we step up to call these policies and practices what they are: terrorism. Our public servants perpetrate terror against our own citizens, our fellow man, and on hallowed, patriotic, domestic soil. Congress exponentially ratcheted upward this terror when, post-9/11, it gave local police forces millions

to arm themselves against the perceived threat of domestic terrorism. The militarization of local police forces and their shiny, expansive cache of warfare weaponry, including armored vehicles—essentially tanks—, perhaps first became apparent during Boston’s unprecedented, city-wide lockdown following the marathon bombing when, though it surely looked as if the National Guard or U.S. Army occupied Boston, it was in fact simply local police. For police departments took these government-offered resources, even in the sleepest, most crime-free towns and cities, even when there was no reason to believe they would ever be needed. But newly flush with military equipment, at some point, one must begin to believe policing’s relation to warfare and enter a corresponding state of militarization and a tendency toward martial law. Furthermore, largely white police forces most often invoke—and rationalize entitlement to—a militarized, martial law when faced with race-based “unrest.” This relation recalls the U.S.’ most staggering domestic, race-based terrorist event in 1921 (Askew, 2001) when the U.S., for the only time in history, bombed, from aircraft, its own citizens in Tulsa, Oklahoma’s “Black Wall Street” to quell perceived “rioting,” which was actually Black folks organizing to protect a wrongly accused young man of attempted rape from the determined white mob setting about to lynch him. The Tulsa, OK race riot (and such a term gravely demeans the unimaginable scope of tragedy, destruction, and loss) still stands as the most violent racial incident in U.S. history.

As Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) argues so brilliantly, were we not a nation whose dominant group believes—and actively constructs and reconstructs—African-Americans as less-than, we could not continue to legislate terror as a slave-class status that effectively bars African Americans from seemingly boundless, meritocratic U.S. economic opportunity and prosperity. This systematic discrimination happens at every turn: through restrictions on “progressive,” long-lasting, New Deal programs like Social Security and unemployment insurance (which “initially excluded farmworkers and domestics—jobs heavily occupied by” (p. 64) Blacks); through “rating” neighborhoods for loan risk based upon the race of its inhabitants (denying legitimate mortgages to Black folk, forcing them to seek predatory lending, and shutting Blacks out of citizens’ single best wealth-building opportunity—home ownership); and Title III of the GI Bill (which, rather than ceding loan authority to the federal level, Congress legislated decision-making control to white officials at local VAs, shutting Black veterans out of home loans) (Coates, 2014). Today, one most readily sees that discrimination, that terror, in the enormous, machine-like, neoliberal profitability of the prison industrial complex and all that feeds it, schools inclusive. And this is to say nothing of how radically negatively a felony conviction eternally alters a person’s—and in particular a Black man’s—political, social, economic, and familial future.

One of the knowledge bombs Coates (2014) drops in his profound, provocative *Atlantic* essay “The Case for Reparations,” is when he posits the economic and political success of U.S. democracy is founded upon its dependence on the benefits of slave labor and its practices of “[B]lack plunder” (p. 62). In short, the U.S. could never have amassed the wealth or the power or the resources to break from the crown were it not for slavery’s legality, which “created the economic foundation for its experiment in democracy” (p. 62); policy protected indentured servants, not slaves: an astonishing insight. Jumping forward in time, with the U.S. still firmly entrenched in a post-slavery, slave-based economy, historian Katznelson argues, “The Jim Crow South [and, I would argue the new Jim Crow America, as Michelle Alexander theorizes (2012)], was the one collaborator America’s democracy could not do without” (quoted in Coates, 2014), designed as it was to make governmental social programs masquerading as “the new American safety net ‘a sieve with holes just big enough for the majority of Negroes to fall through’” (Coates and NAACP quoted in Coates, 2014, p. 64). A sobering new reality, today’s Jim Crow (Alexander, 2012), with its astonishing percentage of African-American males imprisoned, paroled, or on the run, completely undermines the collectivist notion we mythically attribute to democracy, disempowering these men of democracy’s very foundational ideals: the franchise, home, liberty, and—most crushingly—the pursuit of happiness.

With so much already lost, the terror society perpetrates on Black America reads as even more systemic, systematic, purposeful, evil in its angriness, its surety, its entitlement. The senseless deaths of African-American young men—America’s fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons—are not because of the actions, foolishness, or even hatred of a few bad cops. We need immediately to silence that pernicious myth once and for all, calling it out whenever its deeply deluded, dismissive conclusion is raised. What we need to be asking ourselves as a culture is, “What can be done?” and, importantly, “How morally can we permit terrorism enacted upon our fellow mankind, upon fellow citizens?” For, although an important step in acting on such revelatory knowledge is calling to task false attributions, false conclusions, and false consciousness—as important certainly as calling terror by its name and naming those individuals who perpetrate terror—, work of a whole different scale is needed at the systemic level before we can begin to cop to the witheringly discriminatory, disruptive history of African-Americans in the United States. A first step detailed in Coates’ (2014) “The Case for Reparations” is the passing of HR 40.

Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Detroit, has raised House Resolution 40 every year for his past 25 years in office, yet his resolution,

in which he proposes a study on payment of reparations to African-Americans, has never made it to the floor, neither under Democratic- nor Republican-controlled House (Coates, 2014), largely because “The popular mocking of reparations as a harebrained scheme authored by wild-eyed lefties and intellectually unserious [B]lack nationalists is fear masquerading as laughter” (pp. 69–70). Mind you, Conyers’ resolution only proposes *studying* reparations and authorizes not a dime for paying reparations (although the term “reparations” does not necessarily indicate monetary recompense); he merely proposes studying reparations the same way we routinely authorize funds and resources to study our water, air, and environment. But, even to study, even exploring and educating ourselves as a nation in such knowledge as what happened, what contributed, who benefited, and how Black Americans came to, “for centuries, ... [live] in America’s crosshairs” as a result of slavery-based systems of oppression (p. 62) remains far too threatening. For “The idea of reparations is frightening not simply because we might lack the ability to pay. The idea of reparations threatens something much deeper—America’s heritage, history, and standing in the world” (p. 69). But, this is the risk we must take and exactly what makes the work of a task like HR 40 vitally important. Studying reparations and understanding the context created for its need may be the only way we can ever become great as a nation, the only way we can morally, honorably claim to be civilized beings, and is certainly the only way we can ever gain our full humanity as a people, and that means to struggle to understand, to educate ourselves, to feel the shame and pain, and to do all of these with genuine, thoughtful intent. To begin such a project is our only hope of moving as a nation toward a humane racial reality and an end to this reign of terror. Otherwise, we risk the unfathomable: an endless telling and retelling of the story of Michael Brown and his lost brothers without ever hearing the real story.

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Dedication



Don Hufford

Professor Don Hufford dedicated the first 40 years of his professional life to serving children and youth in diverse social service and educational organizations. Working side-by-side with his wife, Evie, Don first strove to influence troubled youth at Morgan Memorial Youth and Children's Center in Boston's then-notorious South End. During that time, Don worked summers as Assistant Director of the Morgan Memorial Fresh Air Camps in the Massachusetts Berkshires and one summer as the Resident Director of the Hayden School for Boys, a Morgan Memorial-affiliated program to which the juvenile court system referred adolescent boys. Don fondly remembers a one-on-one basketball game he played in Boston's South End with the leader of the *Scorpions*, for that game opened the door to encouraging the group to get off the streets and into an organized program and led to their changing their name from the deadly *Scorpions* to *Majestics*. Amazingly, Don still has contact with young men from those Boston days, young men now in their 70s.

After leaving Massachusetts, Don became Campus Life Supervisor for United Methodist Youthville in Newton, Kansas, part of a residential treatment program for boys and girls needing special guidance and direction. Two years later, he moved to Dodge City, Kansas to oversee the development of a new program, Youthville at Dodge City, a treatment-oriented, residential-educational program for disturbed adolescent boys. While Director of Youthville in Dodge City, Don began serving as an adjunct instructor for Dodge City Community College and St. Mary of the Plains College teaching such courses as Sociology, Human Growth and Development, and Marriage and the Family.

Perhaps teaching at these two community colleges whetted Don's appetite for further study and piqued his interest in teaching adults rather than adolescents, for after retiring from Youthville, Don and his wife, Evie, began a new educational adventure first pursuing Ph.D.s at the University of Kansas and then teaching in higher education. Don joined Newman University's School of Education faculty in 1992 with Evie joining the faculty the next year. Don has now spent this second—now 22-year—career in higher education at Newman University where students, faculty, and administrators honored him with the Distinguished Teaching Award in 2000; where the student winning the prestigious Ablah Award selected him as her mentor; and where he served as Commencement Speaker for winter 1999 and spring 2000 graduation ceremonies.

Although starting out rather late in life as a full-time, university professor, Don has achieved considerable success in academe beyond his outstanding work at Newman. Don has served as president of the Missouri Valley Philosophy of Education Society (1998) and of Society of Philosophy and History of Education (2008) and presented the prestigious Drake Lecture for the Educational Foundations Society (2009). He has published three book chapters, *The Hufford Reader*, and has published in such journals and yearbooks as the *The Journal of Religious Thought*, *Educational Considerations*, *Journal of the Philosophy and History of Education*, *The Newman Review*, *The Kansas Teacher Education Advocate*, *Journal of Maine Education*, *The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings*, *Proceedings for the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education*, and in two on-line journals, *Critical Questions in Education* and *Free Inquiry*.

Furthermore, Don has presented numerous academic papers in such venues as: Missouri Valley Philosophy of Education Society, Association for Religion and Intellectual Life, Association for the Sociology of Religion, Association of Independent Liberal Arts Colleges,

Pedagogy of the Oppressed Conference, American Educational Studies Association, Society of Philosophy and History of Education, Conference on Inclusion, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, National Conference on Family Relations, Higher Education Teaching and Learning Conference, Association for Moral Education, Adult Education Research Conference, Academy for Educational Studies, Newman University Literary Festival, Radical Philosophy Society, Association of Teacher Educators, American Philosophical Society, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Oklahoma Education Studies Association, Association for Humanist Sociology, Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, Western Social Science Association, and Critical Questions in Education Conference.

The Society of Philosophy and History of Education (SoPHE) provides its members opportunities to try out ideas, to explore their possibilities, and to marvel at their colleagues' thinking, activism, and fortitude. Don's presentations at SoPHE certainly reflect his 62-year, two-pronged career in education: his abiding faith in education as a means to improving society and individuals' lives within that society. As a teacher educator, Don focuses on the teacher as transformative intellectual. Cautioning that teacher preparation should include pre-service teachers' personal development toward self-awareness and self-knowledge, Don draws from both religious and secular sources to construct the foundation for such personal growth through self-awareness and self-knowledge—Freire, Krishnamurti, Confucius, Drake, and May, among others—and seems tirelessly to look for further insights into ways to know oneself, ways positively to influence his pre-service teachers' lives, and thereby ways to influence the young people his pre-service teachers will teach.

While we, Don's friends and colleagues, marvel at and honor him for his professional accomplishments, Don is most proud of his family. Although his beloved wife, Evie, died of breast cancer one month after their 50th wedding anniversary, in September 2002, Don continues to speak of his love and respect for and his partnership with Evie, continues to tell how much he owes to his lovely Evie. Always, too, a proud father, Don is blessed with three children and 11 grandchildren. Don's daughter, Tara Walker, is an award-winning art teacher in Wichita, Kansas; his eldest son, Scott Hufford, Massachusetts Cultural Council (Boston) staff member, encourages the artistic and musical community; his youngest son, Brian Hufford, is a successful attorney in New York City. His children have made him a rich man.

I consider myself fortunate to know and engage with Don for the 16 years since he first attended SoPHE in 1998. He is a kind, thoughtful,

and thinking man with experiences few educators have to bring to their teaching and scholarship. He has tread where few have had the courage and passion to pass and yet remains positive, affirming, and relentlessly adamant that education improves individual lives and society at large. We the SoPHE membership thank you, Don, for your many contributions.

David Snelgrove
University of Central Oklahoma

In Memorium



Joe L. Green

Joe Green and I met at a Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society (precursor of SoPHE) meeting in the 1970s. The year that I gave the Presidential Address, he was the site chair at Southwest Louisiana State University in Lafayette, Louisiana; the next year Joe gave the Presidential Address. At the various conferences we both attended, I never missed an opportunity to hear Joe's talks and to have dinner with this great storyteller and our fellow colleagues. Joe's wife, Emmilee, sent the photo of Joe Green, Lloyd Williams, and Martha Tevis at the 1977, Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society meeting included later in this tribute to our friend and colleague, Joe Green. She said, "Joe always looked forward to getting together at the meetings with everyone. Those meetings helped keep him inspired for his profession." Through the years I came to know many aspects of Joe's personality and want here to recall some of my impressions.

I remember the fun we had writing a paper together in the late 1970s, for Joe had what southerners might call a "delicious" sense of humor. Emmilee chose the picture heading this tribute because she thinks it shows his wonderful—his delicious—sense of humor. Combining scholarly research with down-home charm, Joe Green was as

comfortable discussing Heidegger as he was explaining the fine points of bluegrass music. My favorite of his conference presentations was the time he received an exceptionally enthusiastic response when he gave a presentation on Huey Long's contributions to education in Louisiana. Once he had closed the discussion period, he said, "Well, I have something to tell you. I submitted this paper 13 times before anyone would publish it, and I just found out that it was awarded the Louisiana Teachers' Association's Award for the best paper on Louisiana education this year." He taught us all a lesson in patience that day.

At conferences, Joe's friends and colleagues didn't simply attend his presentations; we never missed an opportunity to sit with Joe at meals because very soon he would begin one of his stories. On a scale of one to ten as a southern storyteller, Joe was at least a ten. The story might go on for five minutes (rarely), half an hour, or more, but he never lost his audience. I always thought that if Joe ever decided to change careers, he could do very well writing in the vein of Flannery O'Connor or Eudora Welty.

On a personal rather than professional level, one of Joe's most endearing traits was his love for his family and later in life his pride and joy that he and Emmilee had celebrated 50 years together on their last wedding anniversary, June 7, 2013. When he was a Chair at Louisiana State University in Shreveport, the Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society met there, and Joe and Emmilee invited us to their home for a reception. Joe's pride in Emmilee's talents in design and decorating was evident as he showed us through their home. During that visit and every time we met, he had wonderful stories to tell about their children and Emmilee. He and Emmilee shared a love of a comfortable home, love of family, and love of traveling—especially by car. Sometimes, Joe combined his love of travel with his hobby of collecting old post cards. One day when Joe was working at Texas Tech University, I received from him a post card from the 1920s: a church in Seymour, Texas. Joe's phenomenal memory had kicked in while he and Emmilee were exploring west Texas, for he remembered my telling him several years earlier that my mother had been reared on a ranch near Seymour, Texas, found the card in a little shop, and years after our conversation, sent it to me! As the years went on, even when we no longer saw each other at conferences, we continued to keep up by phone.

When Joe and Emmilee retired, they moved to Harrisonburg, Louisiana, population 476 in 1999 (U.S. Census estimate July 1, 1999), located about 38 miles from Natchez, Mississippi and 55 miles from Alexandria, Louisiana. Harrisonburg was where Emmilee grew up and where Joe had his first job, a position as a basketball coach. Upon

retirement, they moved into Emmilee's family home and began to renovate. One day Joe called and said, "Well, I have always envied Clint Allison. He sits in his study and watches deer and wild life, and I have always wanted a study like that. Now I have one. I have large windows all around, and I can sit and read watching the Ouachita River run by; it is very relaxing." He was a happy man.



Joe's return to Emmilee's family home, to the town where he had his first job, and to creating and enjoying this fabulous study led to his telling stories not simply for pleasure but as a sort of second career. He and Emmilee had moved back to a town where he was a hero. He called one day and said they were moved into the house, and he had been down to the coffee shop where he was greeted as a celebrity. As a young man, Joe had been hired as the basketball coach for a team needing some success. From the beginning of his tenure with the team, Joe coached them to winning seasons, nine winning seasons. He said, "They don't know and don't care about my doctorate, but they think I am somebody, and everyone calls me 'Coach.'" I had never heard him so happy. As coach he began visiting around collecting stories as he went. Then, he began writing "An Old Coach Remembers" for the local paper. That made him a celebrity a second time. When he passed away, the service was held in the gym. Those attending sat in the bleachers, and his beloved bluegrass, an old-timey music, played throughout the service. A view of the service and of his and Emmilee's home accompanied by the music he loved is on YouTube at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsirC20eu-Y>

I include the following passage from the obituary his children wrote honoring their father:

Dr. Green's Long memorabilia will become part of the Tulane Archives in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Joe passed while doing what he loved, taking a road trip with his wife through the Louisiana countryside. It was his wish that his body be donated to the LSU Medical Center so that more could be learned about the conditions of diabetes, Parkinson's and heart disease, which he graciously managed for many years. This was the generosity of his Spirit, that even through the death of his body he could continue to serve others.

Continuing without him, but eternally blessed by his legacy and love, are his wife, Emmilee Johnson Green, daughter Kathryn and her husband Jay Brady, son John and his wife Mandy Green, and grandchildren Finn Green Brady and Sarah Green. Donations in Joe's honor can be made to the Catahoula Parish Library. While his great light has left this earth, he will continue to shine on through those he touched so deeply, helping us all to "Keep on the sunny side, friends." (*Catahoula News Booster*, November 13, 2013)

Martha May Tevis
University of Texas–Pan American

2013 SOPHE Presidential Address

Getting a Concept of Coeducation

Susan Laird,¹ University of Oklahoma

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving assistance.

—Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C., §1681–1688

If there is any misleading concept it is that of “coeducation”: that because women and men are sitting in the same classrooms, hearing the same lectures, reading the same books, performing the same laboratory experiments, they are receiving an equal education. They are not, first because the content of education itself validates men even as it invalidates women. Its very message is that men have been the shapers and thinkers of the world, and that this is only natural.... Women and men do not receive an equal education because outside the classroom women are perceived not as sovereign beings but as prey.

—Adrienne Rich, “Claiming an Education,” p. 168

One year after Richard Nixon signed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, I confronted coeducation such as Rich has described when I entered architecture school along with many men and very few women. Most likely, without this law authored by the first woman of color ever elected to U.S. Congress, Japanese-American Patsy Matsu Takemoto Mink, this journal’s contributors and readers would be almost entirely male today.² Designated upon her death the “Patsy T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act,” Title IX is not so simple in practice as its text makes it seem. Two decades later the American Association of University Women (AAUW) initiated a vast program of educational research that has contributed to administrative deliberations over federal policy interpreting the Mink Act, whose author was an AAUW “Member of Note.”³ Sadly, AAUW’s empirical research has documented the truth of Rich’s claim.

I loved design and excelled at it, but abandoned my architecture education after five semesters and changed my career path to enter what Catharine Beecher called “woman’s ‘true’ profession,” teaching school. For I was utterly dismayed by the unnecessary absence of women

architecture faculty, the unnecessary absence of women from the history and theory of architecture curricula, and the apparently accepted status of women architecture students as simultaneously unwelcome “immigrants”⁴ and sexual prey. If you have seen Nathaniel Kahn’s documentary film *My Architect*, you may have some sense of the abusive situation that, at age 23, I decided I could not accept. My own racially desegregated, church-sponsored high-schooling in the late 1960s had been sex-segregated with the existentialist educational aim of cultivating girls’ “courage to be,” an ontological and ethical aim that I learned to take seriously even if I had no opportunity to study physics or drafting ’til college. So I confess I was shocked and bewildered to discover Rich’s claim also described accurately the sex-desegregated, progressive public high school where I taught English. Tragically, much of its truth is still evident in public schools.

As I began my third year of school-teaching, a friend gave me an offprint of Jane Roland Martin’s article in *Harvard Educational Review*: “Excluding Women from the Educational Realm.”⁵ In it she explained how late-modern, analytic philosophy of education had excluded, distorted, and devalued women as both subjects and objects of educational thought, and therefore posed many provocative questions for the field. From the moment I read it, I knew I must pursue my Ph.D. Martin’s philosophical challenge to study the concept of coeducation resonated strongly with puzzlements my teaching experiences had posed for me. So, thirty years ago, I went back to graduate school wanting to write my dissertation on the “misleading” concept of coeducation. A National Women’s Studies Association symposium I heard in 1983—“Should Public Education Be Gender-Free?” presented by philosophers of education Ann Diller, Maryann Ayim, Kathryn Pauly Morgan, and Barbara Houston—made this aim seem not only reasonable but worthwhile.⁶

When I began drafting my dissertation prospectus, Jane Martin commended my idea, too, but my adviser forbade this topic because, he insisted, coeducation was “not a concept.” Consequently, I did not write my dissertation on the concept of coeducation. However, I continued to wonder: Why is coeducation such a thin concept? Is it a thin concept because it lacks substance worthy of study, or just because we have evaded the task of studying it? Especially when controversy emerges concerning the possible value of what empirical researchers call “single-sex education” (as if we should know what that means) such wonderments acquire new practical urgency, making important neglected philosophical inquiry on coeducation. Therefore I have made getting a concept of coeducation my lifetime purpose as a philosopher of education,⁷ by studying highly various thought on this concept by John

Dewey and the community of women teachers at Chicago's Laboratory School, Louisa May Alcott, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Anna Julia Haywood Cooper, Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf, and Girl Scouts USA.⁸ Tonight I focus our attention on such thought implicitly evident in, or evaded and prompted by, empirical research on public coeducation that the AAUW published between 1991 and 2013. (The most recent report focuses on women students in community colleges.⁹)

Thus I will try to untangle some conceptual confusion that makes coeducation misleading. Common-sense talk about "single-sex education" and "coeducation"—which the AAUW has uncritically adopted in its empirical research discourse—often becomes mired in ambiguity with regard to educational ends and means that such terms may signify. Here I will invite you to consider with me many provocative ethical and pedagogical questions that may arise if, as readers of AAUW research, we question that means-ends ambiguity and insist upon more precise conceptual language that recognizes sex-segregation and sex-desegregation as educational means with variable aims and consequences. I will name only two categories of such educational ends here: "one-sex education" and "coeducation." To avoid unnecessarily distracting, sibilant repetition, I will drop the prefix "sex-" even as I imply it whenever I specify, "segregated" and "desegregated." This shorthand usage may call various familiar racial analogies to mind, whose intersectionality with this issue of gender justice may further complicate and develop this inquiry helpfully, offering diverse painful reminders that aimless, thoughtless desegregation—whether racial or sexual—can have unjust, miseducative consequences. Thus intersectionality elicited by this usage may give us repeated pause, as it should: not only to wonder at how substantially African Americans have contributed to thought about coeducation, but also to consider how the stubborn racial injustice of racially desegregated public schooling has led to recent controversial discussions about the possible educational value that voluntary sex-segregated¹⁰ schooling may offer African-American boys. I hope that this exercise in conceptual clarification may prove useful for that important ongoing discussion, which limited space prevents me from taking up here. Meanwhile, too, you may fairly also consider this analysis a cautionary tale about any empirical social-scientific research on education that neglects the philosopher's logical work of clarifying concepts and values—and at the same time a plea that philosophers of education should take such research seriously as an object of conceptual critique.

I. Coeducation—An Experiment

The word “coeducation” was not yet in the English lexicon when, in 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft published *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, critiquing the miseducative character of monarchy and proposing a government-funded, national system of coeducation for all children, rich and poor.¹¹ She theorized coeducational aims and desegregated means for educating women as an experiment, to test the rightness of women’s claims to intelligent humanity, and argued this experiment would be an ethical necessity for revolutionary republics such as those France and the U.S. were then beginning to build. Martin’s *Reclaiming a Conversation* re-introduced philosophers of education to Wollstonecraft’s educational thought after its long neglect, at the same time proposing, “We must understand that some of the most interesting and significant theories of female education may have been authored not by single individuals but by groups of individuals.”¹² As Martin herself would later suggest, the AAUW may be such a group.¹³ Founded in 1881,¹⁴ the AAUW is “a community that breaks through educational and economic barriers so that all women have a fair chance,” working together to “advance equity for women and girls through advocacy, education, and research.”¹⁵ Committed to coeducation as an aim for educational sex-equity, albeit while organizing voluntary segregated education programs to study controversial projects relevant to its mission, the AAUW has become a metaphoric *ad hoc* Principal Investigator for an extended version of the experiment Wollstonecraft had proposed.¹⁶ Since 1991, in a Pragmatist spirit, the AAUW has sponsored over two dozen reports of methodologically diverse, empirical research on culturally diverse girls’ and women’s education within both segregated and desegregated contexts, including, but not limited to, schools, college and university campuses, and online environments. Various teams of scholars and researchers who have produced the AAUW’s many reports come from almost every research specialty found in any college of education—as well as popular journalism—but have excluded philosophers of education.

Yet the latest of their reports on schooling does share Wollstonecraft’s concerns to expand girls’ educational opportunities, to examine comparatively and critically both boys’ and girls’ schooling and education, and to extend those privileges as rights to all children, regardless of socioeconomic status. At least implicitly, their 2008 research vindicates Wollstonecraft’s proposed experiment, whose positive consequences the report’s foreword celebrates: “Women and girls have made remarkable gains in education during the past 100 years, disrupting the belief—now largely unspoken—that boys and men are

better 'suited' to intellectual work."¹⁷ Meanwhile, white U.S. advocacy for segregated education has become philosophically ambiguous: it can reflect democratic concerns supported by AAUW research that often desegregation does obstruct gender justice, thereby miseducating both sexes; or it can reflect concerns to preserve pious traditions of white, female purity, white, male privilege, and compulsory heterosexuality. This circumstance makes conceptual inquiry on coeducational aims important for advocates of segregated education who value both gender justice and racial and sexual justice, no less than for practitioners of desegregated education.

II. The Problem of One-Sex Education

Worthy of *JoPHE* scholars' future historical research, the Mink Act's opposition to one-sex education enjoys strong support from the Obama administration, but under both Reagan and Bush administrations it has become subject to regressive modification.¹⁸ With federal administrations' support for its purpose initially, the Mink Act

...prohibited single-sex classes or programs within coed public schools, with some limited exceptions. Single-sex was permitted for physical education activities involving contact sports, sex education at the elementary and secondary levels, and choral groups. Other than these exceptions, Title IX prohibited single-sex programs unless such programs were designed to overcome the effects of past discrimination. To meet this standard, a school district had to show that the sex-based exclusion was necessary to overcome historical sex-based barriers that have disadvantaged those who would benefit from the program. For example, an all-girl math class may have met this standard if the class was designed to compensate for girls' limited participation in math.¹⁹

In 1995 the AAUW recommended "a guarded enthusiasm" for segregated classes that respected these regulations,²⁰ and later investigated that recommendation further, convening *empirical* researchers for "*philosophical* debate" about it, who acknowledged, "No learning environment," whether segregated or desegregated, "provides a sure escape from sexism."²¹ Observing also that "feminist," segregated²² education seemed to benefit girls more than segregated education that avoided critique of its social context's gender inequality, these empirical researchers could not make a reliable empirical claim segregated education "works" or is "better" than desegregated education without formulating the normative meaning of a "good education," or "the goals of education."²³ Obviously, such formulation is a philosophical research task for which few empirical researchers in education have been

educated explicitly. This roundtable's evaluative paralysis before such basic philosophical concerns recalls Martin's questions six years before the AAUW began its aggressive educational research agenda:

How can a woman avoid shallow solutions to the problems education poses if she never hears what has been said by those who have thought deeply on the subject? How can she know what education to claim if she has never entered into philosophical conversation about this education herself, indeed never even realized that such conversation existed?²⁴

The AAUW has never published even one report of philosophical research on women's and girls' education, or coeducation. Meanwhile, scholarly studies of girls' and women's education in the two decades following the Mink Act, including the AAUW's reports, sparked backlash in 2000, with critics charging that such particular attention to girls' education had put boys at unjust educational disadvantage. Endorsing that backlash, the Bush administration weakened the Mink Act's civil rights protections. In response, AAUW research has debunked "the current hype of the 'boys' crisis, which is often given as a justification for allowing unrestricted, publicly funded," segregated education while "women and girls still face inequities in educational opportunities,"²⁵ but has approved segregated education, "so long as it is appropriate, necessary, and done in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements and existing antidiscrimination laws."²⁶ This battle over the question of deregulating segregation in schools leaves us still in want of normative philosophical inquiry concerning coeducational aims by which the strategy's application might be appraised. This remains a serious gap in the AAUW's work.

III. Coeducational Aims—To Segregate or Desegregate the Sexes?

Both "single-sex education" and "coeducation" are today naïve concepts—thin, under-theorized, blind to their philosophical history and their practical complexities—many of which the AAUW has documented empirically nonetheless. Unlike Wollstonecraft, the AAUW theorizes no particular critical concept of miseducation. However, AAUW reports show that, conceived vaguely with no specificity regarding teaching, learning, or curriculum, both segregated and desegregated education have evidenced miseducative outcomes problematic for gender justice. Yet could each strategy perhaps offer some distinctive assistance toward that difficult end if each were defined and deployed specifically to achieve particular coeducational aims?

The AAUW defines single-sex education simplistically, as "classes or schools attended by only one sex."²⁷ Yet, might one-sex education

not also be conceived—admittedly with a radically deconstructive twist—as classes or schools attended by both sexes that enable one sex’s learning and disable or devalue the other’s? Can these polemically opposed terms, “single-sex education” and “coeducation,” be conceptually helpful to educators if they signify only *means* of schooling, e.g., segregation and desegregation, independent of their educational *ends*? The Mink Act challenges desegregated practices—such as sexual harassment—that have too often seemed to sustain sexism as an end, initially allowing only segregated educational practices that aim specifically for “coeducational” ends—such as equal opportunity to learn. Could segregated schooling’s early 21st-century deregulation reflect endorsement of one-sex education not merely as a means but also as an end? That question is implicit in the AAUW’s opposition to deregulation of segregated education, and might constitute a major plea for a thought experiment to test the pragmatic applicability of segregated educational strategies to particular coeducational aims.

AAUW research has implied contemporary translations of coeducational aims that Wollstonecraft theorized in 1792. For example: (a) offering freedom to claim honest female selfhood; (b) confounding the sex distinction; (c) fostering political, economic, and sexual equality; (d) cultivating sexual mutuality; and, to a substantially lesser extent than Wollstonecraft advocated, (e) providing public education for childrearing. Wollstonecraft conceived each of these coeducational aims and advocated desegregated means for their achievement, but AAUW has admitted the possible utility of segregated educational strategies for achieving them. Which of these aims that Wollstonecraft formulated for coeducation could today reasonably be accomplished through segregated means more effectively than through desegregated means alone? How? To what degree or extent? And with what consequences for surrounding, desegregated contexts? Today I can only pose and gloss, not answer or even develop fully, such questions.

A. Offering Freedom to Claim Honest Female Selfhood

The AAUW has updated the critical spirit of Wollstonecraft’s religious dissent against Divine Rights of Kings, husbands, and parents, her concern about women’s human right to develop honest selfhood. Whereas Wollstonecraft enjoined women to unmediated communion with a rational and just God, the AAUW has adopted an intense psychological focus upon the educational importance of girls’ developing rational “self-esteem,” defined by the AAUW as “a governor on dreams and future actions.”²⁸ Besides recommending scientific learning as a corrective for girls’ suffering self-esteem, the AAUW has called attention also to an “evaded curriculum” whose subject matter includes both “The Expression and Valuing of Feelings” and “Gender and Power,” and

recommended that “Students...begin to discuss more openly the ways in which ascribed power, whether on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual orientation, or religion affects different lives....”²⁹ Sponsored by the AAUW, journalist Peggy Orenstein’s *SchoolGirls* provides narrative insight into coeducational miseducation, premised upon her understanding that “Girls with healthy self-esteem have an appropriate sense of their potential, their competence, and their innate value as individuals. They feel a sense of entitlement: license to take up space in the world, a right to be heard and to express the full spectrum of human emotions.”³⁰ Orenstein demonstrated the (admittedly difficult) possibility of coeducational teaching that prizes *boys* learning respect for women and for girls’ self-esteem, and at the same time documented the particular value Latina girls’ segregated education for self-esteem in a YWCA might have. Later, however, AAUW researchers raise doubts about popular claims that girls in segregated schools have stronger self-concepts, albeit conceding that a segregated environment’s safety has been critical to many middle-school girls’ identity development and that “Something” about segregated classes “makes them preferred by many girls” over desegregated ones.³¹

Can honest female selfhood emerge and grow in segregated spaces with peer encouragement and support through conflicts and difficulties that inevitably arise? Can honest female selfhood emerge and grow in less-protective, desegregated spaces where girls may confront peer challenges that threaten sexist domination? Other categories of voluntary self-segregation—for example, according to ethnicity, race, or sexual orientation—may also become necessary to achieve the coeducational aim of offering freedom to claim honest, female selfhood. Who would not prefer peer encouragement and support over peer challenges that threaten social or sexual domination? Yet how can either boys and men or girls and women learn to value freedom for honest female selfhood if they never have opportunity for learning to negotiate ethically those peer challenges that threaten to foreclose democratic possibilities? Although segregated spaces may also present conflicts and difficulties that threaten racist or heterosexist or other sorts of domination, might segregated spaces nonetheless help to prevent, prepare for, and recover from harmful or threatening peer challenges that learners are not yet otherwise sufficiently honest and strong to resist? Could both segregation and desegregation help to achieve this coeducational aim of offering freedom to claim honest female selfhood, especially if purposefully coordinated with each other, and if the teaching and the curriculum are well-suited to this aim and to the learners themselves?

B. Confounding the Sex Distinction

Wollstonecraft’s language is deliberate: “I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of sex confounded in society, unless where love animates

the behavior.”³² To confound is not to refuse or deny or ignore; to confound is to cause surprise or confusion, to prove wrong or defeat, or to mix up. Her coeducational aim of confounding the sex-distinction, mandated skepticism about teaching one sex a particular subject or set of skills, but not the other, therefore means educating for both sexes’ mental and physical strength. The AAUW has pursued that same aim with comparable rational fervor, commending both segregated and desegregated strategies that have this purpose. Wollstonecraft would praise the AAUW’s strong emphasis on educating girls in sciences, technologies, engineering, and mathematics (STEM); on girls’ participation in sports and athletics; and on explicit teaching about sexuality and health. The AAUW has updated this coeducational aim by confounding also oppositional, essentialist conceptions of gender with alertness to its diverse cultural expressions, and Martin has proposed an ideal of gender justice that “takes gender into account when it makes a difference and ignores it when it does not.”³³ Advocating segregated educational strategies that serve gender justice and rejecting those that do not, the AAUW seems to “confound the sex distinction” by practicing gender-sensitivity that invokes sex as primarily a *political* distinction while regarding the essentialist *ontological* distinction as problematic.

C. Fostering Political, Economic, and Sexual Equality

Wollstonecraft critiqued imperial monarchism’s sexual economy (especially its slavery, common and legal prostitution, and children’s workhouses) to argue for political-economic, sexual equality as a coeducational aim. However, the AAUW has not critiqued, but deployed, the global-corporatist political economy on U.S. women’s behalf: to claim its resources for women’s scholarships and fellowships, for research and advocacy projects, and for coeducation’s improvement to achieve gender justice. Without addressing compulsory heterosexuality’s construction of gender inequalities,³⁴ the AAUW amends Wollstonecraft’s argument for sex equality in the political economy by arguing for educators’ necessary alertness to the double and sometimes even multiple political-economic jeopardy of sex and race, reflected in “Occupational segregation among women of color” and in Black, female-headed households’ high rates of child poverty.³⁵ Focused on the “pay gap” between educated women and men, the AAUW’s many other reports have reflected concern for economically diverse girls’ and women’s preparation and resources to earn their own independent living—although the AAUW has not yet taken up critical inquiry on education in and for professions other than STEM fields and the tenured professoriate to any substantial extent.³⁶

Just as Wollstonecraft envisioned women's political participation and representation as integral to this coeducational aim of gender equality, the AAUW's many local branch organizations and Action Network provide informal segregated education for women's political participation across the nation, especially around the issue of pay equity, and its Public Policy and Government Relations Department represents women's concerns about gender justice in the national political arena, publishing an annual Federal Policy Agenda, much of which concerns education. The AAUW has also hosted "Sister-to-Sister" summits in schools and national conferences to educate campus women student leaders.

Such voluntary segregated education may enable learning to make those political affiliations necessary to persevere and prevail in difficult advocacy for gender equality. At the same time, desegregation may enable learning to understand political strategies and controversies and forge coalitions necessary to make advocacy for gender equality effective. Even if desegregation does not ensure materially equal resources for women's and men's education, materially equal resources for their education are unlikely without desegregation, the AAUW has argued. Nor can such resources reasonably be judged a trivial concern in a nation whose public-funded schools suffer from such profound political-economic inequality, exacerbated by government vouchers for private schools, privatization of public education, and a punitive system of accountability that devalues gender justice. Can this coeducational aim of fostering political, economic, and sexual equality be achieved without segregated education? ...or without desegregated education?

D. Cultivating Sexual Mutuality

Wollstonecraft theorizes monarchist miseducation fosters a double standard of sexual morality—libertinism for men, chastity (or prostitution) for women—which oppresses women directly and children indirectly.³⁷ Therefore, she advocates desegregated learning so boys and girls might develop mutuality as one another's friends. She argues such friendship development could educate them to resist the dangerous delusions of heterosexual romance and, at the same time, prepare them for marital friendship in parental partnership as equal adults free to claim honest selfhood as individuals not dehumanized by the sex distinction. Similarly, in 2001, the AAUW recommended desegregated, coeducational efforts to "Help Girls and Boys Talk Together" and "Cultivate and Support Boy-Girl Friendships."³⁸

But the AAUW has demonstrated also that sexual harassment throughout the U.S. educational system makes this coeducational aim for sexual mutuality difficult to achieve.³⁹ Reporting that boys face sexual, often homophobic, harassment, too, from other boys,⁴⁰ the AAUW has advised that, "Boys must be helped to understand that violence damages

both the victim and the perpetrator, and that violence against women is not in a somehow-more-acceptable category than other violent acts.”⁴¹ For, according to the AAUW, “Sexual relations, interactions, and identity appear the most baffling and problem-fraught social areas for girls.... Sexual violence, sexual risks—principally, pregnancy—and ‘sex’ or relations to boys are cited...as ‘major struggles and issues’ for teenage girls.”⁴²

If we do examine segregated education mindful of this coeducational aim to cultivate sexual mutuality, new gender-sensitive questions arise concerning segregated education, too. Consider Barbara Houston’s question about coeducation: “What other effects do our strategies for eliminating gender bias have?”⁴³ Does segregated education always educate only the targeted sex? Could the very notion of one-sex education be misleading if we fail to consider segregated education’s possible coeducational (often also miseducative) consequences for both the targeted sex and the neglected one? Suppose those of the targeted sex learn to feel superior, powerful, and entitled to favoritism while those of the neglected one learn to feel inferior, powerless, and resigned to self-sacrifice, seduction, or manipulation? Or suppose those of the targeted sex learn to feel simply confident, strong, curious, and adventurous as never before while those of the neglected sex, who may be more accustomed to gender privilege or other injustices, now learn to feel resentful, angry, bitter, and prejudiced? Or suppose segregation sets up expectations of gender conformity that have racist, heterosexist, or even sexist consequences? How can such coeducational dynamics set in motion by segregated education fail to construct oppositional notions of sex and gender that undermine the very possibility of mutuality and neglect the challenges of transgender students? How does anyone learn to surrender unjust privilege or resist against unjust neglect without bitterness or loss of dignity? How can such graceful humility and ethically courageous insubordination be taught?

Of course such targeting and such neglect have long occurred in desegregated settings too—informally and often invisibly—as the AAUW has documented. Could segregated groups in such settings deliberately raise educators’ and students’ awareness of such invisible targeting and neglect in desegregated classes? Could they be designed explicitly to prevent or to survive backlashes against progress made, which are likely to generate more rather than less gender discrimination and sexual harassment and undermine any possibilities for mutuality? Could segregated spaces provide more effective settings than desegregated ones for basic anti-racist education that does not take a dismissive stance toward gender justice? Could segregated spaces provide more effective means than desegregated ones for consciousness-

raising about compulsory heterosexuality's contributions to gender bigotry and gender inequality? Any efforts to provide segregated education for gender justice must, of pragmatic necessity, reflect intelligent prospective thought about proposed means' possible consequences for students' learning in relation to the broader context within which it occurs, whether that context be a school, a family, a community, or a nation. Do those consequences undermine or support this coeducational aim of students' learning to cultivate sexual mutuality? Often, they may do both simultaneously, presenting serious dilemmas that force educators to weigh the odds, take risks, and never stop strategizing.

E. Providing Education for Childrearing

Wollstonecraft applied her theorizing about monarchist miseducation and republican coeducation to her critique of parents, schools, and printed polemics on education, and argued strongly for the necessity of education for childrearing. Her ideal of education for citizen motherhood corrected pre-modern, paternalistic notions of childrearing, although its notion of mutuality in marital friendship and parental partnership ignored many questions about fathers' education for childrearing, thus setting the stage for a new form of sexist oppression, modern maternalism. Although concerns about pregnant students and mothers in schools and community colleges recur throughout AAUW reports as obstacles to women's education, the AAUW has not yet studied motherhood as a site of educational meaning or value, much less other childrearing roles. The AAUW has called for child-care facilities to help student mothers. But it has not yet advanced a coeducational aim for both sexes' learning to care for and raise children for healthy, moral, gender-just lives. That aim could not escape posing some serious questions about curriculum and the comparative value of segregated and desegregated teaching and learning in widely various contexts, not just schools and colleges.⁴⁴

IV. Conceptual Inquiry on Coeducation

We must all learn together somehow to survive, love, and flourish in a deeply troubled, "coeducational" world. Dismissing prematurely the necessity of theorizing about coeducation even as he advocated desegregation in 1911, John Dewey conflated coeducation's ends with its means, never considering segregation's possible coeducational value. But he argued

The smell of academic oil is upon most arguments against coeducation because they fail to note that coeducation has grown up in America not for pedagogical but for social reasons. It is an intellectual and moral necessity in a democracy. Hence were the scholastic difficulties even more serious than

they are they would still have to be met and overcome because, otherwise, their underlying causes would threaten democracy itself.⁴⁵

As an atheoretical practice, what he called “coeducation” here has proven to be miseducative in myriad ways that require reconsideration of both segregated and desegregated education with careful, conceptual formulation of coeducational aims, such as Wollstonecraft’s. Assessment of coeducation’s success or failure requires far more than mere measures of male and female academic achievement: Wollstonecraft conceived its aims as chiefly moral, whose achievement requires profoundly contextual, qualitative, interpretive assessment. Dewey was right that coeducation’s difficulties threaten democracy because they are not only pedagogical and scholastic difficulties, but social ones too—sexism inextricably entangled with heterosexism, racism, classism, xenophobia, and other forms of bigotry. Tonight I have scarcely raised questions about such consequential intersectionality in learning, nor even about curricular segregation and desegregation, nor about coeducation’s possible segregation and desegregation of teachers or leaders. Coeducational ends and means require far more nuanced philosophical exposition than has yet even been attempted, for which culturally diverse primary sources do exist. Wollstonecraft’s lens has clarified some significant contributions and exposed some serious gaps in the AAUW’s thought on coeducation—not least its failure to engage philosophical inquiry on women’s and girls’ education, in which moral concerns about coeducational childrearing figure prominently.⁴⁶ As philosophers of education confronting coeducation’s overwhelming problems, possibilities, ambiguities, contradictions, and complications, we have our work cut out for us if Title IX policy is ever really to accomplish the just purposes that motivated the Mink Act over four decades ago.

Endnotes

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- 2 “Obama Administration Commemorates 40 Years of Increasing Equality and Opportunity for Women in Education and Athletics,” (The White House, 20 June 2012), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/20/obama-administration-commemorates-40-years-increasing-equality-and-oppor>
- 3 <http://www.aauw.org/aauw125th/upload/MembersofNote.pdf>
- 4 Jane Roland Martin invoked this metaphor in *Coming of Age in Academe: Rekindling Women’s Hopes and Reforming the Academy* (New York: Routledge, 1999).
- 5 Jane Roland Martin, “Excluding Women from the Educational Realm,” in *Changing the Educational Landscape: Philosophy, Women, and Curriculum* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 35–52.
- 6 See Ann Diller, Barbara Houston, Kathryn Pauly Morgan, and Maryann Ayim, *The Gender Question in Education* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).
- 7 Susan Laird, “Hungry for Insubordinate Educational Wisdom,” in vol. 2 of *Leaders in Philosophy of Education: Intellectual Self-Portraits*, ed. Leonard J. Waks (Sense Publishers, forthcoming).
- 8 Susan Laird, “Bringing Educational Thought to Public School Lunch: Alice Waters and the Edible Schoolyard,” *Journal of Thought*, in press; Susan Laird, “‘Make New Friends But Keep the Old’: The Girl Scout

- Idea of Educating Girls and Women,” *Educating Women* 1, no. 3 (2010), <http://www.educatingwomen.net>; Susan Laird, “Food For Coeducational Thought” [Presidential essay], *Philosophy of Education 2007* (2008): 1–13; Susan Laird, *Mary Wollstonecraft: Philosophical Mother of Coeducation* (London: Continuum, 2008, forthcoming in paperback from Bloomsbury, 2014); Susan Laird, “Coeducation,” in vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Foundations of Education*, ed. Eugene F. Provenzo (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 140–143; Susan Laird, “Backlash? Advocacy for Boys in a Post-Feminist Era,” *Journal of Philosophy & History of Education* 55 (2004): ; Susan Laird, “Befriending Girls as an Educational Life-Practice” [Featured essay], *Philosophy of Education 2002* (2003): 73–81; Susan Laird, “Rethinking Coeducation,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 13 (1995): 361–378; Susan Laird, “Coeducational Teaching: Taking Girls Seriously,” in *Teaching: Theory into Practice*, ed. Allan Ornstein (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1994), 355–371; Susan Laird, “Women and Gender in John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education,” *Educational Theory* 38 (1988): 111–129.
- ⁹ Adresse St. Rose and Catherine Hill, *Women in Community Colleges: Access to Success* (Washington, DC: American Association of University Women, 2013).
- ¹⁰ Some may object that “sex-separatist” may be a more apt term than “sex-segregated” since one-sex education in this case would be voluntary for boys, rather than forced by law or custom. However, such language obscures the possible forced exclusion of African-American girls from educational advantages the one-sex option makes available to boys.
- ¹¹ Laird, *Philosophical Mother of Coeducation*.
- ¹² Jane Roland Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 181.
- ¹³ Jane Roland Martin, *Changing the Educational Landscape*, 15.
- ¹⁴ For the AAUW’s history, see Susan Levine, *Degrees of Equality: The American Association of University Women and the Challenge of Twentieth-Century Feminism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
- ¹⁵ <http://www.aauw.org/About/>
- ¹⁶ The AAUW sponsors various women’s partnerships, fellowships, and other programs, and has joined with C.A.R.E. to sponsor the Women Empowered Project that produced *A Powerful Noise*, a film about women’s local community-educational actions for relief from disease, war, poverty, and ignorance internationally.

- ¹⁷ Barbara O'Connor, "Foreword," in Christianne Corbett, Catherine Hill, Andresse St. Rose, eds., *Where the Girls Are: The Facts about Gender Equity in Education* (Washington, DC: AAUW Educational Foundation, 2008), xi.
- ¹⁸ See also AAUW Advocacy Fund, *A License for Bias: Sex Discrimination, Schools, and Title IX* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2000).
- ¹⁹ AAUW Policy and Government Regulations Department, "Separated by Sex: Title IX and Single-Sex Education," Appendix J in *AAUW Title IX 35th Anniversary Tool Kit*, http://www.aauw.org/advocacy/issue_advocacy/actionpages/upload/titleixResourceKit.pdf, 43–43.
- ²⁰ Sunny Hansen, Joyce Walker, and Barbara Flom, *Growing Smart: What's Working for Girls in Schools* (Washington, DC: AAUW Educational Foundation, 1995), 10–11.
- ²¹ AAUW Education Foundation, *Separated by Sex: A Critical Look at Single-Sex Education for Girls* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 1995), 2–3, author emphasis.
- ²² "Separatist" might seem a preferable term for "segregated" insofar as such one-sex education is voluntary for girls and women; but so many logical questions about force (law, custom, prejudice) and voluntariness itself arise (for whom, concerning what, considering location, etc.) that I choose to postpone study of this distinction between "separatist" and "segregated," which may merit development of new theoretical language for these phenomena that can capture their complexity.
- ²³ AAUW Education Foundation, *Separated by Sex*, 2, 7.
- ²⁴ Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation*, 5.
- ²⁵ AAUW Education Foundation, *Separated by Sex*, 39, 40; Corbett, et al., *Where the Girls Are*, 2–4. "(1) Girls' successes do not come at boys' expense; (2) On average, girls' and boys' educational performance has improved; (3) Understanding disparities by race/ethnicity and family income level is critical to understanding girls' and boys' achievement."
- ²⁶ AAUW Education Foundation, *Separated by Sex*, 43.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ²⁸ Greenberg-Lake: The Analysis Group, *Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: Executive Summary* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 1991), 8.
- ²⁹ Wellesley Center for Research on Women, *How Schools Shortchange Girls: The AAUW Report* (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995), 141, 144.
- ³⁰ Peggy Orenstein in association with AAUW, *SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), xix.

- ³¹ AAUW Educational Foundation, *Separated by Sex*, 8.
- ³² Mary Wollstonecraft, vol. 5 of *The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft*, eds. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London and Washington Square, NY: Pickering & Chatto and New York University Press, 1989), 126.
- ³³ Martin first formulated this ideal in “The Ideal of the Educated Person,” in *Changing the Educational Landscape*, 83, but later theorized it more subtly.
- ³⁴ On compulsory heterosexuality and heteronormativity in education, see Susan Birden, *Rethinking Sexual Identity in Education* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Gloria Filax, *Queer Youth in the Province of the “Severely Normal”* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2006); Cris Mayo, *Disputing the Subject of Sex* (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
- ³⁵ Wellesley Center, *How Schools Shortchange Girls*, 7.
- ³⁶ AAUW Educational Foundation, *Gaining a Foothold: Women’s Transitions through Work and College* (1999), *Tech-Savvy: Educating Girls in the Computer Age* (2000), *Women at Work* (2003), *Tenure Denied: Cases of Sex Discrimination in Academia* (2004), and *Behind the Pay Gap* (2007); Christi Corbett, *Pay Gap in STEM Occupations* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2011); Catherine Hill, *Graduating to a Pay Gap: The Earnings of Women and Men One Year After College Graduation* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2012).
- ³⁷ Laird, *Philosophical Mother of Coeducation*.
- ³⁸ AAUW Educational Foundation, *Beyond the “Gender Wars”: A Conversation about Girls, Boys, and Education* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2001), 36.
- ³⁹ AAUW Educational Foundation, *Drawing the Line: Sexual Harassment on Campus* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2005); Harris Interactive, *Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing, and Sexual Harassment in School* (Washington, DC: AAUW Educational Foundation, 2001); Louis Harris & Associates, *Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America’s Schools* (Washington, DC: AAUW Educational Foundation, 1993).
- ⁴⁰ AAUW Educational Foundation, *Beyond the “Gender Wars,”* 23.
- ⁴¹ Wellesley Center, *How Schools Shortchange Girls*, 141, 143.
- ⁴² Pamela Haag, *Voices of a Generation: Teenage Girls on Sex, School, and Self* (Washington, DC: AAUW, 1999), 17.
- ⁴³ Barbara Houston, “Gender Freedom and Subtleties of Sexist Education,” in Ann Diller, Barbara Houston, Kathryn Pauly Morgan, and Maryann Avim, eds., *The Gender Question in Education: Theory, Pedagogy, and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 61.

- ⁴⁴ On such questions, see Jane Roland Martin, *The Schoolhome: Rethinking Schools for Changing Families* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- ⁴⁵ John Dewey, "Is Co-Education Injurious to Girls?" *Ladies' Home Journal* (June 1911), in vol. 6 of Jo Ann Boydston, ed., *The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1964–1991), 155–164.
- ⁴⁶ Besides education for childrearing: *also* education for non-violence toward animals, opportunities for self-education in the non-human, natural, wild out-of-doors, arts and aesthetic education to develop imagination, education in and for professions, anti-militarist education, and education to resist the excesses and abuses of the global-corporatist political economy that mask and perpetrate sexual violence and injustice, to name a few such gaps that Wollstonecraft's lens exposes in AAUW's thought on coeducation.

2013

The Drake Lecture

Douglas R. Davis, University of Mississippi

In the spirit of my home in Oxford, Mississippi, I want to begin this talk with the words of William Faulkner. Here are Faulkner's words spoken in Stockholm, Sweden in 1950 following his receipt of the Nobel Prize for Literature:

Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that this award was not made to me as a man, but to my work—a life's work in the agony and sweat of the human spirit, not for glory and least of all for profit, but to create out of the materials of the human spirit something which did not exist before. So this award is only mine in trust. It will not be difficult to find a dedication for the money part of it commensurate with the purpose and significance of its origin. But I would like to do the same with the acclaim too, by using this moment as a pinnacle from which I might be listened to by the young men and women already dedicated to the same anguish and travail, among whom is already that one who will some day stand here where I am standing.

Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up? Because of this, the young man or woman writing today has forgotten the problems of the human heart in conflict with itself which alone can make good writing because only that is worth writing about, worth the agony and the sweat.

He must learn them again. He must teach himself that the basest of all things is to be afraid; and, teaching himself that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the old universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice.

Until he does so, he labors under a curse. He writes not of love but of lust, of defeats in which nobody loses anything of value, of victories without hope and, worst of all, without pity or compassion. His griefs grieve on no universal bones, leaving no scars. He writes not of the heart but of the glands.

Until he relearns these things, he will write as though he stood among and watched the end of man. I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure: that when the last dingdong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, that even then there will still be one more sound: that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking.

I refuse to accept this. I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. The poet's, the writer's, duty is to write about these things. It is his privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past. The poet's voice need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.¹

In 1950 Faulkner said there is only one question: "When will I be blown up?" For those of us here today, I am glad to say, 63 years later, "Not yet." But, a similar fatalistic sentiment persists with a minor revision; today we ask, "When will I burn up?" In this essay I accept Faulkner's challenge in the form of reflection on the meaning of the Social Foundations of Education in a postmodern era of intellectual sand.

Last fall after the SOPHE conference in St. Louis, I had a conversation with Susan Laird about both of us focusing on similar topics for our corresponding Drake Lecture and SoPHE Presidential Address. While I have been remiss on following through with Susan, I prepared this talk after reading Susan's excellent essay, *An Obligation to Endure*,² and many companion articles in a special issue entitled "In Defense of Foundations"³ ("Defense") in the journal *Critical Issues in Education*. The articles in "Defense" as a whole resonated intimately. I recall during my junior year in college when I changed my major from business and economics to history being asked repeatedly, "why history?" My 21-year-old answer to my father was, I liked history—and I

reminded him I had just failed Introduction to Business Data Processing. So, as a result of my difficulty punching data cards and getting them in the right order, I chose a field of study and a profession—education in the humanities—known for its ability to generate the “why” question. “Defense” begins with a lament from its guest editors, Ben Baez and Deron Boyles,⁴ asserting Foundations has failed “...at clarifying (or persuading) others of the importance, centrality, and relevance of Foundations coursework.”⁵ The broad “why” question persists throughout “Defense” with articles focusing on the definition, purpose, and relevance of Social Foundations in our rapidly changing, educational milieu: What are Social Foundations? What are the purposes of Social Foundations? And why are Social Foundations relevant? Baez and Boyles also talk of persuading others, begging the question, “who are the ‘others’ being addressed?” My impression as a whole is many of the articles speak, appeal, and argue to power or those in power.

Speaking to power is vital to the traditional, critical role of Social Foundations. The radical history of our field, a tradition critical of existing social systems, presents a dilemma and Baez and Boyles sum up what negotiating the modern academy requires:

...we must attend to the academic scholar as a social role, especially when we argue that in order to survive, we should find a place within the current system, or to argue for ourselves in ways attractive to those with the purse strings.⁶

Two questions are raised here. First, is there a difference between arguing for the relevance of an academic discipline and an academic discipline being relevant? Second, what is the difference between relevance and purpose in our contemporary postmodern society? In response to the first question, I think one must be relevant to argue relevance; in other words, while many engage in the practice, it is specious to argue you are relevant when you are not. In regards to the second question, I suggest that relevance comes from acting with moral purpose; by moral purpose, I simply mean acting and making decisions with the intent of promoting a social good, albeit the meaning of a social good, is relative. Nonetheless, it is reasonable that one paid by public funds to provide a public service, or promote a public social good, is only relevant by acting (or being) in a manner that promotes actual public good. Thus, the purpose and need for being is clear for Social Foundations scholars as evidenced by the articles in “Defense,” but institutional decision-makers in the academy and beyond are motivated by a fundamentally different set of assumptions regarding the purpose of education, the meaning of moral purpose, and the definition of public good. Baez and Boyles conclude their introduction to “Defense” with an

unflattering mirror reflecting the difficulty of negotiating the role of a promoter of political and economic change in the modern, U.S. academy:

For we know from tenure games and hazing games and grant games, and so on, that once we accept the rules of the game, not only will we be bound by them (we are bound whether we accept them or not), we will enforce them on others, we will standardize them in the name of the “rule of law,” we will reproduce them to institutionalize them, and thus our future roles will be determined by them. Knowing this, can we re-imagine what it might mean to be a [F]oundations scholar within increasingly instrumentalist, corporatized institutions? If so, what is required and how might we bring it about?⁷

In response to the first question it may be time to consider the possibility the answer is no, it may not be possible to be a Foundations scholar within a corporatized institution. Furthermore, I am concerned it may not be possible to re-imagine what it means to be a Foundations scholar in existing institutions of higher learning without selling one’s intellectual and moral soul like Robert Johnson at the crossroads.

Certainly, there is a history of tolerance of critical views in the academy and this will likely continue; however, it must be acknowledged that the goals of the academy, *writ large*, are to strengthen and reinforce existing political and economic systems, not to replace or even change them to any significant degree. Increasingly, it appears that, while radical views are tolerated, they are often marginalized, or worse, ignored, especially within professional fields such as education. While the image of a bluesman standing at a crossroads on the outskirts of the delta city of Clarksdale, Mississippi in the 1920s exchanging his soul for a song is powerful, it is also meaningful. As Laird so eloquently points out in *Obligation to Endure*,⁸ the climate of education has changed and the articles in “Defense” all, one way or another, speak of finding a way for humanities to survive in the current climate while simultaneously working to change the climate.

Consistency in modeling the moral purpose in which we ground our work is one issue. Again, in using the term moral purpose I mean the use of a moral/ethical framework in one’s personal and professional decisions. One reason I raise the possibility of answering “no” to Baez and Boyles’ core questions is because I find inconsistency when one criticizes the head that he feeds and the hand that feeds him; not that this stops me any more than practicing a faith tradition stops selfish, thoughtless, and harmful behavior. Faulkner captures the essence, and, in my view, the reason, for humanities when he speaks of exploring the problems of “the human heart in conflict with itself.” Yes! How could

one be a public intellectual and not be in conflict with one's own heart? It often seems my adult life is a story of an unending struggle to live what I profess to believe: a struggle with my own heart. And, although I am quick to recognize and expose inconsistencies in the writings and actions of other public intellectuals and Social Foundations scholars, I cringe and pull back my pen when I recognize the same glaring contradictions in my own writing and life. But the pen must not be pulled back. In the interest of fairness, however, I am going to reflect on my own participation in the system I criticize. My purpose is to compare representations of Social Foundations as an intellectual sphere which define, defend, and promote the field's self-articulated, moral purpose; and, the ontological actuality of a moral benefit to and positive impact on society.

The fundamental issue, from my experience, is my culture, history, language, and being. In a nutshell, I recognize the problem and it is I (and all the "other" "I"s I live and spend my life with). I am going to switch focus here for a brief historical view of our corporate political and economic system in order to emphasize the deep and integrated relationships between individual identity, economics, politics, and national identity. In U.S. culture, the mutually reinforcing relationship between corporate and government institutions essential for the hegemony of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is deeply entrenched in our political and economic system. Our national economic path, largely controlled through the relationship between government and industry, was settled during the Civil War and the northern victory solidified and entrenched a political and economic system that accelerated a rapid development of commerce and industry. We, as a nation, committed to completing the transition from our early agrarian roots to a modern industrial state. A dominant motive in most national economic decisions became the impact of any decision on the nation's wealth and power. As a result, since the Civil War, the U.S. has consistently and enthusiastically supported corporate development and expansion.

We are in a situation now, however, in which we have become victims of the success of our own political and economic systems. Given the systemic problems provide the content for our work and are much discussed, I want to speak a little of the success of the system. U.S. citizens have enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, almost 150 years of peace at home and historically unprecedented material, consumptive wealth. At the end of the twentieth century, economically, the modern international corporate economy helped establish the U.S. as the world's hegemonic military and economic power. Because of this, I have been fortunate to experience my life in a nation with high levels wealth and security. bell hooks⁹ and other critical race scholars talk of "white privilege" and I

think it describes an actual cultural condition but is not there also something we might call “American privilege?” As a Foundations scholar, I try to remember the system I criticize and seek to change has provided many a life of relative security and economic privilege.

Nonetheless, the conflict in my heart refers to more than systems of politics and economics. Yes, privileged U.S. citizens, those “haves,” live lives replete with full pantries and closets, nice cars and homes (notice I employ plurals), a vast array of entertainment/media/popular culture, Walmart, Home Depot, and fast food; but, the real struggle is at the social/psychological level. When I reflect on who I am, what I am, what I believe, and how I act, I begin to see how being “American,” my individualism and liberal temperament, and my consumptive and other economic decisions, are holistically combined in an almost unconscious U.S. ethos of membership in a national tribe. In other words, I am glad to be living in the U.S. and I enjoy the results of our collective wealth and power. Likewise, I fear what a loss of national wealth and power might mean, both for me and those I care about.

As a member of the American tribe, I continue to make decisions every day that ensure my active participation in the social, political, and economic life of the tribe. Among the multiple ways I participate: I continue to burn fossil fuels at an alarming rate, I purchase goods produced under questionable human rights and environmental conditions, I eat food produced using genetically modified organisms and other harmful chemicals, and on and on. More troubling on a deeper level, not only do I participate in the system, I (and millions of others who challenge the moral authority of the system) own the damn thing. I, as an employee of the University of Mississippi, like employees in public universities across the country, am offered large matching financial benefits to participate in state-supported or individual-optional retirement plans based on investment in corporations. Thus, I am placed in a position of increasing my actual “ownership” of the very corporations my scholarship argues are the problem, or paying what amounts to a financial penalty.

Laird’s *An Obligation to Endure* is a compelling analysis of the tensions between moral purpose within the field and actual social contexts and conditions. We face existential crises on two, deeply intertwined levels. The forces intentionally marginalizing and silencing radical voices in the academy and within the field of Social Foundations are the same forces dominating political and economic systems and decision-making around the globe. What Laird describes as global climate change and educational climate change are both products of similar social and cultural forces. Climbing way out on a small limb to summarize, on one hand Laird presents the global threat of devastating

effects from global climate change and, on the other hand, the educational threat of devastating effects from educational climate change. The similarities are, if I read Laird correctly, a failure of humans or the humanities to maintain control of systems.

Laird's argument seems consistent with views expressed by Chris Hedges in "Death of the Liberal Class."¹⁰ Hedges defines the "liberal class," prominent in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, as "characterized by the growth of mass movements and social reforms that addressed working conditions in factories, the organizing of labor unions, women's rights, universal education, housing for the poor, public health campaigns, and socialism."¹¹ Hedges marks World War I as the end of influential liberalism and the rise of "consolidated state and corporate control over economic, political, cultural, and social affairs."¹² The end result, according to Hedges, is a decline in institutional controls to limit corporate control of "politics, education, labor, the arts, religious institutions, and financial systems."¹³ As a result, liberals, including myself, end up compromising their basic beliefs, resulting in tacit support of "unfettered capitalism, the national security state, globalization, and income inequality."¹⁴ Laird¹⁵ likewise seems to say global climate change and education climate change are an effect of the failure of Social Foundations (or the liberal class, or the humanities) to ground humanity within the tools to control systems of their own creation: to limit corporate power and influence.

It is symbolic to me that, among all the articles in "Defense," Laird's is the only one that emphasizes and highlights climate change as relevant to our work. Laird's focus is on two actual pragmatic effects of our corporate state and the political failure of the liberal left: global and educational climate change. To build on what Laird says about climate change, I concur that the situation is critical. There is overwhelming consensus among climate scientists that we are currently experiencing rapid climate change caused by humans through the burning of fossil fuels, and the effects of this change, while largely uncertain in specific detail, will be catastrophic and potentially lethal to the human species (and perhaps life on the planet).

While time prevents a detailed discussion of debates on the "science" of climate change, I do want to say a little about what I mean when I say "consensus of climate scientists" and what that consensus is. First of all, the consensus is consistent among climate and atmosphere scientists at universities around the world. There are almost no climate-change skeptics within the fields of climate and atmospheric science housed at universities; most climate change skeptics are housed in private research institutions or corporate-funded think tanks. Our own government agency charged with studying climate and weather, the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,¹⁶ has consistently released balanced, well-supported information on climate change. President Obama¹⁷ consistently affirms the reality of climate change, articulating the position of the world's heads of state. Governments of every country in the world accept the conclusion of mainstream climate scientists, and every country with a scientific agency related to the environment supports the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).¹⁸ In addition, much of the intense criticism of the IPCC is from the political far right, and almost exclusively comes from within the United States. In fact, the U.S. is now the only country in the world within which the reality of human-caused climate change is openly discussed as a public question.

Matt Kelsh, from the University Corporation of Atmospheric Research, housed in Boulder, Colorado, recently described the science of climate change during a program on National Public Radio¹⁹ on connections between climate change and the recent Colorado flooding. Kelsh uses a metaphor of medicine, stating climate scientists are very much like doctors: they conduct an examination and gather data through diagnostic tests and then, even though there is much they do not know, analyze and discuss all available information and work to achieve consensus on a diagnosis and prescription. Here is a summary of the latest scientific consensus on climate reporting provided through a 2013 IPCC press release:²⁰

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.

Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (high confidence). It is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0–700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it likely warmed between the 1870s and 1971.

The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane, and nitrous oxide have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. CO₂ concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions.

Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system. It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.

Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Changes in the global water cycle in response to the warming over the 21st century will not be uniform. The contrast in precipitation between wet and dry regions and between wet and dry seasons will increase, although there may be regional exceptions.

The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century. Heat will penetrate from the surface to the deep ocean and affect ocean circulation. It is very likely that the Arctic sea ice cover will continue to shrink and thin and that Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover will decrease during the 21st century as global mean surface temperature rises. Global glacier volume will further decrease.

Global mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st century. Climate change will affect carbon cycle processes in a way that will exacerbate the increase of CO₂ in the atmosphere (high confidence). Further uptake of carbon by the ocean will increase ocean acidification.

Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO₂ are stopped. This represents a substantial multi-century climate change commitment created by past, present, and future emissions of CO₂.

Climate scientists tend readily to acknowledge the large areas of uncertainty and many limitations to a full understanding of what is happening; nonetheless, Kelsh is typical of most when asked, at the close of his NPR interview, what science is saying needs to be done, ending with a statement based on the evidence: “we need to act now.”²¹

Let me summarize: scientists are saying that to avoid irreversible damage to our planet we need fundamental change in our behavior and economic choices. A similar existential threat to humanity, nuclear war, was acknowledged and used by Faulkner as a challenge to the humanities during the early stages of the cold war but, at that time, humans still had control: all we had to do was avoid pushing a button. Considering the

end of humans, Faulkner chides: “when the last dingdong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, that even then there will still be one more sound: that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking.” Could it be that Faulkner’s “puny inexhaustible voice” is intellectual scholars talking to one another with loud proclamations of their own relevance, purpose, and value? I give kudos to Susan Laird for clearly defining global and education climate as the issue of our lives, time, and profession. I believe she models the positive potential of a public intellectual in our field. One knows this from the passion to make a difference evident in her students.

Laird, Faulkner, and the title of this paper speak of hope. With regard to Social Foundations, I do not see hope in the traditional institutional roles of our field, but I do see hope in accomplishing the reason and purpose of our being a field. We must, however, as a field, determine a way to provide the education young people want and need. We must, in other words, be relevant to the lives and experience of young generations during the peak of their advanced moral and intellectual development in the humanities. Given this, the question is, “what do young people want and need?” The answer I hear from young people is “hope.” Young people want a future; they want hope in a future. Social Foundations, if it is to survive as a voice in the institutional provision of educational services, must provide a path to discover hope and to act in hope.

I have some examples of finding and acting in hope from my own experience. First, I met a young couple three weeks ago who, after losing hope in the academy, left the academy for an alternate path. The couple started a commercial food garden, Amorphous Gardens, near Clinton, Mississippi, in the spring of 2012. Before coming to Mississippi, both were graduate students at the University of Wisconsin. The man was a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology and the woman was in a masters’ program in the same field. Today, the couple and their two children are gardening (they do not call what they do farming) on a small plot of hardscrabble red clay in the hill country of north Mississippi. The couple grow food and raise animals with limited external inputs, use no-till gardening practices to preserve the soil, do not use irrigation, raise a number of standard and perennial fruits and vegetables, raise and sell a number of edible plants found wild in Mississippi (curly dok, lambs quarter, poke, thistle, dandelion, and other edible, native plants and herbs), and are working towards saving all their own seed within three years. When I asked the young man why he did not finish his doctoral degree at the University of Wisconsin, he replied, “I just came to the point where I felt it is all corrupt; the field of Sociology, my department, the university, our entire society. I just couldn’t do it anymore.”

I have heard many stories like this over the past four years. A large number (well over 100) of young men and women, mostly in their 20s, work and volunteer on the organic farm I started in 2009. Through WWOOF (World Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms)²² and HELPX,²³ both internet-based, work-share programs which connect people and farms willing to exchange labor for lodging and food, I have hosted young guests from Germany, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all parts of the U.S. My impression from these young people as a group is that they have concern, unmatched since the 1960s, for justice, peace, and the environment. They are deeply concerned for the future, want to be active, and want to engage in activities that make a difference. They also have heroes, individuals they model and follow. Almost universally, young people who actively work for social change follow leaders who speak and, importantly, act with a humanitarian voice: a voice that links social and environmental justice.

As I strive to be what I am not now, I, too, look to heroic examples. Robert Inchausti,²⁴ in his introduction to *Subversive Orthodoxy: Outlaws, Revolutionaries, and Other Christians in Disguise*, provides multiple models of hope as a Social Foundations scholar. Inchausti sums up some commonalities among these individuals:

Most of the thinkers examined here are religious traditionalists whose ideas challenge the assumptions of their secular colleagues. Most are also innovators in their respective fields, alert to contemporary circumstances, aware of changes in their disciplines, critical of dominant narratives, and yet still capable of drawing connections between their faith and the realities of the modern world.

Each of them does far more than simply say “no” to modernism; they bridge the chasm between our longing for spiritual completion and the technoscientific world in which we live. From Andy Warhol to Marshall McLuhan, this orthodox avant-garde finds its inspiration not only in the Gospels, but in the monastic silence of John Cage, the devotional music of John Coltrane, even the negative dialectics of Theodore Adorno.

I read this work because Inchausti is one of my intellectual heroes. I have been a huge fan of Inchausti since I read *Spitwad Sutras: Classroom Teaching as Sublime Vocation*,²⁵ finding it the best book I have read on teaching. For me, *Spitwad Sutras* establishes Inchausti as a writer and thinker in the Social Foundations of Education. In *Subversive Orthodoxy*, Inchausti profiles and discusses many of my heroes in the humanities I have read (and many I have not read) and who have inspired me

throughout my educational life: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Jack Kerouac, Walter Percy, Dorothy Day, Thomas Merton, Wendell Berry, and Ivan Illich.

Unfortunately, except for Wendell Berry, these individuals are no longer with us. Fortunately, there are many other heroes in the humanities alive and doing amazing work today. I want briefly to profile a few (among many) of my contemporary heroes (in addition to Susan): Vandana Shiva, Woody Tasch, Bill McKibben, and, of course, Wendell Berry.

Vandana Shiva is an environmentalist and eco-feminist writer and activist with a background in philosophy and science. She holds a masters in Philosophy of Science and a Ph.D. in particle physics. She founded and directs the Navdanya Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology.²⁶ She has published many books including: *Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis*;²⁷ *Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply*;²⁸ *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace*;²⁹ and *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development*.³⁰ Here is a brief bio from one of her publishers, South End Press:³¹

Shiva is a leader in the International Forum on Globalization, along with Ralph Nader and Jeremy Rifkin. She addressed the World Trade Organization summit in Seattle, 1999, as well as the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, 2000. In 1993, Shiva won the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize (the Right Livelihood Award). In 2010, she was awarded the Sydney Peace Prize for her commitment to social justice. The founder of Navdanya (“nine seeds”), a movement promoting diversity and use of native seeds, she also set up the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology in her mother’s cowshed in 1997. Its studies have validated the ecological value of traditional farming and been instrumental in fighting destructive development projects in India.

While Shiva seeks to expose through her writing and speaking the catastrophic social effects of industrial agriculture in India and throughout the developing world, she also works to develop and promote sustainable alternatives consistent with an emphasis on social justice. One of the biggest problems in addressing the issues she raises is the international corporate/industrial financial system and its monopolistic control of capital.

Woody Tasch is a public intellectual who writes on the problem and actively promotes and develops an alternative sustainable and local

financial system. From 1998–2008, Tasch served as chairman of Investor’s Circle,³² an investment group that has invested over \$150 million in sustainable ventures. Tasch is the author of *Inquiries into the Nature of Slow Money: Investing as if Food, Farms, and Fertility Mattered*.³³

I would be remiss at this point if I left out Bill McKibben, perhaps the best known public intellectual and activist in the world today. I heard McKibben speak last spring and he said something that changed the way I view my role in society. I have never been one to carry a sign or even one who believes protest, and similar forms of activism, effective. McKibben’s talk changed my view when he spoke of politics as decision-making and the obligation of those who speak of change to act for change. I will again quote from a bio, this one from McKibben’s website, that succinctly summarizes his work:³⁴

McKibben is the author of a dozen books about the environment, beginning with *The End of Nature* in 1989, which is regarded as the first book for a general audience on climate change. He is a founder of the grassroots climate campaign 350.org, which has coordinated 15,000 rallies in 189 countries since 2009. *Time* magazine called him “the planet’s best green journalist” and the *Boston Globe* said in 2010 that he was “probably the country’s most important environmentalist.” Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, he holds honorary degrees from a dozen colleges, including the Universities of Massachusetts and Maine, the State University of New York, and Whittier and Colgate Colleges. In 2011 he was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

McKibben has published multiple books on climate change following 1989’s *The End of Nature*,³⁵ including *Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future*.³⁶ Through his work as a public intellectual, McKibben has created organizations like 350.org and has become a world leader in environmental activism and protest.

Saving my favorite for last, I want to say a few things about my hero of heroes, Wendell Berry. Berry has been the subject of or been included in many of my SoPHE papers and I always struggle to explain who he is and what he does, and why I view him as a transformative model of inspiration and hope. In working on this talk and looking through descriptions and bios, I came across an article published in 2012 in *The New York Times* by Mark Bittman. Realizing the risk of including long quotations in my talk from writers far more eloquent than I, I ask nevertheless you indulge me while I read Mark Bittman’s³⁷ article in its

entirety, because it captures the life, person, and work of Wendell Berry extraordinarily well:

The sensibility of Wendell Berry, who is sometimes described as a modern day Thoreau but who I'd call the soul of the real food movement, leads people like me on a path to the door of the hillside house he shares with his wife, Tanya, outside of Port Royal, KY. Everything is as the pilgrim would have it: Wendell (he's a one-name icon, like Madonna, but probably in that respect only) is kind and welcoming, all smiles.

He quotes Pope ("Consult the genius of the place in all"), Spenser, Milton, and Stegner, and answers every question patiently and articulately. He doesn't patronize. We sit alone, uninterrupted through the morning, for two or three hours. Tanya is at church; when it's time, he turns on the oven, as she requested before leaving. He seems positively yogic, or maybe it's just this: How often do I sit in long, quiet conversation? Wendell has this effect.

Tanya returns around noon, and their daughter, Mary, arrives shortly thereafter. (Mary lives nearby, runs a winery, and is engaged in enough food and farm justice issues to impress Wendell Berry.) We eat. It's all local, food they or their neighbors or friends or family have grown or raised, food that Tanya has cooked. There's little fuss about any of that, only enjoyment and good eating. I note that I can't stop devouring the corn bread, and that the potatoes have the kind of taste of the earth that floors you.

And we chat, and then Wendell takes me for a drive around the countryside he was born in and where he's lived for most of his life. As he waves to just about every driver on the road, he explains that the land was once home to scores of tobacco farmers, and now has patches of forest, acres of commodity crops and farms where people do what the land tells them to. That's one of Wendell's recurring themes: Listen to the land.

There really is not that much to see until I try to see it through Wendell's eyes, and then every bit of erosion becomes a tiny tragedy—or at least a human's mistake—and every bit of forest floor becomes a bit of the genius of nature. (If you imitate nature, he's said, you'll use the land wisely.)

He knows the land the way I know the stops on the Lexington Avenue subway line and, predictably, I begin feeling like the fairly techie city person I am and wonder if it could have been

otherwise. I have friends who back-to-the-landed it in the late '60s and early '70s, and a couple of them stuck it out. Although one of them seems to have disappeared somewhere near Leadville, Colo., another—urban as he was in the beginning—has gained the same kind of wisdom Wendell has, a sense of patience and understanding, a kind of calm despite full awareness of the storm.

Genuine and as much of a product of place as Wendell is, he's not a full-time farmer and never was, but a farm-raised intellectual and even a man of the world. I'd never heard of him the first time I read his work—probably in *Harper's*, probably in the '80s—but his words have changed my life. As the years have gone by, I've watched his stature change. If he's not a leader then he's an inspiration to those who are.

In any case, he's in Port Royal now, and has been for decades (his family has been here for 200 years), and there is something about his attachment to nature—it's not just the land but everything on the land—that is so profound that his observations and his judgments (Wendell is a kind but very judgmental man) can be jaw-dropping. If you read or listen to Wendell and aren't filled with admiration and respect, it's hard to believe that you might admire and respect the land or nature, or even humanity.

In Washington this past Monday, Wendell delivered the 2012 Jefferson Lecture, the highest honor the federal government has for “distinguished intellectual achievement” in the humanities. He titled the talk “It All Turns on Affection.” When I visited him last month he told me that preparing the talk “taxed him greatly,” and I can see why. It's incredibly ambitious, tying together E. M. Forster's *Howard's End*, the history of his family and the country around it, and—to summarize it rather crudely—the costs of capitalism's abuse of humans and land.

I doubt there is a more quotable man in the United States. (You can readily see this by reading the text of the talk, or by visiting this lovely page of Wendell Berry quotes.) Monday, he spoke of the “mechanical indifference” of a financial trust, that it had the “indifference of a grinder to what it grinds,” saying, “It did not intend to victimize its victims. It simply followed its single purpose of the highest possible profit, and ignored the ‘side effects.’” This from a poet and an essayist who, by following his love of the land and its people, describes the current state of affairs as accurately and succinctly as anyone on

earth: “The two great aims of industrialism—replacement of people by technology and concentration of wealth into the hands of a small plutocracy—seem close to fulfillment.”

I knew that Wendell and I agreed on these things when I went to visit him. Oddly, I felt, as I imagine others have in making the same trip, as if I were seeking wisdom. Indeed, Wendell’s thoughtfulness and perception, combined with his outside-ness and demeanor (if anyone could persuade me to start worshipping, it would be Wendell), makes this only natural.

We spoke, as I said, for hours, and my two big questions for him were, essentially, “How are we going to change this?” and “What can city people do?”

He makes it clear that he doesn’t think anything is going to happen quickly, except perhaps the possible catastrophe that lurks in the minds of everyone who believes the earth to be overstressed. “You can describe the predicament that we’re in as an emergency,” he says, “and your trial is to learn to be patient in an emergency.”

Change, he says, is going to come from “people at the bottom” doing things differently. “[N]o great feat is going to happen to change all this; you’re going to have to humble yourself to be willing to do it one little bit at a time. You can’t make people do this. What you have to do is notice that they’re already doing it.”

Then he takes me to the barn, where there are seven newborn lambs. And he says, “When you are new at sheep-raising and your ewe has a lamb, your impulse is to stay there and help it nurse and see to it and all. After a while you know that the best thing you can do is walk out of the barn.”

We walk out of the barn, and say goodbye.

Three hours later, my phone rings. (Wendell, famously, does not own a computer.) “Mark,” he says. “I’ve been thinking about that question about what city people can do. The main thing is to realize that country people can’t invent a better agriculture by ourselves. Industrial agriculture wasn’t invented by us, and we can’t uninvent it. We’ll need some help with that.”

Next week, an interview with Wendell Berry by Bill Moyers is airing on *Moyers and Company*.³⁸ If anyone is wondering what I am articulating when I hold Berry up as a model of a relevant public intellectual, I hope you will tune in and watch or download and watch the interview when you have a chance.

Social Foundations as a field must change and adapt not only to educational climate change, but also the postmodern shift in the cultural nature and meaning of knowledge and the educational expectations and needs of future generations. If Social Foundations scholars continue to expect the traditional, academic privilege of institutional authority from which to impart, Mortimer-Adler-like, pre-determined, and essential knowledge, I believe we will not be relevant. Rather, we must understand the contemporary, postmodern milieu and how contemporary learners understand and value knowledge. Like it or not, knowledge is becoming much less objective, authoritative, and fixed and much more fluid and communal through the World Wide Web. A couple of things I will say: The public intellectuals I have just discussed do not argue the relevance of the humanities, rather, they use the humanities to argue for decisions that will make a positive difference; second, I believe relevance for public intellectuals comes from action and not words. Given this, what do the examples of these relevant public intellectual say to me as I continue to work as a Social Foundations scholar?

First, we as a field need to support science and scientists. While I am not a positivist or even a post-positivist, I *do* find science a morally neutral, social process of representation that is both essential to understanding the effects of our corporate industrial system but also necessary as we seek solutions. Scientists who, based on evidence from their field, take a strong stand on the social implications and need for change need support, encouragement, and defending. Most importantly, the socially embedded processes of contemporary science beg for support amid the flood of attacks that challenge the credibility of science—and scientists—by distorting and misrepresenting scientific processes and findings. Science is more than a corporate tool, it is a social process of investigation and meaning-making that, seen through a postmodern lens, is deeply connected to the humanities.

Second, while many of us engage in some of these activities, we need to engage in and create opportunities to pressure the corporate academe system internally. There are multiple ways individuals working at colleges and universities might do this. Bill McKibben is leading a highly effective campaign of divestment³⁹ based on South Africa's successful anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s. This movement seeks to have colleges refrain from investing funds in the petrochemical industry. Students and faculty across the nation are putting considerable pressure on universities and colleges to provide better food more food choices on campuses, especially advocating for the availability of non-GMO, organic, or local food. Employees of colleges and universities should have matching retirement savings options that allow for either investment in local, sustainable enterprises, or environmentally friendly

corporations. Student activists on college campuses need support from faculty. I hosted a three-day meeting in my home (while I was out of town) of students from colleges and universities across Mississippi: a group called MASS (Mississippi Association of Students for Sustainability). These students are doing amazing things but, sadly, they do not feel well supported by faculty members; rather, they tend to view faculty as part and parcel of the system they are protesting.

Third, as much as possible, I believe we need to go local in every possible decision. As an organic farmer, struggling to maintain a business that has four fulltime employees, I am struck by the number of people who talk the talk but who fail to support local, sustainable enterprises. I try not to be the person who complains about the loss of the locally owned bookstore, the locally owned restaurant, and the locally owned hardware store while at the same time chooses to shop at Barnes and Noble, McDonalds, and Walmart because the “prices” are lower. The alternative, I believe, to a global, monopolistic, corporate economic system is a local market economy. This change does not require a revolution or the end of democracy, rule of law, or private property. It does require people who make different economic choices. I work to model these choices.

Finally, we must act without fear. I often ask myself a critical question: “At what point will my values prevent me from working at an institution that fails to support or promote my values?” And “am I willing to give up the money, prestige, and power that comes from being a professor in the academy?” The truth is, I am, in a sense, addicted to the money, prestige, and power. Nonetheless, I must ask myself—and believe we as field must ask ourselves: “What effect does fear have on my decisions regarding doing what I think is right?” To this end, I think we may need to acknowledge the answer to the question presented by Baez and Boyles at the beginning of this talk may we be “no.” We may need to recognize and accept a corporate-controlled education system (regardless of who pays) is not public in spirit or practice and be willing to embrace non-public alternatives, and then develop, engage in, and support alternative education models that redefine “public” as a local system under local control.

Endnotes

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- ²⁷ Vendana Shiva, *Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2008).
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The Sympathetic-and-Empathetic Teacher: A Deweyan Analysis

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Introduction

As we understand Dewey's (1986, 1988) concept of an experienced teacher, she or he possesses the understandings, dispositions, and habits a well-educated, highly skilled, and intelligent person needs and develops in schools, universities, and other settings throughout life. We maintain that in order continually to mature as a teacher, one's preparation should ensure persistent growth in understanding students and cultures, subject matter and cognate fields, the science and art of teaching, and democratic social and political philosophy. We further contend that teacher education faculty and colleagues should monitor this growth while mentoring future teachers to teach prudently and effectively. For us, a teacher's lifelong growth should foster one's abilities to coalesce one's thoughts, feelings, and activities so one matures personally and, as a result of this maturity, grows in one's ability expertly to guide students' growth (Simpson & Jackson, 1997). Of the professional development possibilities Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) advocates to support teachers' lifelong growth, we focus on growth as a sympathetic-empathetic teacher.

We posit that understanding Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) concept of the sympathetic-empathetic teacher is critical to pre- and in-service teachers' growth. We begin by defining and explaining Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) two-pronged meaning of sympathy connecting it to contemporary definitions of sympathy and empathy. We then extend Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) definition of the sympathetic-empathetic teacher by explaining sympathy-and-empathy's personal-pedagogical and ethical-pedagogical dimensions. Using Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) concept of sympathetic-and-empathetic teacher as a lens through which to analyze a problematic, ethical situation in one public school, we illustrate the meaning and value of his philosophy of the sympathetic-empathetic teacher to teachers' decision-making and relational actions in contemporary schools. While our study is conceptual and ethical rather than

qualitative, we use one, real-life, ethical situation ultimately to demonstrate how Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) theory can help teachers see problems with ethical clarity and thereby grow in their ethical understanding and resulting decision-making and responses to difficult situations.

Defining Concepts: Sympathy and Empathy

Sympathy

One can trace sympathy's etymology from ancient to relatively modern linguistic roots that reveal various connotations, e.g., a kinship with, feeling for, and relief on behalf of a group or community. More recent meanings that have evolved continue to overlap indicating that a sympathetic person has feelings for others who have problems. Debates about sympathy's precise meaning(s) today often involve the concept of empathy and the two terms' usage in therapy, medicine, anthropology, and ethics (Frazer, 2010; Stueber, 2014). Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) view of sympathy was constructed in a context before the English word *empathy* emerged and includes two dimensions: an immediate sensitivity to a person's feelings and an intelligent inquiry into a person's thinking (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987).

We therefore use sympathy to convey Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) idea a person immediately feels or cares for another when she or he senses pain or pleasure. For example, sensing students' joys and frustrations stimulates many teachers to celebrate with or care for them. As Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) observes, "sympathy instinctively transports us" to the side of those experiencing mistreatment or accolades "as if we were personally concerned" (p. 261). When a teacher experiences sympathy *as if* she were personally affected, she does not necessarily understand others' viewpoints but recognizes their anguish; an impulse to assist or comfort them emerges. Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) further asserts sympathy may be limited largely to a favored set of people, not extended to students and colleagues who are unknown or who are off-putting (pp. 259–262). Consequently, cultivating sympathy for specific students and colleagues may be crucial at times. On the down side, sympathy may stimulate individuals to act impulsively before understanding important details or the consequences of a decision. Thus, sympathy involves dangers from which no one is immune. Likewise, sympathy does not automatically enable a person to overcome arrogance toward some individuals (Dewey, 1922, pp. 137–138). Because "sympathy instinctively transports us" (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 261) to the side of those experiencing mistreatment or accolades "as if we were personally concerned" (p. 261), sympathy may involve so much emotion that one allows it to dictate one's conduct (p. 333).

Empathy

In contrast to sympathy's relatively long history of use in the English language, the English word, *empathy*, arose in 1909 with unsettled and debatable meanings; controversies about its meaning(s) followed indefinitely (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Why this new term with its unsettled, debatable, controversial meanings was added is unclear but may explain Dewey's almost exclusive use of *sympathy* for contemporary conceptions of both sympathy and empathy decades after *empathy* appeared in English usage.¹ Why, then, do we employ both terms and the hyphenated expression sympathetic-empathetic teacher? Because much has changed in approximately a century, a) we want to communicate clearly and accurately with contemporary audiences; b) we think both terms—sympathy and empathy—are inclusive of Dewey's original conceptual elements and are within his term, *sympathy*. We, therefore, use the term, *empathy*, to indicate the ability to understand others in part by seeing as through their eyes and by assuming the *perspective* of a neutral, inquisitive person regarding *others' perceptions and problems*. Dewey and Tufts (1932) contend:

The emotion of [empathy; our word substituted for Dewey's sympathy]...is morally invaluable. But it functions *properly* when used as a principle of reflection and insight, rather than of direct action. Intelligent [empathy]...widens and deepens concern for consequences. To put ourselves in the place of another, to see things *from the standpoint of his* [or her] aims and values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they assume in *the eyes of an impartial observer*, is the surest way to appreciate what justice demands. (p. 275, emphasis added)

By personal effort and mutual support, one's seeing deeply from another's perspective is possible (Greene, 1978). Learning to walk partly in students' and colleagues' shoes, to understand to a greater degree their perspectives, and to assume to some extent their mindsets requires thinking painstakingly (Cooper, 2011). Moreover, such principles as Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) regard for self, others, social and professional groups, and those beyond our borders serve to augment the principle of empathy. Understanding the consequences of recognizing others' authentic identities (Taylor, 1991), respecting one another as persons (Strike & Soltis, 2009), and caring for and about others (Noddings, 1992) can further enlighten our empathetic journeys. Hence, while people seem to sympathize spontaneously, they characteristically empathize somewhat more reflectively (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Many probably readily recognize others' feelings more often than they comprehend others' thinking. Both abilities can enhance teachers' work.

In fact, Dewey (1895/1964) argues teachers and students need reflectively developed sympathetic proclivities and empathetic dispositions (pp. 199–201).

Because he (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) uses the term *sympathy* to convey (a) contemporary conceptions of sympathy and empathy and sometimes uses sympathy to convey (b) both empathy and sympathy simultaneously, one must extract his meaning from each context. Dewey (Dewey & Tufts) also apparently understands the two concepts as organically related. Therefore, we use the two terms to differentiate, not dichotomize, his ideas for contemporary readers.

Dewey's Use of Sympathy, Prong One: The Sympathetic Element

The *sympathetic element* embedded in Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) use of the term, *sympathy*, is predominantly spontaneous, instinctive, emotive, impulsive, unreflective, and superficial. Additionally, sympathy is frequently, although not always, limited *in scope* to family, friends, and likable colleagues and students; *in vision* to flagrant insult or harm; *in time* to immediate consequences; and *in awareness* to the novel (Dewey & Tufts, 1932). Sympathy embodies a spontaneous interest in students' personal or academic suffering and involves an instinctive sensing of their needs (Dewey & Tufts, 1932). Moreover, a teacher's spontaneous interest in students' learning pains and pleasures can lead to her students' deeper learning and to her and their healthy rapport. Thus, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) may correctly claim: "Nothing can make up for the absence of immediate sensitiveness" (pp. 295–296).

Dewey's Use of Sympathy, Prong Two: the Empathetic Element

On the other hand, *the empathetic element* in Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) use of the word, *sympathy*, suggests the empathetic teacher is intentional, reflective, imaginative, investigative, affective, and evaluative and is involved in understanding, teaching, and acting on others' behalves. Consequently, the empathetic element goes beyond sympathy to imply a growing, knowledgeable regard for students and associates. Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) also claims the empathetic teacher contemplates consequences, for empathy "is the surest guarantee for the exercise of *consideration*, for examination of a proposed line of conduct in all of its bearing" (p. 259, emphasis in original). This contemplating consequences occurs because the empathetic element is not a "cold calculation" of what is at stake in an ethical situation but, instead, "is the animating mold of moral judgment" (p. 298) and action. When these qualities—e.g., growing knowledgeable regard; contemplating consequences; exercising consideration; examining conduct; and utilizing moral judgment—are operative, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) refers to the outcome as "properly" working, "intelligent sympathy [*empathy* in our usage]" (p. 275). In terms of his theorizing, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts,

1932) provides both (a) a contrast between an impulsive sympathy and an intelligent sympathy [empathy] and (b) a view of the potential complementary nature of contemporary sympathy and empathy within his single term, sympathy. By using this single term, *sympathy*, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) illuminates a teacher's sudden impulse to ease students' pains and enjoy their pleasures (impulsive sympathy) as complementing her reflective decisions to understand them better so she might effectively and ethically engage them in learning experiences (intelligent sympathy).

Having explained Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) two-pronged definition of sympathy and connected it to contemporary uses of sympathy (impulsive sympathy) and empathy (intelligent sympathy), for clarity and reading ease, we henceforth use *sympathy* to mean Dewey's impulsive sympathy and *empathy* to mean Dewey's intelligent sympathy. Of course, a person who acts on impulsive sympathy can use her intelligence, e.g., when she comforts students. Conversely, a person who uses so-called intelligent sympathy can draw faulty conclusions. To highlight the complementary relation between sympathy and empathy and note when both prongs of Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) sympathy are at work, we use the term from our title, *sympathetic-and-empathetic*.

Personal-Pedagogical-Ethical Endeavors

Two critical educational matters emerge from Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) reasons for encouraging educators' sympathetic-and-empathetic growth: teachers need to be both effective and ethical. As we analyze teachers' personal-pedagogical-ethical endeavors, we find Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) concept of the sympathetic-empathetic teacher to be larger than our definition above, larger than what may at first meet the eye. First, the teacher needs sympathy and empathy to interact personally and pedagogically with students. *In the personal realm*, the teacher needs sympathy for students and colleagues experiencing frustrations, challenges, and problems. The teacher needs to feel their challenges so she or he is motivated to act on their behalves. Thus, being regularly detached from others, especially the young, is incompatible with Dewey's (1938/2010) view of the teacher. *In the pedagogical realm*, the teacher needs to empathize to understand how students think as they attempt to answer questions, solve problems, and complete projects; the teacher needs to empathize, teach, guide, re-teach, and re-tutor effectively. Ideally, as empathetic co-learners, teachers and students enjoy a "vital [intellectual] current flowing" (Dewey, 1929/1988, p. 22) between them because they are also co-thinkers. Second, in addition to needing sympathy and empathy to interact personally and pedagogically with students, educators need empathy to function effectively within teaching's explicitly ethical dimensions or *in the ethical realm*. Much as

teachers empathetically strive to understand students' culturally diverse backgrounds and lifestyles, they also should endeavor to understand how students' ethical diversity and backgrounds influence their thinking and behaviors (Kunzman, 2006). Since the ethical and personal are embedded in the pedagogical and within each another, we discuss only two dimensions. The first dimension, requiring sympathy and empathy and functioning in personal and pedagogical realms, we name *the personal-pedagogical*; the second dimension, requiring empathy, we name *the ethical-pedagogical*. Our concepts of personal-pedagogical and ethical-pedagogical are distinctive, complementary, and mutually depend on each other. We now extend our definitions of *the personal-pedagogical* and *ethical-pedagogical dimensions*.

The Personal-Pedagogical Dimension

The Personal Side

When Dewey (1895/1964) seems to be discussing sympathy, he maintains individuals ordinarily have “a native sympathy” or “genial impulse” and “sympathy with human life and its aspirations” (p. 199). Elsewhere, he (1916/2010) asserts the artistic teacher needs empathetic insight into the external behavior and the inner states of

...the life of children, what is going on in their more outward motions, in the things they do, but [also in] what is going on in their feelings, their imagination[s], [and] what effect the schoolroom is having on the[ir] permanent disposition[s], the side of their emotions and imagination[s]. (p. 44)

We infer he is asking teachers to develop empathy so they can build on what may be termed quantitative assessment and can evaluate the pedagogical import and significance of students' *behaviors, feelings, imaginations, dispositions, and emotions*. Dewey (1916/2010) hints at going beyond a narrow quantitative assessment to suggest the “schoolroom”—with all its qualitative complexities—needs far-reaching evaluation. Thus, Dewey (1964, 1988) focuses on broadly knowing each student as student, person, and member of groups because such knowledge is crucial to working successfully and appropriately in school and classroom environments. Adding that attentiveness to the person as student and human being matters, Dewey (1916/2010) charges teachers to collaborate with colleagues and social institutions to nurture in students a harmony of “certain affections and desires and sympathies [along with the]...power to carry out intellectual plans” (p. 45). He (1903/2010) affirms one powerful motive to such action is “sympathy and affection, the going out of emotions to the most appealing and the most rewarding object of love—a little child” (p. 151). Although *sympathy, affection, and love* are not mentioned in context as potentially problematic, one knows people have impulses and emotions that can

easily go too far as we later demonstrate through our teacher-Sofia example. Because Dewey (1938/2010) assigns great importance to sympathy and empathy, one need not wonder why he says only teachers who have the ability “to stay young indefinitely and to retain a lively sympathy with the spirit of youth should remain long in the teaching profession” (p. 35).

The Pedagogical Side

Shifting our discussion to *the pedagogical side* of the personal-pedagogical dimension, we highlight Dewey (1938/2010) stresses that empathetic insight—seeing as through each learner’s eyes and understanding—enables teachers to observe “movements of...minds...[and be] sensitive to all the signs [of their] response...to subject-matter” (p. 36). Specifically, he (1938/2010) underscores empathy most impresses when it is “alive to [student] perplexities and problems, discerning of their causes” and has the “tact to put the finger on the cause of failure, quick to see every sign of promise and to nourish it to maturity” (p. 36). Indeed, empathetic teachers’ minds should “move in harmony with those of others, appreciating their difficulties, entering into their problems, sharing their intellectual victories” (Dewey, 1938/2010, p. 36). Dewey (1928/2010) makes clear that discerning the “connected course of [the student’s] actions” and “prolonged sequence of activities” (p. 182) is critical and comes from understanding a student’s sustained intellectual interests and activities.

The Ethical-Pedagogical Dimension

By examining the personal-pedagogical dimension, we have, to some degree, already touched upon *the ethical-pedagogical dimension*. Similar to the way sympathy can enhance personal relationships among students and teachers, empathy can deepen understanding of students’ outward behaviors and inner thoughts. Likewise, sympathetic-empathetic understanding should flow into empathetic, ethical-pedagogical inquiry. To paraphrase Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932): as an emotion with both feelings and cognitive content, empathy is uniquely helpful as an intellectual tool for understanding and actualizing fairness. Even so, it is useful to recognize one’s empathy can grow as one more fully comprehends students as persons. When teachers cultivate their capacities to imagine what it is like to be particular students and encounter their challenges, personal empathies can move to a deeper level, for “a person’s ideas and treatment of his fellows are dependent upon *his powers to put himself imaginatively in their place*” (Dewey, 1934, p. 348, emphasis added). By implication, Dewey (1934) suggests that, as educators get inside students’ thinking, they can better guide these students to imagine or see the desires and interests of their classmates, teachers, and neighbors. So, Dewey (1934) avers, correctly or incorrectly,

growth in ethically understanding another may lead to expanding and restructuring one's own personal capacities and dispositions:

It is when the desires and aims, the interests and modes of response of another *become an expansion of our own being* that we understand him. We learn to see with his eyes, hear with his ears, and their results give true instruction, for they are *built into our own structure*. (p. 336, emphasis added)

Using an empathetic lens for inquiry advances one's ethical beliefs and values, particularly as they bear on building and sustaining productive school and classroom cultures (Kunzman, 2006). Not merely a tool for understanding students and colleagues, empathy is also a virtue vital to developing students' abilities as they learn to see into and understand others' minds and emotions, including their teachers'. As teachers, then, one needs to develop students' empathy by nurturing their imaginations so they can improve their abilities to see the nuances and intricacies of diverse people's ethical ideas and interests (Dewey, 1916).

Applying Dewey's Thinking: Classroom Teacher, Sofia Marks

In this section, we present and analyze one teacher's actions in one problematic situation in her teaching life through Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) concepts of sympathy and empathy. While the details of her situation are numerous, we draw on specifics that inform our analysis.

Description of the Teacher and Situation²

Sofia Marks is a fifth-grade, elementary-school teacher in a public-school district in a southwestern state of the US. When the incidents we analyze arose, she had taught for over a decade and at her current school for five years. Although they may not know to name particular pedagogical practices "Deweyan," many consider Sofia an excellent teacher because she intuitively engages in Deweyan pedagogy by connecting curricula to students' personal interests, backgrounds, and needs; by developing a multifaceted understanding of each student; and by drawing upon her substantial, classroom-teaching experience and upon her knowledge and understanding of student development. Sofia reportedly senses students' personal and academic struggles, gets inside their heads to determine precisely where learning obstacles reside, and then personalizes instruction. As she had done with many other children in her care, Sofia connected with her new student, Jonathan Foster. In Jonathan's case, due to his extraordinary circumstances (described subsequently), Sofia immediately sympathized with him because of his recent trauma and hoped she might help him get past that event through her caring commitment to him. Although Sofia's strengths in Deweyan pedagogy—her sympathetic-and-empathetic teaching—have served her students, colleagues, and the school community well, in her interactions

with Jonathan, her sympathy runs awry creating personal and professional disequilibria and a school predicament. In this section, we analyze her sympathetic-and-empathetic actions in one particular situation involving one traumatized, 11-year-old boy, Jonathan, and, indirectly, his 7-year-old sister, Claudia.

Jonathan and Claudia's parents died in a horrific, fiery automobile accident. Shortly thereafter, Child Protective Services (CPS) moved the siblings to a foster home. After disclosing the heartrending situation to the principal, Jonathan and Claudia's foster parents enrolled them in the school where Sofia Marks teaches; Jonathan became one of Sofia's students. After a short time, both children were doing well academically and behaviorally. Meanwhile, CPS sought a family member to take the siblings permanently and successfully located their biological-mother's brother who agreed to take them into his home and rear them.

Legally, the arrangement was settled, and the children were soon to leave the school when things became suddenly awkward and tense. CPS called the school principal, Mr. George Adams, and told him Sofia was not to be alone or have any contact with Jonathan outside her classroom. The CPS official explained that Sofia had called CPS, while Jonathan was with her during the school day, insisting Jonathan did not want to live with his uncle. Instead, he wanted to live with Sofia and her family. Sofia reportedly told the official that she and her husband wanted to adopt Jonathan but did not mention adopting Claudia. Later, Jonathan's foster parents reported Jonathan told them he did not want to go to his uncle, and they should just send Claudia. He wanted Sofia to be his mom and said she had told him when he became 12 years old, he could decide with whom he wanted to live. The foster parents said Sofia's words increasingly upset and confused Jonathan who cried late into the night. The next day, Saturday, after Jonathan received over 100 text-messages from Sofia's phone, his foster parents blocked the number.

On Monday, Principal George Adams met with Sofia asking her if there had been any reason for Jonathan to interpret her intentions as anything other than maternal. She replied, "No. I love him and want him as part of my family." Emphatic that she had done nothing wrong, she proclaimed she had contacted CPS only because no one would return her attorney's calls. Adams explained the school would comply with CPS' directive, he had transferred Jonathan to a new classroom, and he expected her to have no conversations with Jonathan in school or out until the legal ramifications of the situation were clear. He concluded that if she persisted in contacting Jonathan directly, disciplinary action would ensue up to and including terminating her employment. The school's lawyer added that failure to comply with Adams' instructions would at least mean disciplinary action for insubordination. Sofia stated

she would talk with her attorney to find out what her rights were; until that time, she would do as Adams directed. She added that her love for Jonathan and desire to help him was not necessarily the school's business as long as she complied during school hours.

Adams and a school board member met with Sofia after Jonathan and Claudia had left for their uncle's home. Adams did not want to lose Sofia as a teacher but thought it was imperative she make no further contact with Jonathan. Moreover, he thought it essential she understand why her actions were inappropriate and potentially harmful to Jonathan and Claudia. The academic year ended with a tenuous détente but with the understanding Sofia could return the next year if she complied with Adams' directive. He believed her, still, to be an effective teacher who could learn from the experience; the district's attorney concluded Sofia had not committed any act for which she could be clearly disciplined.

Deweyan Analysis of Sofia Marks' Situation

When analyzing these events, five questions emerge connecting Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) theory to the situation. The questions are: 1) was Sofia acting outside the scope of a reasonable, sympathetic-empathetic teacher's actions; 2) was the principal correct in compelling Sofia to terminate her relationship with Jonathan and thereby acting within the school community's expectations of sympathetic-empathetic teaching; 3) what was the best way to frame the argument Sofia's actions were or were not consistent with sympathetic-empathetic teaching and therefore were or were not in Jonathan's best interests; 4) was it reasonable to retain Sofia as a teacher—was there a plausible argument that she is a sympathetic-empathetic teacher willing and capable of growing from this experience; and 5) what does one learn by examining Sofia's situation as a whole? We address each of these questions in turn.

Question 1: Was Sofia acting outside the scope of a sympathetic-empathetic teacher's actions?

Upon discussion, we agree Sofia acted in an excessive manner: emotions drove her luring her across the proverbial line. Her actions interfered with the legal processes and decision-making to uphold the legal standard of acting in Jonathan's best interests. Her proposed action to adopt him alone gave the impression she was indifferent to Claudia whom she appeared willing to separate from Jonathan without regard for the harm separation might cause and with neither sympathy nor empathy for Jonathan and Claudia's plight as separated siblings having recently lost their parents. Her reinforcing Jonathan's desire to maintain a developing mother-son relationship made helping him accept the move to his uncle almost impossible. Deweyan thinking may suggest she sympathized with only Jonathan excluding Claudia because Sofia did not interact with her since Claudia was not her student. Likewise, she seems

to have a diminished interest in Jonathan's uncle's welfare and feelings. Furthermore, her intense concern for the immediate consequences of the situation for Jonathan and her seem to slight both intermediate and long-term consequences on all parties.

Some may wonder if one should view Sofia's actions through the teacher's traditional duty of standing *in loco parentis*. Historically, that concept was used legally in the US to permit school officials to make decisions regarding students that otherwise belong solely to parents, such as when and how to discipline students. In some instances, school personnel utilized *in loco parentis* to permit educators to do things parents had rejected and asked the school not to do. Thus, *in loco parentis* extended to situations where the educators' decision about the best interests of a child was permitted even against parental wishes.

The *in loco parentis* principle, however, did not privilege an individual teacher's decision over that of higher-ranking school officials.³ When there was dissent within a system about which actions the school would take *in loco parentis*, those with the most authority or greatest expertise made the official judgment. In contrast, Sofia stood alone in—or, perhaps, outside—the district in her assessment of what constituted the best action for Jonathan. Her actions conflicted with the decisions of the governmental agency responsible for making decisions in the best interest of children in its care thus creating a likely conflict between two, state, governmental bodies—public-school district (State Board of Education) and CPS—over jurisdiction and power that in court would likely be resolved in CPS's favor. In this instance, the authority to act for Jonathan *in loco parentis* regarding future custody and adoption rested explicitly with CPS, not with educators or educational institutions.

As noted earlier, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) considers empathy a tool for fairness only if all concerned “humble our estimate” (p. 275) of our abilities and importance. Unfortunately, Sofia appears to overestimate her ability and the necessity to intervene by opposing the CPS decision because she elevates herself while underrating others' professional judgment, abilities, and motives. If one reads Sofia's actions through Dewey's (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) notion of intelligent sympathy—empathy—her actions do not seem to emerge from empathy because she failed carefully to analyze the full set of salient factors and consequences in her desired actions, especially in terms of Jonathan's needs.

Question 2: Was the principal correct in compelling Sofia to terminate her relationship with Jonathan and thereby acting within the school community's expectations of sympathetic-empathetic teaching?

The answer to this second question seems inescapably, “yes.” Jonathan and Claudia were going to live with their uncle's family. Whatever Claudia's feelings about relocation, Jonathan apparently

resisted the new situation encouraged by Sofia's promised alternative. The circumstances as a whole would make the new adoptive family's job of integrating the two children a delicate process. The horrendous death of Jonathan and Claudia's parents had traumatized them and resulted in their temporary relocation where Jonathan found Sofia who intensely loved and sought to protect him. Now, he was being removed to unknown location and conditions against his will. Nevertheless, logically, Sofia had no further role in Jonathan's life, and any continued contact with him would reasonably lead to further unhappiness.

Question 3: What was the best way to frame the argument that Sofia's actions were or were not consistent with sympathetic-empathetic teaching and therefore were or were not in Jonathan's best interests?

When Jonathan and Claudia's parents died and the children became wards of the state, loving relationships' informal and affectionate dimensions did not factor into deciding their futures but instead, statutory presumptions about sanguinity preferences leading to an evidence-based determination founded on established norms and general standards. As soon as the children became the state's wards, CPS procedures guided their movements: foster care, placement with a family member, and possible adoption. Whatever her motives, Sofia had interposed herself disruptively into a state-mandated process in which no role for her existed outside her function as Jonathan's teacher. Even if she had volunteered to provide both children a loving home, she could only appropriately do so if a willing and appropriate family member had not agreed to care for the children. Once a family member entered the equation, Sofia could not appropriately ask to adopt one or both children. Assuming, as is reasonable, she did love Jonathan and wanted to support his healing, her perspective was narrowly relational and clashed with the systemic and inevitable resolution.⁴

One way to interpret Sofia's actions is to assume her *initial* sympathetic-empathetic responses were spontaneous *and* reasonable. As Dewey (1903/2010) writes, a young child is generally "the most appealing and the most rewarding object of love" (p. 151) and how much more so here given Jonathan's needs and response to Sofia. However, Sofia's surge of sympathy moved towards a deep, emotional commitment that apparently dictated her conduct, limited her reflection, and narrowed her focus. In contrast, Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) posits one function of empathy as a principle of reflection is to widen and deepen concern for consequences—something inherent to ethical actions. Sofia's conduct demonstrated a narrowing rather than widening and deepening concern for consequences.

Question 4: Was it reasonable to retain Sofia as a teacher—was there a plausible argument that she is a sympathetic-emphatic teacher willing and capable of growing through this experience?

Subject to her agreement to sever all connection with Jonathan, Principal Adams chose to retain Sofia even though neither he nor any faculty member was aware of the events involving Sofia and Jonathan prior to CPS' call. At first, Sofia's plan to adopt Jonathan was so private even Claudia's teacher was in the dark. Sofia's experience was emotionally devastating because she felt she had to rescue, heal, and guide Jonathan to a happy life. The events, however, were potentially *sui generis* and thus unlikely to occur again. More pointedly, although her initial response was angry and self-protective, her performance as a classroom teacher before and during this time suggested she was capable of developing as a teacher and person. In other instances, her concern for students' growth yielded positive results and aligned with the best tradition of the school. Deciding to invite Sofia back, therefore, seems both fair and judicious illustrating a Deweyan (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) interest in wisdom and fairness. Whether it would have been well-advised for her to accept the invitation is a separate question.

Question 5: What might one learn by examining Sofia's situation as a whole?

Since Dewey (1930/1984) contends that in the first stage of thinking one must interpret a situation's qualities as a whole (Dewey & Tufts, 1932), we asked what one learns after considering one's own and each stakeholder's immediate intuitions, inferences, and perceptions of the situation? What qualities did we and others sense? Did a "pervasive quality" (Dewey, 1930/1984, pp. 258–262) regulate each person's thinking about the situation? Later, one should consider which ethical principles are relevant to choosing among potential solutions (Dewey & Tufts, 1932).

Also needing pondering are Jonathan and Claudia's, Sofia's, CPS', the foster parents', the school's, and the uncle's family's perceptions of good. Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) indicates multiple, conflicting goods are common in problematic situations. For Sofia, the good might be similar to Jonathan's. For Claudia, the good is a glaring unknown. Multiple other goods exist for CPS, the foster family, the school, and the uncle's family. The evils are also somewhat different if overlapping on occasions. While we have embedded some principles that help decide among goods and evils in the previous discussions, we attend next to sensing or intuiting the whole situation's qualities.

Four quick points are especially noteworthy. First, the entire situation entails all that is relevant to addressing the problem. Second, one must clearly identify the situation's goods and ills. Third, the whole situation tells a qualitative story that requires all stakeholders' insightful

interpretations. Fourth, although every participant's insights merit consideration, Dewey (1930/1984) contends experienced, empathetic participants usually better sense and see the situation's dominant qualities than do others. Ultimately, once one grasps the entire situation, which qualities immediately surface? Tragic, sad, and/or unfortunate ones? Unbalanced, disharmonious, and/or divisive ones? Imprudent, dangerous, and/or destructive ones? How and with what evidence might different people support their perceptions? What do the identified qualities suggest about participants' desires, needs, and interests? Which ills should one reduce or eliminate to construct a new, unified situation? How does the situation stimulate participants to arrive at imaginative solutions? Ultimately, who decides on how to use the pooled information?

Finally, many other questions arose during the analysis of this situation we hope others will explore. For instance, when a school is strongly interpersonal and encourages teacher heroism, what are district administrators' and school-based leaders' responsibilities? Are they partially responsible if a teacher's behavior is a logical, if distorted, extension of a school's expectations? Instead of encouraging a highly individualistic culture to grow in a school, should leadership and staff cultivate a sense of *community and shared responsibility* for each other and students? Should at least one explicit goal—making clear that in complex and ambiguous situations involving students, a single teacher, no matter how sympathetically and empathetically attuned, is unlikely to consider all the salient factors, possible options, and consequences as well as a community of teachers—be addressed?

Conclusion

In "My Pedagogic Creed," Dewey (1896/1959) writes: if we "secure right habits of action and thought, with reference to the good, the true, and the beautiful, the emotions will for the most part take care of themselves" (p. 30). While Dewey may be correct, in relation to the operation of sympathy and empathy in effective and ethical teaching, emotions may interfere with practicing right habits and thought more than he seemingly acknowledges. Given that sympathy is usually an immediate and instinctive response to students' struggles and that a culture of teaching is built upon the premise that teachers have a duty to care for their students, the teacher's first surge of sympathetic feeling is to protect and nurture a student in trouble. After all, are teachers not charged with "doing what's right for the kids"? If the student responds to the teacher's sympathetic feelings and actions, reciprocal feelings may produce a strong, emotional current. Thus, a strong connection is possible between teacher and student particularly when the student is suffering and the teacher feels capable of alleviating that pain.

Consequently, while Sofia's situation with Jonathan was unusual, her sympathetic feelings were not—they were variations of a common emotional response to students' pain. She might be expected, as a competent teacher, to move from sympathy to empathy, then to reflective intelligence and thereby to operate from right habits of action and thought. Instead, she appears to have acted like an overly protective parent with intense emotions that shaped and drove her actions. If her feelings were an anomaly, the situation would be an interesting counterpoint among a universe of rational acts. Instead, although the role her emotions play in her actions seems far from idiosyncratic and very much a commonplace deviation, her chosen "solution" seems anything but regular and commonplace for a teacher acting on a deeply cared-for student's behalf.

If Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) is correct about sympathetic-and-empathetic teaching, the paradox becomes: without sympathy—without relationships built on emotional connections—a nuanced process of empathetic and ethical conduct is unlikely to emerge. As integral as emotions are to continuing sympathetic-empathetic relationships between teachers and students, so are right habits of action and thought in the lifelong process of becoming an ethical, caring, and effective teacher. While sympathy and strong emotional responses are potentially dangerous, they are also essential to moving beyond an impersonal process. The ethics of good teaching requires much more than the impersonal. In Deweyan terms, once disequilibrium occurs, how does one foster the requisite balance of feeling and thinking, and how, then, does one make a balancing move from sympathy to sympathy-and-empathy and thus to intelligent action? Although answering these questions is beyond our purpose, we offer four observations.

First, while there is no one way of maintaining and reintroducing personal and institutional balance, Dewey (1933/1986) observes the "best thinking occurs when the easy and the difficult" (p. 350) are balanced. In Sofia's situation, she appears to have had an unseen need that resulted in uncharacteristic choices and behaviors. Some desire tipped the balance causing her to judge poorly and act unwisely. She found it too easy to think and act on her sympathy rather than counterbalance her sympathy with empathetic thinking. Pappas (2008), therefore, rightly highlights the ideal of balance in Dewey's moral thought.

Second, isolation in teaching, a sociologically familiar description of teachers' workplace habits (Lortie, 1975), may be an impediment to ethical teaching. Combining practice in isolation with a school-wide emphasis on forming caring classrooms may multiply risks to teachers and students alike. Having a school-wide emphasis on being a caring

community may be a partial antidote to a tendency of some to become overly sympathetic.

Third, aspiring or practicing school-based educators may correctly think teachers already have too much to learn and too much to do to add still another learning goal—becoming a sympathetic-empathetic teacher; therefore, hesitancy to accept another responsibility, even if it involves ethics, is understandable. Despite their hesitancy, most teachers would agree that being effective, ethical educators requires engaging in complex interactions with students and colleagues; teaching students *how to value* rather than imposing one's own values (Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1984); having the ethical obligation effectively to foster students' learning and ethical behaviors; and having the ethical obligation to create positive learning environments by encouraging democratic ethics of equity, care, and inquiry. Such engaging, teaching, fostering, and creating concern teachers deeply and partially define them as sympathetic-empathetic teachers. Indeed, those running both pre- and in-service teacher programs have a responsibility to examine with their students what it means to be ethically sympathetic and empathetic teachers. Here Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) underscores that one cannot separately cultivate virtues, including sympathy and empathy, for they "interpenetrate one another" and collectively enhance "a rounded and positive character" (pp. 257, 259). If Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) is correct, complementary qualities should accompany one's cultivating sympathy and empathy including interest in inquiring into the evolving factors that influence human behavior, evaluating the ideas and values that are studied, thinking with and acting on the ideas and values that are being reflectively retained and refined, understanding when and why certain choices are well advised, foreseeing the consequences of actions in different circumstances, and acting on behalf of one's own and others' mutual betterment when making decisions.

Finally, educators should work to advance students' reflecting upon their experiences with and their resulting understandings of sympathy and empathy. By teaching students to be interested in and attentive to others' pain and pleasure and to see the virtue of using empathy as an intellectual tool, school personnel nourish "right habits of action and thought, with reference to the good, the true, and the beautiful" (Dewey 1896/1964, p. 93). Although one neither magically produces nor permanently achieves these habits, they are worthy of ongoing human pursuit and admiration unless research and reflection indicate their actual consequences are contextually counterproductive. Like Dewey (1934), we encourage educators to pursue the process of becoming a sympathetic-empathetic teacher; to determine if, when, how, and to what

degree they have worked through the process; and, in response to that determination, to revisit the process as needed to achieve and retain moral balance.

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Endnotes

- ¹ When comparing Dewey and Tufts' (1932) use of sympathy with that of G. H. Mead's (1934), it is clear they had similar understandings of the word.
- ² All names are fictional, and many details are reconstructed to protect the anonymity of the individuals whose stories we relate and analyze.
- ³ The legal doctrine of in loco parentis has existed as a matter of common law and in school district policies throughout the U.S. as long as common schools have operated. The U.S. Supreme Court finally expressly decreed public schools have such interests as safe and efficient operations that permit them to impose punishments on students against parents' wishes (See Ingraham v. Wright, 1975; New Jersey v. T. L. O., 1985). Schools can also make decisions about the educational programs students follow despite parental objections, subject to legislatively created statutory limitations. Although the conflicts between governmental officials and parents about a child's best interests are not limited to education, schools have been an arena where such conflicts often arise. Such conflicts can also arise within schools where such employees as teachers work to provide educational or other services district policy or state law prescribes. The scope of such issues is beyond full explication in this article. Suffice it to say, if Sofia had violated a superior's direct and legal order, such as those the principal clearly made here, she would be subject to insubordination charges. CPS was acting within the scope of its legislatively assigned duties in respect to Jonathan, and Sofia had no authority to disregard its decisions. In all likelihood, unlike the school district, she lacked standing to challenge CPS' decision in court.
- ⁴ There are occasionally exceptions to the mechanistic legal processes of settling children removed from biological parents. Furthermore, on some occasions, the legal, decision-making apparatus can lead to decisions no reasonable person would describe as protecting the best interests of a child (indeed, most literature of a biographical nature about children put into the "system" of foster care, e.g., suggests a Dickensian nightmare). Nonetheless, in this case, the preferred option of putting children with blood relatives was available. There was neither indication that choice was problematic nor was there any

reason to suggest splitting the two siblings so Sofia could adopt Jonathan was inherently desirable. These cases are very often difficult and hard to judge in terms of “best interests,” to say the least (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2013).

Political Upheaval and Turmoil's Shaping Educational Philosophy: Hannah Arendt on Education

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Introduction

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) was a student of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), three important, influential, 20th-century German philosophers whose work grounded and remained visible in Arendt's philosophy. Arendt's philosophy also recalls the German philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), and, dare I say, Karl Marx (1818–1883). Although Arendt's philosophy does not necessarily resemble Kantian rationalism, Hegelian idealism, or Marxian dialectical materialism, she developed a philosophy that was every bit as systematic as these earlier German philosophies. In *The Human Condition* (1958), for example, Arendt wrote a well-conceived examination of *vita activa*, in its three parts: labor, work, and action. Using a three-part analysis again in *The Life of the Mind* (1978), her unfinished but posthumously published study of *vita contemplativa*, Arendt analyzed the mind's three functions: thinking, willing, and judging. In this paper, I trace Hannah Arendt's life as it relates to her work with particular attention to the philosophers who taught and influenced her, her writing, and her activism; next, I examine her philosophy of education as it emerged during her life in the United States amidst political turmoil played out in public school yards, turmoil that did much to shape her philosophy of education; finally, I offer a remaking of Arendt's philosophy of education the way I deduce it might look had she not, perhaps, been caught between cultures when her own philosophy of education emerged out of the Civil Rights Movement.

Philosopher, Political Analyst, Biographer, and Poet

Arendt's phenomenological roots (Husserl, Heidegger, and Jaspers) affect not only her philosophy but also her political and biographical work. Beginning with her doctoral dissertation published as *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin* (1929; *St. Augustine's Concept of Love*) and later in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), *On Revolution*, (1963), *On Violence*

(1970), and *Crises of the Republic* (1972), Arendt examined, with new insights, some pivotal historical ideas and events. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) provided Arendt recognition as historian and political philosopher. In *Origins* (1951), Arendt analyzed totalitarian government systems' rise focusing on Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. After the publication of *Origins* (1951), she received invitations to lecture at Princeton (1953), Berkeley (1955), and Chicago (1956) universities and joined the faculty of the New School of Social Research (1967).¹ Interspersed throughout her publications are short (with the exception of the over 300-page biography, *Hannah Arendt: The Life of a Jewess*, 1957/1997) biographical studies that represent another facet of her work and thought. In these biographical studies, Arendt analyzed individuals' contributions with a goal of examining "how they were affected by historical times."² Arendt seemed to be especially interested in individuals' strengths and weaknesses during particularly distressing times. Finally, though seldom mentioned, but not without importance, Hannah Arendt was a poet with a poet's sensibility that appears even in her prose. "Poetry," she said, "whose material is language, is perhaps the most human and least worldly of the arts, the one in which the end product remains closest to the thought that inspired it."³

From Prep-School Dismissal to University: Growing Phenomenological Roots

Capable student, voracious reader, and popular peer, Hannah Arendt was expelled from her girls' gymnasium/prep school after leading a demonstration against a disliked teacher, the last of many difficulties the temperamental and willful Hannah had with the conservative and often anti-Semitic *Ladieschule* (girls' gymnasium/prep school in Königsberg).⁴ Those not so gifted suffered significantly more than she from German anti-Semitism that increased with the rise of the Nazi party and Hitler's dictatorship. Arendt survived her early education by being a gifted student whose family had the wherewithal to support her when situations that stifled her creativity and intelligence confronted her. Thus, her family was able to sustain her continued studies after she was expelled from her Königsberg *Ladieschule* sending Arendt to Berlin where she studied independently for the *Abitur*,⁵ or high-school graduation and college-entrance exam. Interested in Christian Theology, especially the then-popular, existentialist Christian theology, Arendt studied Greek and Latin, attended the lectures of Romano Guardini (1885–1968), and read the works of Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855)⁶ in which she later found the source of Existenz Philosophy.⁷ Despite her interest in theology, after reading Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), his *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), and Jaspers' *Psychology of World Views* (1919), the 16–17-year-old Arendt became increasingly critical of dogmatic religion.⁸

In 1924, Hannah Arendt passed the *Abitur*, thereby earned admission to the university, and began her university studies as Martin Heidegger's student in Marburg, fall 1924. A well-known and popular philosophy professor in Marburg, Heidegger had studied with Edmund Husserl in Freiburg and taught there as *Privatdozent* (university lecturer paid by students) until he became professor of philosophy at Marburg in 1922. Although it was another three years before his most important work, *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)*, was published, his students and colleagues highly regarded him as a lecturer and thinker: his "name traveled all over Germany like the rumor of a hidden King."⁹ Arendt described Heidegger's thinking as having a "digging quality peculiar to itself, which, should we wish to put it in linguistic form, lies in the transitive use of the verb 'to think.' Heidegger never thinks 'about' something; he thinks something."¹⁰ Despite his thinking's digging quality, "to thinking there belongs *Gelassenheit*: serenity, composure, release, a state of relaxation."¹¹ Although Heidegger partially defines thinking as serene, composed, a state of relaxation, and contrasting to willing (in which there is always something to be willed—power, wealth, health, etc.), he also defines thinking as passion: "To the old opposition of reason versus passion, spirit versus life, the idea of passionate thinking, in which thinking and aliveness become one, takes us somewhat aback."¹² His term "passionate thinking" indicated the energy and creativity Heidegger applied to the act of thinking, an energy and creativity that especially impressed Arendt:

That something like Heidegger's passionate thinking exists is indeed, as we can recognize afterward, a condition of the possibility of there being any philosophy at all. But it is more than questionable, especially in our century, that we would ever have discovered this without the existence of Heidegger's thinking.¹³

Beyond the allure of his exquisite teaching and thinking, Heidegger was brilliant, charming, thirty-five, and married with two sons; Arendt was young (18), naïve, swept up in "Heidegger, the perfect teacher,"¹⁴ and in love. By the end of the year, it was clear *they* had no future. The next year Arendt moved to Freiburg to study with Heidegger's mentor, Edmund Husserl. Arendt and Heidegger remained close until he was appointed Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933—ten days after which he joined the Nazi Party and remained an active member for nearly a year. Arendt found it interesting that Heidegger and Plato alike, when entering "into human affairs, turned to tyrants and Führers."¹⁵

Arendt stayed in Freiburg to study with Husserl who was in his last years at Freiburg where he had been for twelve years. Now swept up in the "most modern and interesting philosophical tendency, Edmund

Husserl's phenomenology,"¹⁶ she concluded Husserl's phenomenology transcended the historical, natural, biological, or psychological determinism found in the philosophy of the time; broke from Hegel's metaphysical and historical approach; and "freed modern philosophy... from the fetters of historicism."¹⁷ Although she studied with Husserl only one semester, this semester marked an important change, for in Husserl's phenomenology, Arendt found the relation between being and thought.¹⁸ Husserl helped Arendt master the "modern feeling of homelessness in the world," the feeling that "things are torn out of their natural context."¹⁹ Because Husserl was convinced that through phenomenology man could again be at home in a world that had become alien, she surmised: "In this fundamental claim of phenomenology lies the most properly permanent and most modern attempt to find a new foundation for humanism."²⁰ Mastering Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his ideas concerning homelessness, being torn from one's natural context, and the possibility of being at home again in a world become alien increased in importance as she faced the Nazi party's mounting influence, control, and the effects of that influence and control.

After her semester in Freiburg with Husserl, Arendt went to Heidelberg to study and write her dissertation with Karl Jaspers. Unlike her relationship with Heidegger, from whom she was estranged between the early 1930s and 1949, Arendt and Jaspers had a long friendship and extensive correspondence. Jaspers gave Arendt a new slant on phenomenological thinking unencumbered by Husserl's classicism or Heidegger's functionalism. Jaspers' philosophy focuses on communication, sharing ideas with another person. One sees Jaspers' influence in *The Human Condition* (1958) in which Arendt developed the idea of action: public, political behavior based on communication. This political expression became the *vita activa* so important in Arendt's thinking. "Jaspers," Arendt wrote, "achieved his break with traditional philosophy in his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, where he represents and relativizes all philosophical systems as mythologizing structures, in which Man, seeking protection, flees before the real questions of his Existenz."²¹ This Existenz is, for Jaspers, nothing less than human freedom. Arendt wrote: "only in so far as Man moves in the freedom that rests upon his own spontaneity and is directed in communication to the freedom of others, is there reality for him."²² Seeking reality is, for Jaspers, the end of philosophy. One can see Arendt merging the idea of home from Husserl with Jaspers' emphasis on reality: "The task of philosophy is to free Man from the illusory world of the pure object of thought and let him find his way home to Reality.... Being as such is not knowable, it is to be experienced...."²³

While Arendt's teachers and mentors clearly influenced her, she brought considerable gifts to her work when applying what she learned (both through instruction and through introspection) to communicate her thoughts and ideas through essays and books. In her historical and biographical works, Arendt shows a broad interest in using writing as communication and philosophy as a means of analysis in the phenomenological and existential thought permeating her writings and as a means of analyzing philosophy of the past.

From Student to Philosopher-Activist

Hegel's Philosophy of History Influences Arendt's Philosophy and Activism

Although Arendt was as well versed in classical philosophy as in the 18th- and 19th-century French and German philosophers, it was not until her work observing and assessing the Eichmann trial and writing *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) that Arendt, with her phenomenological underpinnings and perspective, looked to history and the philosopher of history, Hegel, to help her understand and explain Eichmann's actions and the actions of others like him. Hegel posited individuals' day-to-day activities move history forward. From the greatest to the lowest, responding to their own needs and desires, prejudices and preferences, the power they wielded or to which they succumbed, and their responses to social and physical environments and pressures account for history's progress: "mankind ceases to be a species of nature, and what distinguishes him from the animals is no longer merely that he has speech...or reason...his very life now distinguishes him...his history."²⁴ Humans' activities "spring from their needs, their passions, their interests, their characters and their talents";²⁵ reason uses those activities to advance history. In gratifying their interests, humans subconsciously do reason's bidding and make history: the *cunning of reason* "sets passions to work...while that through which it develops itself pays the penalty and suffers the loss."²⁶ For Hegel, "The happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed...on the slaughter bench of history.... To what have these things been sacrificed?"²⁷ They have been sacrificed to the growth of human freedom to which attaining freedom always proceeds even if it often seems to take two steps forward and one step back. In addition to Hegel's idea that day-to-day activities move history forward as people gratify their interests, desires, and passions and that the cunning of reason sets passions to work, significant to Arendt's analysis and assessment of WWII atrocities and Eichmann's role is Hegel's warning: "The caprice of the individual is not freedom. It is this caprice which is being limited, the license of particular desires...law, morality, the state...are the positive reality and satisfaction of freedom."²⁸

Analyzing Eichmann's Crime: Historical and Phenomenological Lenses

Arendt's interest in human affairs resulted from her encounter with the "shock of Nazism" that led to her political and Zionist activities in the 1930s and '40s, first in Germany then in France and the United States. Because "philosophy is a solitary business,"²⁹ Arendt chose to leave it in favor of action in the public realm. Thus, when the editor of *The New Yorker* requested Arendt cover the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel for his role in the "final solution of the Jewish question,"³⁰ Arendt, feeling compelled to view the proceedings first-hand, rearranged her rather-full calendar. In her mind, she had a debt to her past to see, in the flesh, the person responsible for the deaths of so many: in Berlin Eichmann assumed responsibility for Jews' deportation, evacuation, and transportation to implement the Final Solution.³¹

Arendt found what drove Eichmann, even if evidence to the contrary now exists, was not hatred for the Jews, which he had; Nazi ideology, which he adhered to; or some personal depravity. Eichmann, she thought, was but a career-oriented *petit bourgeois* bureaucrat whose inflated sense-of-self increased when accepted into the *Schutzstaffel* (S.S.); after receiving military training transfer to the *Sicherheitsdienst* (S.D.), the S.S. intelligence agency; and when earning subsequent promotions. Perhaps Eichmann became, for Arendt, the German *everyman*, and evil became the banal product of the bureaucracy in which no one was to blame since all the bureaucrats did what they were told. "The trouble with Eichmann," she wrote, "was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal."³² If the S.S. and Gestapo were the implements of terror in the camps and in society, many functionaries made it possible for them to do their bloody work.³³ Gaining insight from Hegel, she concluded history proceeded through the activities and labor of these plodding bureaucrats and party apparatchiks always seeking increased rank, status, importance, and wealth.

In *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963), which resulted from her *New Yorker* assignment, Arendt portrayed Eichmann as a simple-minded bureaucrat and clown³⁴ and, again drawing upon Hegel, reduced the Jewish Councils' collaboration with the Nazis to behaviors required to fulfill their own needs and self-interests. Arendt's understanding of Hegelian historical philosophy allowed her to view the effects of the individual's caprice and the *cunning of reason* at work in the process of history. When reading *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) the similarity between evil's banality, which loomed large in Nazi Germany, and Hegel's cunning of reason, putting passions to work and thereby advancing history, is apparent. Upon publishing her analysis and assessment of Eichmann's trial, Arendt

lost much of the Jewish community's and the state of Israel's support, for the Israelis banned *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963).³⁵

From Thoughtlessness and Civil Unrest Emerge Arendt's Philosophy of Education

Setting the Stage

During the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, in addition to teaching at the New School of Social Research and writing essays and books, Arendt increasingly spoke as a guest lecturer in many colleges, universities, and other organizations. These were turbulent years in the United States; the Civil Rights Movement, legislation, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions resulted in backlash. The Vietnam War and antiwar movement created division and dissension. The deaths of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and others, created a sense of hopelessness for the future. Constantly thinking and writing about the social, political, and educational events and issues of her time, Arendt did not follow conventional wisdom and was sometimes misunderstood as when she published *Eichmann* (1963). In "Crisis in Education" (1958) and "Reflections on Little Rock" (1959), for example, Arendt considered the wider implications of the thoughtlessness she saw in *Eichmann*, the thoughtlessness of people in response to the issues and events that confronted them, and the consequences—intended and unintended—of national leaders' and their opponents'—the extremists and radicals—actions on the left and right. Arendt found U.S. society's problems in these years to stem from "a security hysteria, a runaway prosperity, and the concomitant transformation of an economy of abundance into a market where sheer superfluity and nonsense almost wash out the essential and the productive...and...the problem of mass culture and mass education."³⁶ One can see Arendt's analysis of the world was without sentimentality or bias. She took this same kind of analysis into her posthumously published, *The Life of the Mind* (1978), where she dealt with the thoughtlessness present in her society.

Emerging Philosophy of Education: Outside the Mainstream

The editor of *Commentary*³⁷ invited Arendt to write "Reflections on Little Rock."³⁸ Arendt used the picture of Elizabeth Eckford, one of the students who integrated Little Rock Central High School in 1957, as an organizing graphic. Because the essay she submitted to *Commentary*, "Reflections on Little Rock," was outside the mainstream, *Commentary* refused to publish it. Although Arendt considered not publishing, when subsequent events clarified her contribution's importance, Arendt published the essay some months later in *Dissent*³⁹ with a preface acknowledging the controversy. In short, she questioned the propriety of using children and schools to solve social problems and to attain rights.

Ralph Ellison (1914–1994) pointed out to Arendt that she did not understand the Black experience in which it was necessary for young people to experience firsthand the “terrors of social life with all the mysteries stripped away”⁴⁰ unadulterated by parents, pastors, teachers, etc. When making such a statement to Arendt, Ellison seems not to have considered Arendt’s own experiences with “terrors,” and that being a Jewish child in Nazi Germany instead of a young adult would have magnified her experiences with those terrors. Still, Arendt did not think U.S. racism mirrored German racism in particular and European racism in general but was unique because “created by the one great crime in America’s history”⁴¹ and rooted in a tradition that led to the conditions of segregation, discrimination, and bigotry.

In addition to racial issues, in “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt found politicians at fault for using schools and other educational institutions to work out societal problems adults had failed to solve. Arendt asked, “Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in school yards?”⁴² Arendt identified the problem from a Hegelian perspective: “the United States is not a nation-state in the European sense and never was”;⁴³ like Hegel, she saw the state as the unified cultural, linguistic, and historical condition of a people.⁴⁴ Such a multi-tiered unification did not exist in the U.S. Using public schools to alleviate social problems became problematic for her because schools, like family and religion, are also rooted in the private and social realms. Specifically, Arendt conceived society, much as she did philosophy, in three realms, the private, the social, and the political; when the political disregards the social and the private, totalitarian tendencies ensue:⁴⁵

Because the many different factors involved in public education can quickly be set to work at cross purposes...it seems highly questionable whether it was wise to begin enforcement of civil rights in a domain where no basic human and no basic political right is at stake, and where other rights—social and private—whose protection is no less vital, can so easily be hurt.⁴⁶

At about the time she wrote “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt (1958) published “The Crisis in Education” in *Partisan Review* (1958).⁴⁷ In this essay, Arendt critiqued using schools as a political means of addressing problems, and she referred to the condition of schools and pedagogy in general, especially the excesses of student-centered education, as the “Rousseauian ideal in education.”⁴⁸ For Arendt, “education belongs among the most elementary and necessary activities of human society, which never remains as it is but continuously renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new human beings.”⁴⁹ She

explained, “Modern education, insofar as it attempts to establish a world of children, destroys the necessary conditions for vital development and growth.”⁵⁰ For her, solving the problem of education meant looking closely at the way schools function in society.

Arendt contended the crisis in education related to three assumptions about education. “The first,” she said, “is that there [exists] a child’s world and a society formed among children that are autonomous and must insofar as possible be left to them to govern.”⁵¹ This assumption focuses too much on the child group and deprives children of the normal child-adult relationship. The second assumption Arendt connected to the education crisis concerned pedagogy, the science of teaching: “Under the influence of modern psychology and the tenets of pragmatism...[pedagogy] has developed into a science of teaching in general in such a way as to be wholly emancipated from the actual material to be taught.”⁵² The result is a deficiency in teachers’ content knowledge leaving students to their own devices and depriving teachers of the respect that comes with superior knowledge. The third assumption about education she critiqued and deflated advanced the notion “that you can know and understand only what you have done yourself...[and therefore] results in the substitution of doing for learning and of playing for working...[both attempt] to keep the older child...at the infant level.”⁵³ Thus, for Arendt, the education

...that should prepare the child for the world of adults, the gradually acquired habit of work and of not-playing, is done away with in favor of the autonomy of the world of childhood...and the pragmatic formula, its application to education, that is, to the way the child learns, tends to make absolute the world of childhood.⁵⁴

Arendt linked this assumption about education to a “pathos of the new...the illusion that a new world is being built through the education of the children.”⁵⁵ In contrast and in keeping with Hegel, Arendt viewed any world into which children are born as an “old world, that is, a pre-existing world, constructed by the living and the dead.”⁵⁶ Arendt claimed the disappearance of common sense—meaning the community’s shared-in-common sense of reality (rather than “good sense”)—led to the educational crisis. Arendt saw common sense working as a necessity in U.S. political life “directly influenced by Rousseau, in which education became an instrument of politics, and political activity itself was conceived of as a form of education.”⁵⁷ In the political realm, Arendt identified

...the unique role the concept of equality plays and always has played in American life...more than...equality before the law, more...than the leveling of class distinctions, more even than what is expressed in the phrase “equality of opportunity”...in

the American view a right to education is one of the inalienable civic rights.⁵⁸

Indeed, the pathos of the new was in response to the old world that had “no solution for poverty and oppression.”⁵⁹ For Arendt the struggle to equalize, minimize, and erase differences exacerbated the educational crisis politicizing it during the Civil Rights Movement and, more specifically, during the movement to integrate public schools.⁶⁰

Although at the time Arendt was writing on education, her ideas were outside the mainstream, she was neither writing in a vacuum nor alone in making controversial claims about the state of U.S. education. Her position resembled many others’ views on public education’s woeful condition. Arthur Bestor (1908–1994), James Conant (1893–1978), John Gardner (1933–1982), and Hyman Rickover (1900–1986) all bemoaned the U.S. education system’s failure, in their opinions, to teach essential skills.⁶¹ Such others as Robert Hutchins (1899–1977) and Mortimer Adler (1902–2001) contended schools failed to cultivate the intellect leaving students ignorant of their intellectual history.⁶² Given these critics’ backgrounds,⁶³ one can understand and appreciate their positions, but Heidegger, Husserl, and Jaspers were not their teachers.

While Arendt certainly cast into relief important flaws in the U.S. educational system and ways the relation among the political, social, and private influence children in schools, she also attacked and dismissed student-centered learning as a means of teaching students to remain infantile, as an emphasis on pedagogy without content knowledge, and as a skirting of one’s responsibility to prepare students for the adult world of work. It is this attack and dismissal I find problematic and outside her philosophical character. How could Arendt be an existentialist in virtually all other ways and remain so anti-progressive in her views on education? How could she embrace Jaspers’ emphasis on communication and communication directed toward others’ freedom and altogether reject student-centered learning? Arendt once noted many bureaucrats who served the Nazi regime slid into position to run the post-war, German government.⁶⁴ Perhaps because the same was true for teachers—many who taught under the Nazi Reich continued teaching in the *Bundesrepublik* (The Federal Republic of Germany, democratic West Germany) and the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (The German Democratic Republic [DDR], communist East Germany)—Arendt distrusted teachers and other government workers to have the intellectual fortitude to teach students the meaning and value of living in a free society; how to maintain and retain that free society; how to recognize such destructive ideas as those of the anti-democratic, anti-human, anti-free-individual, fascist Nazi regime; and how to stand firm

against destructive forces always recognizing that “they” may take the Jews today, but, even with one’s silence as they take the Jews away, these same destructive forces will take everyone else tomorrow. Possibly her success as a student in a conservative educational institution, despite being discriminated against and feeling discomfited, caused her to underestimate the importance of equal treatment and opportunities in schools. Conceivably, her Germanic roots in which the mother tongue and German culture are paramount—language and culture she continued to prefer above all others—exercised such power and influence over her she was unable to observe and analyze from any other perspective.

Remaking Arendt’s Philosophy of Education

Arendt asserted schools function to incite and support society’s continuous rebirth and evolution; this on-going rebirth ensures possibilities of newness, diversity, and freedom.⁶⁵ I posit 21st-century, U.S., public education must transcend the psychological and developmental models that have defined it for the last half-century and escape the business management model focused on economic and consumer behavior while sacrificing *teaching* students *for* living the active political and social lives necessary to good citizenship in a vital democracy. As a result, I remake Hannah Arendt’s educational philosophy to support U.S. public education’s transcending and escaping these models; to reflect her philosophy as it appears in *The Human Condition* (1958) and *The Life of the Mind* (1978); and to meet Arendt’s “necessary conditions for vital development and growth”:⁶⁶ preparing “the child for the world of adults, the gradually acquired habit of work and of not-playing.”⁶⁷ Revisiting Arendt’s phenomenological background (Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers) and her own philosophy for the purpose of constructing a philosophy of education based on her work, but markedly different from the philosophy of education she wrote during mid-20th-century, civil unrest in the United States, I theorize an Arendtian philosophy of education useful in contemporary public schools, true to Arendt’s non-education philosophical thinking, and respectful of her “necessary conditions”⁶⁸ while free from her preference for German language and culture.

For Husserl education meant developing empirical learning into an ordered knowledge system through a process of eidetic and phenomenological reduction that allows one to abstract and apply intellectual data.⁶⁹ Husserl “sought to reestablish the ancient relation between Being and Thought”⁷⁰ as a palliative to homelessness, *anomie* (lack of society’s moral guidance), *ressentiment* (sense of frustration, hostility, and powerlessness), and alienation thereby enabling a

“reconstruction of the world from consciousness.”⁷¹ For him, “the phenomenological method operates exclusively in acts of reflection.”⁷² Recalling Husserl’s *Phänomenologie* (1913) is the basis of Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, Jaspers’, and Arendt’s existential thought, one also sees Heidegger focused on thinking and being but through the process of hermeneutics based on the individual in the world rather than as a palliative to homelessness, *anomie*, *ressentiment*, and alienation. Education for Heidegger concerned the individual student trying to answer the question “Who am I?” through “calculative and meditative thinking.”⁷³ For Karl Jaspers education’s meaning and role lay in “helping the individual to come into his own in a spirit of freedom and not like a trained animal” (“*Erziehung ist die Hilfe zum Selbstwerden in Freiheit, nicht Dressur*”).⁷⁴ Therefore, for Jaspers education requires students to act in freedom making their own choices in lieu of acting in ways others require them to act and choosing what others oblige them to choose.

Arendt’s work, primarily her philosophical works, *The Human Condition* (1958) and *The Life of the Mind* (1978), provides the means to construct a philosophy of education that, although not aligned with her published essays on education, honors her philosophy and her teachers’ legacy, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Jaspers’. In *The Human Condition* (1958), Arendt investigates the *vita activa* and the problem of action, a central concern expressed in political theory. She designates “three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. They are fundamental because they correspond to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man.”⁷⁵ Labor sustains the biological life process; work results from man’s creative interaction with and change of nature; action results from the condition of citizenship, membership in a culture, state, or group.⁷⁶ One can expand upon her structure to posit schools should be part labor, part work, and part action. Not all learning is creative; some is just necessary, and schools provide students with avenues for acquiring these necessities essential for modern life.

A possible schema for an Arendtian philosophy of education would include the labor, work, action format Arendt advances in *The Human Condition* (1958) and the thinking, willing, judgment format she puts forth in *The Life of the Mind* (1978). In schools “labor” means schools provide instruction and training on skills necessary in everyday life while students learn the requisite fundamental disciplinary knowledge needed for more advanced learning. After mastering the educational basics through “labor,” students would have opportunities to move beyond labor to educational work. Educational work would include students’ applying creativity and intelligence to investigating and solving problems,

seeking and creating new knowledge, and learning both independently and through interactions with others. Education as work becomes more personal, internal, and important to students than labor. The teacher-instructor during “labor” now becomes teacher-fellow-investigator during “work” as teacher and students delve more deeply into the subject matters’ complexities and nuances. “Action” means and even requires students be ever-more creative over increasingly long time periods and over time for students to perceive creativity magnifying in value. The “work” of learning, applying creativity and intelligence, enhances the “labor” of learning, acquiring facts and skills. The “action” of learning, learning through active participation, means embracing Jaspers’ emphasis on communication, moving in freedom, directing communication to free others, and arriving home to reality. This student-centered communication keeps students grounded in reality and working toward good citizenship in a free society. Combining Jaspers’ emphasis on communication and reality with Hegel’s philosophy of history means the “action” of learning involves students in intellectual community positively influencing their personal and social well beings.

An example of the “labor, work, action” continuum from foreign-language learning illustrates labor, work, and action in one content area. When learning a foreign language, students begin their language learning by rote. They memorize vocabulary, conjugate verbs, and learn grammar rules; as they advance, students assemble sentences, communicate creatively with others, apply the knowledge they have in various ways. If they show interest and fortitude, they become active learners choosing literature, responding to cultural behaviors, and remaking themselves in response to new stimuli. Those who travel experience concretely the breadth of knowledge that had been hitherto abstract and academic. By progressing from labor to work to action, students participate fully in the discipline they have learned.

Although Arendt’s labor-work-action continuum works well within the educational context, this Arendtian philosophy of education means more than defining education as *vita activa*—labor, work, and action—and assigning it value. In re-visioning and remaking Arendt’s philosophy of education, I connect *vita activa* to preparing students for a life of the mind, *vita contemplativa*—thinking, willing, and judging—and to assigning that life value. According to Arendt, thought is abstract, is the search for meaning and relevance. Thinking concerns not only one’s own daily life and environment, the amalgamation of one’s experiences, feelings, and emotions, it includes considering others’ lives and environments in one’s own and foreign societies. Unlike thinking, willing and judging have particular objects or goals.⁷⁷ Willing means making decisions and choices, means expressing desires; based on thought and reason, willing

is the “spring of action”;⁷⁸ appreciating human action’s diverse nature is in turn a requisite of freedom.⁷⁹ Societies establish parameters for what one may reasonably will, parameters that define these societies’ freedoms. Since schools are one way societies pass on their cultures and values, in school one is taught that willing beyond those parameters invites censure; therefore, one is taught to limit and constrain one’s will and then extend what one has learned about parameters in school through the process of daily living and learning from experience. Judging, the problem Arendt least clarified, means contemplating attributes and deciding their relative value.⁸⁰ In philosophy of education, judging presupposes knowledge and sense of the common world—a “sixth sense,”⁸¹ the social group’s shared wisdom. Though perhaps not always the case, generally, thinking and willing are necessary for judging causing all manner of prejudice and discrimination to result from will and judgment without thought.

Thinking, willing, and judging ultimately serve to inform labor, work, and action. The educated person, then, thinks, wills, and judges while performing labor, doing work, and being socially and politically active. Arendt’s educational philosophy conceptualized as *vita activa* with a goal of *vita contemplativa* would focus on the learner as a thoughtful community member participating in and preparing for an active social and political life in a free, diverse society, a progressive idea indeed.

Endnotes

- ¹ Soon after she arrived in the United States, Hannah Arendt began teaching at Brooklyn College, summer 1942. She regularly taught courses at Brooklyn College, Columbia University, and the New School for Social Research in the 1940s and 1950s. The New School had formed the University in Exile in 1933 to accommodate academics unable to remain in their own countries. Arendt was invited to lecture at Princeton in 1953, Berkeley in 1955, and Chicago in 1956. She was named lecturer at Princeton in 1959 and taught at the University of Chicago, 1963–1967, until she was named Professor of Philosophy at the New School in 1967. “Biographical Note,” *The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress*, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/arendhtml/arendthome.html>
- ² Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York: HBJ, 1968), vii.
- ³ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 169–170. (originally published in 1958)

- 4 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 33–34.
- 5 *Abitur* is the name of the high school graduation exam in Germany, Finland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Estonia. This exam may be at the end of either 12 or 13 years of education.
- 6 Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 34.
- 7 Hannah Arendt, “What is Existenz Philosophy?,” *Partisan Review* 1 (1946): 34–56.
- 8 Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 36.
- 9 Hannah Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” *New York Review of Books*, 21 October 1971, 50–54, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1971/oct/21/martin-heidegger-at-eighty/?pagination=false>
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 46.
- 15 Arendt, “Heidegger at Eighty,” 50–54. After resigning as Rector, Heidegger remained an inactive Nazi-party member. He had a strong pride in and preference for German culture and language.
- 16 Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 46.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 36.
- 18 Arendt, “What Is Existenz Philosophy?,” 35.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Ibid.*, 36.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 52.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 53.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 54–55.
- 24 Arendt, “The Concept of History,” 75.
- 25 G. W. F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, ed. Robert S. Hatmann (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 26.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 43.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 27.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 50.
- 29 Hannah Arendt, “Sonning Prize Acceptance Speech” (presented at the University of Copenhagen, 19 April 1975), <http://miscellaneousmaterial.blogspot.com/2011/08/hannah-arendt-sonning-prize-acceptance.html>

- ³⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 5.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 64–65.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 276.
- ³³ Hannah Arendt, “Auschwitz on Trial,” in *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003).
- ³⁴ Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 54.
- ³⁵ The film, *Hannah Arendt*, Zeitgeist Films, 2012, directed by Margarethe von Trotta, screenplay by Pamela Katz and Margarethe von Trotta, dramatizes the events surrounding the Eichmann trial, the publication of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, and the effects of the book’s publication.
- ³⁶ Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” *Dissent* 6, no. 1 (Winter, 1959), 55.
- ³⁷ In 1945 the American Jewish Committee founded *Commentary* magazine and appointed Elliot Cohen (1899–1959) editor; the Committee established *Commentary* for the purpose of carrying forward Jewish spiritual and cultural heritage. “*Commentary*,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0005_0_04544.html
- ³⁸ Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” 49–56.
- ³⁹ *Dissent Quarterly* was established in 1954 “to dissent from the bleak atmosphere of conformism that pervades the political and intellectual life of the United States; to dissent from the support of the status quo now so noticeable on the part of many former radicals and socialists; to dissent from the terrible assumption that a new war is necessary or inevitable, and that the only way to defeat Stalinism is through atomic world suicide.” <http://dissentmagazine.org/files/wordtoreaders1954.pdf>
- ⁴⁰ Ralph Ellison quoted in Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 316.
- ⁴¹ Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” 46.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 50.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁴ Hegel, *Reason in History*, 50.
- ⁴⁵ Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” 50–52.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.
- ⁴⁷ In 1934 William Phillips, Philip Rahv, and Sender Garlin founded the critical, political, cultural, and literary journal, *Partisan Review*. The last

- issue of *Partisan Review* was spring, 2003. In 1961 “The Crisis in Education” was included in the collection of essays, *Hannah Arendt: Between Past and Future* (New York: Penguin Books, 1968). <http://hgar-pub1.bu.edu/web/partisan-review>
- 48 Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” 46.
- 49 Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” 185.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 187.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 180–181.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 182.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 183.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 184.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 176–177.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 177.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 176.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 179.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 178.
- 60 Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 311.
- 61 John D. Pulliam and James J. Van Patten, *History of Education in America*, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall, 2003), 265.
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 Hannah Arendt, “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” in *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 34–35.
- 65 Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” 185.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 *Ibid.*, 184.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 185.
- 69 Edmond Husserl, introduction to *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 3–8; Edmond Husserl, “Second Section, Fourth Chapter, Point 56,” in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 104.
- 70 Arendt, “What is Existenz Philosophy?,” 35.
- 71 *Ibid.*, 36.

- ⁷² Husserl, *Ideas*, “Introduction,” 3–8; “Third Section, Second Chapter, Point 77,” 139–142.
- ⁷³ Martin Heidegger, “Thinking,” quoted in John Paul Strain, *Philosophies of Education* (New York: Random House, 1971), 475. Heidegger and Arendt found meditative thinking to be lacking from modern-era societies and thoughtlessness to be a modern problem of monumental scale.
- ⁷⁴ Karl Jaspers, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* (München. 8. Aufl., 1967), 202 translated and quoted in Hermann Horn, “Karl Jaspers 1883–1969,” in *Thinkers on Education* (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1997), originally in *Prospects: the Quarterly Review of Comparative Education* vol. XXIII, no. 3/4, (1993): 721–739, <http://www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/ThinkersPdf/jasperse.pdf>
- ⁷⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 7.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Hannah Arendt, “Thinking,” in *The Life of the Mind*, ed. Mary McCarthy (New York: Harcourt, 1978), 92.
- ⁷⁸ Hannah Arendt, “Willing,” in *The Life of the Mind*, ed. Mary McCarthy (New York: Harcourt, 1978), 6.
- ⁷⁹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 234; “Thinking,” 214.
- ⁸⁰ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 69–70.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., 50.

The Sociopolitical Ideology of a Communist Educator: Doxey A. Wilkerson

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Introduction

The African-American experience during WWI and WWII was defined by economic exploitation, lack of educational opportunities, and a political disenfranchisement that fostered a social invisibility within a capitalistic democracy (Holloway, 2013; King, 2004). Doxey A. Wilkerson (1941) suggests, “By any criterion which values human welfare above private profit, these teeming millions of men—they, too, have the right to live” (p. 387). Wilkerson, a career educator during the mid-twentieth century, embraced a political philosophy with potential to bolster the sociopolitical plight of the African-American masses. More importantly, Wilkerson’s advocacy for a radical shift within the time’s popular political ideology would be the answer to the “Negro question” and the realization of a pragmatic utopia meant to galvanize social uplift of all oppressed peoples and destroy the existence of elite caste systems (Dawson, 2013; Lewis, 2009).

Wilkerson’s (1944) career spans over 57 years in an assortment of roles in higher education institutions. His research left fingerprints, for example, on foundational studies such as Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Dilemma,” and on 1938 research on the status of the Negro for President Roosevelt. His political advocacy arose from involvement on such projects, and he proved an unfamiliar voice within the liberty-denying harmony of the U.S. Essentially, Wilkerson (1944) believed Communists better understood the need for Negro/white unity than any other group in society. He insisted upon top-down reinstatement of political and social ideologies promoting an inclusive democracy for all within U.S. confines. In this paper we align Wilkerson’s political advocacy with his educational practice and detail a life narrative that left a deep impression on the Black intelligentsia’s radical philosophies of the post-war U.S. In order so to do, we focus on Wilkerson’s most visible period of political activism during his membership within the United States’ Communist Party.

U.S. social history remains incomplete without reimagining the twentieth century's racial and political violence that reigned with terror African-Americans' lives. And white supremacy and an oppressive racial order have long worked to deny a truly tangible citizenship for millions of U.S. African-Americans. Dismissed as "the past" are ceremonial lynchings coinciding with Black disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow South. Forgotten and unresolved is the burning, in 1921, of Tulsa, Oklahoma's Black community affectionately known as the "Black Wall Street." Muted are the voices of those executed in the East St. Louis riots of 1919.

The realization of citizenship for African Americans during the mid-twentieth century meant the destruction of social and cultural hegemony inherently woven into the U.S.' democratic practice. "White Americans at the time objected to [B]lack economic, social, and political enfranchisement because they argued explicitly that it undermined their standing as citizens" (Dawson, 2013, p. 23). A complete "social reconstruction" of society would demand a total redistribution of wealth and resources that ultimately would link education with political ideology (Watkins, 2005). Examination of Wilkerson's sociopolitical activism illuminates a social reconstructionist paradigm intent upon seeking the attainment of a progressive society. Citizenship and the development of democratic ideology are critical since citizenship assumes the recognition of humanity. The evolution of the African American from an object of exploitation to a citizen relied upon a sociopolitical platform that could blur the lines formerly predetermined by race and class. Wilkerson believed utopian possibility could be established through a political vehicle that acknowledged the existence of citizenship within the very spirit of the African American. His career—and life—were spent seeking this possibility.

Doxey A. Wilkerson was born in 1905 near Kansas City, Missouri in Excelsior Springs. During his childhood years, Wilkerson was regarded as a bright child who "became an avid reader and maintained a newspaper route to supplement the income of his family" (Daily & Washington, 1985, p. 102). His affinity for reading was bolstered by engaging the political rhetoric of *The Crisis*, the official magazine of the National Association of the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and gaining a foundational understanding of "the implications of U.S. bigotry through the eloquent and acerbic expressions of Afro-American writers opposed to segregation and Jim Crow laws" (p. 102). Consequently, his bright nature led him to an above-average academic career at Sumner High School in Kansas City, Missouri (Daily & Washington, 1985).

Upon completion of B.A. and M.A. degrees at the University of Kansas, Wilkerson progressed to a career in higher education. From

1927–1935, Wilkerson (1944) served at Virginia State College as an Associate Professor of Education. With the aid of northern philanthropy and through its political sensitivity to Negro education, Virginia State College became one of the few major higher learning institutions serving African Americans (Daily & Washington, 1985). Historian James Anderson (1988) asserts, “Significantly, the great shortage of [B]lack teachers existed at a moment in history when the philanthropists, white school reformers, and [B]lack leaders were locked in a struggle to shape the ideological content of schooling for the [B]lack masses” (p. 111). Wilkerson’s teaching appointment to Virginia State was symbolic of the wave of Black intelligentsia inserting themselves into the ideological argument for formal education of the Black masses. The popular belief system on manual and industrial education for Blacks suggested Black education should lie within the control of Black educators. Wilkerson (1934), among others, advocated for the formal education of the oppressed to embrace not only facets of industry, but also a quality education predicated on survival coupled with an escape from the prevailing opinion of the Negro being “inferior” (p. 453).

The Great Depression’s economic implications prompted a serious inquiry into the state of quality education for U.S. African-Americans. Black educators and scholars such as Wilkerson now had an obligatory mission to bridge the gap of quality education for the faithful, and properly to frame the political and economic implications of a societal meltdown resulting from post-WWI economics and racial ignorance (Wilkerson, 1941). Political scientist Ira Katznelson (2006) contends, “During the Great Depression, [B]lacks...experienced sharp downward mobility, losing the economic gains hundreds of thousands had secured by moving northward during the First World War” (p. 13). Quality education and fair labor treatment would increasingly become the mantra Wilkerson advocated through scholarship and research. Wilkerson (1944) suggests, “the freedom goals of the Negro and the survival goals of the nation have become inseparably merged. ... Both must now move forward together” (p. 8).

He was increasingly recognized as one of few African-American scholars chosen for the foundational Gunnar Myrdal study. Wilkerson, one of the newly emerging members of the Du Boisian “Talented Tenth,” was considered the most valued project staff before becoming one of its most severe critics (Lewis, 2009). Lewis claims, “In Myrdal’s eloquent formulation, racism was an imperfection in the social order, an incompatible substance the body politic fights to expel” (p. 623). Wilkerson vehemently disagreed, believing “the government could reverse this process and become an instrument in positive educational changes that would correct the basic inequalities within society” (Daily & Washington, 1985, p. 105). His thinking illuminates the Socialist

precepts that later define his political advocacy, for the gradual deconstruction of racism and sociopolitical inequity were not assumed by Wilkerson. Emerging discord across Socialist ideologies led Wilkerson back to Virginia to continue his research agenda for African-American students' educational equity (Daily & Washington, 1985).

Is it possible for educational reform gradually to deconstruct the generalized assumptions of Black inferiority and African Americans' intellectual incapability? Politically defined systems of educational reform acknowledge the assumed disadvantages of African-American students. The practicality of these systems perpetuates the generalized assumptions of inferiority of African-American students as if the culture were monolithic. To address properly the historical disadvantage of African-American students is to understand how the political, economic, and social systems have been designed not to reflect a humanist/universalist paradigm (King, 2004). Wilkerson understood African-American oppression as situated in four categories of human relationships: economic, social, political, and civic. Essentially, he argues, to redefine these relations for African Americans called for a societal embrace of a Marxist framework (Dawson, 2004).

From 1935–1942, Wilkerson worked as an Associate Professor of Education at Howard University. While working in Washington, he accepted several tangential but related roles with the federal government. Most notable was his role as Research Associate on President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Education. During his term, Wilkerson published a scholarly work entitled "Special Problems of Negro Education," and was named the Education Specialist of the Office of Price Administration (Wilkerson, 1955). In 1943, Wilkerson resigned from Howard University and his government appointments, and announced he planned to join the Communist party. In this role, Wilkerson would work within the CPUSA's educational programs in Washington, D.C. (Wilkerson, 1955). Soon to be formally recognized as a "political radical" (Lewis, 2009, p. 681), Wilkerson would utilize his party membership to advocate Socialist ideals as a means to realize the enfranchisement and social uplift of the oppressed.

The Jim Crow South, where most African Americans lived and toiled, proved a central focus to Wilkerson's advocacy for a reinstatement of social and political ideals. Wilkerson's political paradigm suggests a truly democratic nation could not survive with the parasitic and oppressive activity U.S. southern states practiced between the wars. Wilkerson (1944) claims,

The people's war against fascist enslavement has stimulated and strengthened democratic liberation movements throughout the world. In the onward march of mankind, the Negro people

of the United States will rise to their full stature and dignity as citizens of the country they have done so much to build and defend. (p. 3)

During the wars, the U.S. propagandized its participation as a global partnership to liberate the oppressed regions of the world, and to employ democratic ideals in the face of fascism. Wilkerson contended this fight would be fruitless if the U.S. could not galvanize the hope of those oppressed to be recognized as “true” citizens, and, more importantly, human beings.

Communist ideals made a dramatic sociopolitical appeal to the Black intelligentsia during the mid-twentieth century. The political disenfranchisement of citizens, perennial economic exploitation of laborers, and social terrorism experienced by African Americans throughout the U.S.’ southern region compelled the oppressed to seek a political voice and representation for the democratic promise proclaimed by the *U. S. Constitution* (Dawson, 2009). The Communist appeal came from a political party that understood achievement of African-American rights as fundamental to the welfare of the nation as a whole (Wilkerson, 1944, p. 6). Additionally, The U.S. Communist Party utilized a variety of resources that officially prevented the “legal lynching” of the Scottsboro boys during the early 1930s” (Wilkerson, 1944, p. 6). In an effort to realize the “Black struggle” in the southern U.S., Communist party leaders effectively constructed political action to protect the lives of young Black men wrongly convicted of raping a white woman. Never before had the African-American community witnessed a political ploy to protect Black life in the South. The Communist Party represented not only an opportunity for African Americans to become enfranchised within a democracy, but a governmental entity that could recognize African Americans’ humanity.

Wilkerson believed the “American experience” entitled one to enjoyment of inherent rights fully guaranteed by the federal government, and social alienation of African Americans in the South contradicted the law’s spirit in a litany of ways. Wilkerson (1944) suggests, “I became convinced...the Communists offered the most fundamental and correct approach to the problems of the Negro people, and also to those broader social objectives for which I and other progressive organizations had long been fighting” (p. 21). Plainly, it was Wilkerson’s opinion a complete overhaul of governmental practice would answer the “Negro question.” Wilkerson (1944) further maintained, “Negro and white, Jew and Gentile, youth and age, man and woman, professional and worker—all are bound together by close personal and political ties which make of them genuine comrades” (p. 22). Communism presented Wilkerson with an opportunity to participate in a fully inclusionary political experience from which he and others would otherwise have been excluded on the

basis of race. His political affiliation would empower his people to incite war upon inherently racist policies and would serve as a catalyst to dismantle societal discord.

The ideological tenets of Communism reconciled the effects Jim Crow placed on labor and integrationalist ideals of quality education. Wilkerson (1955) adds, "This special oppression of the Negro people operates to strengthen economic and political reaction throughout the country, and thus to worsen the conditions of the whole population" (p. 4). Wilkerson asserts the essence of Jim Crow in the South and the inherently discriminatory practices of capitalism amplifies its negative effects. He claims discriminatory, capitalistic labor practices severely inhibit the educational progress not only of Black children, but of Southern, white children as they, too, experience educational opportunities far below the national standard (Wilkerson, 1955). Wilkerson understood that, further to promote full democratic practice for all people, specifically within education, the fight would need to begin with fair labor practice and full unification of labor unions who could raise their voices in support of full integration and quality education. Racial segregation, Wilkerson argued, was "highly profitable," employing a "hatred for democracy" (Wilkerson, 1955, p. 8).

Racial segregation destroys the dream of democracy. The institution of slavery and the failed promises of the Reconstruction did not dissipate the faith African Americans maintained for sociopolitical liberation. Liberty, equality, and dignity are three facets needed for reconstructing public philosophy (Bromell, 2013), and racial segregation denied a people all three of these facets, most important of the three being dignity. Dignity for African Americans meant simply to be "seen" as a part of the democratic process. To deny such dignity, such humanity, is to perpetuate an inherent hatred for democracy itself.

Wilkerson's radicalized sociopolitical philosophy was not unlike many of his predecessors' (Dawson 2009; Lewis, 2009). What was deemed "radical" during the mid-twentieth century was nothing more than a progressive philosophy to humanize the African American experience and provide a sense of political and social inclusion for Black U.S. citizens. Wilkerson's advocacy within his particular, highly controversial political platform was the result of a society unwilling to transition. Wilkerson (1941) contends, "The peoples of the world are moving. Their immediate struggles are for decent standards of living, for civil liberties for national liberation and independence, and for peace" (p. 419). These desires, specifically from the African-American community, are desires defined by their enslavement less than a century removed from the wars. The vestiges of African-Americans' enslavement permeated unjust federal policies and social treatment of the masses within the South. Wilkerson believed in the "power of the people" as a

means rapidly to realize a truly liberated democracy for all (Wilkerson, 1941, p. 419).

Wilkerson's teachings suggest African-American liberation is "human" liberation. The democratic goals of a nation must be universal. The denial of democratic rights for African-Americans suggests denial of democracy for all. Democratic realization, for the African American, was a call for solutions to the economic, social, and civil relationships denied by sociocultural hegemony inherently woven into the U.S. reality. Wilkerson, Communist educator, sought the reformulation of policy that offered a direct solution to denial of a democratic humanity.

What does Wilkerson's experience offer contemporary educational practice? His work calls educators and policymakers to *continue to imagine the possibilities of utopia*. We cannot disregard the courage to include the history of oppression and denial of polity within pedagogical discourse. Political realism allows educational practitioners a starting point to reimagine the possibility of a utopian democracy that fully acknowledges the dignity of its participants. Reconciliation discussion necessitates a psychological societal transformation. Radical thinking towards progressive change must exist outside academic think tanks and inside the classrooms and policy meetings that dictate our sociopolitical relationships.

Wilkerson serves as an ideal point of departure for contemporary educational philosophy. Although there is much more in Wilkerson's sociopolitical thought that warrants our critical attention, strategic deconstruction of inequity, implication, and application are addressed by Wilkerson's ideologies. His sociopolitical thinking proved open to African Americans' ever-changing condition. For Wilkerson, the cornerstone for radical change of our educational and societal systems meant a reformulation of the nation's political morals and values from policy to practice.

Michael Dawson (2009) asserts, "Organizations of [B]lack leftists, feminists, egalitarian liberals, and nationalists must be rebuilt or strengthened to take on issues of economic inequality, the continuing disadvantage that faces [B]lacks and especially [B]lack children, gender disadvantage, and the incarceration state" (p. 204). Wilkerson believed a Socialist/Communist approach would aid in creating a utopian society capable of reconciling the physical, social, and economic effects capitalistic enslavement produced, and which inherently racist policy and practice magnified. The Jim Crow South neither provided a welcoming embrace to African-American veterans, nor did the military an instrument for African Americans' advancement (Katznelson, 2005). The Black political left sought an opportunity to realize a dream imbued with the hope of equal opportunity.

Doxey A. Wilkerson was a sociopolitical rebel who fought to unveil the socially invisible to the world. His beliefs echoed throughout the time's Black intelligentsia and sought viable opportunity for the voiceless to be heard and recognized without bias. What Wilkerson's advocacy teaches us, as students of the human experience, is that radical change, radical thinking, and radical practice politically galvanize those with a similar belief system. Dawson (2009) claims, "Reinventing the desire for politics—the desire to stand together is critical" (p. 209).

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Reflections on the American Lyceum: The Legacy of Josiah Holbrook and the Transcendental Sessions

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Introduction

Josiah Holbrook formed The American Lyceum Movement and it would become a pivotal foundation for adult education in the nineteenth-century United States. The movement functioned *outside* the traditional university system in order to address expanding needs of adult learners through non-formal, community-based structures. Holbrook's legacy evokes the organization of complex social environments conducive to the transmission of applied sciences and egalitarian adult education, as well as the transcendental ethos of the time. Holbrook's actions instilled across the U.S. character a sense of liberal expressionism; he outfitted the young nation with an andragogical venue capable of articulating practical and progressive philosophies. The advancement represented in the Lyceum manifested the social and educational aims of both layman and philosopher. Herein I describe the roots, formation, and development of Holbrook's movement, discuss the imperative educational and social repercussions of the Lyceum, and shed light on the relevance of some of the brilliant lectures presented in Salem's Lyceum during the 1848–1849 season. Ultimately I establish the first scholarly connection between the American Lyceum Movement and the Morrill Land-Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, for Justin Smith Morrill's direct involvement in the American Lyceum Movement led him to pen his watershed higher education legislation. Finally, my analysis reveals the Lyceum's inheritance as salient today.

Origins and Necessity

According to Bode's (1956) comprehensive analysis of the American Lyceum, Josiah Holbrook was born in Derby, Connecticut in 1788. He was raised in a rural environment and became familiar with agricultural equipment and farm machinery. As a young man, he also grew fond of geology, mineralogy, and developed a passionate desire to learn. He became an astute scholar and at age 18 he enrolled at Yale College. Holbrook participated soundly in class and managed to attain a laboratory position under a prestigious professor named Benjamin

Sillman (Bode, 1956). Ray (2005) argues Sillman was the first professor at Yale to lecture on concrete and modern scientific subjects such as chemistry and natural history. Sillman's discourses on the physical properties of minerals, geological taxonomies, and chemical compounds represented a significant progression from Yale's antiquated custom of scientific instruction; pre-modern teachings of natural philosophy, or the general study of nature, had dominated the college's science curriculum since its founding in 1701.¹ Sillman was also editor of the *American Journal of Science* through which he effectively distributed applied and contemporary scientific knowledge. Holbrook drew influence from Sillman's oratory prowess and editorial capabilities (Bode, 1956).

Sillman's modern scientific teachings, however important for Holbrook, were indicative of the knowledge's peripheral role at Yale. Very much like Yale College, early-nineteenth-century higher education establishments in the U.S. remained obstinately narrow in curricular offerings. Geiger (2005) argues, in the succession of the Second Great Awakening, the vast majority of prototypical U.S. colleges were religiously affiliated institutions, concomitant with their respective Christian sects. Clerical tutelage was considered the main goal of college matriculation and the training of ministers "an integral mission of the colleges" (p. 45). Ecclesiastical scholarship and expressly the demand for fluency in the classical languages cultivated an orthodox program. As a result, the reproduction of conservative curricula within formal higher education institutions rarely provided opportunities for technical training and relegated the teaching of the mechanical and agricultural arts to an apprentice system.² The inflexibility of the early-nineteenth-century college curriculum proved at odds with emerging U.S. industries. Consequently, these changes profoundly would influence the demands of adult education.

By the 1820s, a growing number of U.S. workers strongly criticized colleges and universities for their restrictive curricula. The rapid emergence of advanced agricultural mechanics, the boom in the textile industry, and the ever-expanding construction of railways and transportation systems offered new employments requiring technical skill proficiency. This rise in U.S. industry revealed a citizenry of intellectual practitioners who yearned to be educated in the mechanical arts and applied sciences. However few civilian, U.S. higher education institutions existed to accommodate the needs of this expanding class of adult learners. Consequently, laymen insisted either upon bolstering the customary college curriculum or locating other means of education. Geiger (2005) argues that, in the first several decades of the nineteenth century, "colleges were attacked for their obsession with the dead languages" and "for neglecting practical subjects and science" (p. 46). As

modern science and technology advanced ever forward, Holbrook recognized this gap and began to develop a proposal to accommodate a new class of adult learners.

Formation and Appeal

William Russell's first volume of the *American Journal of Education* (1826) includes an article colorfully exploring the idea that demands for mechanical instruction were already being answered in other, industrializing nations. Social establishments such as Anderson's Institution, founded in 1796 in Glasgow, Scotland, and the London Mechanics' Institute, which opened in 1824 in England, illustrated the popularity and instrumentalism of mechanical associations (*American Journal of Education*, 1826). Furthermore, Holbrook read in this very issue between 85 and 90 mechanics institutes or similar establishments were prospering in England (Weaver, 1976). He gathered from his readings, in a sense, it was becoming necessary for adult learners to get professional training outside the traditional institutional setting. Holbrook ardently believed local communities held within themselves an intrinsic educational capacity. He theorized adults could organize themselves and provide educational means to one another without necessity for college matriculation.

As an early innovator of U.S. adult education, Holbrook broadly understood the self-directed, emancipatory learning aptitude of adults. According to Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner (2007), emancipatory learning in adult education includes "not only the examination by learners of the sociopolitical assumptions under which they learn and function" but also the "incorporation of collective action as an outcome" (p. 108). With a rendition of this theory in mind, Holbrook's aim was to uplift entire village communities through mutual adult improvement. In the early 1820s, Holbrook developed archetypal community clubs and societies in Connecticut for the mutual improvement of youth and adults. The social community clubs were founded so members might discuss applied science, history, and art. Though these first clubs were largely unsuccessful, he nevertheless gathered important experience that would later shape the construction of the American Lyceum Movement.

In October 1826, Holbrook decided to build on his directorial experience from former community efforts and published a manifesto: "The Association of Adults for the Purpose of Mutual Education." He chose to publish the outline and goals of his mutual education club anonymously in the *American Journal of Education*, since the journal's audience was well aligned with his goals. William Russell, the journal's editor and curator, supported the diffusion of applied modern science, higher education access for men and women, and community uplift

(*American Journal of Education*, 1826). One month after the publication of his manifesto, the first branch of the American Lyceum was established in Millbury, Massachusetts where, coincidentally, the *American Journal of Education* was published (Long, 1991). An expanded edition of Holbrook's proposition was published in the *American Journal* in 1829, and was entitled "American Lyceum, or Society for the Improvement of Schools and Diffusion of Useful Knowledge."

Holbrook deliberately chose the term *lyceum* for several reasons. According to records from *The New England Farmer*, the term had been assigned to an agro-mechanical institute founded in Maine as early as 1822 (Fessenden, 1823). Other educational organizations, domestic and international, had adopted the term before Holbrook. Ray (2005) suggests that, by the 1820s, "the correlation between *lyceum* and learning was anything but vague" (p. 3). It is clear Holbrook recognized the popularity of this term and adopted it, though deeper analysis suggests Holbrook's ongoing relationship with Sillman also influenced his choice of terminology. Although Sillman advocated the study and teaching of modern science, he remained rooted in Yale's conservatism. In 1828, Sillman decisively defended Yale's classical curriculum in the landmark *Yale Report*. Geiger (2005) summarizes the implications of the report:

The classical languages were championed as the ideal vehicle for instilling mental discipline as well as culture and "balance." From these premises, the report could argue that all other forms of education—for practical training or advanced learning—should be relegated to other kinds of instructions. This position rationalized the *de facto* undergraduate focus of the colleges. The cogency of the *Yale Report*, moreover, seemed to grow over time and become the principle defense of the classical course for the next sixty years. (p. 47)

Sillman's defense of the curriculum and his transparent petition for non-traditional and professional learning to occur outside the college therefore presented Holbrook with a justification to establish an extramural association. The term *lyceum* functioned as an open admiration of Aristotle's public lecture school in classical Athens. Moreover, Holbrook sagaciously recognized not only the practicality of creating an external organization but also respected the traditional system from which he advanced by legitimizing the entire presentation of the novel movement through his use of the classical style. According to Ray (2005), "Early promotional materials present the Lyceum as a return to the much-admired splendors of ancient Greece and also a herald of a new, broad-based democracy in the nineteenth century United States" (p. 5).

Holbrook intended to accomplish two main objectives: 1) diffuse rational and useful information through the community generally; and 2)

apply the sciences and the various branches of education to the domestic and practical arts. Holbrook personally took on the challenge of circulating the idea of the Lyceum by actively lecturing and traveling in New England (Bode, 1956). His powerful, attractive personality drove the message of egalitarian education. He empowered men *and* women to take education into their own hands and to build community centers for the distribution of useful knowledge. Holbrook (1833) argues the Lyceum system, “especially in its social principle, can be applied for the benefit of both sexes, all classes, and all ages of the American Republic” (p. 4).

The American Lyceum became very attractive for an abundance of reasons. Along with its initial intent to discuss applied science, the mechanical arts, and history, village communities proved ready to discuss philosophy and progressive social developments. The Lyceum provided a venue within which social ideas such as the abolition of slavery, women’s rights, public education, unionism, and a vast array of other progressive, pertinent municipal and social causes could be explored. Furthermore, the organizational structure of the Lyceum allowed a wide range of access, local convenience, and communicative freedom. People from villages and regional centers alike could go to their homegrown Lyceum for a very reasonable price to attend weekly or annual lecture series that conferred shared issues, educational materials, and philosophies. The Lyceum structure provided a powerful outlet for free expression and intellectualism. Program and lecture topics broadened widely as communities articulated and directed their own educational endeavors. Bode (1956) summarizes the movement:

At the very beginning it was designed for artisans and farmers, but since it taught the practical application of science—which would result in better workmen and more efficient farmers—it did not threaten the higher economic groups in the way a political forum would have. Then, as the lyceum programs began to change into those heterogeneous courses of lectures on travel, history, biography, foreign affairs, and the art of living, the audience also changed. (p. 30)

By 1831, the movement had exploded like wildfire, by which time there were at least 800 town Lyceums complemented by 60 county regional centers (Weaver, 1976). The same year, Holbrook’s successes culminated in New York City where the American Lyceum Movement became a national society whose membership included interstate delegates and county officers (Long, 1991).

Notably, the role of Lyceum participants changed between the formative periods that spanned the 1820s through the 1830s and latter periods that stretched from the 1840s through the 1860s. During the initial stages, local associations would promote and read their own

lectures and scientific presentations. Later, the trend moved toward neighborhood establishments participating in sponsorship of outside lecturers. This was especially the case in larger cities such as Portland, Boston, and Salem. The expanding interests presented in main Lyceum centers began to attract prominent literary and scientific figures. Celebrated agriculturalists, poets, and even musicians began to tour and participate in lecture series across the nation. All the while, Holbrook supported public intellectualism through his prolific writing. In a letter to the editor of *The Colored American* (1839), Holbrook praised the common farmer as a scientist in his own right.

Mr. Editor,—I have, for several years, been fully convinced, that neither lawyers, nor physicians, nor clergymen, nor professors of colleges, nor any other class of the community, have so many inducements or so many facilities for becoming really intelligent, scientific men, as farmers. No class of men have an occasion for so constant, or so extensive an application of science, in their profession. Botany, mineralogy, geology, chemistry, natural philosophy, entomology, and the natural history of animals generally, are brought into use, directly or indirectly by every farmer, almost every day he is engaged in his business. (p. 4)

By 1839, there were between 4,000 and 5,000 groups spanning from New England west to the Missouri and south to Florida. The incredible growth of the American Lyceum movement incentivized celebrity lecturers to tour professionally throughout the country. Iconic presenters and professional orators enthusiastically visited multiple Lyceum societies to enlighten large crowds; financial gains and self-promotion drove these endeavors (Ray, 2005). Among those iconic lecturers who toured Lyceum circuits in later periods include the renowned transcendental philosophers of New England.

Transcendental Harmony

A profound compatibility is evidenced between the American Lyceum Movement and transcendentalism. First, the philosophical foundation of both crusades developed as a refutatory reaction to conservative societal and religious norms. The groups' ideas on adult education closely mirrored Brookfield's (2001) argument: "critical theory of adult learning should have at its core an understanding of how adults learn to recognize the predominance of ideology in their everyday thoughts and actions and in the institutions of civil society" (p. 20). Accordingly, both assemblages were comprised of adults who contested hegemonic ideas and practices and challenged traditional ideologies by operating largely outside the conventional higher education structure. Second, each movement had roots firmly positioned in New England

and therefore the main leadership parties were often in close communicative proximity. Frothingham (1876) emphasizes, “New England furnished the only plot of ground on the planet, where the transcendental philosophy had a chance to show what it was and what it proposed” (p. 105). Bode (1956) offers similar commentary on the Lyceum’s location: “It was in New England that the lyceum developed best, and Massachusetts was clearly pre-eminent within New England” (p. 41). Lastly, major theorizations of transcendental thought resonated roundly within Lyceum lectures. The expansion of the Lyceum Movement’s diverse, progressive properties appealed to the most influential transcendental minds of New England. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and other notable figures utilized the Lyceum podium to broadcast free discussion of liberally motivated ideas. Along with its technical and scientific applications, Holbrook’s lectern became a social stage for the dissemination of enlightened and reformist philosophy. The result was an inextricable and undeniable melding of institutional pragmatism and groundbreaking philosophical inquiry. My subsequent analysis of the Salem Lyceum Chapter verifies the harmony between transcendentalist and American Lyceum movements.

The Salem Lyceum

The Massachusetts Lyceum, most notably the Salem chapter, conceptualized a series of consortial, enlightening lectures that eventually attracted some of the nineteenth century’s most influential thinkers, mechanics, and progressives. Each year’s roster proved more exciting than the last. The season of 1848–1849 was particularly extraordinary. The remarkable lineup is chronicled in Cameron’s (1969) *The Massachusetts Lyceum during the American Renaissance*. Among the year’s lecturers were Henry Thoreau, author of *Walden*; Ralph Waldo Emerson, renowned transcendentalist and author; Horace Mann, educational reformer; Edwin Whipple; James T. Fields; and many other prominent minds (Cameron, 1969). The Salem Lyceum of Massachusetts became an extraordinary example of Holbrook’s legacy. This Lyceum’s historical depth, richness of lecture quality, and forward-looking agenda marked a notable episode in the American Lyceum Movement.

According to the *Salem Gazette Press* (1879), the Salem Lyceum chapter was established by the town’s local citizenry in January 1830. Opening lectures began the following February. The first lectures were delivered in the Universalist Meeting House due to a lack of space in the Town Hall.³ That summer, plans were drafted by local leaders to construct a Lyceum hall. The structure was erected and made ready for occupancy in January 1831. The overwhelming support of the community and the triumph of the lectures accounted for the expense of the building. In fact, “The cost of the lectures were so small, and the

income of the Lyceum was so large, that in a very few years the debt of the building was extinguished, and it has since been the property of the members of the Lyceum” (*Salem Gazette Press*, 1879, p. 5).

Lyceum Hall became an admired center for adult education in Salem, providing opportunities for average citizens to seek and gain knowledge of such topics as farm mechanics, art, and philosophy. Men from varying occupations attended the lectures (Bode, 1956). Women, too, were properly represented in Salem; they were expected to contribute to the intellectual symposia. Egalitarian access to the Salem Lyceum’s lectern provided a powerful tool for educated women to express their intellectual capability and to represent their ideas freely on behalf of their underrepresented constituency. The *Salem Gazette Press* (1879) expressed that, “for many years ladies have not only attended the lectures upon equal terms with the gentlemen, but have assisted to deliver them, until it has come to be thought that a course is incomplete without a lady lecturer or reader” (p. 6). The grand role of the American Lyceum continued to empower women well into the 1870s and beyond. In 1833, Holbrook is quoted as saying, “ladies have in many instances used the accommodations provided by Lyceums, for their own benefit and the benefit of the community” (p. 4). Furthermore, Ray (2005) asserts, “With women’s access to formal education and the traditional professions severely restricted, the lecture circuits—particularly after the Civil War—provided the opportunity for a remunerative public career” (p. 36). As the prestige of the Salem Lyceum evolved, so did the quality of its lecturers.

In 1848, the distinguished 20th course of the Salem Lyceum’s symposium was comprised of an all-star cast. Nathaniel Hawthorne, who authored *The Scarlet Letter*, became the official secretary of the Salem Lyceum that year. During his term, he worked tirelessly to bring in the utmost in fascinating lecturers in order to provide eloquent, educative uplift for his community (Bode, 1956). As per standard national Lyceum procedures, Hawthorne corresponded with lecturers to determine a presentation date and negotiate a speaker’s fee accordingly (Ray, 2005). The following list marks those dynamic topics discussed at the apex of the American Lyceum Movement in Salem. Cameron (1969) chronicles Salem’s presenter repertoire in the season spanning 1848–1849:

- Daniel Webster—History of the *Constitution of the United States*
- James T. Fields—A Poem, “Post of Honor”
- Henry D. Thoreau—Student Life in New England, its Economy
- Henry Colman—Philanthropic [*sic*] Institutions of England
- John S. Holmes—Self-Possession
- Louis Agassiz (three lectures)—Vegetable Kingdom

- Edwin P. Whipple—Genius
- Theodore Parker—Transcendentalism
- Ralph Waldo Emerson—England and the English
- Charles Sumner—Law of Progress
- Edwin P. Whipple—Authors
- Samuel Osgood—Poetry of Mechanism
- Henry Colman—A Conversation about England
- Henry Giles—*Don Quixote*, Woman
- Henry D. Thoreau—Student Life, its Aims and Employments
- Henry Giles—European Revolutions
- Henry Giles—*Don Quixote*, Human Life
- Horace Mann (two lectures)—Knowledge (p. 19)

The lecturers in this list are easily recognizable by scholars today. Thoreau, Emerson, Whipple, Mann, Fields, and others had a significant impact on both U.S. character and culture. Education, history, philosophy, agriculture, technological trends, poetry, social commentary, economics, and a vast variety of other subjects were represented. This roster well illustrates the breadth of subject matter covered in the Salem Lyceum, and its extensiveness is descriptive of the fervor of adult learning pursuits inherent in the American Lyceum Movement.⁴ Undoubtedly, many great Americans were influenced by the entirety of the movement. One such was U.S. Senator Justin Smith Morrill.

The Connection: Morrill Land-Grants Acts and the American Lyceum Movement

The American Lyceum Movement and the Morrill land-grant colleges share striking structural and symbolic similarities. Justin Smith Morrill's direct involvement in the Lyceum led him to author watershed education bills. Much like Holbrook, Morrill expanded upon his understanding of adult education societies and established progressive institutions that aimed to administer the teaching of applied sciences and an expanded curriculum. Further, Morrill's land-grant colleges effectively broadened educative access for adult women and working-class men. They operated independent of established, traditional colleges and aspired to provide vocational opportunities to an expansive, Western frontier.

Justin Smith Morrill was born in Strafford, Vermont, in 1810. He attended Thetford Academy, now the oldest secondary school in Vermont. However, Morrill did not attend college due to his family's financial limitations. By age 18, Morrill was well-versed in literature and interested in politics. To utilize his skills, he moved to Portland, Maine, in search of work. Morrill quickly found a job as a merchant's clerk in

Portland and continued to practice his composition proficiencies. In 1828, he was actively involved in a mutual-improvement society called "The Club." His colleagues gathered to discuss "ideas and hear lectures" (Cross, 1999, p. 8). Talks of modern science and ancient history were common and encouraged among Morrill and his peers. Morrill's early life participation in a scientific and lecture-based society is noteworthy because he would likely have been conscious of the presence of community-based organizations such as the Lyceum and other agro-mechanical societies within the Portland region. Bode (1956) notes, outside Massachusetts, "Augusta, Belfast, and Portland were the other cities that usually supported lyceums," and the Lyceums in Maine "showed more activity than that of any other New England state aside from Massachusetts" (p. 58). The eminent concentration of Holbrook's organizational activity within the Portland region was finely complemented by the first vocational trade school in the United States. Gardiner, Maine, situated roughly 50 miles northeast of Portland, was the home to the Gardiner Lyceum which, according to Cooper (1895), was designed to enable "mechanics and farmers to become skillful in their respective pursuits" (p. 276). Launched in 1822 by Robert Hallowell Gardiner, the Gardiner Lyceum institutionally implemented a curriculum that emphasized a blend of the mechanical, technical, and agricultural arts (Lang, 2002). It represented a valuable center of industry and knowledge for the regional community. An impressive report on roads published in 1830 by the Gardiner Lyceum Committee demonstrates the instrumental, cooperative, and physically far-reaching nature of the organization (Gardiner Lyceum, 1830). The assumption is Morrill probably attended some Lyceum lectures during his stay in Portland, or at least he was well aware of the Lyceum's place in the community.

After his three-year stay in Portland, Morrill moved back to Strafford, Vermont where he formed a business partnership with a general store owner and continued his self-directed studies. Wikof (1985) states Morrill "read extensively, started a subscription for a town library in 1827, and in 1831 helped found a lyceum" (p. 132). Morrill was eager to raise public intellectualism through community learning. He, like many working class people around him, did not have the opportunity to attend college. It is assumed that, during this time, Morrill recognized the practicality of learning through channels outside the traditional higher education system. Parker (1924), Morrill's biographer, also supports the idea Morrill visited the Lyceum. "In all customary interests and diversions he took his part; he attended church in the bare, square meeting-house on Sundays and the infrequent meetings of the Lyceum, when they came, at the same place" (p. 32). As Morrill's business ventures became successful, he invested time and energy into an array of

Lyceum activities. He even had the opportunity to give a lecture at Thetford Academy, where he received his secondary schooling. Hiram Orcutt (1898), former headmaster of Thetford, explains:

While in charge of Thetford Academy, I was accustomed to invite distinguished lecturers from abroad to address my school. I had invited Mr. Justin Smith Morrill—then a bright young man living in Strafford, but since, for thirty-seven years and now at the age of eighty-eight, an able and honored member of the United States Senate from Vermont—to deliver a lecture. In this case, it was an exchange. In compensation for his lecture, I lectured before his village Lyceum. (p. 109)

Moreover, Morrill drew influence from his participation in the community-based agro-mechanical societies of the 1820s and 1830s in order to develop the core arguments of the 1862 and 1890 American Agricultural College Acts, commonly known as the Morrill Land-Grant Acts. Morrill served in Congress from 1855 until 1898, and his most lasting contributions were his 1862 and 1890 American Agricultural College bills creating and supporting U.S. land-grant colleges. The 1862 bill is extensively considered to be one of the great pieces of higher education legislation in U.S. history. Much like the intensions of the American Lyceum Movement, the bills were passed to provide “practical education for working people” and to expand curricula “to include all branches of engineering, agricultural sciences, veterinary medicine, and the vast majority of other subjects” (Cross, 1999, p. xiii). According to The Morrill Act (1862), the purpose of land-grant colleges was “to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life” (U.S. Code, 1862). This mission statement closely mirrors Holbrook’s summation on the establishment of agricultural seminaries in his manifesto “American Lyceum or Society for the Improvement of Schools and the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge” in 1829: “The importance of institutions which shall at once present opportunities for a *liberal*, a *practical*, and an *economical* education, is extensively and sensibly felt” (p. 12, emphasis in original). Akin to the American Lyceum Movement, the establishment of land-grant institutions opened educational opportunities for traditionally marginalized U.S. populations such as women and the working classes. Cross (1999) articulates: “Since 1862, more than 20 million Americans, men and women of every race, ethnicity, religion, and economic background have been educated by Land-Grant colleges and universities” (p. x).

Because Morrill had developed a political lens, as opposed to Holbrook’s academic lens, he petitioned the U.S. government to appropriate land and funding for the development of institutions that would cater to the diversifying needs of U.S. working class citizens and

women. President Abraham Lincoln, a Lyceum lecturer, signed the first landmark education bill in 1862.⁵ As a result, Morrill succeeded in developing 69 land-grant institutions, forever changing the U.S.' history of adult and higher education.

Extensions to the Modern Day

Today, there are still barriers to many U.S. citizens entering traditional universities. Economic, racial, and gender discrimination is still pervasive and commonplace in higher education. Granted, although these hindrances are less inhibiting than during the nineteenth century, historically marginalized people remain restricted from freely accessing enrollment. The authors of *Learning in Adulthood* recognize the “democratic ideals of equal opportunity and open access make the current reality of uneven and unequal participation in formal adult learning particularly worrisome” (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2007, p. 75). Although attaining a liberal arts education from a traditional, four-year institution is important, it does not guarantee an individual a career in a technologically driven economy.. Therefore, it is important to be mindful of educational movements that evolve outside formal systems for what they reveal about society, education, and the needs of learners.

The landscape of U.S. labor and industry is changing. The ways that people work, interact, and even seek entertainment have dramatically changed in the last fifteen years. Communication and connection are becoming increasingly important factors in a rapidly globalizing economy. U.S. workers must now have the skills to compete locally, regionally, *and* globally. As technological trends change, many adults must return to school in order to get advanced degrees or certifications in order to stay competitive. However, traditional universities continue to increase their tuition rates well beyond the reach of the average U.S. worker, and the total student debt has recently climbed to over a trillion dollars. In order to combat high tuition rates and institutional inflexibility, alternative channels of higher education have emerged through online learning communities. The Lyceum opened its podiums and halls to women and laymen; it fundamentally democratized lecture-based learning in some of the same ways scholarly online communities are democratizing higher education today. Educators who facilitate online learning communities will likely expand their influence and mirror Holbrook’s attempt to raise public intellectualism. In the present day, leaders create informal, online learning platforms that attempt to address the modern, diversifying needs of adult learners.

Online access to social networks allows adults to disassociate technical, scientific, and professional learning from customary higher education institutions. Each year, a greater number of legitimate, adult

educational alternatives are becoming available. Minimally restrictive, social websites also allow U.S. adult learners to assemble and lead educational enterprises without the consent of traditional university organizations. Such interactive, online establishments permit the convenience of local and immediate access to higher education, free or cheap enrollment, and even the ability to create societies intended for the discussion and enrichment of specific educational interests. The advance and rapid dissemination of Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs), online vocational schools, and free, web-based lecture series such as TED talks can be construed as modern day echoes of the nineteenth century American Lyceum associations. Although the teaching methodologies of distance learning are constantly being refined, MOOCs and other self-directed educational options will continue to provide exceptional learning opportunities for people from different backgrounds. They can now pursue higher education, gain social mobility, and develop a life-long desire to learn with the aid of these technologies. Entire communities of scholars from around the world are able to communicate in real-time, collaborate, and access an unparalleled wealth of knowledge. Collectively and through online networking, engaged students can form local cohorts and blend online experiences with corporeal social interactions. For the cost of internet access or travel to one's local, public library, people from various socioeconomic backgrounds can view riveting lectures, connect with academic experts, and even enroll in free classes that aim to improve the individual and society. Currently, an immense array of online learning resources are available and the digitization and liberation of information through open access projects is unarguably expanding every year. It is indeed possible to consider that MOOCs, like the lyceums, may one day fundamentally change the way that people think and learn. With time, I envision MOOCs as able to transcend the blueprint of their original design. In light of the example set by the American Lyceum Movement, future renditions have the potential to encapsulate entire philosophical crusades, inspire watershed legislation, and generally benefit the lives of students and practitioners.

Conclusion

By critically reflecting on the American Lyceum Movement's history, one can begin to appreciate the importance of informal education, how it evolves in a specific context, and how educational professionals can apply this knowledge to their practice. Just as the American Lyceum Movement was formed to address expanding demands of adult learners during the Industrial Revolution, online learning communities are addressing the demands of adult learners during today's digital revolution. Instructional technology is ubiquitous, dynamic, and inseparably tied to higher education. Undoubtedly,

globalization, access to technology, and the democratization of higher learning will affect the way people approach education in the next 50 years. In order to do so, we can look into the past and gain valuable insights from the American Lyceum Movement and Josiah Holbrook's legacy.

The American Lyceum Movement became a pivotal foundation of U.S. adult education during the nineteenth-century. Holbrook recognized adult learners' educational demands diversified during the rise of industrialism. Thus, he ingeniously fashioned an adult learning complex outside restrictions commonly found in denominational higher education institutions. He did so in a fashion appealing to higher education standards of the time in both presentation and practicality. What began as an effort to create a network of community associations, designed for the promotion of applied sciences and mechanical arts, soon evolved into a massive national undertaking that encapsulated the emergent transcendental and reformist assertiveness of a young nation. The sheer expansiveness of the Lyceum Movement also set an influential groundwork that predisposed Justin Morrill to write the decisive legislation of the American Agricultural College Acts. Over the course of many years, Morrill was actively engaged in Lyceum activity. His direct interaction with the Lyceum helped him form rationalizations about the expanding demands of adult learners during the Industrial Revolution and the potential for westward expansion. This rationale eventually contributed to the formation of land-grant colleges. Morrill's progressive institutions paralleled Holbrook's undertaking and became part of the formal structure of U.S. higher education. As a result, access to higher education was expanded on an unprecedented scale. Examining this history sheds light on how advances in science and technology change the needs and demographics of adult learners fundamentally historically and in the modern day.

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Endnotes

- ¹ Yale's official website exhibits the college's original charter statement with a reference to "science," or natural philosophy. Refer to <http://www.yale.edu/about/history.html> for details.
- ² This view has been counter-argued by scholars in recent decades. For examples of alternative positions and a validation of certain opposing points, please see *The Education of Engineers in America before the Morrill Act of 1862*, T. S. Reynolds, 1992, pp. 459–482.
- ³ Although many church leaders inevitably participated in and supported the Lyceum Movement, and church space was frequently used as a place of meeting, the statutes of the Lyceum effectively banned any religious lectures or affiliations. Refer to Bode (1956) for details.
- ⁴ Though no women are represented in this specific list, female lecturers such as Sarah Lippincott, Mary Livermore, and Lucett Webster presented lectures at the Salem Lyceum in following years. Refer to Cameron's (1969) list of Salem Lyceum presentations for more details.
- ⁵ Abraham Lincoln lectured on "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions" at the Young Men's Lyceum in Springfield, IL in 1838. See p. 97 in Bode's chapter on the Midwest Lyceum.

Philanthropy at Its Best: The General Education Board's Contributions to Education, 1902–1964

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During the period after the United States' Civil War, numerous wealthy, northern philanthropists turned their attention to the plight of Southern African Americans' health care, social services, social equity, and education. As time passed, these philanthropists explored Southern African Americans' well-being with the purpose of helping all poor and disadvantaged peoples. In the early-twentieth century, the General Education Board (GEB) and the Julius Rosenwald Fund, two foundations particularly active toward meeting these ends, frequently worked on similar projects and, from time to time, even funded one another's projects. Their boards of directors sometimes overlapped, and many, if not all the major foundations' directors of the time, knew each other or at least knew of each other. Therefore, it is not surprising their philosophies of giving are, with few exceptions, quite similar. In fact, although Julius Rosenwald had already been a philanthropist for several years when he founded the Julius Rosenwald Fund, he drew his inspiration for the foundation's organization and operation from the General Education Board¹ founded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. on behalf of his father, John D. Rockefeller, Sr.² During this same time, such foundations as the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching existed with similar goals. In this paper, I focus on the General Education Board's influence on education analyzing its strengths and weaknesses and identifying lessons contemporary educators might do well to learn from the GEB's practices, outcomes, and use of political and economic power.

Overview

Founded in 1902, the General Education Board spent its last funds in 1960³ although it did not officially cease its existence until 1964.⁴ During those 58 years, the foundation spent “nearly \$325 million for the promotion of education in the United States.”⁵ John D. Rockefeller, Sr.'s interest in improving African-Americans' education had its roots in his Northern Baptist religious beliefs; in his wife's influence;⁶ in his father-in-law's history of helping enslaved African Americans escape to Canada;⁷ and in his son, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s influence after having

attended a conference sponsored by Robert C. Ogden, one of Hampton Institute's founders.⁸ This Ogden-sponsored conference had a great impact on Rockefeller the younger who wanted to form a Negro Education Board until Washington and Lee University's President Henry St. George Tucker persuaded him the name would prove divisive. With white schools also widely regarded a disgrace, Tucker explained to Rockefeller: "You must lift up the 'poor White' and the Negro together if you would approach success."⁹ Indeed, the challenges facing the General Education Board were great. In the South at that time, the only education that could be called *real* education was in private, white-only schools that catered to the well-to-do and well-born. Horace Mann's common school recommendations concerning curriculum, teacher training, school funding through taxation, minimal requirements for facilities, teachers' salaries, and attendance had passed the South by.

The GEB's first priority was improving education beginning with elementary education by addressing needs as basic as transportation; then expanding to support high schools; educating farmers and their children; and finally, strengthening higher education using grants to raise faculty salaries and pensions to retain the best and the brightest. Eventually, the Board brought the influence of large amounts of money to states to begin improving education; supported rural, one-room school consolidation; transportation to school; and grants for primary-school supervisors. However, even a heavily endowed foundation had limitations. Substantial public tax support was necessary for meaningful reform to take place. The first Secretary of the GEB, Baptist minister Dr. Wallace Buttrick, attacked this problem by creating an

...organization which would launch a widespread, popular campaign for tax supported public elementary schools. Named the Southern Education Board, with a group of trustees almost identical to those of the General Education Board, the organization poured out an avalanche of statistics and arguments to the press and educational groups across the South. The results of its campaign, between 1901 and 1914, were in many ways remarkable—in the rise of literacy, of teachers' salaries, and of tax funds apportioned to the school. In over a dozen years the General Education Board contributed approximately \$100,000 to the work of the Southern Education Board, finally, absorbing most of the work of this sister organization in 1914.¹⁰

In 1912, the Board "offered to subsidize the appointment of special officials in state departments of education throughout the South who could devote full time to the improvement of [B]lack schools."¹¹

Elementary School Education

During the early to middle 1900s most persons in the Southern United States lived in rural areas. Most rural children did not go to secondary schools so elementary education was the area first addressed with GEB funding. Funding for consolidating one-room schools, providing transportation, involving the community through the cotton and tomato clubs (explained subsequently), and funding state officials to oversee education all assisted in creating community support.

High School Education

Eventually, the GEB had to address the high school question: are high schools within the public education system? Although in the *Kalamazoo* U.S. Supreme Court case of 1874 the Court stated high schools were part of the public education system and, therefore, could receive money, the public was opposed to expenditures for high school education. During the early-twentieth century, most people were employed directly or indirectly in rural pursuits; most hard-working rural citizens did not prize a high school education as either relevant or necessary to life.

The General Education Board attacked the high school education problem by supporting “in every state, attached to the faculty of the state university, a trained specialist in secondary education—a man who could inform, cultivate, and guide professional, public, and legislative opinion.”¹² Laws were changed favoring public, tax-supported high schools; hundreds of new high schools were built, and standards began to improve in secondary education.¹³ Although the benefits of this approach went at first to high-school-aged, white children, in 1915, high schools for African Americans began to be organized: euphemistically referred to as “county training schools to appease Southern opinion,”¹⁴ because stressing vocational and home-making training, these schools were not equivalent to white high schools. Through such schools, Booker T. Washington and the Hampton Institute made vocational education and training in home-making for Black children acceptable to Southern whites. In *The Big Foundations*, Nielsen states that after World War I the General Education Board was less active than previously in controversial educational programs in the South. A period of violent racial prejudice with increased Klan activity and riots resulted after the war.¹⁵ Nielsen contends the General Education Board purposefully turned its attention away from concentrated involvement in Southern, African-American education to “less controversial educational development across the United States.”¹⁶

Higher Education

While no longer focusing its attention on poor whites’ and African-Americans’ educations, the GEB did not completely turn away from its

previous concerns. For example, the GEB established grants for Negro higher education, grants for Negro state-education agents, and a new fellowship program that provided “advanced training for Southern white and [B]lack educators.”¹⁷ The fellowship program¹⁸ began in 1924¹⁹ and reflected affluent board members’ views of higher education: one goes to college to study—period. To have to work and study at the same time was antithetical to them. One African-American college president said: “It was the first time in my life that I didn’t have to make a living and study at the same time.”²⁰ According to Fosdick and Nielsen, almost every African-American administrator and faculty member in higher education had been a Board fellow by the time the fellowship program transferred to the Council of Southern Universities in 1954.²¹

Rural Education

According to the 1900 U.S. census, the South’s population was 58% farm, 18% urban, and 24% rural, nonfarm. Thomas Maloney states, “A typical African American farm family at the start of the twentieth century lived and worked on a farm in the South, did not own its home and was unlikely to have its children in school.”²² Therefore, the GEB initiated and invested in education outside the classroom, an area that was to have a dramatic impact on the lives of Southern farmers, both white and African American. Dr. Buttrick met Dr. Seaman Knapp of Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College and was impressed with his ideas about how to improve crop yield as well as his ideas on how to “sell” these ideas to doubting farmers through demonstration farms. Dr. Knapp preached the gospel of crop rotation and the “selection of better seed, earlier planting, a more thorough preparation of the soil, more careful evaluation, and earlier harvesting.”²³ The Board supported demonstration farms and agents; the “corn clubs,” made of boys following Dr. Knapp’s method when planting an acre of land, and the “tomato clubs,” made of girls using Dr. Knapp’s method when planting one-tenth an acre of land whose yield they then canned, reinforced the Board’s support. Often these young people converted their parents. The Board made an influential friend when the son of a Virginia state senator chairing the state finance committee harvested 114 bushels of corn—though the senator had previously derided claims the method could result in 100 bushels.²⁴ Although for those poor, rural farmers success using this method was literally a lifesaver after the trials of the boll weevil since farmers depended on cotton, as usual, rural, white farmers benefitted more than did African Americans. If one considers poor, rural children a “minority” in the sense of being disadvantaged, then one might argue the Board was probably as effective as possible considering the prejudices of the times and acknowledge the Board’s lasting legacy of

the corn and tomato clubs that eventually evolved into today's 4-H Clubs.²⁵

Higher Education Faculty

In higher education, the General Education Board not only concerned itself with the quality of education but with faculty salaries. After World War I, inflation so eroded the dollar the nation was in danger of losing university faculty on an unprecedented scale if something was not done and done fast. The General Education Board's resources were inadequate; thus, in December 1919, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. gave \$50 million to the Board to improve faculty salaries: participating universities had to add \$36 million to the \$50 million; place the money in an endowment exclusively for faculty salaries; and expend the funds by June 1924 for the grants to be made a permanent contribution to participating institutions.²⁶ By 1933, faculty salaries at participating colleges, while still low, were 30% higher than in 1920.²⁷

Medical Education

In 1910, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching funded a report that contributed to making far-reaching changes in U.S. medical education. Layman and Secretary of the General Education Board, Abraham Flexner, was asked to prepare a report on the state of medical education in the United States.²⁸ Approaching this task similar to the way Horace Mann studied schools in Massachusetts, Flexner visited all 155, U.S., medical schools and evaluated them on their quality of facilities, faculty, and students. Fosdick underscores the appalling state of U.S. medical education Flexner documents in his report: the medical facilities were direly inadequate with filthy, disorganized labs; most medical faculty worked teaching around their private practices; and pre-med students were grossly underprepared, for "of the 155 schools, sixteen required two or more years of college work for entrance, fifty demanded a high school education or its 'equivalent'; eighty-nine asked for 'little or nothing more than the rudiments or the recollection of a common school education.'"²⁹ The General Education Board funded the changes necessary for improved medical education.³⁰ The early grants concentrated on full-time teaching, a matter of some concern to many on the Board. Board trustee and Harvard's President Eliot opposed insisting on full-time teaching because it "was in contradiction to its policy not to interfere with the 'domestic management of an institution.'"³¹ In 1913, the GEB made its first grant to Johns Hopkins. By 1960, the GEB's initial \$94 million dollars and the conditional matches had become \$600 million spent for bringing US medical education out of the dark ages to a model for other countries—Flexner rightly called it a "revolution."³²

When Flexner evaluated the medical schools, he found that of the African-American schools, only Howard University in Washington, DC and Meharry Medical College in Nashville were “worth developing.”³³ While Howard University depended for its funding upon the not-always-generous U.S. Congress, Meharry depended totally upon its own resources. “From 1920 until 1936, when Congress had become more generous the Board contributed almost \$600,000 to”³⁴ Howard Medical School while “Meharry, which was in a much more precarious position financially, received \$8,673,706 between 1916 and 1960.”³⁵ These grants, when coupled with the fellowship program, provided impressive support for African Americans’ medical education. In fact, at the time the Board ceased to exist in 1964, “nearly half...[the African American] physicians and dentists...practicing in the United States received their training at Meharry.”³⁶ In 1962, Raymond B. Fosdick wrote that Howard and Meharry produced four-fifths of the country’s African-American doctors.³⁷

Learning from and Building upon the General Education Board’s Legacy

From the beginning, the General Education Board’s policy “to have no policy”³⁸ enhanced its creativity in turn leading to its extraordinary success improving U.S. education, especially in the South, for African Americans and poor whites. During its existence, the GEB provided \$62.5 million to improve African-American education.³⁹ By 1932, the number of accredited African-American high schools rose from zero to 32.⁴⁰ The fellowship programs and support for higher education provided strong African-American leadership for the future, a leadership that would pass on a legacy of hope long after the foundation’s funds were expended and its books closed. The advances in farmers’ education eventually established a scientific basis for maintaining a continually abundant food supply. The changes in medical education resulted in the United States’ going from a nation with abysmal medical facilities, training, students, and care to a nation with the finest in the world. These results have enhanced generations of human lives.

As impressive as these gains were, the Board received criticism for its emphasis on vocational education and homemaking; its more impressive gains for white children than African-American; its paternalistic attitude; its use of power to spread its philosophy; and its withdrawal of its previous level of support for Southern schools from 1940–1960.⁴¹ Although African Americans in the South only attained access to equal treatment and education with the power of the vote, one must continually remind oneself that access does not guarantee equal treatment; over 50 years after the withdrawal of the Board’s strong support in 1960, African Americans throughout the U.S. still work to achieve the equality and equity the law, in principle, guarantees. Indeed,

for most of U.S. history, African Americans, in the South in particular, have not been well treated as fellow human beings.

Although over the years of its operation, the General Education Board made many gains, many problems remained unsolved. Most noteworthy, the difficulties of instigating change became even more difficult when those changing or asked to change did not feel ownership. The Board's failure to grant participation to those involved in the Board's improvements was evident in numerous locales. For example, early on, African-American leaders most likely appreciated any assistance from the big foundations, but, as time passed, they complained the Board consistently failed to request their advice or consider it when given: "by the late 1930s, Black leaders cease[d] to attempt to reason with GEB leaders and other whites over the improvement of schools in their communities."⁴² In New York City, 1917, Raymond D. Fosdick and Abraham Flexner resigned from the School Board because their advocacy for changing the direction of New York City's public schools met with criticism: "Dr. Flexner Quits Education Board: His Connection with Rockefeller Organization Aroused a Storm of Criticism."⁴³ John Taylor Gatto complained the Board had a definite political agenda when using their power to "mold people through schooling."⁴⁴ When the Board tried to bring change to Indiana rural schools, James H. Madison described the cause of the problem:

The attempt by experts to change fundamentally the schools of Johnson and La Grange counties illuminates the assumptions, definitions, and solutions reformers presented generally for rural America in the first three decades of the twentieth century; it points also to the complex relationships and conflicts that ensued when cosmopolitan outside experts entered local communities to work with citizens, politicians, teachers, and school administrators. The ensuing battles included elements of arrogance, condescension, self-interest, and [naïveté] on the part of the professional experts and, on the part of the rural citizenry, large portions of stubbornness, provincialism, and parsimony. In their own minds, rural Hoosiers were protecting their locally controlled schools and their organic communities from alien outsiders, while professional experts saw themselves as liberal reformers bringing economy, efficiency, and progress to rural America. Above all, the demonstration project showed the wide gulf that separated these opposing views of school and community and the inability of either side to convert the other.⁴⁵

There is no question the General Education Board and other big foundations produced impressive results when funding educational

programs. The education of African-American university faculty and presidents, the founding of what became 4-H, the first accreditation of African-American high schools in the South, and the transformation of medical education are only a few of its successes. However, whenever someone else holds the purse strings, it behooves those who are the recipients to stop and think about whether the giver's agenda is compatible with the recipients' ethical standards. In the 1950s and early 1960s there was great pride in not taking federal funds for education. Today the controversy seems to accelerate as the federal government more and more determines states' needs with the federal government's power of the purse a strong incentive for states to scrutinize little while turning a blind eye to the implications of accepting funding. Needing and accepting federal funding are dilemmas and part of an ever-difficult balancing act states daily perform. Perhaps there will never be a time when dependency on external funding will cease to exist, and perhaps it should not because it has potential for so much good. However, the federal government, federal funding agencies, and private grantors need to be attentive to educating the public, government officials, and themselves on involving those these funding agencies will affect when funding programs and involving those who will be affected by whatever programs these agencies fund in local schools.

Endnotes

- 1 Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 338.
- 2 *General Education Board* (New York: General Education Board, 1964), 3; General Education Board Archives (1901–1964)–1967; Raymond B. Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving: The Story of the General Education Board* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 116–120, <http://www.rockarch.org/collections/rockorgs/geb.php>
- 3 Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving*, 1.
- 4 General Education Board, *Archives*.
- 5 Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving*, 1.
- 6 Raymond B. Fosdick, *John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: A Portrait*, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), 116. Mrs. John D. Rockefeller, Sr. was born Laura Spelman. Spelman College for Negro women was named after her family.
- 7 Nielson, *The Big Foundations*, 333.
- 8 Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving*, 3–5. Part of Hampton Institute's work involved visiting various Negro schools in the South.

- ⁹ *General Education Board: Review and Final Report, 1902–1964* (New York: General Education Board, 1964), 3.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ¹¹ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, 336–337.
- ¹² *General Education Board*, 6.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ¹⁴ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, 337.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 338–339.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 339.
- ¹⁸ In *Adventure in Giving*, Raymond B. Fosdick quotes Fisk’s President Stephen J. Wright as saying, “The G.E.B. fellowships made a critical kind of difference. By modern standards, I suppose, the recipients were selected in an almost haphazard way—no lengthy application forms or tests—and yet I doubt that there were many mistakes” (304). The record bears this out. About 85 percent of the recipients returned to the South to teach or work as educational administrators. The roster of college presidents alone is impressive: Rufus Clement of Atlanta University, James P. Brawley of Clark, Albert E. Manley of Spelman, Stephen J. Wright of Fisk, Alfonso Elder of North Carolina College at Durham, Samuel M. Nabrit of Texas Southern University, and others. Fosdick also notes, “Ralph J. Bunche became head of the political science department at Howard before he moved on to the broader stage of international affairs....” (305).
- ¹⁹ Fosdick, *Adventures in Giving*, 303.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, 339; Fosdick, *Adventures in Giving*, 303.
- ²² “Maloney, Thomas, African American in the Twentieth Century,” EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. Robert Whaples, <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/african-americans-in-the-twentieth-century/>
- ²³ Fosdick, *Adventures in Giving*, 42.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 52–53.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 142–146.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 149.
- ²⁸ Joseph W. Ernst, *Dear Father, Dear Son: Correspondence of John D. Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.* (New York: Fordham University Press in cooperation with Rockefeller Archive Center, 1994), 48.

²⁹ Fosdick, *Adventures in Giving*, 152.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

³¹ *General Education Board*, 34.

³² *Ibid.*, 37.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

³⁷ Fosdick, *Adventures in Giving*, 187.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 317.

³⁹ Nielsen, *The Big Foundations*, 342.

⁴⁰ Matthew Davis, "The General Education Board and Institutionalization of Black Public Schooling in the Interwar South," *American Educational History Journal* 33, no. 2 (2006): 71–77.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² V. S. Walker, "Organized Resistance and Black Educators' Quest for School Equality, 1878–1938," *Teachers College Record* 107, no. 3: 380. Quoted in Matthew Davis, "The General Education Board and Institutionalization of Black Public Schooling in the Interwar South," 75.

⁴³ "Dr. Flexner Quits Education Board: His Connection with Rockefeller Organization Aroused a Storm of Criticism," *The New York Times*, 18 May 1917, 14.

⁴⁴ John Taylor Gatto, *Underground History of American Education* (New York: The Oxford Village Press, 2003), <http://www.johntaylorgatto.com/chapters/12o.htm>

⁴⁵ James H. Madison, "John D. Rockefeller's General Education Board and the Rural School Problem in the Midwest, 1900–1930," *History of Education Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1984): 181.

Reflections on Law and Society: Retrospect and Prospect

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As a returning World War II veteran who received special state and federal help for a wide choice of educational career opportunities, it is noteworthy to see that support continue for future generations. Veterans throughout the years have received preference in hiring, educational admissions, low-interest housing loans, as well as resources for small-business start-ups. This stage was set during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administrations. Such veterans programs provided the background for future aid programs to minorities and women as well as set the stage for affirmative efforts to address low-income, marginalized people's educational and employment needs.

Congressional legislation, executive, and Federal Court rulings have expanded civil rights and economic opportunities. These rulings and decisions continue to affect social and educational policy at all educational levels. Affirmative action did, does, and continues to provide assistance to minorities and women, and guide gender preferences in education and the workforce.

Historical Background

After World War II, in 1946, President Harry Truman appointed a committee on Civil Rights.¹ In 1948, acting on their recommendations, Truman signed executive orders implementing desegregation of the federal work force and the armed forces. His action set the stage for the *Brown* decision six years later. Civil rights acts in ensuing years have reaffirmed and expanded those 1948 initiatives.

In 1947, the *Truman Commission Report*² recommended expanding universal education through the community-college level, giving more citizens improved economic and employment opportunities. Today community colleges enjoy the largest student enrollments in all higher education, even during economic downturns. Furthermore, community colleges provide educational access and opportunity to more of the population through local facilities at minimal cost. Recently many community colleges have expanded their curricula, becoming four-year institutions; others have instituted graduate-level degree programs.

By 1954, in *Brown v. Board of Education*³ the Supreme Court ruled “separate but equal” facilities inherently unequal. Public school segregation, they opined, was a denial of equal protection of the laws and violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. To achieve unanimity in the decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren, former governor of California, brilliantly divided the case into two parts. *Brown I* ruled for school integration while *Brown II* sought to desegregate schools with all deliberate speed. Implementation of the law for integrated schools forthwith was not accomplished without widespread resistance. In some instances, federal troops were required to overcome protests and escort students to classes. The *Brown* case led to a more activist Supreme Court. The court prior to *Brown* left educational issues and decisions to local-school-district administrators and officials. Since then, *The Educational Law Reporter* reflects a multitude of legal issues and decisions affecting all educational levels.

In the 60 years since *Brown* many efforts have addressed past historical injustices. Affirmative action was mentioned in John F. Kennedy’s executive order of March 1, 1961, ensuring the Federal government’s hiring and employment practices be free of discrimination. Lyndon Johnson first implemented policies for equal access, equality in education, and job opportunities for African Americans and other minorities. Through his legislative skills Johnson overcame persistent, ferocious opposition. *The Civil Rights Act of 1964* outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in public places engaged in interstate commerce. Title VI of the Act prevented discrimination in any government agency receiving federal funds. Johnson notes U.S. citizens seek not just freedom but opportunity and not simply legal equity but human ability—not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and a result. His vision reflects the public policy of a great society.⁴ *The 1964 Civil Rights Act* was amended and expanded in 1991 to provide tort remedies to victims of racial and sexual discrimination.

Through the intervening years, affirmative action has been expanded to include Hispanics, women, Muslims and other minorities as well as African Americans. As our society has become more diverse through increases in immigration, educational and governmental policymakers’ decisions have come to reflect a multiethnic and multicultural society, but resistance to changing social structures is historically part of paradigm shifts. Such resistance is reflected in conflict and eventual reconciliation as societal adaptation to language-based, cultural, and racial diversity expands. That process continues as we reach the status of a majority minority nation. As the minority becomes the

majority by 2050, according to some demographers, investment in opportunities for all citizens will continue.

Federal District Courts, Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court have issued rulings and decisions affecting education. These affirmative action decisions are often the result of students seeking and being denied admission to their institutional choices.

In *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978),⁵ the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the University's quota system for Blacks while ruling the use of race as one criteria among many acceptable. This case was one of the first dealing with reverse discrimination. Although Bakke graduated and so the court case made moot, the courts found utilizing quotas to achieve racial diversity unconstitutional, while using race in university admissions as one factor among many was ruled constitutional.

Major Michigan cases in 2003 continued to define the legal parameters of affirmative action. *Gratz v. Bollinger*⁶ dealt with an undergraduate, Jennifer Gratz, denied admission to the University of Michigan despite reporting higher test scores than admitted minorities. Gratz, who graduated from another university, brought suit claiming racial preferences in admissions violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled the use of race in admissions not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, requiring individualized consideration of each applicant for admissions. The same year at University of Michigan, in *Grutter v. Bollinger*⁷ the court upheld the Law School's race-conscious admissions process that might favor underrepresented minorities but took into account many other factors on an individualized basis for every applicant. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor opined affirmative action might not be necessary in 25 years. She also notes the court was influenced by a massive outpouring of support for affirmative action by the military and corporate sectors since the officer's corps and the higher echelon of corporate leadership seek more diversity in their management teams.

A public school case, *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*,⁸ regards students' right to apply to any district high school. In this district, some schools were oversubscribed, so if a student body deviated from an approximately 41% white and 59% non-white division, race was used as a tiebreaker. No distinction was made among "non-whites," whether Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, or African Americans. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling struck down the district's plan as not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest in diversity and to avoid racial isolation.

*Fisher v. University of Texas, Austin*⁹ was brought by a white applicant, Abigail Fisher, whose grades were alleged to be higher and extracurricular activities more comprehensive than minority applicants', yet she was not admitted to UT. Formerly, to achieve student diversity the university admitted applicants from the top 10% (now 8%) of graduates from the state's high schools. Not enough minorities enrolled through that process, so university admissions gave extra preference to applicants' racial minority status. The high court imposed strict scrutiny on the university, ruling that before turning to racial classification there must be assurance that available, workable, race-neutral alternatives do not suffice. The Court remanded the case back to the lower court to reexamine if strict scrutiny was followed to assure there was no race-neutral solution available. The ruling left intact the use of race as one factor in admissions. Attempts to limit the role and function of affirmative action continue in *Schuette*.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear *Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmation Action* to determine whether voters can amend a state's constitution to ban racial preferences by referendum. In 2006, Gratz and others got a referendum passed by Michigan voters (58%–42%) to ban racial preferences for university admissions. The district court upheld the Michigan referendum as constitutional, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the referendum (8–7), arguing such an amendment would create extra hurdles for minorities, and such burdens undermine the Equal Protection Clause guaranteeing all citizens equal access to tools of political change.¹⁰ The *Schuette* decision would determine whether voters could vote to ban racial preferences. As in past affirmative action cases, U.S. Supreme Court Justices are divided between liberal and conservative positions on the 14th Amendment's equal protection guarantee. As in all affirmative action cases, there are advocates pro and con gathering supporters in an attempt to influence the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. On April 22, 2014 the high court, by a 6–2 ruling, supported Michigan's ban on affirmative action in admissions to state universities.

Affirmative action has advocates in higher education as most universities are committed to student, faculty, and staff diversity as a compelling state interest. Bollinger, former president of the University of Michigan during the *Gratz* and *Grutter* cases, and now president of Columbia University, argues it vital to enroll minority, low-income, and marginalized students in higher education institutions. In each recent U.S. Supreme Court case on affirmative action there has been strong support from professional education associations as well as business and industry. In the *Fisher* case, for example, over 59 companies including Microsoft, Wal-Mart, Gap, General Electric, Pfizer, Shell Oil and

Viacom filed a brief noting they rely on universities to prepare a racially diverse workforce.¹¹

The composition of the court will affect future decisions. The two newest appointees, liberal Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan are firm supporters of activism on behalf of minorities and marginalized peoples. Sotomayor often refers to the important role affirmative action played in her Ivy League educational career.¹²

Supreme Court Justices in the 2003 *Gratz*, *Grutter*, and *Fisher* cases raised questions about “critical mass” used by university lawyers for maintaining affirmative action programs. How many minorities comprise “critical mass?” What is the definition of “critical mass?” University lawyers could not give a number since that would involve invoking a quota, so answers included the number of minority admissions that would make them feel comfortable. Again the question arises: “what is the definition of comfortable?” Ambiguity is introduced across responses. Other questions raised by Justices include: “will there be a limit to protected classes?; are there important groups of individuals that desire and deserve protected classes?; how can we define a compelling state interest in diversity?; and how can that interest be determined?” Social science research on the effects of student, faculty, staff, and administration with the compelling state requirements for diversity are mixed. What if a person can claim several minority classifications not in protected classes? These are some of the questions that will become the basis for future litigation. Harvard Law School professor Randall Kennedy’s recent book *For Discrimination*¹³ raises additional issues. He questions whether it is good for the country to perpetuate preferences for privileging relatively well-off Hispanics and African Americans over better-qualified and often less-affluent Asians and Caucasians. Randall believes affirmative action will remain a substantial presence in U.S. life for the foreseeable future regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court decides. Many universities use race-neutral policies in admissions. Socioeconomic factors, first generation students, academic potential, and violence-threatened neighborhoods, are a few alternative-admissions criteria. The Cato Institute and other organizations continue to push for the elimination of affirmative action and for race-neutral admissions policies.¹⁴

Each presidential administration seeks to leave a legacy for future generations, yet all are prisoners of the age in which they live. Harry S. Truman, criticized for not going far enough with his civil rights agenda, provided the background for further advances including *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). When Congress blocked his civil rights efforts, Truman used executive order. Franklin Roosevelt signed the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill) into law June 22, 1944, and Truman

implemented the law after Roosevelt's death. Besides the expansion of community colleges, Truman made major contributions to education.¹⁵ Materials housed in the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri reveal his commitment to economic and social justice. A personal letter to Mr. William E. Cotter, April 7, 1948, argues the role of education in extending equal educational opportunity for all persons, to the maximum of their individual abilities without regard to economic status, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry.¹⁶ Truman notes in a letter, August 28, 1946, to the chairman of the American Veterans Committee discrimination, like a disease, must be attacked wherever it appears. This applies to the opportunity to vote, to hold and retain a job, and to secure adequate shelter and medical care no less than to gain an education compatible with the needs and ability of the individual.¹⁷ John F. Kennedy set the groundwork for major civil rights legislation. On Kennedy's death, Lyndon Johnson's legislative skills led to the landmark *Civil Rights Act of 1964*,¹⁸ amended and expanded in 1991. Like Truman, Johnson was faced with major resistance to his civil rights agenda. He pushed Congress to honor Kennedy's legacy by passing the *Civil Rights Act*. Critics wanted him to push harder and implement more governmental pressures to eliminate discrimination in education and employment. Both Presidents Truman and Johnson made major steps toward a more compassionate and just society at great risk to their own political careers.

The issue of social justice through affirmative action continues to be litigated. There are few countries in the world where college students can have their cases reach and pique the interest of Justices in the land's highest court. Barbara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz, Abigail Fisher, and Allan Bakke were students whose admissions concerns led to U.S. Supreme Court rulings.

While each new case builds on preceding cases, the trend has been toward limiting affirmative action's reach. Affirmative action cases have addressed issues of equality and access for opportunity and employment in education, business, government, and industry for over half a century. Current and future presidents and their administrations continue and will continue efforts for economic and social justice, often in the face of determined critics. After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Michigan's affirmative action ban, California and other states that eliminated race preference affirmative action will reexamine their policies. The *Schuetz* case will examine whether the political restructuring process is applicable.¹⁹ Under political restructuring, state action is unconstitutional where it meets both elements of a two-prong test: first, if it has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that primarily benefits the minority group's interest; second, if it reallocates political power or reorders a decision-making process in a way that places special

burdens on a minority group's ability to achieve goals through the process.

The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Schutte* may not weaken affirmative action, but, together with past decisions, it may lead to other-than-race-based factors in assuring diversity as a compelling state interest. Examples include economic, first generation, challenging living environments, and marginalized individuals. The continuing effort toward a more civil, humane society, with expanded educational and economic opportunities remains a work in progress in U.S. democratic society.

Endnotes

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- ¹⁹ American Bar Association, *Bill Schuette, Michigan Attorney General v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) in the Supreme Court of the United States*, www.supremecourtpreview.org

Early Congressional Activities on West Point: 1776 to 1861

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Historically, there was a long period during which the physical condition of an army was one primary determinant of its success or failure in battle.¹ Over the last several centuries, however, with the increased importance of technology, warfare became more complicated, necessitating sophisticated training in order for military leaders to maximize the effective use of armaments. Military education became central to the soldier's professional development and the strengthening of national defense. The abilities of military leaders to adopt technological advances in order to maintain strategic and tactical advantages increasingly determined success or failure on the battlefield.

Military education scholarship tends to focus either on West Point or events following the Civil War. One of few pre-Civil War-era examinations, *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York* examines the early history of West Point, but does not explore congressional activity regarding the military academy.² Ira Reeves' *Military Education in the United States* focuses primarily on West Point and the post-Civil War period.³ Even more contemporary works do not venture into legislative origins of West Point. Frederick Rudolph's *The American College and University and Curriculum* does not discuss social forces that created and shaped West Point.⁴ More recent examinations of West Point, such as *Duty, Honor, and Country* by Stephen Ambrose covers the entire span of its history but fails to delve in any detail into its legislative antecedents.⁵ *Mister Jefferson's Military Academy* provides the most detailed analysis of why Jefferson decided to support the creation of a military academy, but not the legislative activities during and immediately following the American Revolution.⁶ In sum, examination of military education scholarship locates a sizeable gap in the literature on both the history of Congress and West Point, as well as the history of higher education.

The purpose of my argument is to document and analyze congressional activities regarding West Point from the American Revolution until 1861. Herein I develop an understanding of

congressional activities and responses to occasional opposition to a military academy's existence. I do not intend to provide a comprehensive documentation of all legislation debated in Congress on the subject of military education, but rather offer analysis of congressional activity with respect to West Point, the United States Military Academy. My focus here remains on one federally controlled institution: West Point. Annapolis, the Naval Academy, is not included in my investigation as it was not founded until 1845 and does not provide an historical examination as lengthy as that of West Point, founded in 1802.

In the United States, the approval of Congress is needed to establish and support financially a military and its support mechanisms, such as educational institutions. Standing professional armies, particularly those that aggressively pursue innovation, represent capital expenditures for governments. To establish and support financially a military academy requires approval of Congress, for the Constitution grants Congress the power to "raise and support armies..."⁷ Recounting an understanding of how West Point developed must therefore include activities by the legislative branch of the U.S. government.

Legislative Activities during the American Revolution

Correspondence between Henry Knox and John Adams indicates that, before the thirteen colonies declared their independence from England, the idea of a military academy was a subject of dialogue between the army and Congress. On 2 November 1775, Adams, a member of the Congressional Board of War, wrote to Knox to inquire about military engineers, particularly those experienced in fortifications and gunnery, in addition to any available books on military science.⁸ In his 16 May 1776 reply, Knox, by that time General Washington's Chief of Artillery, suggests the establishment of an academy where "the whole theory of the art of war shall be taught."⁹ Though Adams supported the idea, no action was taken either by the Board of War or by Congress.¹⁰

The lack of a colonial military academy stands in contrast with British military science, whose officers were educated at Woolwich, a factor giving them a decided advantage on the battlefield, much to the concern of generals like Knox. On 25 September 1776, Knox replied to Adams, "Military academies must be instituted at any expense. We are fighting against a people well acquainted with the theory and practice of war, brave by discipline and habit."¹¹ Knox reiterated these views a short time later to a visiting congressional committee sent to investigate the war's progress. Knox reports in *Hints to Congressional Committee now in camp. Headquarters, Harlem Heights, 27 September 1776*, that:

As officers can never act with confidence until they are Masters of their profession, an Academy established on a liberal plan

would be the utmost service to America, where the whole theory and practice of Fortifications and gunnery should be taught; to be nearly on the same plan as that of Woolwich making allowance for the differences of circumstances.¹²

The committee reported back to Congress and, on 9 October 1776, passed a modest proposal for a “continental Laboratory and military Academy....”¹³ The academy’s purpose was to educate officers while they continued to serve with their regiments, for that is where they were most needed during war. The academy was the first action taken by Congress to provide officers with a scientific education including mathematics, arithmetic, and geometry. It operated from 1777 until the conclusion of the war in 1783, when it was terminated.¹⁴

Army Inspector General, William von Steuben, wrote to Alexander Hamilton following the war. Hamilton served on a congressional committee charged with investigating a permanent defense policy for the United States. In his letter he lays out an elaborate, complete plan for a proposed academy including a curriculum of natural philosophy, experimental philosophy, civil and international law, history, geography, mathematics, civil architecture, artillery, and engineering.¹⁵ Von Steuben’s plan was based on the British model at Woolwich, and much of his plan eventually would become incorporated at West Point.

Washington’s communications with von Steuben and Hamilton helped him formulate *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment*, which he sent to Congress in May 1783. The influence of Knox and von Steuben was apparent as he outlined a militia that easily could be called to order in the event of emergency. Washington felt it necessary that a number of young men in each community be educated in the science of war for the plan to work.¹⁶ He also recommends the establishment of one or more academies “for the instruction of the Art Military; particularly those Branches of it which respect Engineering and Artillery, which are highly essential, and the knowledge of which, is most difficult to obtain.”¹⁷ He emphasizes the need for an institution devoted to military education, “Of so great importance is it to preserve the knowledge which has been acquired thro’ the various Stages of long and arduous service, that I cannot conclude without repeating the necessity of the proposed Institution, unless we intend to let the Science become extinct.”¹⁸ Much of Washington’s plan for deterring war is built around an overall strategy of maintaining a state of military readiness.

However, these carefully reasoned plans were almost entirely ignored by Congress. The political state of the nation under the Articles of Confederation was unfavorable to any consideration of a military

academy. The central issue, the survival of the states as a nation and adoption of a Constitution, crowded out discussion of military education, considered a comparatively minor subject.¹⁹ Post-Revolutionary War, the United States had an army comprised of no more than one regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery: a total of approximately 800 men. The army was virtually nonexistent and no provisions were made for military education of the officer corps.

Early Presidential Appeals to Congress

Washington continued to press the issue though his earlier suggestions on military education were not implemented. In his second annual message to Congress on 8 December 1790 he recommends the establishment of a military academy as a subject Congress should undertake.²⁰ In his second term of office he again addresses the importance of a military academy to Congress. Washington states that “however pacific the general policy of a Nation may be, it ought never be without an adequate stock of Military knowledge for emergencies.”²¹ He argues such an institution necessary to the nation in order to preserve and transmit knowledge of military science, a field according to Washington that “...demands much previous study.”²²

In his eighth, and final, address to Congress on 7 December 1796, Washington again proposes the establishment of a military academy. He points out Congress’ lack of activity on this subject and emphasizes this is a matter too important to be ignored based on how “a flourishing state of the arts and sciences contributes to national prosperity and reputation.”²³ Washington’s comments were particularly significant at the time in light of worsening diplomatic relations with France.

Despite his many exhortations, no action is taken by Congress to create a military academy. Meanwhile, relations with France continue to deteriorate, so that by 1798 the United States is at the brink of war with a nation of considerable, advanced military prowess. In a step toward formation of a formalized military academy, on 16 July 1798, Congress authorized President Adams to appoint four teachers of the arts and sciences to the Corps of Artillerists to teach officer cadets in West Point, New York at the fortifications on the Hudson River.²⁴

Creation of the Military Academy at West Point

On 16 March 1802, Congress formally founded the United States Military Academy at West Point.²⁵ It was approved by President Jefferson and became formally known as the Military Peace Establishment Act.²⁶ Congressional approval of West Point in 1802 was likely enabled by continuing poor foreign relations with France coupled with harassment from Mediterranean pirates.

While the United States had succeeded in averting all-out war with France, international relations and tensions continued to be a critical national issue. On 2 December 1806, Jefferson submitted his annual address to Congress which he opened by speaking to foreign relations problems with Britain, France, and Spain, as well as on U.S. soil with Indians.²⁷ The threatening foreign relations climate is expressed by Representative Felix Grundy of Tennessee, who states that, if the British are successfully engaged in war, they will be driven “from our Continent—they will no longer have an opportunity of intrigue with our Indian neighbors, and the setting of the ruthless savage to tomahawk our women and children.”²⁸ The British and Native American threats to the nation are echoed by President James Madison in his war message to Congress on 1 June 1812.²⁹

Following the War of 1812, congressional support for military education increased. The House Committee on Militia submitted a 17 January 1817 report which includes the committee’s concerns and recommendations on military education. The report is as much an endorsement of military education as it is a warning. That the committee preferred a citizen-based militia is clearly articulated in their report.

The safety of a republic depends as much upon the equality in the use of arms amongst its citizens, as the equality of rights. Nothing can be more dangerous in such a government than to have a knowledge of the military art confined to a part of the people; for sooner or later that part will govern.³⁰

The committee based much of their criticism on concerns about the power a professional military structure would command. They compared America to ancient Rome, which transferred military education from the masses to professional soldiers who, in turn, took arms against their own country. The most logical solution, according to the House Committee on Militia, was to disseminate military education throughout the population public education rather than leave it to a small, privileged elite.

While the Revolution served to raise awareness of the need for West Point, the War of 1812 justified its the value. No fortification constructed by a graduate of West Point was captured by the British.³¹ However, in spite of examples of competence and bravery, the army paid a high price for having been unprepared, ignoring the advice of Washington and others to maintain an army in a state of readiness.³² While successes could be credited to West Point, disasters were accounted for by the lack of properly educated officers.³³

That West Point proved its value was evident in two attempts further to expand military education. Representative Richard Johnson of

Kentucky submitted a 19 November 1818 resolution requesting the Committee on Military Affairs investigate the necessity to establish additional military academies.³⁴ Representative Daniel Cook of Illinois submitted a 4 January 1819 resolution asking the same,³⁵ submitting a similar resolution on 15 February 1819; however, no action was taken on their proposals.³⁶

Attacks on West Point

Beginning in 1820, there began a series of attempts to persuade Congress to abolish West Point. Several of these were led by the academy's former superintendent, Captain Alden Partridge. Partridge began serving as acting superintendent in 1808, and was appointed superintendent in 1814. He was replaced in 1817 but refused to relinquish his command. President James Monroe ordered him court-martialed and he resigned his commission the following year.³⁷ After his departure from the army, Partridge embarked on a path of revenge against the institution. On 2 March 1820, Partridge presented a memorial to Congress in which he attacked West Point and warned of the threat of a growing military aristocracy.³⁸

Partridge's complaints soon found sympathy; on 10 March 1820 Representative Newton Cannon of Tennessee submitted a resolution in the House Appropriations Committee which recommended the elimination of West Point. It was addressed the same day and rejected by a vote of 12 to 6. The committee reported the vote to the full House and no further action was taken.³⁹

Andrew Jackson resembled other early-nineteenth-century presidents in his continued support for West Point. In his first address to Congress in December 1829 he encouraged West Point's continued support.

I recommend to your fostering care, as one of our safest means of national defense, the Military Academy. This institution has already exercised the happiest influence on the moral and intellectual character of our Army; and such of the graduates as from various causes may not pursue the profession of arms will be scarcely less useful as citizens. Their knowledge of the military art will be advantageously employed in the militia service, and in a measure secure to that class of troops the advantages which in this respect belong to standing armies.⁴⁰

The preceding passage contains several messages to Congress important to historians. While Jackson's tenure in office witnessed several attacks on West Point, Jackson himself was supportive of the institution, and demonstrated a clear recognition of its benefit. However,

Jackson indicates he expects men graduated from West Point will fulfill their military obligation as militiamen, not as professional soldiers.

On 25 February 1830, Representative David Crockett of Tennessee introduced a resolution that sought the elimination of West Point. Like Partridge's, Crockett's resolution on West Point was grounded in the idea it threatened to create a military aristocracy. Crockett further alleged West Point favored upper social classes in its admissions. The House Committee on Military Affairs took no action.⁴¹

Another attempt to abolish the academy was made on 17 May 1834 by Representative Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky. In a meeting of the Committee on Military Affairs, he cites formal resolutions from the Tennessee and Ohio legislatures that recommend closing West Point. The committee decides not to recommend closing to the full House and no further action is taken.⁴²

On 7 January 1836, Representative Albert Hawes of Kentucky introduces a proposal asking for the appointment of a select committee to investigate whether West Point should be closed. His proposal is rejected in committee and goes no farther.⁴³ The only evidence of the Committee on Military Affairs having supported an attempt to close West Point is in 1837. Led by Representative Francis Smith of Maine, the committee approves a bill to discontinue government support for cadet education; however the House takes no action on the bill.⁴⁴

On 12 October 1838, Captain Partridge and Edward Burke submit another memorial to Congress, petitioning for the elimination of West Point. Partridge's second memorial represents a change from his first when he recommended only a change in the form and organization of military education. Partridge's second proposal asks West Point be eliminated and military education be passed to the state level, each state with its own academy.⁴⁵ No action is taken on the petition, and the cessation of further appeals to Congress coincides with the death of Captain Partridge in 1854. After 1854 there are no further records of proposals to eliminate West Point.

Conclusions

Revolutionary War leaders recognize the value of military education during and after the war. Early congressional activities are characterized by resistance toward the idea of establishing a military academy, even at the request of Washington and other Revolutionary War leaders. The efforts of early presidents are impeded by a Congress suspicious of a standing army as evidenced in the lack of a clearly defined, post-Revolutionary War military establishment.

An examination of congressional proceedings during the early-

nineteenth century reveals a series of appeals to Congress to close West Point. These appeals begin shortly after Captain Partridge leaves West Point and continue until the 1850s. Criticism of West Point is generally grounded in the idea West Point might develop a military aristocracy and therefore represents a threat to a free society. Such a cursory review might initially lead one to the conclusion that West Point suffered from a general lack of congressional support. A more detailed look, however, reveals none of those proposals for West Point's elimination were sent to the full House for a vote. All proposals were defeated in committee. While a single attempt to eliminate West Point was approved in committee and referred to the House as a bill,⁴⁶ no documentation remains in evidence to indicate its final disposition. That only one of six attempts received enough support to be sent to the House indicates West Point benefitted from the support of a majority of its members.

The Mexican War may have played a role in dispiriting further attempts to abolish West Point, elevating perceptions about the value of a well-educated officer corps. While in Canada during the Revolution, ill-prepared U.S. troops suffered more defeats than victories, lost more men than were gained as prisoners of war, and the few victories they did win took place close to their bases of operation. The opposite was the case in the Mexican War, where a smaller U.S. force led by well-trained officers fighting against an inadequately prepared Mexican army won a series of victories, and in the end captured enough cannons, small arms, munitions, and territory to more than repay the cost of the war effort.⁴⁷ As evidenced within testimony offered by General Scott before Congress:

I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, within its first half more defeats than victories falling to our share, whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.⁴⁸

My historical examination reveals congressional activities toward military education reflect a larger conflict that took place following the Revolution. That conflict centers on whether the republic would be defined as a collection of sovereign states or a federally controlled system of government. Following the Revolution, political divisions began to develop and party affiliations began to polarize around the issue of increasing federal acquisition of authority. The Federalists were a conservative group concerned about an overzealous application of democratic principles which might remove the wealthy and educated from public office.⁴⁹ Those who identified themselves as Federalists,

such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington, considered the republic to be nationalistic in form, meaning a strong federal government should be superior to state sovereignty. Anti-Federalists tended to support the Articles of Confederation that implied the sovereignty of states over that of a central government. They opposed the growing central authority of the federal government and perceived this as an aristocratic move aimed at seizing governmental power, an idea completely incompatible with a democratic form of government.⁵⁰

That Congress took no action on Washington's several appeals for the founding of a military academy parallels similar attempts to establish a national university to prepare civil servants and can be understood within the larger context of conflict between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. James Madison proposed the idea of a national university at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, but was opposed by those who reasoned government had no justifiable role in education because education was delegated to the states.⁵¹ Anti-Federalists further opposed the idea out of fear such an institution would produce civil servants more loyal to the national government than state governments.⁵²

In spite of consistent congressional support for West Point after its founding, evidence nevertheless reveals lingering suspicion toward a military academy. Such a finding is consistent with early United States' emphasis on the citizen-soldier rather than the professional soldier. It is also consistent with the message Captain Partridge articulates in his advocacy of private military education after he left the army in order to ensure military knowledge did not rest solely in the hands of a small elite. However, the citizen-soldier theme never received sufficient congressional support to have threatened the existence of West Point. If anything, it was an inconvenience that stalled West Point's founding until 1802 rather than during the Washington administration.

A lingering question remains as to why President Thomas Jefferson supported the founding of West Point when he had earlier opposed it. During the Washington administration the idea of a military academy was discussed at several cabinet meetings. Washington and several others supported the idea, but it was opposed by Jefferson on the grounds the Constitution did not authorize the federal government to establish such an institution. Washington decided to leave the matter to Congress due to Jefferson's concerns about constitutionality.⁵³ An answer to this question might be found in preference ordering. Preference ordering informs us individuals will behave in such a manner that their actions maximize utility.⁵⁴ While Jefferson opposed a military academy as a cabinet member, the prospect of war and an existential

threat to the young republic may have persuaded him a military academy was preferable.

An understanding of congressional activities surrounding West Point reflects the larger political conflict that took place following the Revolution. When viewed in such a framework, differing positions toward the establishment of a military academy logically emerge. While the need for a military academy continues to be supported in the present, the larger political debate over the power and role of the federal government continues. Our present political parties most clearly differ in terms of the extent of power that should be held by the federal government relative to the states, as well as the level of involvement in the lives of individual citizens. This ongoing debate largely mirrors the differences between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Our present political parties trace their respective antecedents and differences to the early Federalists and Anti-Federalists.⁵⁵ In spite of an historic aversion to a standing army, the citizen-soldier principle was never fully implemented in the sense that the nation relied solely on a semi-professional militia. In spite of a philosophical ideal inspired by a citizen soldiery, the reality of national security in an unstable world ensured West Point's survival.

Endnotes

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Adequacy and the Courts: A Review

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Questions of the structure and content of publically funded education are typically considered the province of state legislators, educational policymakers, and philosophers, but deciding how to pay for the resulting system has largely been left up to the court system. School finance litigation's long history dates to the 1960s and such litigation has continued nearly unabated into the present; nearly every state's school finance provisions have been challenged and states compelled to adjust how educational resources are generated and distributed to local school districts. Texas has remained in seemingly constant litigation over how to pay for its public schools since the first *San Antonio v. Rodriguez* suit was filed in 1968 (Sracic, 2006). Currently over 600 Texas public school districts are suing the state alleging failure to provide an equitable and adequate level of funding for a growing and rapidly changing student population. And the state's Supreme Court is expected to render a decision before the 2015 legislative session convenes. Given the legislature's past response to Supreme Court school finance decisions, pending rulings are unlikely to put an end the matter.

In this paper I examine one major legal concept employed in challenging state school finance provisions: adequacy. I first offer a brief definition of adequacy; then examine its emergence as a legal argument to challenge state school finance arrangements; discuss the ways in which the courts have applied the concept; address the problems associated with adequacy theory as a remedy for flawed state school finance plans; and finally note the growing tendency of courts to blur lines between equity and adequacy in their efforts to devise a more comprehensive and effective pattern of state school finance provisions. I conclude by recommending the trend toward combining adequacy and equity in a broad approach to school finance reform continues.

The Meaning of Adequacy

It is impossible to define adequacy in isolation, rather the concept must be understood in relation to external criteria, such as that offered by the language of a state constitution's education clause (West & Peterson, 2007) or a set of externally determined outcomes. Simply stated, adequacy theorists assert the education clause of a state's

constitution commits the state to guaranteeing all students reach a minimum level of academic achievement and requires the state provide the level of spending needed for all school districts to produce a specified level of educational achievement. The concept of adequacy differs from that of equity since, while a standard of equity requires a state eliminate spending variations between rich and poor school districts, adequacy establishes a minimum spending level required to produce specified educational outcomes (Costrell, 2007). Ascertaining baseline adequacy requires setting standards gauged by answers to four questions: adequate to do what?, for whom?, to what extent?, and for what period of time? (Odden & Picus, 2014). As a standard, adequacy may be applied both to traditional resource inputs and the results those inputs produce. Koski and Hahnel (2008) note adequacy “is understood to mean a specific qualitative level of educational resources or...a specific level of resources required to achieve certain educational outcomes based on external and fixed standards” (p. 47). As a tool to challenge state school finance arrangement, adequacy is a relatively recent arrival on the scene.

The Emergence of Adequacy

Scholars usually divide the history of school finance litigation into three distinct “waves” (Heise, 1995; Thro, 1989). The first wave, roughly the period 1970–1973, grounded legal challenges to state school finance provisions based on two sources, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the *U.S. Constitution* and the theoretical work of Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970). These authors contended state funding for public education should be both substantially equal among school districts and independent of the wealth of the school district in which students reside. This approach to school finance litigation was initially successful at the state level but was foreclosed when the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in 1973, education was not a federally protected right (*San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*). This decision closed the doors of federal courts to state school finance litigation.

The second wave (1973–1989) concentrated on legislating disparities in the distribution of state school funds across school districts. The purpose of such litigation was to convince courts to interpret the language of the education clause of the state constitution in ways that would recognize differentials in need among school districts and free districts from dependence on local wealth to fund educational programs. Unfortunately, the courts were largely unconvinced by these arguments and plaintiffs won only a minority of court decisions in this period (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997).

The third wave began in 1989 with the Kentucky State Supreme Court’s decision in *Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.* Based on its

interpretation of the state constitution's wording, the court declared Kentucky's legislature had failed to afford students the required adequate public education, directing the state to remedy those inadequacies. To guide the legislature's response, the court included in its decision a list of skills and knowledge that, in its view, constituted an adequate education. *Rose* is a landmark case marking a turning point from a standard of equity to a standard of adequacy as a basis for challenging state school finance provisions (Koski & Hahnel, 2008; Rebell, 2002; Thro, 1989).

What motivated this shift from equity to adequacy as a basis legally to challenge school finance reform? During the second wave of school finance reform litigation, state defendants prevailed in the majority of cases decided (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997; Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Rebell, 2002). Losing became a powerful incentive to seek a new basis for challenging state school finance revisions. A second motivating factor was the seemingly simultaneous emergence of the standards movement, especially at the state level where rigorous content standards in most academic areas had been implemented. Standards began to provide the framework for challenging state school finance provisions. As Peter Schrag remarks,

There's incontrovertible logical, ethical, fiscal, and legal, [*sic*] in the tight two-way link between standards and adequate resources. If a state demands that schools and students be accountable—for meeting standards, for passing exit exams and other tests—the state must be held equally accountable for providing the wherewithal to enable them to do it. (quoted in Rebell, 2009, p. 64)

Thereafter, standards and adequacy became linked in the minds of many school finance reform advocates.

Additional reasons exist for the emergence of adequacy arguments in the period following 1989 (Koski & Hahnel, 2008; Koski & Reich, 2006; Rebell, 2002). First, by concentrating on the language of the state constitution's education clause, the courts avoided a "spill-over" effect to other areas of state services and thus the need for increased revenue and taxes. Moreover, adequacy arguments appear to flow naturally from state education clauses' existing language, negating judges' necessity to look for language supporting "fundamental rights" and "suspect classes" required by an equal protection claim (Koski & Hahnel, 2008, p. 48). Third, establishing adequacy as a floor beneath state support permits local districts to provide additional resources for their students over and above what courts demand. Nor does the standard of adequacy threaten the sanctity of local control. In fact, for wealthy districts with resources

able to provide educational programs beyond what adequacy requires, local control is actually enhanced. Importantly, adequacy appeals to established U.S. norms of fairness and equal opportunity and seems to support education's continued role as key to economic success and upward social-class mobility. Finally, establishing adequacy appears, on first glance at least, to be an uncomplicated undertaking. "All that the state legislature is required to do is to define what constitutes an adequate education and provide districts with the resources and conditions to deliver than level of education" (Koski & Hahnel, 2008, p. 48). Thus a complex problem of public policy became reduced to its simplest form.

How Courts Interpret Adequacy

Hanushek and Lindseth (2009) note a substantial number of states have faced adequacy challenges to school finance provisions. To examine all or even most of those cases is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, a review of three cases provides strong exemplars illustrating how courts in different states have interpreted adequacy: Kentucky's *Rose* case; the series of decisions by the New Jersey state Supreme Court known as the *Abbott Decisions*; and, from New York, the *Campaign for Fiscal Equity* case. I offer readers a word of caution; courts often use the terms "adequate" and "sufficient" interchangeably. For present purposes readers should consider these terms synonymous.

The Rose Case. In 1985, the Council for Better Education, a coalition of 66 school districts, filed suit against the state of Kentucky alleging it had failed to provide "an efficient system of common schools" as plainly required by the language of the state's constitution. The trial court ruled for the Council, asserting an "efficient school system must provide sufficient physical facilities, teachers, support personnel, and instructional materials to enhance the educational process" (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009, p. 107). The court directed the Kentucky General Assembly to supply appropriate financial remedies.

The state appealed the lower court's ruling but the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling. The court declared the state's public school system unconstitutional because it was "inadequate and well below the national effort" (*Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.*). The court then directed the Kentucky General Assembly to "re-create...a new system of common schools" based on the premise that education is "a basic, fundamental constitutional right that is available to all children within the Commonwealth (*Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.*). To guide the Assembly's work, the court laid out seven standards for a constitutionally adequate education:

- *Sufficient* oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization
- *Sufficient* knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable students to make informed choices
- *Sufficient* understanding of governmental processes to enable students to understand the issues that affect their community, state, and nation
- *Sufficient* self-knowledge and knowledge of student's mental and physical wellness
- *Sufficient* grounding in the arts to enable students to appreciate their cultural heritage
- *Sufficient* training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable students to choose and pursue life work intelligently
- *Sufficient* levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states in academic or the job market

Pursuant to the court's direction, Kentucky redesigned its public school system. Reforms included a new three-tiered school finance system with a significant infusion of new money, the establishment of content student performance standards, standardized testing, changes in school governance and management, and an accountability system with rewards and sanctions for schools and school districts (Adams, 1994).

Uniquely, in the *Rose* decision, those standards used to define adequacy emerged out of a statewide public engagement process initiated by the trial court and carried out during a six-month stay of its decision (Rebell, 2009). During this time a select committee appointed by the trial court held a series of public meetings, all of which received extensive media coverage. The standards were a product of this statewide public engagement process and were adopted by the trial court and approved by Kentucky's Supreme Court. Although Hanushek and Lindseth (2009) contend the *Rose* decision moved well beyond the Kentucky constitution's language and "hardly constitute[s] operational definitions that are easily judged or applied" (p. 109), courts in several states including Alabama, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina have adopted them (Rebell, 2009). Indeed the *Rose* decision "set the agenda for school finance up to the present time" (Odden & Picus, 2014, p. 33).

The Abbott Decisions

New Jersey represents one of the more extensive attempts to define adequacy through both litigation and legislation. Beginning with *Robinson*

v. Cabill (1973–1976) and continuing through *Abbott v. Burke* (1985–2009), New Jersey struggled with the problem of providing all students in the state with equal access to a quality education (Goertz & Weiss, 2009). New Jersey’s Supreme Court would issue over twenty opinions and the state legislature enacted three separate versions of school finance reforms reform legislation. It was not until 2009 in *Abbott XX* that the court finally declared the state’s school finance system constitutional for all students and lifted its standing order for additional funding for a set of supplemental programs for poor and minority students. While the original litigation in New Jersey addressed conditions specifically in 28 poor, urban school districts, the final decision applied to all New Jersey public school districts.

In 1981, the Education Law Center, a New Jersey advocacy organization, sued the state on behalf of students in four poor, minority urban school districts (Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey City). This number would eventually expand to 31 poor, urban school districts who would be designated the Abbott districts. The suit (*Abbott v. Burke I*) claimed the existing school finance system created disparities in funding between poor urban and wealthy suburban school districts that unconstitutionally deprived the poor district of needed student resources. When the case finally reached the New Jersey Supreme Court it was remanded to an administrative law judge for hearing and decision (Education Law Center, 2012). The judge upheld the plaintiff’s claims. In its 1990 opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the administrative law judge’s ruling that the state’s school finance system affected poor urban school districts unconstitutionally. The court’s ruling notes the “thorough and efficient” public education clause of the state constitution must be interpreted broadly. Public education should provide all students with the ability to meet the duties of good citizenship and “participate fully in society, in the life of one’s community, to appreciate art, music and literature, and to share that with friends” (*Abbott v. Burke II*, quoted in Goertz & Weiss, 2009, p. 11). The court directed the New Jersey Legislature to amend existing law or enact new legislation that would “substantially equalize” funding between poor and wealthy suburban school districts and be adequate to fund supplemental programs that addressed the disadvantages of poor and minority urban students. The new funding system was to be in place for the 1991–1992 school year. The legislature responded by passing the Quality Education Act of 1990. The act increased funding for poor, urban schools to a limited degree but failed to equalize funding to any great extent (Education Law Center, 2012).

The plaintiff districts argued the Quality Education Act fell short of meeting the needs of poor and minority students and returned to court.

In a 1994 decision (*Abbott v. Burke III*), the court agreed the Quality Education Act failed to meet the requirements of *Abbott v. Burke II* and directed the state legislature to enact a new law to comply with the court's requirements for equitable and *adequate* funding. The legislature's response, the Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act, was then challenged as inadequate, so litigation continued. In *Abbott v. Burke IV*, the court directed the state legislature to create parity in educational funding by the 1997–1998 school year. The court ordered a new trial in the lower court to develop an evidentiary record of needs for supplemental programs. It also directed the State Education Commissioner to study the needs of poor and minority schoolchildren to present recommendations for remediating funding programs (Education Law Center, 2012). In *Abbott v. Burke V* (1998) the court directed implementation of extensive supplementary programs for the districts' poor and minority children. The programs included: implementation of a research-based, whole-school reform (*Success for All* was the preferred model); full-day Kindergarten programs; half-day preschool programs for three- and four-year-olds; referral services for social and health care; alternative school and school-to-work plans; supplemental funding for additional programs based on student needs; and state funding for the entire cost of remodeling unsafe and out-of-date facilities or construction of new ones where remodeling was not possible (Education Law Center, 2012). Taken together, the court's actions in *Abbott v. Burke IV* and *V* established requirements for an adequate and equal education for poor and minority, urban schoolchildren. In a subsequent opinion, *Abbott v. Burke X* (2003), the court amended the list of supplementary educational programs to include early literacy programs, class size limitations, family support programs for elementary schools, secondary school reform, and the hiring of technology personnel (Goertz & Weiss, 2009).

In 2008, the state legislature passed the School Funding Reform Act. The state asked the court summarily to declare the Act constitutional and the supplementary programs ordered in *Abbott v. Burke IV* and *V* unneeded. The court declined to comply and remanded the issue to the lower court for trial (*Abbott v. Burke XIX*). The court subsequently upheld the results of that trial and, in *Abbott v. Burke XX* (2009), declared the School Funding and Reform Act constitutional and applicable not only to the Abbott districts, but for all the state's students (Education Law Center, 2012). Litigation would continue into 2011, when the court declared the extant version of the school finance law constitutional, extending the *Abbott v. Burke* criteria to all districts in the state, thus closing the books, however temporarily, on adequacy litigation in New Jersey (Odden & Picus, 2014).

The *Abbott* decisions are important to understanding adequacy standards for several reasons. First, litigation focused primarily on districts serving urban poor and minority students. Additionally, the court, early on, combined equity and adequacy in its search for a comprehensive school finance remedy. Moreover, the decisions were unique in that they appear to define educational adequacy as single, comprehensive, whole-school reform fitting with state-adopted content and performance standards. In terms of funding, adequacy consists of the “resources needed to implement an effective (research-based) comprehensive set of school strategies that would provide all students with an equal opportunity to learn to state performance standards” (Odden & Picus, 2014, p. 37). The decisions also expanded the meaning of adequacy to include services for pre-school children who fell outside the ages specified for services in the state’s education clause (5–17 years old). Finally, in the *Abbott* decisions, the Court compelled the state legislature directly to deal with the need to define an adequate education, rather than avoiding the issue (Odden & Picus, 2014).

The Campaign for Fiscal Equity

This case originated in challenge to New York’s public school finance system filed by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE). CFE is a non-profit advocacy group composed of parents, low-performing school districts, and public education advocates. While the organization’s goal was to ensure all schools in New York received adequate resources, the specific objects of their efforts were New York City’s school districts and students. This case is significant not only because it involved the nation’s largest public school district, but also for the total amount of money involved (Hanushek & Lindseth). Litigation would prove to be a 13-year process before a final decision was rendered.

CFE charged New York City was failing its duty under the state constitution to provide an opportunity for a sound, basic education to the school children of the nation’s largest city. At the heart of the CFE suit was the right of New York City schoolchildren to be accorded the sound, basic education as required by the court in *Levittown v. Nyquist* (1982). In support of its claims, CFE presented evidence to show New York City’s public school students performed poorly on academic tests and experienced low graduation rates. Furthermore, a lack of resources resulted in overcrowding in some areas, large class sizes, and unqualified teachers, as compared to teachers’ credentials in other parts of the state. Plaintiffs blamed a “broken political process” in state government that failed realistically to address the finance issue. The trial court ruled in favor of CFE and ordered the state to reform the school finance system to make it predictable, transparent, and reactive to student needs. The

court also identified acceptable criteria for sound, basic education as providing students with those skills needed to become productive citizens capable of engaging in civic life and participating in a competitive job market. Criteria for a sound basic education included:

- *Sufficient* numbers of qualified teachers, principals, and other personnel appropriate to class sizes
- *Adequate* and accessible school buildings with sufficient space to ensure appropriate class size and implementation of a sound curriculum
- *Sufficient* and up-to-date books, supplies, libraries, educational technology, and laboratories
- *Suitable* curricula, including an expanded platform of programs to help at-risk students by giving them additional time on task
- *Adequate* resources for student with extraordinary needs
- A safe and orderly environment (*Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State*, 2001)

On appeal the trial court's decision was overturned when the New York Court of Appeals ruled students in New York constitutionally were entitled to no more than an eighth-grade education (*Campaign for Fiscal Equity*, 2012).

The plaintiffs returned to court and, in 2003, the New York Court of Appeals reinstated the original trial court's decision, holding the "sound basic education" to which all New York students were entitled was "a meaningful high school education." The court returned the matter to the trial court, instructing it to undertake a costing-out study to determine the amount of funding required to provide this level of schooling. The lower court appointed a panel of three referees to conduct the study. The panel concluded New York City schools should receive an additional \$5.6 billion per year in operating funds and \$9.2 billion for the modernization of school facilities. The trial judge accepted the panel's recommendations and ordered the state to phase in the additional monies over a five-year period. These additional funds were over and above the \$12.6 billion already devoted to the city's public schools (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009), yet the state legislature balked at appropriating this amount of money. Ultimately, in 2006, Governor Elliot Spitzer mediated a compromise that supplied New York City's schools with an additional \$5.4 billion over a four-year period (*Council for Fiscal Equity*, 2012).

Judicial determinations of adequacy vary from state to state depending upon specific circumstances and the plain language of the relevant state constitution's education clause. Yet, as Michael Rebell (2002) argues, a consensus on certain "core concepts" deemed to make

up a constitutionally adequate public education has emerged from state adequacy decisions, holding that an adequate education must “prepare students to be citizens and economic participants in a democratic society;” reflect “contemporary, not archaic educational needs;” be attached “to more than a minimal level” of achievement; and “focus on opportunity, rather than outcome” (p. 239).

Problematising Adequacy Theory

For all its popularity and its use as a basis for challenging state school finance arrangements, problems are associated with standards of adequacy. Three problem areas are particularly relevant to this issue: difficulties in clearly defining adequacy requirements; problems determining the cost of adequate educational programming; and adequacy standards’ lack of attention to the needs of poor and minority students. While most may agree children should have an “adequate” education, there is nevertheless wide disagreement on what an adequate education entails. In this regard, the language of state constitutions rarely is helpful. These documents typically use terms such as “general,” “thorough,” “efficient,” “uniform,” “a general diffusion of knowledge,” and “suitable” to describe the state’s educational responsibilities (Hanusheck & Lindseth, 2009). Such nonspecific language compels courts to interpret the actual meaning of the education clause to create a standard against which to judge states’ funding efforts’ adequacy. Quite often, derived standards remain vague and non-specific (see *Rose* and *CFE* definitions of an adequate education quoted earlier in my argument). As Dunn and Derthick (2007) aptly remark, “Defining a generality with more generalities does not make a generality more precise” (p. 331). Nor are standards of great assistance in defining adequacy. The appeal of standards lies in their links to quantitative measures, which appear to offer an alternative to the vagaries of constitutional language (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). Yet constitutional requirements rarely, if ever, enter into the development of standards. “Instead, [standards] are derived from the rules and procedures of schools, and from policy discussions within state boards of education, state education departments, legislative bodies, and special commissions” (p. 120). Standards also vary from state to state, are rarely consistent, and often include assumptions about teaching and learning. Thus justices are given little guidance as they attempt to craft a definition of adequacy.

There are also difficulties associated with determining an adequate education’s cost. There are four generally accepted approaches to “costing out” an adequate education (Downes & Steifel, 2008; Hanusheck, 2007). The Professional Judgment approach relies upon a

panel of professional educators to decide the level of spending needed to achieve adequacy in a school with predetermined characteristics. The Successful District Approach examines spending patterns in districts already meeting the state's performance standard. The goal is to identify an adequate level of spending before applying it to districts not achieving the standard on the assumption, but which assumes the designated level of spending is adequate. The Whole School Design Approach applies the same reasoning as the Successful District Approach to individual schools to identify an adequate level of spending. The School District Cost Function Approach uses economic analysis techniques to determine the cost of achieving a specific educational outcome or outcomes (Downes & Steifel, 2008). Each of these cost-estimating procedures is widely used, but each possesses significant procedural and methodological flaws. The problems associated with cost estimation led Hanushek (2007) to conclude "[t]here simply is not a reliable, objective, and scientific method to answer the question of how much it would cost to obtain achievement that is noticeably better than that currently seen" (p. 97). But perhaps the search for a "scientific" process of determining the cost of an adequate education is misdirected. As Rebell (2009) remarks, "the educational process inherently involves an array of judgmental and environmental factors" not conducive to establishing a direct, causal link between spending and achievement (p. 161).

Finally, some scholars (Koski & Reich, 2006) reject the notion of adequacy entirely, instead calling for a return to equity as a guiding principle in designing state school finance schemes. They assert moves towards adequacy, standards-based reform, and "new accountability" in education "are antithetical to egalitarian goals such as achieving equality of educational opportunity" (p. 549). Although they acknowledge these policies may improve education for some, they maintain the overall impact of adequacy and its associated policies are "indifferent" or even hostile to whether disadvantaged children are afforded opportunities for an education equal to that provided their wealthier peers. Koski and Reich (2006) contend the policy shift away from equity and towards adequacy will only increase existing disparities in academic achievement for poor and minority students largely because "[a]dequacy focuses on bringing all schools up to a certain standard of quality, but once this standard is met, adequacy allows districts with greater means to supplement their local schools" (Ryan & Saunders, 2004, p. 467). In its "purest form," adequacy permits "objectionable inequalities" to exist and may even worsen differences in achievement and educational opportunities for poor and minority children (Koski & Reich, 2006, p. 549). A possible response to Koski and Reich's criticism may be some

combination of adequacy and equity to ensure more comprehensive school finance reform (Baker & Green, 2008; Underwood, 1995).

Combining Adequacy and Equity?

Most observers of recent school finance litigation note a tendency in the courts to combine adequacy and equity—especially vertical equity—in crafting remedies for state school finance cases (Baker & Green, 2008; Briffault, 2007; Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Rebell, 2009; Underwood, 1995). This “blurring of adequacy and equity” (Briffault, 2007, p. 27) occurs because courts recognize the interrelatedness of the two concepts, even when they have been asked to separate them. “A judicial determination of educational inadequacy in a particular school district,” notes Briffault, “is almost always predicated in some finding of inequity” (p. 27). Underwood (1995) recognizes the connection between the two concepts when she comments “[t]he theme [in school finance cases] using the state education clause is adequacy from the perspective of ‘vertical equity,’ meaning that different students should be treated differently based on their special educational needs” (p. 493). And Rebell (2005), prominent adequacy advocate and litigator, writes:

[T]he concepts of [“adequacy”] and “equity” increasingly are becoming merged, since the society requires all students to learn to function at high cognitive skill levels. Recognizing this link, lawyers, activists, and plaintiffs in education adequacy cases have begun to articulate demanding concepts of “adequacy” in the educational opportunities they expect to be extended to historically disadvantaged minority populations. (p. 291)

If courts do, in fact, combine equity principles with adequacy in an attempt to craft a fairer school finance plan, as a review of the remedies prescribed in the *Rose*, *Abbott*, and *CFE* cases indicates, what patterns might these connections take? In an analysis of state school finance decisions connecting adequacy and equity Briffault (2007) finds adequacy/equity relationships fall into one of three categories: adequacy as inequality excused; adequacy as equity minus; and adequacy as equity plus.

Decisions in which adequacy has been used to *excuse or mitigate inequality* include *Rodriguez*, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found the Texas school finance formula constitutional despite spending inequalities since the system provided children with basic skills. Courts who connect adequacy and equity in this manner either adopt a very limited definition of an adequate education, or they severely restrict the scope of the adequacy requirement in a state’s constitution by asserting adequacy does not require equality of spending. In some instances courts decline to

undertake an extensive investigation of the actual adequacy of the education being financed. In these litigations adequacy is inferred either from the amount of money devoted to funding education, or from the existence of state standards. When adequacy is employed to excuse inequalities in the system, no attempt is made to determine what adequacy might mean. Briffault (2007) points out many such cases predate the dominance of an adequacy argument.

In adequacy as *equity minus* decisions, adequacy is construed to create greater equity in the way funds are distributed to districts, but complete equity in funding across the board is not required. This approach to adequacy and equity responds to some of the practical and political problems associated with equity theory (Briffault, 2007). It permits courts to sidestep issues of extreme expense that may be required to ensure all districts have access to the same level of resources the wealthiest districts in the state enjoy. Equity minus decisions typically require the state to provide additional funding for poor districts but leave in place higher levels of funding available to wealthier districts. In effect adequacy is used to improve the quality of education for poor districts without requiring they be made fully equal to wealthy districts (Briffault, 2007). In effect, equity minus decisions enable state legislatures to increase spending for the bottom tier of district, to level spending for the middle and upper middle tier, but to avoid “leveling down” the resources available to the districts’ wealthiest tier. Adequacy as equity minus “is more modest than full equity, costs less, and makes space for a significant continuing local financing role” (Briffault, 2007, p. 38). States whose school finance decision fall into this category include New Jersey, Texas, Ohio, South Carolina, and Kansas.

Adequacy as *equity plus* decisions emerged only after the *Rose* and *Abbott* decisions were known. Adequacy as equity plus decision incorporates three strands of thinking to address problems inherent in equity theory (Briffault, 2007). First, adequacy as equity plus acknowledges the need for effective school finance plans to provide additional funding for specific groups of schoolchildren so they may receive a genuinely adequate education. Second, such decisions frequently require legislatures provide more money for education statewide, not limited to improved funding for poorer school districts. Finally, adequacy as equity plus goes beyond financing. These decisions require state legislatures to specify the components of a constitutionally adequate education, to determine appropriate inputs, including curriculum, staffing, facilities, and instructional materials needed, and to monitor more effectively local school districts to ensure they are delivering the specified level of education (Briffault, 2007). Adequacy as

equity plus “reflects a maturation of the equity idea from one of simple equalization of interdistrict tax-base or per-pupil spending to a more sophisticated understanding of the additional resources...that may be necessary in order...actually [to] equalize educational opportunities” (Briffault, 2007, p. 43). These cases combine equity and adequacy rather than rely on adequacy alone to craft a more complete scheme of state school finance.

Conclusion

Adequacy theory has dominated the debate over state school finance provisions for an extended period of time. Adequacy challenges, based on the language of state constitutions’ education clauses, have occurred in almost every state, with varying results (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). Yet, as I argue, adequacy theory is beset with several flaws, including difficulties in defining what a constitutionally adequate education actually is, problems in estimating the cost of an adequate educational program, and a de-emphasis on issues of equity and promotion of equal educational opportunity. As a stand-alone basis for challenging state school finance schemes, adequacy has serious shortcomings, but courts have been creatively and effectively blurring the lines between equity and adequacy. The most comprehensive of remedies devised for flawed state school finance reform are decisions which combine a clear definition of adequacy with a broadly interpreted version of equity that Briffault (2007) calls “adequacy as equity plus.” These decisions combine a clearer state definition of adequacy, a partial equalization of financing for poorer schools and school districts, and a genuine concern for the needs of disadvantaged school children. This trend will only strengthen as states struggle to deal with the educational needs of a rapidly changing world.

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Vietnam's War-Memorial Museums: Diverse Narratives and Multiple Histories Searching for Identity

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Nearly four decades since the American-Vietnam War (1956–1975)¹ ended and North and South Vietnam united politically, no common, nationalist, victory narrative appears across Vietnam's war memorials and museums. Instead, Vietnam's war memorials and museums present divergent narratives of the historical events, places, and people (including warriors, victims, witnesses, and leaders) they have commemorated in common. The educational and political agendas accompanying the narratives vary widely comprising the truths or lies they advance, the memories they highlight, and the values they promote.

In this article, I analyze the narratives of four prominent *war-memorial-museum* sites in Vietnam through the lens of Hayden White's metahistory model² juxtaposing the stories the museums tell with visitors' comments on social media to illuminate divergent cultural identities and pedagogical aspirations across these four, Vietnamese, cultural institutions. To inform my analysis, I couple Stuart Hall's³ theory of knowledge construction and representation with Foucault's⁴ theory of institutions' power-knowledge tension. After identifying the four, war-memorial-museum sites I analyze, I define and explain White's⁵ concept of metahistory and apply his employment types to characterize memorials' and museums' narratives as literary typologies. I then briefly explain Hall's⁶ particular approach to knowledge construction and representation and Foucault's concept of institutional power-knowledge tension. With this multi-layered theoretical foundation in place, I define and explain museums, memorials, and war-memorial museums particularly drawing upon scholarship examining such institutions' narrative meanings and values, for this scholarship complements White's⁷ and Hall's⁸ theories. I then analyze four, war-memorial-museums' narratives in juxtaposition to blogs from various visitor, social-media sites through the lens of White's metahistory. Ultimately, I gain insight into and draw conclusions about the war-memorial-museums' roles in shaping Vietnamese citizens' cultural memories of their war experiences, in defining national or global

identities, in making historical meanings, and in promoting political and educational agendas.

While recognizing my limitations as a short-term, foreign visitor to Vietnam, one with biases of a former anti-war advocate and draft-age, Asian-American, conscientious objector, I analyze these Vietnamese, war-memorial museums, study their narratives, and thereby uncover the cultural-historical identities each narrative advances and illustrates and the pedagogical or moral missions emerging from each narrative. Following, I list the four museums I analyze indicating each museum's location and declared purpose.

1. *The Ho Chi Minh Museum* in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, is a tribute to the most revered and honored leader in Vietnam's history.
2. *The Củ Chi Tunnels War Memorial Park*, located outside Ho Chi Minh City proper, part of a 75-mile-long (121 km) complex of connecting underground tunnels, now provides visitors with a taste of how the Viet Cong heroically lived and fought U.S. soldiers through these tunnels.⁹
3. *The War Remnants Museum*, a large, Vietnamese, government-operated museum in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), the former capital of South Vietnam, primarily documents atrocities U.S. and South Vietnamese militaries committed and challenges the legality of the U.S. involvement in the war.
4. *The Sơn Mỹ Memorial*, on the grounds of the 1968 Mỹ Lai Massacre where U.S. Army soldiers brutally killed an estimated 347–508 unarmed villagers.¹⁰

Hayden White's Metahistory Analysis

In *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-Century Europe*, Hayden White presents history as imaginative construction historians build using the raw materials—facts, chronicles, annals, events, and other artifacts—at their disposal.¹¹ Proposing a metahistory model,¹² White defines an historical account as “a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of *explaining what they were by representing them*.”¹³

White's argument for the metahistory model is based on several interpretive principles: 1) any historical work contains “a deep structural content which is generally poetic, and specifically linguistic, in nature, and which serves as the precritically accepted paradigm of what a distinctively ‘historical’ explanation should be”;¹⁴ 2) this metahistorical

understructure is composed of three kinds of strategies historians use “to gain different kinds of ‘explanatory affect.’ [White calls] these different strategies explanation by formal argument, explanation by emplotment, and explanation by ideological implication”;¹⁵ 3) for explanations by emplotment, western historians consciously or subconsciously choose from among four, western, literary-genre archetypes—Romance, Comedy, Satire, and Tragedy—to explain or represent their data;¹⁶ 4) “there are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can legitimately claim an authority for any one of the modes over others as being more ‘realistic’”;¹⁷ 5) therefore, the best grounds for choosing among contending interpretive strategies or “for choosing one perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological”;¹⁸ and 6) this choice historians make “represents only the statement of a preference for a specific modality of historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established.”¹⁹

Whether in the form of a textbook, biography, novel, or movie, the historical account results from the historian’s and author’s organizing a chronicle of events into a coherent story or plot which then becomes history when the historian makes it conform to his or her individual preferences thereby making it meaningful *as history*.²⁰ This conforming means choosing, consciously or subconsciously, an emplotment or literary genre—Romance, Comedy, Satire, Tragedy—through which to frame the history telling; selecting a mode of argument or means of explaining the narrative; and choosing an ideology through which to establish point of view.²¹ White explains:

Narrative accounts of real historical events, then, admit as many equally plausible versions of their representation as there are plot structures available in a given culture for endowing stories, whether fictional or real, with meanings.... The demonstration that a given set of events can be represented as a comedy implicitly argues for the possibility of representing it with equal plausibility as a tragedy, romance, farce, epic, and so on.²²

In this analysis, I focus primarily on analyzing the four museums through the four kinds of emplotments—literary genres or archetypes—into which historical narratives fall (Romance, Satire, Comedy, and Tragedy²³) with some attention to the ideologies the museums’ designers and curators project through the emplotments they consciously or subconsciously select. White defines the four emplotments in his metahistory as follows:

The Romance is fundamentally a drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero’s transcendence of the world of

experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it.... The archetypal theme of Satire is the precise opposite of this Romantic drama of redemption; it is, in fact a drama of diremption, a drama dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master, and by the recognition that...human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the dark forces of death, which is man's unrelenting enemy.²⁴

In Comedy, hope is held out for the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional *reconciliations* of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds.... In Tragedy, there are no festive occasions, except false or illusory ones; rather there are intimations of states of division among men more terrible than that which incited the tragic agon at the beginning of the drama.²⁵

The four-genres model provides investigators a form through which to describe the ways in which historians and, in the case of this study, museum designers work to distill a judgment, "truth," or value imperative from the chronicle of events and the plot the chronicle weaves.²⁶

Hall's Knowledge Construction Meets Foucault's Power-Knowledge Tension

I draw my assumptions in this inquiry from cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall's²⁷ theory of knowledge construction and representation. Hall extends knowledge-construction beyond theorizing that the natural and social world is a matter of human and social meaning making²⁸ to explain that the constructionist researcher "recognizes [the] public, social character of language...acknowledges that neither things in themselves nor the individual users of language can fix meaning in language. Things don't *mean*: *we construct* meaning, using representational systems—concepts and signs."²⁹ In turn, these constructed knowledges and truths relate to the exercise of power, to Foucault's³⁰ proposition that knowledge, truth, and power are linked. Hence, the relation among constructed knowledges, truths, and power explains how museum designers and curators use the sites' exhibits and presentations to promote the knowledge and truths they have constructed from the historical data and artifacts to which they have access.

I apply Hall's³¹ theory of constructivist meaning-making and knowledge-production in conjunction with Foucault's³² knowledge-power tension to three context groups in my analysis: (1) to the museum designers and curators, (2) to the museum audiences, and (3) to me as researcher making and analyzing these observations and here reporting

my results. In the first context group, the museum designers and curators have construed and derived *their* knowledge, meaning, and truths from their experiences, expertise, and informed or uninformed biases. They exert influence—exercise power—by using the historical data and artifacts comprising the sites' exhibits, participatory events, and other presentations to advance their individually constructed knowledges and meanings as truths they want the public to accept and embrace. Per Foucault's knowledge-power argument,³³ the discourse in the sites' presentations carries an authority of truth and the clout to *make itself true* by means of public presentation.³⁴

The museum audiences in turn make meaning out of *their* experiences of shared memories, retold narratives, and reinforced truths or falsehoods they see in the exhibits. By entering the museum and engaging in the exhibits, visitors are participating, consciously or subconsciously, in the museum's initiation of power relationships inherent in the institution's public presentation of knowledge as Foucault asserts: "We should admit...that power produces knowledge...that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge."³⁵ Museum visitors individually choose how open they are in their viewing, listening, and learning the information, meanings, and messages museum designers and curators have presented. The understandings they gain and the meanings they make in accepting, challenging, or revising the museum designers' intended meanings and messages also connect to visitors' personal power in the knowledge-power equation.

Third, the patterns I identify, analyze, and interpret as researcher become *my* constructed knowledge, meanings, and truths. Just as each museum's narrative emerges filtered through the designers' and curators' biases, so my research narrative, this article, emerges as the third context group of constructivist meaning-making and knowledge-production I present. Such personal and cultural biases as my being a short-term, foreign visitor in Vietnam choosing to study these four, war-museum memorials with my still-unforgettable memories of being an anti-war advocate and draft-age, Asian-American, conscientious objector during the American-Vietnam war filter my observations, interpretations, and, as a result, my knowledge construction, meaning-making, and truth derivation. As investigator-researcher, I *construct* the patterns I observe, the themes I identify, and the conclusions I draw and then present them in this article and journal. Similar to designers and curators, I present *my* truths wanting readers to accept and embrace them. I am aware I exercise power over readers by virtue of the legitimacy (which is also

constructed and open to challenge) I project through my Asian-American heritage, my anti-war advocacy, my physical presence at the museums, my analysis of visitors' blogs, and my status as university professor and scholar publishing in a scholarly journal. That is, the very biases that filter my knowledge construction and meaning-making help legitimize for readers my research narrative.

Others cannot objectively verify the knowledges and meanings museum designers and curators, audiences, and researchers construct and make respectively as truths since they all construct their own knowledge, make their own meanings, and derive their own truths—just as readers here do—based upon their backgrounds and how they perceive and interpret the events and facts to which they have access.³⁶ As a result of their knowledge construction, meaning-making, and truth derivation, museum designers and curators, audiences, and researchers exercise power, albeit differently: “there is no...knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations.”³⁷

Museums, Memorials, and War-Memorial Museums

In the 19th century, museums shifted from private “cabinets of curiosity”³⁸ showcasing their owners' wealth and experiences to public purveyors of the national history, culture, and values. The museum as public purveyor, particularly one that focuses on the history and memory of past events, places, or people, is, then, an institution that conserves and exhibits a collection of culturally or historically important artifacts.³⁹ Communication studies and social thought scholar Miranda J. Brady applies Foucault's concept, *heterotopia*,⁴⁰ to characterize museums as places that reflect, distort, and influence reality.⁴¹ Brady argues that in museums' attempts to represent reality, they tend to reflect the mainstream, historical narratives at the time of their creation.⁴² Sociologist Myriam Sepúlveda dos Santos⁴³ moves beyond narrative to representation: museums “have been described as powerful social elements in the building of national symbols.”⁴⁴ French cultural history scholar Daniel J. Sherman⁴⁵ combines Brady's notion of narrative with Santos' idea of representation postulating “the museum's founding fiction, [*is*] that an arrangement of heterogeneous objects can constitute a logically consistent representation of the world.”⁴⁶ Infused with meaning, the museums' objects and artifacts weave a plot that claims legitimacy as historical truth positing “this production of memory as history seeks not to annihilate memory but to transform it, to produce in visitors a new and different set of memories as a basis for a collective identity.”⁴⁷ Sherman views visitors' *own* memories of the museum as henceforth connecting them to the collective identity the museum exhibits and narratives offer.⁴⁸

In the 20th century, museums' role again shifted, this time to converge with that of memorials and historical monuments. Designers now construct museums and memorials to define and promote collective and individual memory, identity, and practices.⁴⁹ This converging of museums' and memorials' roles supports Sherman's contention that the visitors' own memories of the museum connect them to the collective identity the museum exhibits and narratives promote.⁵⁰

In *Memorial Museums: The Gold Rush to Commemorate Atrocities*,⁵¹ museum studies scholar Paul Williams suggests a different means of establishing collective identity, defining the *memorial museum* as "a specific kind of museum dedicated to a historic event commemorating mass suffering of some kind."⁵² If one considers war to be a form of "mass suffering," then one might apply Williams' definition of *memorial museum* to the four institutions I examine in this study. Hence, the Vietnam war-memorial museums I analyze in this article are examples of cultural institutions that sociologist Lorena Rivera-Orraca describes as seeking to play a "central role in the construction of a coherent historical national discourse that reinforces a sense of collective identity and social cohesion through common understandings of order, aesthetics, and symbols."⁵³ Although the four war-memorial-museum sites may each be in a position to create a common, collective, Vietnamese national identity emerging from the war experience, there is yet to be consensus for a singular or unified national identity narrative. In turn, I examine each of the four museums in light of the scholarship I have summarized from Brady, Santos, Sherman, Williams, and Rivera-Orraca to demonstrate how they illustrate and thereby support these scholars' hypotheses.

The *Ho Chi Minh Museum* exemplifies Santos' assertion that museums are "powerful social elements in the building of national symbols."⁵⁴ The Ho Chi Minh Museum achieves this national symbol building through its primary function as an extended tribute to Vietnam's revered leader, Ho Chi Minh. Museum visitors observe the museum's elevating Ho Chi Minh into a national symbol; Foucault's claim museums reflect, distort, and influence reality;⁵⁵ and Sherman's notion museums weave plots that claim to be historical truths⁵⁶ as evidenced by visitors who describe the museum as "a propaganda tool of the Vietnamese communist regime, used to whitewash both the Communist Party and Ho Chi Minh's legacy and historical image."⁵⁷ This idealized memory assembled in the museum of Ho's persona spins a specific meaning for contemporary visitors: this museum's surprising, sometimes unexpected, and occasionally creative exhibits⁵⁸ suggest an

allegory depicting President Ho loathing the widespread corruption and totalitarian tendencies in the current Communist national and local governments.⁵⁹

The *Củ Chi Tunnels War Memorial Park* also illustrates national symbol making—not of an individual, but of the memories associated with the Củ Chi Tunnels. By providing visitors with narratives of how the Viet Cong heroically lived and fought the U.S. military through these tunnels, the park’s designers created the memorial park as a symbol of heroism, glory, and victory.⁶⁰ The portions of the tunnel complex preserved for visitors to crawl through as part of their park experience illustrate Sherman’s thesis that these experiences “produce in visitors a new and different set of memories as a basis for a collective identity.”⁶¹ It exemplifies Williams’ suggestion *memorial museums* serve to build a collective identity from commemorating mass suffering.⁶² As the blogs’ text I examine in the next section indicate, the Viet Cong’s courage and determination impress some visitors who then accept this collective national identity the park designers advance. Other visitors, including some local Vietnamese and some international visitors, question or reject the park’s moral imperatives to join the collective identity and embrace the values of patriotism, heroism, courage, and defiant determinism.

In contrast to the glorified, warrior-as-hero, nationalist ideals the Củ Chi Tunnels advance, the *War Remnants Museum* primarily documents examples of atrocities the U.S. military and their allies committed and challenges the legality of U.S. involvement in the war. The museum recounts the story of a collective, Vietnamese citizenry a brutal, vicious, immoral, and inhumane enemy invaded and the international community betrayed. This identity narrative aligns with Foucault’s observation that museums reflect, distort, and influence reality,⁶³ with Brady’s view that museums reflect the historical narratives at the time of their creation,⁶⁴ and with Rivera-Orraca’s contention that museum designers try to construct “a coherent historical national discourse that reinforces a sense of collective identity and social cohesion.”⁶⁵ The argument is: although the U.S. violated international laws, treaties, and policies, the global community and the international justice system neither stopped this bully nation nor prosecuted it for committing such war crimes as using illegal chemical weapons—napalm, Agent Orange, and white phosphorus bombs, for example—among other war-time atrocities.⁶⁶ One sees the museum’s preserving the history of mass suffering (Williams) both through its documenting of war crimes and other atrocities and through its plea for visitors to recognize the on-going, Vietnamese anguish stemming from the international community’s betrayal. The War Remnants Museum appears to shape a collective

memory of the international justice and security systems' failure to uphold and enforce internationally agreed-upon legal, ethical, and humanitarian principles. Anthropologist Christina Schwenkel concludes: "The War Remnants Museum...demonstrates how museal institutions and the historical truths they produce are entangled in webs of global interdependencies and uneven relations of power that affect and shape the representation of knowledge and memory."⁶⁷ Hence, from within this context, the museum projects an agonistic national identity: the Vietnamese citizenry remains uncertain about its nation's sovereignty and membership in the international community.

Finally, the *Sơn Mỹ Memorial*, on the grounds of the 1968 Mỹ Lai Massacre, stands as witness and reminder of U.S. Army soldiers' killing over 500 villagers, slaughtering their livestock, and torching their homes and other buildings in the hamlet.⁶⁸ Instead of elevating a leader or a memorial park into a national symbol, this memorial's designers built the memorial to transcend nationalistic interests: it symbolizes human solidarity, remembrance, peace, and reconciliation—all transnational values—spinning a transnational identity narrative memorializing the villagers' suffering, healing, and reconciliation. The memorial evokes emotional responses that move visitors to reflect upon the madness that occurred perhaps inspiring them to search for paths toward healing, reconciliation, and solidarity with the Mỹ Lai victims. As a result, the Sơn Mỹ Memorial exemplifies both Williams' assertion that memorial museums function to build collective identity by memorializing a historic event involving mass suffering⁶⁹ and Sherman's notion that "this production of memory as history seeks...to transform it, to produce in visitors a new and different set of memories as a basis for a collective identity."⁷⁰

Metahistorical Analysis: Visitor Blogs and Memorial-Museum Narratives

I examine postings on travel blogs and social networks⁷¹ to discern how visitors experience the memorials and museums; which messages and meanings visitors perceive; and what they think and feel about them. These visitor comments help to confirm or disconfirm patterns that emerged through analysis and kind of emplotment typology that the designers and curators chose, how the visitors read their narratives, and then the emplotment visitors' comments reveal. Such social media as *TripAdvisor* and *Blogger* are platforms where visitors share experiences, reflections, and interpretations of the museums. By doing so, the visitors accept, reinforce, or challenge the designers' and curators' intended messages and agendas narrated through the museum.

Examining the narratives the four museums tell through the lens of White's⁷² metahistory-model reveals the following emplotments for the four museums I analyze.

Romance and Comedy: The Ho Chi Minh Museum

The Ho Chi Minh Museum illustrates White's Romantic and Comedic emplotment typologies exemplifying White's contention that "a given historical account is likely to contain stories cast in one mode, as aspects or phases of the whole set of stories emplotted in another mode."⁷³ The Ho Chi Minh Museum's apparent aim to have viewers honor and revere President Ho Chi Minh as hero and icon fits White's definition of *Romance* "as a drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero's transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it."⁷⁴ Here, the drama depicts President Ho's thinking and vision through modernist, art-gallery-style exhibits and traditional photo and story posters. The museum's designers and curators arrange the artifacts to highlight the "drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice, of light over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world."⁷⁵ Visitors reviewing the Ho Chi Minh Museum on *TripAdvisor.com* reveal an ambiance of honor and reverence from locals juxtaposed against ambiguity from international visitors. The following post gives a critical, tongue-in-cheek description:

The first floor is a collection of photos of HCM in various places staring at things or chatting with Russians. Overall, it's pretty dull. The 3rd floor is the most interesting. It's full of post-modern weird exhibits including a walk around HCM's brain, metal displays that wouldn't look out of place in Superman 2, partial recreations of Picasso's work and a Cadillac driving through a wall.... There are English explanations for most things, so you don't need a guide. Just a sense of humour.⁷⁶

Another visitor says the museum:

...appears to be wholly dedicated to the adulation of Uncle Ho and his achievements, whilst taking a swipe at capitalism.... Have your photo taken beside a large painting of Uncle Ho. There's a real mix of wry humour and confronting historical concepts.⁷⁷

The Ho Chi Minh Museum as *Comedy*—"the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional *reconciliations* of the forces at play"⁷⁸—especially emerges in the playfulness and lightness bloggers observe. One calls the museum "weird and wonderful; serious and silly."⁷⁹ Their reading the museum's narrative as Comedy contrasts with

those visitors reading the narrative as Romance. Examining this museum's visitor responses in the blogs and briefly in the museum itself, I observe visitors reading the Ho Chi Minh Museum as either Romance or Comedy to be determined individually rather than determined according to a cultural pattern.

Although the Ho Chi Minh Museum primarily serves to reinforce the nation's collective adoration of its hero, the non-stereotyped exhibits and unexpected presentations draw visitors' attention to President Ho's multidimensional persona and perhaps a more nuanced agenda: the art-deco juxtapositions or the "unexpected wacky postmodern installations,"⁸⁰ the tongue-in-cheek playfulness, and the subtle, ironic subtext criticizing the current government apparently invite open discussion and even debate about President Ho's Chi Minh's life and legacy.

Romance: The Cu Chi Tunnels War Memorial Park

Similar to the Ho Chi Minh Museum's narrative, The Cù Chi Tunnels War Memorial Park uses *Romance* as its storytelling genre; Viet Cong soldiers are the heroes and heroines. Imploring viewers to remember and emulate the Viet Cong's courage and perseverance, the museum calls today's Vietnamese youth to rally, again to be ready to fight the "evil Americans" or any foreign invader. Viet Cong soldiers used the tunnels as hiding spots, supply routes, food and weapon caches, and living quarters. The tunnel systems helped the Viet Cong achieve ultimate military success against U.S. forces.⁸¹

The Vietnam government has turned the tunnels of Cù Chi into a war-memorial park lauding the soldiers'—including children and adolescent soldiers—patriotism, heroism, courage, and defiant determination. According to the site's orientation film, one, girl soldier, "lost her parents to a cowardly attack from the air by the Americans, but she came back with a strong hatred and fought valiantly and killed many Americans in return."⁸² The rebuilt jungle area is designed like an amusement park so visitors may crawl through the narrow tunnels, gawk at instruments of torture, walk among life-sized, Viet Cong, warrior models dressed in fallen, U.S.-troops' GI gear, and fire actual rounds from an M-16 rifle or AK-47 machine gun. Blog accounts corroborate the memorial's effectively stimulating visitors' imaginations by creating thrilling simulations of Viet Cong warriors' experiences:

Tourists are encouraged to try crawling through the tunnel for about 200 meters only. I tried and am proud I made it! After experiencing the crawl through the dark, dingy tunnel, you just can't imagine how these Vietcongs survive in this guerrilla

warfare! I salute their determination and perseverance! ... After this visit to the Củ Chi Tunnel I can understand the hardship these guerrillas had to endure during the war and their profound aspiration for independence and the love for their country. Hail the Vietcong!⁸³

The shooting range is also a popular attraction:

...we had several options of weapons to choose from: M 16 rifle, M 60 machine gun, carbine, K 59, etc. I already had my heart set on the AK-47, and paid roughly \$17 USD for the opportunity to shoot off just 10 rounds. All the guns were harnessed in place, which was an extreme disappointment. I envisioned shooting freely at my target all proper and tough, which isn't really how it turned out. I still ended up properly bruised afterwards, so it was well worth it.⁸⁴

These accounts resonate with the park's agenda to promote the Vietnamese as strong, determined, and loyal warriors. Bloggers express excitement about being close to the deadly weapons and the thrill of firing them. However, other visitors recognize that this is the park's particular agenda, and they object to its artificiality. For example:

What a total waste of a full day. Very anti-american and very fake. Not sure this was a disney created place just to show how a few soldiers killed lots of americans and how proud they are about it. Don't do this one.⁸⁵

Others object to the glorification of brutality:

Well, the Americans may be blamed for their Vietnam War but the Vietnamese (who tried to defend their country) were not sweethearts themselves.... When you see and get demonstrated what possible booby traps they had for their invaders, you can't believe your eyes.... Moreover, our Vietnamese guide still has pretty lights in his eyes when he describes what the boobytraps did with the bodies of the Americans.⁸⁶

Satire: The War Remnants Museum

In contrast to the warrior ideals advanced at the Củ Chi Tunnels Memorial Park, the War Remnants Museum appeals to the primacy of international law and justice narrating how international law and world opinion reveal US policies' illegality and immorality, giving many examples of U.S.-committed war crimes and atrocities. Named the Exhibition House for Crimes of War and Aggression before the normalization of relations with the U.S. in 1995,⁸⁷ this museum demonstrates a *Satiric* emplotment because no redemption exists in this war story: one could not overcome "the dark force of death, which is

man's unremitting enemy."⁸⁸ Depressing and pessimistic in viewpoint, the museum communicates that even international law and world opinion could not stop the U.S. from their illegal and immoral actions. Continuing to document examples of U.S. and South Vietnamese atrocities and to challenge the legality of U.S. involvement in the war means, to some observers, the museum is thick in distorted information and propaganda:

Many exhibits in the museum contain a heavy dose of anti-American propaganda. Even simple displays of U.S. weapons used during the Vietnam War are displayed against backdrops of displaced villagers and civilian victims. Quotes from leaders and historic photographs are commonly used out of their original context. Exhibits not openly portraying anti-American sentiment tend to showcase the overwhelming U.S. firepower used against the Vietnamese during their "Resistance War".... Although the exhibits are blatantly one-sided and need to be taken with a grain of salt, they do graphically portray the horrors of war.⁸⁹

Many visitors specifically focus on these horrors of war, as did the blogger in the post below, "speechless, but worth going!"⁹⁰:

We were taken by our guide Tony, to visit this museum which gives you an idea of the Vietnam War. The graphic visuals were truly mind-boggling, and would leave you stunned about the bitter truth that happened during the war. The moving part for me was about learning the after effects of "Agent Orange" that were used during the war! Terrible and the people are suffering to date as a result. You have to visit this museum or your trip to HCMC is not complete. I'd advise that it's not for young children or the faint-hearted as the graphic visuals may be disturbing to some. My heart goes out to the Vietnamese people as they have been through a lot.⁹¹

The War Remnants Museum narrates the story of the U.S. government's illegally supporting the illegitimate, South Vietnamese government and its full responsibility for the horrors and war crimes documented in the museum. While most war museums base the victor's rightfulness in their claim to national sovereignty, the War Remnants Museum boasts international consensus, the world press, international law, and even the protest movement in the U.S. to substantiate its "historical truths." In this Satire the victory is bittersweet and hollow because the museum tells the failures of international law and justice: this history told through Satire portends a hopeless future for humanity in a world where internationally, agreed-upon laws, treaties, and policies

as well as overwhelming world opinion cannot prevent or sanction a bully nation from wrongfully attacking and committing war crimes on another.

Tragedy: The Son My Memorial

Exhibits at the Søn Mÿ Memorial ask viewers to bear the massacre that transpired in Mÿ Lai and several other hamlets in the Søn Mÿ village. The memorial inspires viewers to endeavor never to allow such horrors to happen again. It seems to ask visitors to reflect upon how one might prevent future massacres and other senseless violence. The Søn Mÿ Memorial's genre is *Tragedy*, for "there are no festive occasions.... Still, the fall of the protagonist and the shaking of the world he inhabits...are not regarded as totally threatening to those who survive the agonic test."⁹² Hope rises, and one glimpses redemption when the sanctity of the place moves the visitor. The museum, built on the grounds of a preserved section of hamlet, documents the event and worldwide press coverage following the revelation of the incident. Tour guides who recount the event are themselves relatives of victims and survivors.

Visitors to the Søn Mÿ Memorial are moved to reflect on the madness that occurred and may be inspired to search for paths toward healing, reconciliation, and solidarity with the victims. Writes one visitor:

I was only seven years old when the My Lai massacre occurred, but I still remember seeing disturbing photos of it in *Life* magazine. Now I was standing at the irrigation ditch where over one hundred of the bodies were found. My Lai is an emotionally tough place for anyone to visit.... Standing there I tried to contemplate the madness that occurred on this peaceful spot. Roosters crowed in the distance and the pungent smell of burning brush wafted over the village. It was an ordinary day, just like the one when the massacre occurred. Then I looked down and noticed hundreds of bare footprints along the path, many of them the tiny footprints of young children. They were interspersed randomly with imprints of army boots.⁹³

Another blogger describes his emotional response and his reflections upon what he resolves to do with the meaning he has made from his experiences:⁹⁴

One thing that struck me...was my emotional response, particularly at My Lai...one cannot help but to feel the spirit of the place—*hallowed ground*.... We can still hear the voices of the dead begging us to hear their suffering and remember so that war can be avoided in the future. There is so much suffering in

war, and particularly in this war on all sides—one cannot help but be affected and affected to say “never again.”⁹⁵

Discussion and Implications

Rather than a single story, the four, Vietnamese, war-memorial museums in this study project diverse narratives about events they describe in common. This diversity spawns divergent “truths,” conflicting lessons, and different value priorities wherein every museum appears to teach its own lessons, preach its own sermons, and sing its own national anthems. These observations support the view that history is not singular; multiple histories exist. To highlight these diverse, pluralistic, history narratives at a glance, I summarize my analysis of the four, war-memorial museums through the lens of White’s metahistory below table form. I include the metahistory employment type, the identity the museum seems to project, and the pedagogical or moral mission(s) the museum advances.

War Memorial Museums	Metahistory Emplotments	Identities Projected	Pedagogical/ Moral Missions
Ho Chi Minh Museum	Romance and Comedy	The museum projects the <i>united Vietnamese national identity</i> —North and South Vietnam politically, economically, linguistically, and culturally unified—that Ho Chi Minh worked toward throughout his life and work and that he exemplified in his nation-building efforts and labor to improve all Vietnamese citizens’ quality of life.	The museum aims to inspire and educate local and international visitors about President Ho Chi Minh’s multifaceted personality, intellect, leadership, and charisma. Its exhibits include playful juxtapositions and ironic allegories condemning Vietnam’s current local and national governments.
Củ Chi Tunnels Memorial Park	Romance	The memorial park projects a <i>valiant warrior identity</i> . It implores visitors to emulate the young Viet Cong soldiers’ heroism, patriotism, and defiant determination and to be prepared to fight courageously against another foreign invader.	The memorial park aims “to ‘move visitors’ and ‘stir their pride,’ as well as educate the youth and enhance their understanding of Vietnam’s ‘tradition of revolution’” ⁹⁶

War Memorial Museums	Metahistory Emplotments	Identities Projected	Pedagogical/ Moral Missions
The War Remnants Museum	Satire	The museum projects an <i>agonistic identity</i> : the international community betrayed and disenfranchised the Vietnamese people by failing to stop, to prosecute, and therefore to ensure international justice when the bully U.S. nation illegally invaded and committed inhumane, illegal, and immoral actions—war crimes and other atrocities—against the Vietnamese. ⁹⁷	The museum aims to instill in visitors distrust and skepticism concerning the global community’s willingness and ability to enforce agreed-upon laws and protections in war.
The Sơn Mỹ Memorial	Tragedy	The memorial projects a <i>global-citizen identity</i> : Vietnamese and international visitors alike join in solidarity with Sơn Mỹ’s dead, survivors, and perpetrators by reflecting upon which aspects in human nature moved leaders and foot soldiers to massacre civilians and by taking responsibility to ensure massacres and other senseless violence never repeat themselves.	The memorial aims for visitors to learn about, to mourn, and to reflect upon the horrific 1968 Mỹ Lai Massacre. It aims to recruit and unite visitors into a global citizenry resolving to prevent massacres and other senseless violence in the future so they happen <i>never again</i> .

Metahistory analysis provides a model for understanding the museums’ modes of emplotment, ideology, and argument/explanation thereby revealing the identities designers and curators project for the Vietnam nation and Vietnamese people, their pedagogical agendas, and moral missions. Visitors to these four, Vietnam, war-memorial museums (or other institutions) are free to accept, challenge, or revise the meanings and “truths” museum designers project through the museum’s displays and presentations. When visitors share their observations,

interpretations, and reflections on social media or in other fora, they not only validate or challenge the knowledge and “truths” the museum designers set forth, they cast their knowledge and truths upon fellow bloggers and others who read their postings; they actively participate in living history-making, knowledge-building, and cultural meaning-making conversations in and for the community.

To write Vietnam’s museum narratives as Romance, Satire, Comedy, or Tragedy is to accept these forms as universal enough to be credible, valid, and meaningful when applied to the non-European, 20th-century accounts emerging from Vietnam’s war-memorial museums. Similar to the three levels of knowledge construction I outline in connection to Hall’s and Foucault’s theories, using White’s theory of metahistory, I show the interplay of three, history-writing contexts: the museums’ designers and curators write history choosing an emplotment to frame their narratives (whether they are consciously aware they are choosing or not); the visitors, though having fewer raw materials than the museums’ designers and curators from which to draw their narratives, also write history choosing an emplotment (again, whether consciously aware they are choosing or not); investigator-researchers in their turn write history using the raw materials displayed at the museum and visitors’ stories to write still another history. Thus, it is possible for individuals at each level (the museum designer, the museum visitor, and the researcher-investigator) to describe a single war experience through different literary emplotments with each scripting a narrative that conforms to their individual aesthetic or moral preferences and with no one emplotment choice more epistemologically verifiable than the others. Together they make a new narrative, potentially a new history, a new interpretation of the events chronicled subject to biases and selective data inclusion and exclusion just as the museum designers and curators imposed their individual biases on the data as they selected what to include in and exclude from each museum’s repertoire. This process affirms museology’s and historiography’s currently embracing pluralistic, historical explanations.

By observing the exhibits and reading visitors’ comments, one can perceive the identities each site projects, its particular value priorities, and its pedagogical and/or moral missions. The “truth claims” carry validity, credibility, and veracity if the audience assumes or consciously accepts the legitimacy of the artifacts (e.g. photographs, weapons, diaries), the “historical facts,” and other data included in each museum’s presentation and narrative. By identifying, naming, and describing the chronicle of events; by uncovering and listening to the narratives, plots, and stories the sites and visitors tell; and by discovering the underlying

biases, assumptions, constructed meanings, and educational and power-motivated agendas each site projects, one not only constructs his or her own knowledge, history, and “truths” but comes to understand the knowledge-construction and history-making processes, the meaning and value of these sites’ narrative powers, and the meaning and value of each individual’s history-writing and history-making potential.

Acknowledgments

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Endnotes

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- 9 Tom Mangold and John Penycate, *The Tunnels of Củ Chi* (London: Orion, 1985), 267–268.
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- ¹⁸ Ibid.
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- ²⁰ Ibid., 5–7.
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- ²³ White consistently capitalizes the four literary genres or employments in his book, *Metahistory*, though not in his article, “Historical Pluralism.” I have chosen to capitalize the four employments throughout this manuscript as he does in his book.
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- ⁵¹ Paul Williams, *Memorial Museums: the Gold Rush to Commemorate Atrocities* (New York: Berg Publisher, 2007).
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 8.
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- ⁵⁹ I confirmed this observation with a local historian and senior tour guide, Ky, who worked for the Communist regime as a prison guard in Hanoi during the American-Vietnam War. After visiting this museum, I asked him, "If Ho Chi Minh were alive today, what would

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Worldview Understandings and Teacher Authenticity

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Introduction

“I think I may say, that of all men we meet with, nine parts out of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education. ’Tis that which makes the great difference in mankind” (Locke, 1968, p. 112). It may well be that John Locke, the philosopher, writing so long ago, overstated a premise. It may also be that—when the word “education” is broadly defined—these words resound as a truthful statement. The process of education does, of course, involve more than schooling. In schools we are educated by teachers, but other methods of educating the human psyche play significant roles in forming individual personalities. For “There are as many different kinds of education as there are different milieux in our society” (Durkheim, 1956, p. 67).

There is a conditioning process that takes place in family settings, in churches, in social groups, in cultural environs, in political arenas, in personal encounters. It happens wherever perceptions about life, living, and the “other” are instilled into a receiving mind, since “An identity is always articulated through concepts and practices made available by religion, society, school, and state; mediated by family, peers, friends” (Appiah, 2007, p. 20). Each individual’s personal philosophy of life—his or her worldview—is, in many ways, the result of subtle—and not-so-subtle—indoctrinations into ways of thinking, doing, and being. Too often we do not understand *why* we are who we are. This happens when we fail intellectually to question the source and the validity of those beliefs that color how we view ourselves, and as we interpret the world in which we live.

Such failure raises moral implications, because “morality resides in the painfulness of indefinite questioning” (de Beauvoir quoted in Arp, 2001, p. 100).¹ Continuous, open-ended questioning is a source of moral reasoning, of personal growth, of personal *becoming*. We understand the intricacies of the moral underpinnings of *who* we are only as we achieve new intellectual awakenings by questioning *what* we believe, and *why*; “Assumptions must be questioned, presumptions must be challenged”

(Berlin, 2001, p. 3). Beliefs must be rethought in light of new knowledge, new understandings, new interpretations based on new experiences because “we form and reform the world in the very act of perceiving it” (May, 1985, p. 137).

A question with moral implications for those who choose to be teachers thus arises, and that is the pedagogically impregnated question, “Who am I?” inherent in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s transcendentalist understanding, “That which we are, we shall teach.” If we accept Emerson’s premise we teach who we are, then self-understanding becomes a moral priority, and self-understanding requires continuous self-interrogation or the questioning of various ideas and concepts that constitute a personal worldview. “The only choice we have is to be consciously aware of our worldviews and criticize them where they need criticizing, or let them work on us unnoticed and acquiesce to living unexamined lives” (Smith, 2001, p. 21). And the unexamined life lacks a solid moral foundation.

Those whose words and actions directly affect the thinking of others have a unique responsibility to understand the *why* of who they are. Therefore, each teacher has a moral obligation periodically to investigate the basic understandings that constitute his or her personal belief system. “Because teachers are defined by their identity and integrity, who they are is dependent upon what they believe” (Eckert, 2011, p. 22). As teachers, we violate a moral imperative if we allow ourselves to lapse into an unthinking, unreflective acceptance of “what is,” in terms of our personal ways of believing, thinking, feeling, doing, and being. This responsibility presupposes we frequently will examine the presuppositions, assumptions, beliefs, prejudices, perceptions, and personal truths that define who we are as teachers and as human beings. “We need to learn to ask questions of ourselves...risky questions and baffling questions, dynamic questions, and then to live within them” (Ayers, 1992, p. 139). As we live within the risky, life-altering questions, we try on answers. Sometimes these answers fit, sometimes they do not. But each effort is a birthing process, the emergence of a new way to face life’s inevitable ambiguities and paradoxes. The teacher who continues a journey of *becoming* finds personal meaning in Erich Fromm’s (1959) statement that “living is a process of continuous birth...man must be active and creative at every moment of birth” (pp. 156–157). It is the birth of new ideas and new ways of interpreting the world that make possible creative revisions of an otherwise unexamined worldview.

Many answers to life’s persistent questions reflect a tacit worldview—an often-unrecognized way of interpreting experiences, ideas, other people, and ourselves. At some point in a teacher education program the future teacher should be challenged to pull back what

covers his or her unexplored tacit beliefs, and ask risky, baffling questions that may reveal unexpected answers. Some worldviews are based primarily on the cerebral, intellectual, and rational. Others find more room for emotion, intuition, and the imagination. Many connect *both* head and heart, reflecting the understanding that, “I must know with my entire self; with my critical mind, but also with my feelings, with my intuitions, with my emotions” (Freire, 1998, p. 30). Whatever the case, the future teacher should have the academic opportunity—and be encouraged—critically to explore his or her personal worldview.

A personal worldview may be liberating or constricting. It can result in pessimism about what is possible for the self, others, and for the world. It can cloud the soul. Or it may reveal vistas of emerging possibility. A worldview is a theory about life—unspoken, often unacknowledged—but nevertheless lived. A worldview may be passive or active. If one’s worldview is passive, then one will tend to rely on *absolutes*—those pronouncements of someone (or some *it*) in authority—to define the parameters of one’s truth. If one’s worldview is active, then he or she questions absolutes; one is open to new experiences, new interpretations and revised meanings of old knowledge. An active worldview allows one to build upon a partial, fragmentary, changing, incomplete view of what *is* and creatively to reflect upon what *should be*. The difference between a passive and an active worldview is found in how “our mind does not gain true freedom by acquiring materials for knowledge and possessing other people’s ideas, but by forming its own standards of judgment and producing its own thoughts” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 71).

Exploring a Personal Worldview: An Academic Experience

I teach the only educational foundations course in a small, midwestern university’s School of Education. A significant priority in the course revolves around helping future teachers reflect upon the moral dimensions of a classroom setting, no matter what the subject matter. And, of course, “morality makes multiple demands. It is multifold and pluralistic, not singular and monistic in conception.... Emphasis is on a form of thinking” (Hamm, 1989, p. 149). The form of our thinking, including the process and the content, is a major determinant in the moral decisions we make. There is a significant reminder that emerges from the Buddhist tradition: “Thoughts become ideas, ideas become action, action becomes character, and character determines destiny. So, think good thoughts.”

The thoughts that are part of our thinking process reflect the foundational planks that support a worldview. And, one’s worldview affects one’s understanding of life. It involves a belief system implicit in

a teacher's political, cultural, religious, and communal commitments. These commitments then, perhaps subconsciously, influence a teacher's way of doing and *being* in the classroom. A worldview often contains hidden and/or unexamined philosophical assumptions reflected in what we say and do; in *who* we are as intellectual and moral models in the classroom. The pedagogical process that defines the course I teach seeks to awaken students to the moral ramifications of a worldview; to the reality that "we teach who we are."

The attainment of personal wide-awakeness is not always an easy achievement. To be wide-awake is to exercise a listening ear that allows the discordant notes of differing views to enter the inner-consciousness. As defined by a student and future teacher, "An awakened mind is not restrained by ideologies and routines, but aroused by what *may be*; is in a perpetual state of expanding the intellectual imagination" (Spexarth, 2010). It is a mind that is alive to alternative possibilities, open to challenges to entrenched ways of thinking; willing—and able—to make modifications and corrections in one's worldview, and in one's life-direction. To be intellectually wide-awake is to possess an active worldview; it is to be willing to expose the self to the thinking condition that philosophers define as *aporia*.² "...truly [to] learn is...continuously [to] expose the conditioned mind to possibilities to be untaught of what has been taught, unravel the paradoxes and ambiguities of life, and give birth to revised understandings and beliefs" (Do, 2011). This learning involves a network of ideas, concepts, beliefs, and personally interpreted truths about life's multifaceted, and often paradoxical, meanings. The interpretations are often tinged by inflexible, ideological truths that exist in a moral vacuum when they go unexamined and unquestioned.

Though we may believe unreservedly in a certain set of truths, there is always the possibility that some other set of truths might be the case.... The moral justification for our actions comes from the tolerance we have shown to other ways of being in the world, other ways of considering the case. (Menand, 2001, p. 440)

It is just such tolerance, a willingness open-mindedly to explore diverse ways of believing, doing, and being that provides a moral compass for the direction of classroom encounters. Even the professional teacher must be alert to the possibility—as rare as it might be—of contracting a case of *aporia*; and making the necessary corrections in a personal worldview. It may be that "all genuine learning begins with unlearning" (Wu, 2009, p. 38).³ To "unlearn" requires a rare kind of risk-taking, intellectual courage. "It is not enough to have the courage of your own convictions, but you must have the courage to have your convictions challenged" (Phillips, 2001, pp. 3–4).

My foundations of education classroom is a place for future teachers to ponder upon the thought, “we teach who we are.” Students are reminded in various ways that *who* they are is not static: if...*if* they have the courage to ask those risky, baffling, morally challenging questions of their personal worldviews. In the words of one student: “Human beings are made up of questions. These questions must be kept alive; they are what keep us moving, creating, wondering” (Kennally, 2010). The process of *becoming* involves questioning. It involves shaping, verifying or changing, evaluating, and fine-tuning a worldview. It is a process replete with moral implications. Moral decisions are imbedded in the various “truth” understandings—personal definitions and interpretations of Truth and truths—interconnected within one’s personal worldview.

Fine-tuning one’s worldview requires removing the “mind-forg’d manacles” (Blake, 1958, p. 52) that keep a person bound rigidly to imposed ways of interpreting his or her world. It requires an evolving awareness—and a critical assessment—of the assumptions and presumptions which are the foundational stones of one’s personal philosophy of life. This involves a growing recognition of the political, religious, cultural, social, and economic influences that have shaped and continue to shape our worldview. “You can only live *your* life when you understand all these influences, and—through understanding them—begin to discover your own way of thinking and living” (Krishnamurti, 1974, pp. 83–84). As one better understands the whys of one’s personal worldview one becomes a more *authentic* person: becomes more sensitive to the views of others, better able to live with the paradox of different but often equally valid answers to significant life-defining questions; better able to identify alternative life possibilities and select from various available options. “One of the prime elements of human uniqueness is the ability to create and exercise new options. The ultimate test of education is whether it makes people comfortable in the presence of options” (Cousins, 1981, p. 17).

The presence of options: This is why my foundations of education classroom focuses on the dialectical. We discuss, converse, dialogue, challenge, and question. We speak, *and* we listen, as co-teachers and co-learners. We share ideas, beliefs, and values based on diverse personal political, social, cultural, and religious assumptions. We learn from each other. “We must come to realize that a variety of meanings and interpretations is what ultimately makes life truthful” (Hightower, 1981, p. 206). We better understand our own interpretations of ideas and issues when they are placed in connection with—and analyzed in counterpoint to—other options, other worldviews. We may come to

agree with a teacher education student that “perfunctory thinking satisfies nothing; half-truths solidify nothing but laziness of mind” (Stop, 2013). The horizon of a personal worldview may be expanded by way of an on-going classroom dialectic in which critical responses and challenging questions are welcomed and incorporated into the learning experience. Even the mysterious may be welcomed into the classroom; with the understanding that “a little mystery in life leads to great explorations” (Foster, 2010).

Students—and teachers—need to understand how their own, lived realities are encased in a worldview. A worldview grows from transmitted traditions, and also from lived experiences. A worldview is a philosophy of life. Therefore, it involves answers to philosophical questions regarding the metaphysical (what is real/true?), the epistemological (how do I know what I know?), and the axiological (how do I define, and achieve the moral and the aesthetic “good”?).

My philosophy of education, which influences my teaching methodology, my relationships with students, and my responses to diverse and contentious educational issues, is an outgrowth of my worldview. And, “a worldview, I have discovered, begins as autobiography” (Ochs, 2009, p. 464). This means I must strive for self-awareness, and I must provide opportunities for my students to ask provocative question of who they are, why they are who they are, and who they have the potential to become. “It is self-discovery that allows us humans to feel and care; to be genuine, and to understand and live-out our system of values and beliefs” (De Vies, 2003). This is why I understand that, as I engage the heads and hearts of students: “...the time has come for doing moral philosophy. This means an examination of the lives we live, an intensified consciousness of the choices we make” (Greene, 1973, p. 219).

Moral Philosophy in the Classroom: Dissecting Worldviews

When I—only half-jokingly—warn students at the beginning of a semester to be ready for the “headache class,” I am preparing the groundwork for doing moral philosophy. I am metaphorically tilling the classroom soil for the growth in individual students of the “intensified consciousness” that begins to understand the reality of a personal worldview: the “why” of personal choice. I hope to “cultivate students’ inner-eyes” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 102). The inner-eye provides a focus for the intensified ability to see deeply into the self, and to ask questions of what is seen. “Our inner-dialogue is priceless, and we only need listen to it” (Hendrix, 2011). I want students to “do” moral philosophy; to scrutinize personal worldviews, and, in the process, become more intensely free, autonomous, and authentic human beings.⁴

To “do” moral philosophy is not easy. It involves asking questions of one’s basic beliefs. It presupposes challenging the assumptions, preconceptions, and truths that define how an individual life is lived. “Moral growth requires an open-mind, and the ability to question, doubt, and re-think established beliefs” (Wood, 2013). Such digging into the self may cause earthquakes in a person’s worldview. But, “it is very important, it seems to me, to have self-knowledge, which means going very deeply into oneself...so that the mind has no deceptions, no illusions” (Krishnamurti, 2004, p. 137). Firmly indoctrinated, illusionary deceptions are difficult to counter, but doing moral philosophy in the classroom opens an academic space in which the fresh air of countervailing ideas are allowed to circulate.

Not all academic settings are designed to provide the free-flowing, dialectical atmosphere in which to challenge students—and the teacher—to do moral philosophy. But the very nature of a foundations of education classroom allows teacher and students to find personal ways to cross the boundaries that separate different ways of viewing the world. “Only fluency across boundaries provides a clear view of the world as it really is, not as seen through the lens of ideologies or dogmas” (Wilson, 1998, pp. 13–14). A boundary-crossing fluency is not easily attained if our view of the world is askew; if “*we all just see the world through this little distorted piece of Coke bottle*” (Melvin & Thompson, 1992). One’s ability to discard the metaphorical coke bottle and cross worldview boundaries may, however, be a capacity gained while engaged in the “doing” of moral philosophy.

This type of vigorous “doing” requires the thoughtful doer to engage the mind in an active, skeptical, questioning process that many writers have defined as critical thinking. It is critical thinking that is imperative for doing moral philosophy, which, in turn, reflects the moral imperative for teachers continually to examine, and, as necessary, revise personal worldviews. “All beliefs, dogmas, doubts, emotions should be critically analyzed, questioned, and then reevaluated and re-questioned continuously” (Bernier & Williams, 1973, p. 13).

Reflecting upon the foundations of education in an academic setting requires intellectually wrestling with controversial political, historical, cultural, philosophical, and even theological aspects of education. It calls for the critical thinking that so characterizes doing moral philosophy. “The critical thinker is an examiner of life, always alert, ready to pay attention, interested in everything, constantly asking ‘Why?’ and taking delight in the process of discovery” (Forni, 2011, p. 8). Of course, discovery is not always a delight. In intellectually and emotionally struggling with the demands of doing moral philosophy, in open-

mindedly examining our personal worldview, we may discover a moral blemish in our personal way of thinking. How we react to this discovery reflects a character trait. “Let him be made to understand that to confess the flaw he discovers in his own argument...is an act of judgment and sincerity.... To change his mind and correct himself, to give up a bad position...are rare, strong and philosophical qualities” (de Montaigne, 2003, p. 139).

It is these morally embedded, rare, philosophical qualities we seek to stimulate in those students preparing to be teachers. It is through personally engaging in the “doing” of moral philosophy in the classroom, through exposing cracks in personal worldviews, that future teachers grow as human beings capable continually of refreshing their moral sensitivity to life’s inevitable conundrums, ambiguities, and paradoxes. As one future teacher writes in a weekly reflection essay:

Teachers should be constantly at battle with their worldviews. A well-qualified teacher is on a continuous journey for answers that she or he may never find. Educators should not only continue to test their beliefs, but challenge their students to do the same. Through this process teachers will change the way they think, which in turn likely alters the way they approach their educational methods.⁵ (Traffas, 2012)

The testing of beliefs by open-mindedly interrogating one’s personal worldview is integral to doing moral philosophy. And this mind-shaking, often mind-*shaping*, activity should be part of every future teacher’s academic experience. The classroom activity of self-inquiry, of evaluating, questioning, and challenging beliefs which define the self, allows an individual “to probe deeper levels of reason and insight with a sense of intellectual adventure” (Schneider, 1996, p. 22). The academic “doing” of moral philosophy is impregnated with intellectual adventure. It is “intellectual” because it is a thinking, reasoning, insight-generating, mentally challenging, belief-questioning process. It is an “adventure” because it is an exploration of previously unexamined intellectual and emotional terrain. It is an enlightening exposure to differing ways of interpreting life experiences. It is an exposure that is “characterized by the release of the individualized viewpoint and the sustaining of multiple and dynamically changing and even contradictory viewpoints at the same time” (Zajonc, 2010, p. 104).

Reflecting upon a personal worldview with open-minded, reflective consideration of other changing and diverse belief systems allows one to engage in a morally imbued, internal dialectic. Such reflection involves “a form of speculation which consists of pouring over an often well-known truth, discovering further horizons to it as well as hitherto

unsuspected connections with other truth” (D’Arcy, 1946, p. 206). A School of Education should provide at least one classroom academic experience where the future teacher is given wide-ranging opportunities intellectually to hear—and, more importantly, “listen to”—opposing worldviews; views often impregnated with cultural, racial, religious, political, and social indoctrination. “When united in a conversation in which understandings and worldviews are shared, we stand a better chance of reducing the limitations and narrowness of our existing worldviews” (McKenzie, 1991, p. 125).

It is through sharing of views that we come to understand “the story of your education is in large part one of self-dialectic” (Wofford, Jr., 1970, p. 66). A dialectic can only take place within the self when two or more contradictory viewpoints are given a hearing.⁶ It is when a self-dialectic has taken place, that personal decisions may be viewed as morally defensible. And, we are reminded “the teacher as a moral agent [is] condemned continually to choose” (Greene, 1973, p. 184). This existential—and ethical—responsibility makes the practice of moral philosophy an important ingredient of a teacher education program. Existentially ethical decisions are those that escape the bounds of unreflective, conditioned conformity to what someone else has defined as fact, or truth, or reality. Such open-minded reflection on life’s realities allowed one future teacher to say: “I no longer see my teaching role as imparting the goals and aspirations that were imparted to me. I see it as a way to enlighten, encourage, and challenge students to *become*; to *be* and not just to *do*” (Lix, 2001).

Doing moral philosophy in a classroom allows the student to define his or her individually authentic sense of life; to be wide-awake to options and newfound possibilities. It provides opportunities for the critical examination of personal worldviews, and the morally sound motivation to make necessary readjustments when necessary. In the words of an undergraduate student on an intellectual quest: “The wonder of life is that we will never know when we will be faced with a moment of truth and understanding” (Martin, 2011).

Concluding Considerations

“Teaching is an inherently moral enterprise” (Thomas, 1991, p. 66). This statement opens wide the door to many interpretive possibilities. The teacher is, indeed, a moral agent; whether he or she is fulfilling the role of an authority, model, friend, inspirer, motivator, questioner; the list goes on. And it may be that “moral authority is the dominant quality of the educator” (Durkheim, 1956, p. 88). The basic premise of my argument is there is truth to the maxim “we teach who we are,” and this reality has moral implications. Too often teacher education programs

focus with dedicated intensity upon the technical/instrumentalist/measurable aspects of teaching, at the expense of consideration of the mysterious “who”: the inner-self of the teacher. This self, consciously or subconsciously, establishes the atmosphere of the classroom, and encourages or stifles positive relationships and learning opportunities.

It has been said, “we are mysteries unto ourselves.” Each teacher has a moral responsibility continually to seek to unravel this mystery that so penetrates U.S. classrooms. Such responsibility requires periodic, perhaps continuous, self-interrogation of one’s belief system. Critical, introspective inquiry of one’s worldview can only be meaningful if it includes consideration of differing ways of interpreting the world and answering life’s BIG questions. “Dedication to the truth means a life of willingness to be personally challenged. The only way that we can be certain that our map of reality is valid is to expose it to the criticism and challenge of other mapmakers” (Peck, 1978, p. 52).⁷

A worldview, one’s map of reality, affects one’s understanding of his or her personal moral responsibilities, and is implicit in a teacher’s political, cultural, religious, and communal commitments. And, these commitments, perhaps subconsciously, influence a teacher’s way of doing and *being* in the classroom. In one future teacher’s words: “I will now choose to live the examined life as an intellectual adventure” (Wilbert, 2010). It is at this point we consider the importance of “doing moral philosophy” as an important component of a teacher education program. To probe at the roots of one’s personal belief system, one’s worldview, helps to generate a “constructive restlessness” (Brandon, 1976, p. 4): that inner disquietude which motivates an individual to question not only *who* he or she is, but also *why*. It is the restless, open-minded search for answers to these self-defining questions that are vital to the doing of moral philosophy, and to becoming an authentic individual. After all, it is the answers—including the uncertain, conflicted, and paradoxical ones—that provide the future teacher with a better understanding of the struggle to be both existentially authentic *and* a moral model in the classroom.

Endnotes

¹ There is a connection here to a thought expressed by the actress, Rosalind Russell, playing Mother Simplicia, in the film, *Where Angels Go... Trouble Follows*: “Self-examination is always painful” (Frye & Neilson, 1968). And, here a reminder of a thought from theologian,

- Paul Tillich (1966): “I was able to reach intellectual and moral autonomy only after a severe struggle” (p. 36).
- 2 Aporia is that unprepared-for condition that comes over a person when he or she has been absolutely sure of the validity of a conviction, or a “truth,” and then, after open-mindedly listening to opposing views, suddenly thinks: “I have been wrong.” But, Bertrand Russell may have been correct. In order to experience the condition of aporia, “(t)here must be preliminary uncertainty.... We should admit that even our best-formed beliefs probably stand in need of correction” (Russell, 1926, p. 176).
 - 3 We are reminded: “Human beings constantly create and re-create their knowledge, in that they are inconclusive, historical beings engaged in a permanent act of discovery” (Freire, 1996, p. 119).
 - 4 We are reminded that: “Authenticity is the reduction of phoniness toward the zero point” (Pirsig, 1981, p. 183).
 - 5 A fellow student in the same class wrote: “The true struggle of the human being may be to examine his or herself...to find personal, ever-changing truths” (Manion, 2012). And, as noted by a student during a previous semester: “For learning to take place we must shake up our worldview” (Thudium, 2009).
 - 6 This process was defined by a former student as an “inner dialogue.” She writes: “Our inner dialogue is priceless. We need to take time to listen” (Hendrix, 2011).
 - 7 When we reflect upon our map of reality we may want to consider: “Our worldview is the picture we paint of reality. And just as Monet’s paintings can educate our eyes so that we leave the museum conscious of light sparkling off every tree and building, so a successful worldview leaves us open to experience” (Ochs, 2009, p. 465).

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A Narrative of One Teacher's Journey Toward Conscientization

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Introduction

In this paper I look to the past to find clarity and direction: I recount the events following a personal tragedy that led to professional and personal awakening and critical consciousness. Although I work to see this awakening and journey objectively, my narrative is nevertheless subjective, for I tell of my awakening, coming to critical consciousness, and conscientization (*conscientização*; Freire 1970). I have chosen to tell this story because it may help others in their efforts to free themselves toward becoming fully human and because it ultimately reveals the power of education—including self-education—to transform racists and bigots if only they will think, reflect, and remain open to all kinds of Others. In keeping with the causes of transformation, I use Freire's (1970) liberation pedagogy—specifically his concepts of conscientization, critical consciousness, praxis, and epistemological curiosity—to frame my story. Within this Freirean (1970) frame, I combine Noddings' (1984) ethics of care and Critical Race Theory (Ladson-Billings, 1995, 1998, 2003; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995) to demonstrate how I worked through my own racism and bigotry toward becoming more fully human. As I worked through the process of conscientization, towards the process of becoming fully human, towards ridding myself of deeply engrained racism and bigotry, I embraced as role models such civil rights activists as Septima Clark¹ and Bayard Rustin.²

I begin by defining and explaining Freire's (1970) concepts conscientization, critical consciousness, praxis, and epistemological curiosity positioning them within his liberation pedagogy. I then explain Noddings' (1984) ethic of care and outline Critical Race Theory's tenets (Crenshaw, 1995; Ladson-Billings, 1995, 1998, 2003; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). Next, I show my context and the “knowledge,” attitudes, and beliefs with which I entered classroom teaching and that I continued to espouse until I forced myself to create a vision and goals for realizing that vision and subsequently to work toward positive self-

transformation following an event that shattered my life. Third, I recount the story of my liberation—my awakening and my process from magical to critical consciousness in my journey toward conscientization—using Freire’s, Noddings’, and Critical Race Theories to illuminate the meaning and value of my liberation process. Finally, I posit the use of service learning in teacher education and reeducation will positively affect the achievement gap and help to eliminate the Black/white, them/us dichotomy in education.

Theorists Influencing My Path to Liberation

Paulo Freire

Freire’s (1970) conscientization is the agency that leads to liberation of individuals and groups and the process by which individuals and communities develop a critical understanding of their social reality through praxis—reflection plus action (Freire, 1970, 1973, 1984). Freire (1970) contends one develops that critical understanding by working through three levels of consciousness: magical consciousness, naïve consciousness, and critical consciousness. One’s magical consciousness takes life at face value without questioning or identifying systematic themes in the world (Freire, 1970, 1973). Although through naïve consciousness one identifies a social reality where one’s place in society is marginalized, making one’s life more difficult than those in the dominant group’s, one does not yet identify a systematic pattern or deliberateness for the inequalities among races, genders, classes, etc. (Freire, 1970). Through critical consciousness one identifies systematic issues by actively engaging in praxis—reflection plus action—so to understand one’s social reality (Freire, 1970, 1973, 1998).

Since a teacher teaches who she or he is, self-interrogation is vital to developing metacognitive and meta-emotional strategies that move teachers through the levels of consciousness thereby developing their awareness of self and the relationship to their theory, practice, and methodology (Noddings, 2004, 2012; Stets & Burke, 2000). Awareness and the interdependence among who one was, who one is, and who one is to become awaken one to critical consciousness (Freire, 1970). Because all aspects of one’s awareness of reality are alive within and ever changing (Freire, 1970), one is attuned to feelings, emotions, thoughts, and experiences and therefore makes deliberate choices that together transform one’s dichotomized thought processes into liberated, humanized ones (Freire, 1970, 2004). For Freire (1970, 1998, 2004) the process of conscientization is the ongoing journey through these three levels of consciousness with epistemological curiosity fueling the journey and praxis navigating the way. Epistemological curiosity is the desire to obtain new knowledge that in turn stimulates thought and reflection (Freire, 1970, 1973). A person who has epistemological curiosity

challenges why one knows what one knows, questions why systems exist as they do and how those systems affect their reality (Freire, 1970).

Noddings

Philosopher of education Nel Noddings (1993, 2002, 2004) proposes educators live by and teach using an ethic of care. Imploring contemporary educators to leap from the educational conundrum of standards-based grading and common-core standards to embrace care and love, Noddings (1993, 2002, 2004) challenges educators to bring care to the forefront of education: de-compartmentalize, generate an environment conducive to all students' learning, and strive for human care, concern, and connection (the three Cs philosopher of education, Jane Roland Martin [1994] advances). Caring requires one to listen respectfully to others, (Tirozzi & Uro 1997), to be attuned to one's perceptions and feelings, to reflect (Freire, 1973; Noddings, 1994; Tatum, 1994), to engage in conversation which includes listening attentively (Freire, 1973; Noddings, 1994, Tatum, 1994), and to serve the community competently (Freire, 1973; Noddings, 1994, Tatum, 1994).

Initially, this serving as an act of caring stimulates teachers' and service workers' good feelings about themselves, their actions, and those whom they serve. Over time these good feelings often lessen as the caregiver begins to need particular reactions from recipients to continue feeling good about his or her service (Noddings, 2012). If the service recipient does not provide the expected reaction, the caregiver's good feelings diminish as deeply embedded, negative feelings arise, gain strength, and increase in power (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1995, 2012). For example, when something occurs to break the trust between the caring educator and the cared-about, cared-for student, as it does in the classroom scenario I recount in a moment, the educator no longer cares for the student, and the student becomes inhibited in his or her learning (Noddings, 2012). Their individual reactions together lead to an environment in which the student feels threatened and becomes unable to take risks necessary to his or her continued learning (Noddings, 2012). Noddings calls this environment unsafe (2012).

Critical Race Theory

Critical Race Theory (CTR) emerged from the 1970's critical legal studies movement, and is an analytical lens used to develop a critical consciousness concerning the inequities of institutional and systemic power along racial lines (Crenshaw, 1995). Racism's permanence, counter-narratives, interest convergence, and critiques of liberalism comprise CRT's tenets (Crenshaw, 1995). Permanent and ever-present in our culture, racism as systemic practice and policy normalizes racism (Crenshaw, 1995). Historically, the law has encoded and created a norm passed down from generation to generation through families, schools,

and communities creating institutional and structural racism so well masked it seems to have disappeared (Crenshaw, 1995). Just as the dominant, white male scripts the social and legal language, practice, and policy to which one adheres today, white hegemony generates the narratives perpetuating many theoretical ideologies that promote the thinking that racism is wavering, diminished, or gone (Crenshaw, 1995). Robert Gordon (1990) explains “the most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are” (p. 413). The dominant culture touts progress by pointing to legal equality, school integration, and overt violence in decline, somehow failing to recognize disparities in educational and employment opportunities, disproportional poverty levels, and racial profiling in arrests and sentencing (Bell, 2004). Cultural deficit theorists contend one is not failing to recognize these disparities and disproportionalities but that such negative social symptoms as poverty, low levels of education, unemployment, and criminal activity emerge from race and cultural values (Bell, 2004). In contrast, Gloria Ladson-Billings (Ladson-Billings, 1999, 2003; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995) calls educators to recognize racism—not in such big happenings as lynchings or such contemporary, symbolic lynchings as Michael Brown’s, Travon Martin’s or Rodney King’s—in the thousand, daily, racist cuts one witnesses and, as a result, in which one participates, and to fight, not to win, but to join the daily struggle.

Critical Race Theorists challenge everyone to create and listen to narratives that counter the dominant culture’s insistence racism no longer exists when indeed one sees it flourishing in many, daily, racist acts, words, and attitudes (Ladson-Billings, 1999). Listening to, “owning,” and creating narratives countering the dominant one help pave the way to questioning the historical scripts of meritocracy, colorblindness, and assimilation, to dismantling white hegemony, and to turning the page so a new narrative can emerge along with changes in laws, policies, and practices (Crenshaw, 1995; Freire, 1970). Interest convergence is in apparent opposition to the tenet of counternarratives since for change to occur, the proposed changes must converge with the general interests of whites (Bell, 1995). Historically, one has certainly seen interest convergence at work in *Brown v. Board’s* symbolic desegregation (Bell, 2004) and seen such African Americans as Booker T. Washington recognize at least some truth in this tenet and use it to advance African Americans’ educations or at least vocational educations (Bell, 2004).

Paulo Freire was exiled from Brazil, not because of his commitment and success in teaching literacy but because he helped marginalized people awaken to their oppression. As Gordon (1990) explains, the system of oppression works because people believe things are the way they are. This belief held by both the dominant and the dominated legitimizes historical scripts such as meritocracy, color-blindness, and assimilation (Crenshaw, 1995). Meritocracy or the “bootstrap mentality” is the belief that with hard work, determination, and grit, any person can achieve the American Dream. Color-blindness, the notion one does not see color and therefore treats all people equally, is a common theme in white, middle-class, female teachers’ discourse and is dangerous because advancing color-blindness means advancing normality: no individuals exist; everyone is the same; treat everyone the same. Thus, one is not to take one’s home, racial or cultural background, and mental and physical abilities into account; one is to treat others equally rather than equitably. To assimilate, one peels away one’s culture, discards one’s cultural capital as worthless, takes on the dominant culture’s values, and works to accumulate that dominant culture’s cultural capital. Since one function of U.S. schools has been to teach and perpetuate the dominant cultures’ values and cultural capital, U.S. public school educators—whether with or without full knowledge—strive to help non-whites and females to assimilate to the culture and values of the white, male U.S.

Context

Although my first teaching job was in a school of 80% white students and 20% African-American students, the typical ratio in lower-track classes was the reverse: 20% white and 80% African American. As a young, new teacher, I was assigned many of these lower-track classes. At the time, I was labeled “good with those kids” because my pass-to-fail ratio was the highest among my colleagues. I was proud of helping students of color though, in fact, I was simply keeping them in their place, maintaining a pleasant *status quo* from my position not of slave owner but of foreman.

Much of what I learned as a white, middle-class teacher echoed, reflected, and supported what I had learned growing up. As a result of my parents’ and community members’ teachings, racism and bigotry deeply rooted themselves in me as knowledge and truth. I learned most African-American students are disadvantaged because their families do not support them; most do not have the resources to succeed; most are too lazy to improve their situations; and most abuse the system. Reared to believe one should “pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps,” that a person who worked hard could achieve the American Dream, I could only have distaste for those too lazy to support themselves and their children. I learned that although African-American males are especially

angry and dangerous, many female African Americans are also angry. I should be careful. I learned my goal as the white teacher was to save my African-American students, rescue them—just like in the movies. This knowledge and these truths permeated my practice and dictated whom I believed could learn as a result of my teaching. As stated earlier Freire (1970) claims our upbringing defines who we are in an ongoing ebb and flow of experiences and reflections. As a child I neither knew my parents' beliefs and teachings were racist nor questioned these beliefs and teachings; therefore, the beliefs my parents taught me became deeply rooted and integral to who I am. With 80% of my students African American, I, a state-certified educator, operated on the level of magical consciousness (Freire, 1970). Without questioning, I simply accepted those beliefs and teachings passed onto me even though I had students showing me daily that my "truths" may well have been lies or at least dangerous distortions of reality.

Similar to the way my parents and educators taught me to fear African Americans, my African-American students' families and community had taught them to fear whites—even white teachers. Thus, when white teacher and African-American student came together in the classroom, each with the knowledge of the Other their parents and community members had taught them, the classroom could become a hostile place. While giving a lecture, the white middle-class teacher notices an African-American student in the back using an electronic device, not having the proper materials, or perhaps combing his or her hair. When the teacher calls the student's name, instructs the student to get on task, and directs the student on how to proceed, she expects the student to comply. While a teacher may indeed care about all her students, in some cases, when a student does not respond in the expected way, trust breaks and the teacher stops reaching out and caring about that student.

The African-American student perceives the situation differently. Because historically an African American showing signs of aggression would likely be suspended, arrested, or shot, African Americans have reared their children to fear white authority—to freeze, not move, not speak, and not run. The student asked to get on task may freeze from fear. Unaware of the student's survival tactic, the teacher interprets the student's noncompliance as disrespectful and defiant resulting in her anger and fear. Besides, many white, middle-class teachers know what I knew for the majority of my life: all people should strive to assimilate. However one looks at the interaction, the student's noncompliance reinforces and stimulates the educator's already present, deeply rooted prejudices, bigotry, and fear (Howard, 2003; Ladson-Billings, 1995;

Tatum 1992, 1994; Woodson, 1933; Yosso, 2005). As a result, care and learning cease; the classroom becomes a dangerous place for the student (Noddings, 2012). How was I to save these students? As long as I disciplined them, was not I saving them? Such questions spun within me until a tragic blow forced me to question the beliefs and values I learned during my girlhood, forced me to face the pain of my deeply buried, always-ignored racism.

Tragedy Precipitates the Journey Toward Conscientization

On April 23, 2009 my husband of 15 years committed suicide. In an instant my world froze, and I entered the realm of shock, disbelief, devastation, and vulnerability. This tragedy obliterated my belief system in a single moment leaving me no foundation, no answers, no joy—just questions, anger, confusion, uncertainties, and pain. Why did he do it? I searched for purpose and meaning in a time when everything I had known had changed leaving me frightened and uncertain. Sleep was impossible; questions, pain, and anger consumed me. I had two, school-aged children fully vested in their community who needed the support and structure of our old life and a strong, healthy parent guiding them to make sense of the world. They could not afford to lose another parent. I required health and strength to help my children and me move forward in our lives. I needed to begin my new life's journey by going through the messy, uncomfortable stages of grief until I accepted what had happened.

In the following years, I gradually awoke to the inequalities, inequities, injustices, and white privilege, in particular, that exist; I began to move into naïve consciousness (Freire, 1970). Rather than wanting to run away *from* my life, I now fantasized about running *to* a life of service by leaving the United States to travel in pursuit of peace and justice. In this time of confusion and enlightenment, friends and family encouraged me to seek answers to my questions. My quest for answers led me to a Ph.D. program emphasizing social justice, Critical Race Theory, and peace work: I found hope in academe. Through my doctoral readings and class discussions, I began the spiritual, emotional, and intellectual healing that led to critical reflection, the first part of Freire's (1970) praxis, which in turn pulled me beyond naïve consciousness to critical consciousness (Freire, 1970), spiritual awakening, and a meaningful existence.

Once introduced to Critical Race Theory (CRT), I began critically interrogating myself. Questioning national claims of equality and fairness, I turned for guidance to civil-rights activists known to pursue peace and justice. These activists maintained self-control, stayed calm, and remained steadfast in their beliefs as they withstood hatred often expressed violently through physical and psychological abuse. In

hindsight, I was seeking help for controlling my anger. Thus, pacifist Bayard Rustin particularly appealed to me, for he dedicated himself to healing others to subdue his own anguish. Wanting to return meaning and stability to my life by having a positive influence on others, I resolved to adapt his life of service.

Adapting a life of service resonated with my Catholic upbringing helping me develop a working vision: facilitate others' self-empowerment and opportunities, work side-by-side with others toward liberation, and research social-justice issues to understand the systemic nature of inequity. Goals toward realizing that vision included creating a service-learning course at my high school shifting my position from mathematics teacher to social-justice teacher, pursuing graduate education, and traveling through the Peace Corps. Reading Paulo Freire's (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* helped me understand and focus my awakening, claim my voice, name my vision, and direct my growth in critical consciousness. I entered into a covenant with myself to work toward eradicating inequities and injustices in the world in every way I could. I was indeed moving forward in my journey towards conscientization (Freire, 1973).

Conscientization: From Crooked Room to Critical Consciousness

Philosophers have long conceded...that every man has two educators: "that which is given to him, and the other that which he gives himself. Of the two kinds the latter is by far the more desirable. Indeed all that is most worthy in man he must work out and conquer for himself. It is that which constitutes our real and best nourishment. What we are merely taught seldom nourishes the mind like that which we teach ourselves."³ (Woodson, 1933, p. 86)

Although the readings and intellectual conversation associated with my Ph.D. work were addictive and energizing, I read and conversed within a crooked room: a metaphor for a person's process of fitting into a peculiar situation, of leaning heavily to one side or another when perceiving a room has been altered (Harris-Perry, 2011). The service-learning course I designed and developed for my dissertation research became my self-created, crooked room, for I leaned to the side of action—writing the proposal, securing certification and support, writing the curriculum, facilitating the course—while neglecting the other part of Freire's (1970) praxis, reflection.

In connection to this first, service-learning, course project, I began volunteering at food banks, homeless shelters, Habitat for Humanity, and schools where I tutored, but my service work was riddled with incongruences; I served to save the unfortunates—they were to be

indebted to me; I was making a difference—praise goes to me. Initially, as I began participating in service work, I would feel wonderful; serving filled me with peace and fulfillment. For about two years, I would swoop into various places bringing my good will, imposing my help, and feeding my soul with satisfaction and good feelings. But those feelings would lose their intensity and quickly disappear. Two events catapulted me forward in critical consciousness (Freire, 1970) so I began evaluating my thoughts and feelings as I interacted with others and the environment: a clash in a men's homeless shelter and a church-sponsored, one-on-one, neighborhood needs survey.

When I was serving a meal at a local, men's homeless shelter, I was offended one night by the way one of the clients spoke to me. I perceived him to be disrespectful. After all, I had taken the time to volunteer, so he should be grateful to me. I got upset, and we got into a shouting match. After a few minutes, a fellow volunteer came over and told the client to sit down and stop talking to me. I felt validated and on the way home, kept thinking about what a jerk he was. A few months later, looking back on that night, I felt ashamed. I now recognized my arrogance and rudeness. I had no business going to shelters thinking I was better than people who lived there. In that moment, I understood to be a good servant, one must put oneself in others' shoes and participate with those one serves as equals, side by side.

A second lesson advanced me beyond putting myself in others' shoes to being one of the individuals I saw myself helping and to working side by side with those individuals as equals. This lesson occurred during a church community day I attended to clean up yards, repaint houses and fences, and bring joy to older neighbors in this inner-city neighborhood. A fellow parishioner challenged me to do more, to come down to the neighborhood, knock on doors, and ask people what they needed from us. Hesitant and full of excuses, I reluctantly agreed after his gentle coaxing. Possibly because I would have to knock on doors and talk to people about what they needed from us, I realized this day that to care about the people in this neighborhood, I had to see myself first as one of them.

Perhaps, I had this two-step epiphany because throughout these years of volunteer work, I renewed my faith and read as much as I could about racism, white privilege, oppression, and humane education. We must ask people what they need and then, as Septima Clark and Paulo Freire (1970) counsel, work side by side with them to meet the needs *they* identify. Perhaps the knocking on doors caused me to remember my earlier readings about Clark who demonstrated true leaders listen first; change and self-empowerment come only when people believe in what they are doing (Charron, 2009, Clark & Brown, 1990).⁴ I finally began to

recognize (Freire, 1970; Gilligan, 1982; Howard, 2003; Ladson-Billings, 1995), then awaken to (Freire 1970), and finally embrace my inner racism and bigotry moving me further into critical consciousness (Freire, 1970) and doing social-justice work side by side with students and colleagues of color (Charron, 2009; Cipolle, 2010; Freire, 1973).

What has now become an acute awareness of my inner bigot (Schwarz, 2012) helps me open myself to honest interaction with students who often preserve the caring environment of my once-unsafe classroom (Noddings, 1984, 2012). Only through critical consciousness (Freire, 1970) could I interpret events, break down my old value system, and retune my thinking and feelings. Through the work of Paulo Freire (1970), I have learned to hone my awareness of opposing themes, dispel my myths, and live in my present reality: “unveil reality [and] unmask its mythicization, and achieve a full realization of the human task: the permanent transformation of reality in favor of the liberation of people” (Freire, 1970, 1973, 2004). This awareness has led to my developing spiritual, emotional, and intellectual epistemological curiosity and has propelled my teaching practice from banking to problem-posing dialogue resulting in my liberation (Freire, 1970).

Still Learning Liberation

People do not decide to risk their lives and livelihoods because an organizer talks them into it. They choose to do so because something inside of them changes.... Until you free a person mentally, emotionally and spiritually you can't accomplish very much, but as those things happen, oh my Lord, it just gets better. (Charron, 2012, p. 304)

My white colleagues frequently ask such questions as: how do I close the achievement gap in my classroom; how do I create a safe classroom; what reform will work to change our school or district; what will help me change? In my early service work, I, too, sought answers to these questions. My desire to identify problems and fix them became almost obsessive. I was driven to find solutions. CRT has taught me that racism is permanent in society and in me. Accepting and understanding the source of my inner bigotry has helped me move forward and see how to address my colleagues' questions: join the everyday struggle to give one's best; reeducate and quiet one's inner bigot; work side by side with others to eliminate the dichotomies pervading education; and replace these dichotomies with humane thinking (Ladson-Billings, 1995, 2000). Although I understood the relationship between teacher and student Freire (1970) advocates—teachers are students; students are teachers; both teach and learn together—it was not until I read Noddings' (1984, 1993, 2004) work that I realized teachers and students

bring their beliefs and learned, emotional responses to the classroom as hidden curricula that influence their exchanges with each other. As classroom teacher, my hidden curricula include my racist upbringing, my early teaching life, and my inner bigot. These curricula have caused me to respond in particular ways to situations involving students of color. I have learned to recognize and quiet responses my upbringing, early teaching experience, and resulting bigotry elicit, continually to question what I believe and why I believe it—Freirean unfinishedness and epistemological curiosity (Freire, 1998, 2004)—to join in the fight against systemic oppression and inequities, and to engage in Freirean dialogue with my students.

According to CRT theory, racism is permanent (Bell, 1995). Therefore one's goal as a white teacher must be to liberate oneself, to recognize, acknowledge, and eventually quiet one's inner bigot, to do the work necessary to become fully human (Freire, 1970). The never-ending process towards self-liberation propels one into the everyday struggle toward humanization. One must release oneself from the quest for solutions to embrace this journey and recognize that making the journey means success.

Endnotes

- ¹ Septima Clark was a visionary and legendary civil-rights activist, mentor, and collective conscience to the civil rights movement. Please see Appendix for a brief overview of her life.
- ² Dehumanizing oppression and humanization fostered Bayard Rustin's belief liberation was not to come from fighting and harming others but from love and respect for life. His faith in humanity guided him in his civil rights leadership. Chastised by society, Bayard Rustin suffered great personal pain as a homosexual man (d'Emilio, 2003) yet through this pain he became aware of his dual consciousness as a member of marginalized groups.
- ³ Woodson does not reference the quotation in his book's original text.
- ⁴ "We felt...[Septima Clark] had the most important quality; the ability to listen to people" (Charron, 2012, p. 250). A transformational leader, Clark listened intently to people in the community, uncovered their wants and needs, and then dedicated herself to educating and training leaders within the community. "As an activist educator and clubwoman, she had devoted much of her attention to school and health issues affecting the [B]lack community while remaining equally

concerned with mentoring young black women and garnering respect for [B]lack womanhood. As an organizer of several HFS-sponsored workshops in 1955 and 1956, she incorporated affordable housing and consumer cooperatives into her agenda. Clark had a broad definition of ‘citizenship education,’ augmented by her involvement at Highlander but firmly rooted in southern [B]lack women’s activist organizational culture” (Charron, 2012, p. 247).

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Appendix

Born in 1897 as one of eight children, Septima Clark, a visionary and legendary civil-rights activist, mentor, and collective conscience to the civil-rights movement, grew up in Charleston, South Carolina. Clark's parents were Peter Porcher Poinsett, a former slave, and Victoria Warren Anderson, a free American reared in Haiti where she was taught to read and write. Clark's parents valued education and demanded all eight children put time in on their lessons. Clark (1990) credits her parents for showing her the value of education and of standing up for her beliefs: "I really feel that [my mother's courageousness] helped me to be able to stand in front of the Klansmen and White Citizens' Councils, of large groups that were hostile" (p. 96).

From 1916–1956 Septima Clark was a schoolteacher in various parts of the Southern U.S. At first, Clark taught on Jones Island at Promise Land School, an impoverished, desolate community. After years of teaching in the segregated South, Clark understood poverty's hardships and the systematic oppression imposed on people of color. After 40 years of teaching, taking night and summer-school classes toward earning advanced degrees, and, as a widow, rearing a son, Septima Clark became the director of education at Highlander. An important leader in the development of Citizenship Schools throughout the South, Septima Clark describes how she would go into a town and meet with people listening to what they felt they needed. She asserted good leaders work with communities to empower themselves to design and develop their own paths toward liberation. In addition to setting up

Citizenship Schools, Septima Clark recruited and trained teachers and developed the curriculum helping to teach thousands of adult Blacks to read and register to vote. Eventually, Clark joined forces with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference working closely with Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. utilizing education peacefully to liberate Southern Blacks, her beliefs and educational practices serve as a model to all teachers today. To me, the most intriguing aspect of Septima Clark's repertoire is her unwavering spirituality. Even under the toughest conditions of pain and suffering, her missionary spirit fueled her strength, courage, and unselfish dedication tirelessly to serve people for over 60 years (Charron, 2009; Clark & Brown, 1990).

Outlook Not So Good: The Struggle for Integration in Evanston, Illinois 1966–1971

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Introduction

Ten years after *Brown v. Board of Education*, public School District 65 in Evanston, Illinois began voluntary, systematic, racial integration as a first step in a 50-year journey towards a still-unrealized dream of social and educational equity.¹ Superintendent Gregory C. Coffin was hired to advance a broad, civil-rights agenda starting with the racial integration of District 65, which would become the second school district in the entire nation voluntarily to integrate.² The resolution that guided Coffin's action was passed just before his tenure began:

...RESOLVED That the Board of Education does hereby resolve to eliminate de facto segregation in this school district and to develop a plan to achieve this end; and be it RESOLVED further, that the Board of Education will encourage other agencies of government to take effective action on aspects of the problem as it relates to children within their areas of influence and will provide full cooperation and support in such action.³

With this resolution, the board acknowledged the need racially to integrate its schools while also emphasizing segregation as a broader social issue in Evanston. The primary factor influencing *de facto* school segregation in Evanston was residential segregation. Within the regional context of Chicago's metropolitan area, support of Evanston's residential desegregation represented a sharp departure from support of the *status quo* and the highly segregated status of the metropolitan Chicago area, and state of Illinois more generally. As James Loewen notes in *Sundown Towns*, "...15 suburbs had 85% of Chicago's 128,300 suburban African Americans," and "of Chicago's 285 suburbs...117 were less than 1% [B]lack."⁴ Evanston, an "upper middle-class, white dominated suburb, which prided itself on [its] liberality," was one of

only two Chicago suburbs voluntarily to integrate, the other being Oak Park.⁵ Between 1964 and the present, desegregation nationally, in the Chicago area, and in Evanston specifically has continued as a contentious subject of public and scholarly discourse. The Chicago metropolitan area was and remains one of the most highly segregated regions of the country.⁶ The District 65 community, like many others, continues to grapple with realizing the potential of integration in closing persistent achievement gaps; as recently as 2013, a comprehensive survey of stakeholders found that closing the Black/white achievement gap continues to be the district's most pressing challenge.⁷

In this paper, I explore the voluntary integration of District 65 during the period 1967 through 1971 from the perspective of insider Dolores Story Kaufmann, a white woman with a working-class background who served as the district's Director of Information Services during its initial, wholesale integration implementation. Kaufmann, a public-relations professional, feminist, and civil-rights activist, has devoted much of her professional life to advance the interests of both women and minorities through education. In this paper, I argue Kaufmann's role as Director of Information Services for District 65 placed her on the forefront of struggles for both racial and women's equality and that her role as a public-relations professional for District 65 helped shape the way the civil-rights struggle would unfold in Evanston. Like other female, civil-rights activists of her era, both white and Black, her participation in the movement for racial equality resulted in a painful awareness of the gender inequity not addressed by the racial equality movement.

Methodology

This paper is part of a larger, in-progress biographical study. My primary source is Kaufmann's collection of professional papers, which she assembled while working as Director of Information Services for District 65 between July 1966 and July 1971. Data includes personal correspondence, bi-weekly staff newsletters, copies of the nationally acclaimed, monthly "School Outlook" district newsletter she edited, district press releases, and speeches written for Superintendent Gregory Coffin. Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with Kaufmann. Secondary sources, such as news media coverage of district events from approximately 1966 to 1971, also inform this work. Kaufmann's papers provide a rich source of data for understanding the timeline and differing perspectives of Evanston's integration story. Scholarly work, both primary and secondary, on the civil rights movement in general, women in the civil rights movement, and desegregation nationally and in Illinois provide context for understanding Kaufmann's role.

Formative Influences

Dolores Marie Kaufmann (nee Story) was born in 1929 in Oak Park, Illinois. Her parents were Ellis Jerome Story, a carpenter, and Ada Caroline Schwarz, a part-time homemaker who worked various jobs but did not have a career. She had one half-brother eight years older than herself, child of Ellis Story. Kaufmann endured a peripatetic and materially insecure working-class childhood during the depths of the Great Depression. Her family's circumstances only eased somewhat with economic changes brought on by the war effort in the early 1940s.

Kaufmann attended Chicago's Amundsen High School, graduated in 1947, and attended Northwestern University on a half-tuition scholarship for her freshman and sophomore years, earning enough money at a series of secretarial and assistants' jobs to bridge the gap between scholarship support and actual expenses. She studied at Northwestern's acclaimed Medill School of Journalism and graduated with a Bachelor's degree in 1952 and a Master's in 1953, at a time when elite higher education was not particularly welcoming to working-class women. Attending Northwestern provided important intellectual and social benefits for Kaufmann. It offered her a promise of meritocratic social mobility through accomplishment and access to expanded social circles that would help later to establish and maintain her career. Yet being a female and working-class graduate student at an elite institution meant she often experienced the feeling of being an outsider. The pervasive, reflexive sexism and class privilege she encountered resulted in development of a life-long sensitivity to prejudice and social inequity.

The civil rights movement writ large provided a tumultuous backdrop for Kaufmann's early career. As a burgeoning journalist, she was tuned in to the news and very aware of civil rights activists' efforts occurring both nationally and locally. At the time Rev. Dr. King, Jr. led the Chicago Freedom Movement,⁸ also known as the Chicago Open Housing Movement, Kaufmann was working her first professional position as editor for the U.S. Savings and Loan League. During this same timeframe, in Evanston, the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) activists illegally occupied the office of a real-estate broker who publicly supported "forced housing" (the term employed by the opponents of state and local open housing laws similar to what was finally enacted at the federal level as the Fair Housing Act of 1968).⁹ As an employee, Kaufmann was at least peripherally aware of discriminatory lending practices such as "redlining" (denying mortgages to prospective buyers of housing in racially determined areas), restrictive covenants, and other discriminatory practices of the housing industry.¹⁰ Kaufmann recalls appreciating her work at the Savings and Loan Association for being a great entry-level job, but notes she was not able fully to use her talents

and passions. Kaufmann was looking for a public relations position that would allow her to make a difference, and she applied for the position of Director of Information Services when she learned of District 65's by-then well-publicized intention to integrate.

Integration of Evanston District 65

Evanston, Illinois is a large, first-ring suburb of Chicago, bordering both the city and Lake Michigan. It is the location of Northwestern University, the world headquarters of Rotary International and the Midwest Montessori School, a major training school for Montessori teachers. During the era of school integration in Evanston, the neighboring suburbs and the city of Chicago were all highly segregated, mirroring the state of Illinois more broadly. District 65's efforts at racial integration of public education began in 1961 with district-wide workshops in human relations for teachers. In 1963, the district implemented a voluntary transfer policy, which did not work. In December 1964, the school board passed a resolution to eliminate segregation and begin voluntary integration. The board authorized then-Superintendent O. M. Chute to develop desegregation plans and to redraw attendance areas.¹¹ The integration plan was to be fully implemented in fall 1967. In 1966, the District 65 school board hired Gregory C. Coffin to carry out the newly approved integration plan.¹² Coffin, who had "all the credentials that go with a Harvard education and a New England ancestry dating back to 1649,"¹³ had previous experience with integration in his former position in Darien, Connecticut.¹⁴ The combination of his elite background combined with his seemingly tame progressive leanings made him appear perfect to the District 65 board that supported integration by varying degrees. Coffin hired Kaufmann in August 1966 as Director of Information Services.¹⁵ At the time, Kaufmann was the only female on the district's administrative team. The letter she received containing her employment offer included her first assignment from the Superintendent to be completed immediately, as it was needed before her contract would begin. As a freelance employee who was not yet under contract, Kaufmann was asked to edit and produce the first issue of the new district newsletter, "School Outlook."¹⁶ The first article she would edit would be a description of the district's "new plan" to remedy "*de facto* segregation."¹⁷

Ending *de facto* segregation through integration in Evanston school district was a multi-faceted plan that would fully be implemented in August 1967. From a technical standpoint, it consisted of redrawing school boundaries and busing some Black pupils from central Evanston to peripheral, all-white schools.¹⁸ In order to accomplish integration, elementary school boundaries were redrawn, and transportation was

arranged for approximately 500 children who would have to walk more than a mile to new schools. The district's elementary schools had a Black student population of 13–32%.¹⁹ Establishment of a feeder school system for the junior high resulted in a Black junior high student population between 16% and 23%.²⁰ Additionally, the all-Black Foster School was converted into a laboratory school with open enrollment.²¹

But implementing integration in Evanston required more than working out technical aspects such as percentages. Successful integration in Evanston required public acceptance. As a public-relations professional, Kaufmann believed one of the biggest obstacles in gaining public acceptance for an integration plan was the public's lack of accurate information. Coffin states, "Facts, many facts had to be interjected into a sea of rumor and distortion."²² One rumor suggested everyone would have to change schools under the integration plan; this was refuted with a "stability chart" providing factual information.²³ Other public concerns included "the cost of busing, overcrowding, lowered academic standards, discipline, and a host of less-significant items."²⁴ Kaufmann, in her role as Director of Information Services, was the person responsible for producing and disseminating needed "facts" to a nervous public throughout 1966 and 1967. She was responsible for all aspects of District 65's public-information campaign on integration, from providing advice on the overall media strategy to producing, editing, and disseminating information. Efforts at providing public information during the year before implementation were broad in scope and designed to reach everyone in the Evanston community. Kaufmann produced regular communication in the form of press releases and articles written for "School Outlook," a bi-weekly, district publication to support the Superintendent's implementation of integration. She also engaged in massive community outreach to help people understand what the integration plan entailed. These efforts included the coordination of:

...speeches made before all service clubs, PTAs and other local organizations; 17 public information meetings, one in each neighborhood school; television, radio and extensive newspaper coverage; flyers and newsletters distributed by such groups as the NAACP, the Urban League, and the Citizens for Better Education; coffees; and a few favorable sermons delivered from the pulpits of local churches.²⁵

Kaufmann designed a dynamic public-relations strategy that provided mechanisms for the school district to target its efforts at disseminating information about its integration plans. For example, during the 1966–1967 school year, Kaufmann focused on a district, two-way communication strategy in which the district systematically sought and received community input on the integration plan in addition to a

more traditional approach of reporting district events and programs. As part of this massive communication effort, Kaufmann leveraged her contacts with the Evanston League of Women Voters to get their participation in analyzing the complaint correspondence received in Dr. Coffin's office and turning it in to a "fact sheet" on integration distributed to over 40,000 voters.

Once basic integration had been achieved in District 65, Kaufmann focused on other, important public relations efforts both within the district and between the district and the community to help the community adapt successfully to an integrated school system. Importantly, Kaufmann worked with the PTA and administration of every single school to help produce individual schools' newsletters. This single act would turn out to be an empowering avenue for Black parents to communicate with one another, particularly when board support for integration waned.

The integration agenda promoted by Coffin's administration included more than racially balancing Evanston's 16 schools. The "integration agenda" was also tightly focused on Coffin's 3Rs: Relevance in the school environment, relevant teachers, and relevant curriculum,²⁶ an early version of what is now referred to as "culturally responsive pedagogy."²⁷ Implementing the 3Rs also extended to training teachers on matters of human relations including ongoing professional development in anti-bias training and selection of class materials that would not privilege existing "white frames of reference,"²⁸ reflecting "critical pedagogy."²⁹ While District 65 had its own curriculum department that made materials and films to support the district's curriculum, communication about these materials was handled by Kaufmann, who regularly disseminated information about the 3Rs through her staff newsletter and the "School Outlook" newsletter; these communications contributed to the legitimacy and efficacy of some of the less-obvious aspects of District 65's integration agenda.

Leaders of the integration movement in Evanston were committed to ending *de facto* segregation for the purpose of promoting educational equity, but there was an explicit and broader social-justice agenda in place as well that involved breaking up the historically inequitable power relations in Evanston. Throughout the year leading up to integration in Evanston, it became increasingly clear that not only was Coffin committed to building a fully integrated school system but he believed schools could be a vehicle for social change, helping to create "a single nation."³⁰ Integration of School District 65 was perceived by supporters, including Coffin and "his army," to be but one step in advancing empowerment of Blacks.³¹ More broadly, and in step with Rev. Dr. King, Jr.'s Freedom Movement and with the 1964 Evanston school

board resolution calling for desegregation, leaders in the Evanston school district strove to extend integration into the community by supporting “a strong open-housing ordinance” in the city and “allowing supporting petitions to be posted in the schools.”³² It was this aspect of the integration agenda that was most threatening to the *status quo* because it would result in integration of Evanston’s neighborhoods, not just its schools. While many in Evanston supported the district’s broader integration agenda being implemented during Coffin’s tenure, there were numerous, powerful opponents.

For years in Evanston, the District 65 Caucus, a coalition of “community and civic groups—PTAs, Kiwanis Club, the North Shore Realty Board” had vetted and screened school-board candidates: a Caucus endorsement being tantamount to guaranteed election. At least one of the groups represented by the Caucus, the North Shore Realty Board, has been described by one source as a group of “white militants” who fought actively Chicago-area open-housing ordinances.³³ In June 1969, the board was pressured not to renew Coffin’s appointment. During a two-day meeting, the board heard testimony from 54 speakers on the “subject of the Coffin superintendency.”³⁴ The board voted to end Coffin’s contract in June 1970 by a four to three vote. At this same meeting, Coffin requested all charges against him be put in writing. This board meeting represented a shift in power between those who supported a full integration agenda and those who supported more limited versions of integration that did not change the racial geography of Evanston or alter existing power structures. On April 11, 1970 a school board election would decide not only Coffin’s length of tenure as Superintendent, but the future direction Evanston would take with integration.

The Caucus ran a slate of candidates from the “non-[B]lack, non-poor, and non-young ward in northwest Evanston,” a white and wealthy part of the city sandwiched between Skokie and Wilmette.³⁵ This slate of candidates publicly supported integration, but in limited ways that did not challenge the substance of the school experience or the racial geography of the Evanston community. The opposing “Citizens for 65” were Coffin supporters, including many Black community groups, who sought to advance a Rev. Dr. King, Jr.-style, comprehensive integration movement of the sort actively promoted by the Coffin administration: Kaufmann included.

During the school-board election campaign, Kaufmann continued to perform her duties, which included producing and disseminating communication promoting the full integration vision that was part of the original board resolution. She received hate mail and phone calls from citizens opposed to the eventual goal of geographic integration. She

recalls one anti-Coffin caller accused her being “Coffin’s Goebbels.” In September 1969 Kaufmann authored an article for “School Outlook” that listed a factual chronology of events related to Coffin’s non-renewal starting with the June board meeting and continuing to the present. When proposing the article to Coffin as a means to provide the public with a factual account of what had happened since the June board meeting, Kaufmann states in a personal note that, “I don’t look for controversy, God knows we have enough without manufacturing any or rekindling fires—ignoring the whole thing seems ridiculous.”³⁶ The article was perceived as antagonistic by the board and its publication became the focus of efforts to censor Kaufmann’s communication. On September 26, 1969 the school board passed two resolutions designed to curtail dissemination of information.³⁷ The first states that in “School Outlook” “no further mention shall be made...as to the contract renewal dispute between Superintendent Coffin and the Board of Education or of any matters related thereto.”³⁸ The second resolution states, “no employees on school time or using school facilities or materials, shall prepare and or disseminate any written statements or news releases of a partisan nature regarding the controversy between the board and Superintendent or the School Board election of April 11, 1970.”³⁹ From the board’s perspective, “partisan” information included any and all facts related to the election including, and not limited to, information about polling places and voter registration.⁴⁰ These resolutions as well as a list of additional guidance to be used in supervising Kaufmann were communicated in a memo to Coffin from Board President Seyl. Kaufmann’s commitment to the role media plays in a functioning democracy was clear in her response to Coffin when she states:

To make necessary the submission in advance to any board member (whose executive officer is the [S]uperintendent, and who always has been responsible for the overall supervision of all programs including that of information is a form of censorship and “management” of the news, which makes suspect to the media any information so released and which results in extremely bad press relations. It also makes the school board appear to be something that is a foretaste of the nightmare world described in the book *1984* where “big Brother” is watching every act of every citizen and would be most harmful to staff morale.⁴¹

Clearly Kaufmann’s public relations acumen was notable in her efforts toward promoting the integration vision, and her skill was perceived as a serious threat by the incumbent board who hoped to gain more support in the April election to release Coffin and replace him

with someone more suitable. Additional efforts to control and constrain Kaufmann's work continued as the election year progressed, including a mounting campaign to reduce the budget for information services so Kaufmann's salary could no longer be paid and distribution of "School Outlook" greatly reduced.

Although the anti-Coffin contingent had very deep pockets, the contentious April 1969 school-board election resulted in a very narrow (400 votes) victory by the anti-Coffin slate, and a recount was ordered. A poster authored by members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Concerned Black Parents and Citizens of School District 65 went up in the community hours after the recount of the board election results stating:

Coffin was the bullseye but the Black community is the target. Is there a plan to repress and then eliminate the Black community? We think so. We must stop this racist repression. We must end all repression. We cannot wait for them to rip off our people. We call on all persons of good will who are prepared to struggle against all oppression to come to Foster Center tonight.⁴²

Unsurprisingly, the non-renewal of Superintendent Coffin was upheld.⁴³ In the weeks following the election, massive demonstrations ensued throughout Evanston, including mass boycotts by Black students at various schools, creation of "freedom schools" attended by boycotting students, a call for an economic boycott of all white-owned Evanston businesses, a request for creation of a permanent advisory committee composed of seven representatives of the Black community, a demand for dismissal of the two board lawyers involved in advising on Coffin's dismissal and Kaufmann's supervision, a demand for participation in selection of a new superintendent, and a request for an emergency meeting to respond to all requests.⁴⁴

With Coffin out, immediate steps were taken by the school board further to "neutralize" Kaufmann and diminish her scope of influence in the midst of a community crisis lest she further empower those in favor of a comprehensive integration agenda. The newly elected board quickly, and without precedent, put oversight of Kaufmann into the hands of the board's president, requiring Kaufmann seek board permission before disseminating information. Additionally, the board completed their review of Kaufmann's department budget and determined it should be greatly reduced. Unsurprisingly, and after almost two years of extremely close supervision, which Kaufmann perceived as hostility from the new board, Coffin left his position, moving on to become a professor at Northeastern University. In 1976, he became the director of Northeastern University's Phase II Desegregation operation (later the

Urban Schools Collaborative Office) and worked on desegregation for the remainder of his career.⁴⁵

Kaufmann left district 65 in Evanston and moved to southern Illinois in 1971. After working on the effort to pass the Equal Rights Amendment for several years, she took a job as the Director of Information Services for the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) in 1977. In 1980 she left ISBE to work freelance, moving to Washington, DC at precisely the time when her connections and affiliations could do her the least good there. Kaufmann was a leader in both Illinois' League of Women Voters and the National Organization of Women; these connections did not help further her career. To be a 50-ish feminist and experienced PR manager of a contentious integration effort did not open many doors in Ronald Reagan's Washington.

As for Evanston, research published in 1971 about the first three years of integration indicates integration efforts in Evanston modestly increased academic achievement for Black students in Evanston without decreasing the achievement of whites.⁴⁶ District 65 continued with its initial, voluntary transfer and busing program till the mid 1970s, when the school board adopted a "15% Plus or Minus" policy regarding racial integration which required the racial balance of each school to be within 15% of the overall racial demographic of Evanston. Then, in the mid 1980s, the school board adopted a 60% policy that required each school to be racially balanced so no school population could be made up of more than 60% of a single race.⁴⁷

Review of achievement data from 2004 to 2013 reveals that, although there remains a relatively large, persistent gap between the academic achievement of District 65's white and Black students, the achievement gap is anywhere from 30% to 50% smaller than the average statewide achievement gap in all tested subject areas.⁴⁸ Additionally, review of the most recent data for District 65 shows, when compared to districts of the same size and demographic makeup averaged across grades, District 65's Black students' achievement is higher in every subject. Despite some success at providing better-than-average educational opportunities for Black students, the community continues open dialogue about the importance of addressing the achievement gap and about the integration of its schools.⁴⁹

Conclusion

Voluntary integration of District 65 schools in Evanston, Illinois is an important point on the timeline of U.S. racial equity. Coffin, Kaufmann, and their supporters sought to alter the fabric of their corner of U.S. society by integrating schools, by changing education more broadly, and by challenging the racialized geography of Evanston, Illinois. Through Kaufmann's meticulous documentation and

recollections, it is possible to understand this moment more clearly. But Kaufmann was neither a silent nor passive witness; she helped shape history because she was an active participant in the public discourse emanating from the district on integration. Understanding the civil-rights movement in Evanston through Kaufmann's first-hand account helps one understand how promoting social change takes courage. Kaufmann found the courage to take part in the movement though it put her at professional risk and jeopardized future opportunity. Kaufmann, a woman from a working-class background working in a field dominated by men, put a lot at risk.

Women's contributions to the civil-rights movement have been a topic of scholarly inquiry in recent decades as part of an effort to describe and understand the movement more fully; until very recently, there has been little acknowledgement of the importance of their role.⁵⁰ Recent efforts shed light on the importance of women's various efforts previously eclipsed by better-known, mostly male figures of the movement. As one example, Houck and Dixon⁵¹ uncovered speeches given by previously unrecognized women in the civil rights movement. Many speeches they uncovered could have disappeared forever were it not for a small material trace. In Kaufmann's case, while material traces abound, the context in which they were created did not allow her to be given credit. A female, public-relations professional (a group whose role is to shape narratives invisibly rather than to be subjects in them) and a school administrator, she operated in an era when women did not occupy prestigious positions in either profession and participated in a movement where male perspectives dominated. Without intention to recover a more complete history, her contributions would continue to be an anonymous part of the legacy of Gregory Coffin, much the same way her sisters in struggle were rebuffed at the "Tribute to Women" in 1963 after the March on Washington.⁵²

Many women participated in various civil-rights causes assuming their efforts were needed, and would be welcomed and acknowledged. What became obvious to many women activists was how men in the movement did not extend their beliefs about racial equality to issues of women's equality. Many have noted how the gender inequities of the civil-rights movement combined with those expanded leadership opportunities the civil-rights movement provided to give birth to a new decade of feminism.⁵³ This was certainly the case for Kaufmann, who next focused her efforts on passing the Equal Rights Amendment.

The period of history I recount here represents a most ambitious period in the educational history of Evanston in terms of realizing the promise of *Brown v. Board of Education*. Clearly those activists' efforts that resulted in integration of Evanston's schools and community did not go

uncontested. Efforts to integrate schools in Evanston occurred despite many obstacles and are unique for several reasons. First, Evanston schools voluntarily integrated far earlier than almost any U.S. school district. Next, the schools in Evanston *were* integrated despite powerful opposition within the community. Additionally, Evanston was and is surrounded by one of the most segregated metropolitan areas in the entire country, which was true in the 1960s and which remains true today. Despite the pervasive national trend toward dismantling desegregation efforts,⁵⁴ schools in Evanston remain relatively integrated today, though integration is constantly in danger of jeopardization by efforts to redraw attendance areas in Evanston resulting in resegregation. Evanston continues to be segregated with regard to homeownership, but the effort to desegregate its schools has largely prevailed, especially when compared to other cities in the U.S., though not to the extent that was envisioned during the high tide of civil-rights concern. This case demonstrates for educators, civil-rights advocates, and families that concerted and persistent efforts to effect fundamental school reform can succeed; it also shows no such success endures without a continued effort to maintain it, and that such efforts will always be contentious, because they threaten the *status quo*.

Orfield points out that, in the national trends, dismantling desegregation “is, in essence, sleepwalking back to *Plessy*.”⁵⁵ Orfield explains that “*Brown’s* judgment that segregated schools are inherently unequal remains correct, not because something magic happens to minority students when they sit next to whites, but because segregation cuts students off from critical paths to success in American society.”⁵⁶

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- ⁴³ Board of Education of School District No. 65, Cook County, Illinois, Report of the Board of Education on the Superintendency of Dr. Gregory C. Coffin (1969).
- ⁴⁴ The Ad Hoc Committee of Concerned Black Parents and Citizens of School District 65 to the Evanston District 65 School Board, 14 April 1970 (collection of Dolores Story Kaufmann).
- ⁴⁵ Gregory C. Coffin, *Gregory C. Coffin Papers* (Boston: Northeastern University Archives and Special Collections, 2014).
- ⁴⁶ Norton and Hsia, *Evaluation*.
- ⁴⁷ Larry Gavin, "A History of Foster School and Desegregation in District 65," *Evanston Roundtable*, 19 June 2002, <http://>

evanstonroundtable.com/main.asp?SectionID=16&SubSectionID=27
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- ⁴⁸ Illinois Interactive Report Card, <http://iirc.niu.edu/Classic/Default.aspx>
- ⁴⁹ Norton and Hsia, *Evaluation*.
- ⁵⁰ Lynne Olson, *Freedom's Daughters: The Unsung Heroines of the Civil Rights Movement from 1830 to 1970* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
- ⁵¹ Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon, eds., *Women and the Civil Rights Movement 1954–1965*. (Jackson, MI: University of Mississippi Press, 2009).
- ⁵² Ibid.; Olson, *Freedom's Daughters*.
- ⁵³ Sarah Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage, 1980).
- ⁵⁴ Gary Orfield, "Toward an Integrated Future: New Directions for Courts, Educators, Civil Rights Groups, Policymakers, and Scholars," in *Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education*, eds. Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996).
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 331.

