

**JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY &
HISTORY
OF EDUCATION**



2022

The Journal of the Society of Philosophy & History of Education

Journal of Philosophy & History of Education

vol. 72, no. 1, 2022

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ISSN 2377-3499 (print)

ISSN 2377-3502 (online)

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The *Journal of Philosophy and History of Education* is a publication of the Society of Philosophy & History of Education. Following the 2021 annual meeting of the Society of Philosophy and History of Education in St. Louis, Missouri, a call for papers was issued and submissions subjected to the blind-review process. The opinions expressed in the respective works are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Society, the editors, the Editorial Advisory Board, or the publishers.

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Printed in the U.S.A.

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From the Editors

What Difference Does Difference Make?

After researching, collecting materials, and thinking about *Three Guineas* for almost 10 years, Virginia Woolf (1882–1941) begins writing her educational treatise, November 1936, publishing it one year and seven months later in June 1938, one year before Britain enters WWII. Although Woolf scholars have tended to pay less attention to *Three Guineas* than to her other works (British Library, n.d.), *Three Guineas* was relevant and deserving attention in 1938, has remained relevant and deserving attention every year since its publication, remains so today, and will continue to remain so as long as patriarchy, violence, and war exist and when they no longer exist, as a reminder diligently to maintain political and legal equality and to prevent war persistently, attentively, and relentlessly. Although I do not overtly draw parallels between Woolf's (1938) *Three Guineas* and today's England and today's other "democracies," I have chosen to return to this work because Woolf's words keep blasting from its pages, jolting me to attention. Is Woolf shouting, banging pots and pans, beating her walking stick on her still-standing writing shed? Does she stand before us, a not-so-silent specter risen from grave and guineas alike?

Woolf (1938) opens *Three Guineas* creating a fiction in which her female narrator begins a response to a letter left unanswered for three years. The narrator names her correspondent "an educated man" which translates to a middle-class man whom the narrator surmises has earned his education in the best English schools, schools created uniquely for boys and young men. The educated man poses the question, "How in your opinion are we to prevent war?" (p. 3). Although readers unfamiliar with British war history may assume he queries because Britain teeters on war's brink not yet 20 years since WWI's end and although this teetering may incite him to inquire when he does, his question surely emerges because the British are perpetually at war. Since WWI's end, November 11, 1918, and the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, the English have not lived those twenty years war-free but engaged in 11 conflicts outside its borders. As Woolf's (1938) narrator pictures the educated man across her letter's page, British soldiers war in the Great Arab Revolt (1936–1939) against Palestinian Arabs demanding Arabs' independence, and simultaneously, British volunteers unofficially fight with Spaniards battling fascism during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). WWI and the 11 British military conflicts following WWI contextualize the educated man's question, "How in your opinion

are we to prevent war?” (p. 3), and the narrator’s remark to him: “You have never sunk into the contented apathy of middle life...you are writing letters...and...asking questions, *with the sound of the guns in your ears*” (Woolf, 1938, p. 4, emphasis added).

Now living over 100 years after “The Great War to End All Wars,” not only the British but people everywhere live with guns sounding in their ears, people yet to hear the world’s sounds without guns’ sonic booms—whip-like snaps and cracks—reverberating in their ears.¹ Without naming other nations in her scathing critique of late-1930s’ English democracy, Woolf (1938) implicates all societies’ hypocritically claiming democracy as their political base, as England’s people, again on world war’s brink, live and breathe in an England no longer a country or nation but heading a crumbling Empire of colonies most often absorbed through military aggression, colonies to which Woolf’s English countrymen clutch as their source of wealth, military fodder, strategic trade sites, tactical military defense bases, and consequently, global power. While society has advanced in at least some ways since Woolf (1938) published her treatise, she argues the English and, by extension, others who claim they live in democracies, use language to disguise fascism, language to enact violence via exclusion. This violence pervades *Three Guineas*’ every page.

Woolf’s (1938) casting into relief Englishmen’s hypocrisy and history of violence in and outside England’s borders makes visible patriarchy’s liaison with the State institution it has created, violence as a pivotal tenet within patriarchal ideologies, and therefore violence as a defining feature within the State patriarchy have established. Normalized and strengthened through the centuries, this patriarchy–State liaison forms a barrier blocking females from accessing education, professional training, and earning an independent income. Although Woolf’s (1938) narrator asserts patriarchy chalk this border on the ground, she also clarifies that chalk line’s erasability taunts in its apparent finiteness, chalk a mere indicator for seemingly impenetrable fortifications’ unseen locations. As the patriarchy–State alliance barricades females from the public realm, especially from education and earning livings through the professions, oppressing and enacting violence against them in often subtle or unseen ways, its patriarchy war against Arabs fighting for independence, volunteer to fight against fascism in Spain, and rally against Italian and German fascists whose leaders they name Dictator and Tyrant. No one under such a state survives unscathed; no one in the world lives unafraid.

Not surprisingly, through language Woolf (1938) infuses every page with this violence patriarchy launch and control in and outside the State’s parameters. Before examining that language, I briefly address the relation among patriarchy, violence, and the State. Next, I touch upon four ways Woolf uses language to illuminate violence deeply embedded in the State’s origins, driving centuries-long exclusionary practices patriarchy establish, enforce, and maintain to benefit an elite few. Although Woolf uses language

in multiple overlapping ways to demonstrate the English–patriarchal State grounds and steeps itself in violence, beginning with violence against women, I focus on four ways she uses language to show the violence inherent in exclusion. Specifically, Woolf selects war-related words when writing about non-military matters; perpetually defines; weaves a clothing-language motif in word and photographic images; and constructs legal and military linguistic structures to elucidate professionals’ competing, confronting, defending, breaching, and aggressing, an exclusionary design Woolf ultimately turns on those excluding women.

Chicken or Egg, Patriarchy or State?

In *Three Guineas* (1938), Woolf critiques patriarchy, connects patriarchy in England with foreign fascism, plays with dichotomies throughout giving particular attention to the private–public relation, and insists the public–political, -legislative, and -justice sectors legislate and adjudicate the private, a highly contentious claim in 1930s’ England. She argues boys’ teachers educate them for violence not only directly through curricula, as early 20th-century photographs of English boys’ school-military training, uninterrupted playground brawls, and sports activities evidence, but indirectly through organized social interactions. Directly and indirectly, boys learn through confrontation, competition, and aggression to behave violently in order to excel, win, and dominate. Englishmen’s having legislated and adjudicated females’ exclusion from public education, sports, professional training, professional work, and civil, franchise, legal, economic, and property rights and their Parliamentary legislation and legal adjudication defining females as “non-persons” and married women as their husbands’ properties certainly reinforce boys’ public school educations for violence and its ultimate expression, war.² Woolf (1938) leaves no stone unturned to demonstrate violence imbues every English public and private institution, English institutional violence often manifests through exclusion, and quite poignantly and contentiously, boys and girls’ educations promote violence that leads to militarism. Nevertheless, she does not overtly claim violence originates with patriarchy or the State, that patriarchy or the State holds a monopoly on violence. Another chicken or egg conundrum?

Challenging feminist theories of history, contending many feminist scholars have treated patriarchy as ahistorical, Austrian-born U.S.-feminist historian Gerda Lerner (1986) aims to understand how patriarchy establishes and institutionalizes in Western civilizations. Lerner (1986) correlates patriarchy’s manifesting and institutionalizing in the Western world with gender construction, defining patriarchy as “the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general” (p. 239). Thus, Lerner necessarily assumes something precedes patriarchy (Hunter, 1988). Rather than listing the theories and assumptions Lerner (1986) rejects and summarizing her theoretical foundation, I give only enough detail to shed light on the relation among patriarchy, violence,

and the State. Lerner uses German philosopher, historian, political theorist, and revolutionary socialist Friedrich Engels' (1820–1895) socioeconomic and processual contribution, connecting social changes to sexual relations, and, with some alterations, French anthropologist and ethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss' (1908–2009) formulation concerning the “exchange of women.” Lerner asserts male–female reproductive differences displaying in women's unique childbearing abilities and women's unique ability to child-rear (especially feeding infants) drives labor divisions. Such egalitarian societies as the hunter–gatherers operate on a different-but-equal basis, dividing labor by sex so each sex's work complements the other's, functioning advantageously for all (Lerner, 1986). Significantly, rather than biology, culture determines these divisions in hunter–gatherer societies (Lerner, 1986).

Moving from hunter–gatherers to developing Neolithic agricultural societies, Lerner shows women's reproductive abilities' transforming from contributing to the group's labor pool to becoming a resource and commodity. Lerner builds upon Swedish medical doctor and anthropologist Peter Aaby (1977), and French, neo-Marxist-economic anthropologist and Africanist, Claude Meillassoux's (1981) claims that this society's controlling females' sexuality predates private-property acquisition. Because women's childbearing capacities makes women necessary to survival, communities and individuals begin exchanging and capturing women (Lerner, 1986). Over time, exchange and capture make women more than resource and commodity but define and brand women as private property.

U.S. historian Stephanie Coontz and Irish-born anthropologist Peta Henderson (1986) corroborate Lerner's (1986) historical research. When analyzing gender and kin-corporate societies, Coontz and Henderson (1986) isolate marriage rules' disadvantages to the sex that moves to another kin-corporation. Moving separates that individual from being a controlling member in his/her natal group's property to being a non-owning producer in another (p. 122). Exchanging and capturing women means women tend to be the ones moving to another kin-corporation. Such patrilocal channels “labour and prestige into a single local lineage...creating the potential for” ranking and social stratification: “inter-lineage inequality” (p. 138).³ Thus, Lerner (1986) and Coontz and Henderson (1986) agree social and economic evolution lead to men's dominating women, then men's private property ownership (beginning with their owning women); class societies emerge from these two evolutionary moves.

Although Lerner (1986) traces Mesopotamian history between 4000–2000 B.C.E., evidencing patriarchal features' honing within families and what she calls the archaic state, I condense her analysis of these 2,000 years' evolution to a few milestones that help elucidate the relation among patriarchy, violence, and the State. Women move from dependent positions in the Sumerian courts where women nevertheless exercise

power and influence, own property, participate in business, and compose poetry to a period when men hold power over other men and all women. Lerner emphasizes women's oppression and enslavement precede general enslavement; men model men's enslavement on women and children's enslavement; and introducing concubines and slaves into a society already enslaving its own women and children leads to hierarchizing the unfree. Although not all named "slaves," all women—wives, concubines, prostitutes—and all slaves mix in the hierarchy of "unfree" (Lerner 1986). Significantly, freemen's wives do not necessarily hold positions at this hierarchy's top; concubines, prostitutes, and both male and female slaves may have higher positions than some freemen's wives. With Aaby (1977), Meillassoux (1981), Coontz and Henderson (1986), and Lerner's (1986) documentation and corroboration, one doubts little that patriarchal relations come first, then patriarchal ideologies, then the State institution; one doubts little that patriarchal relations are violent relations, that violence becomes integral to patriarchal ideologies, and that patriarchs creating the State as institution infuse violence into the State's ideologies, ensuring its violent relation to people.

Language Violence, Warring Language

Word Attacks, Word Wars

Because, at least when pointed out, one sees without difficulty the first and most obvious way Woolf (1938) infuses violence onto *Three Guineas*' every page, I merely caution readers war words abundantly pock these pages, each a minefield stretching before readers' eyes. Throughout, Woolf selects war and war-related words to relate non-military events, demonstrating violence as omnipresent in English language and society, single-word war metaphors in such long and frequent use speakers likely have forgotten the comparisons these words represent: weapons, arms, guns, munitions, soldiers, wars, fights, battles, skirmishes, campaigns, battlelines, battlefields, burnings, peltings, hanging effigies, and Woolf's oft-repeated, multi-word refrain, "£300,000,000 spent on arms annually." Additionally, Woolf saturates *Three Guineas* with less-pointedly military language connecting to the military, aggression, celebrating military might, heralding military outcomes, and everyday violence: processions, ceremonies, bribes, escapes, prisons, imprisonments, captivity, locked in, locked out, treaty-like documents, parchments, conditions, and slammed doors. Although one might think Woolf's using war words in 1930s' England means she attaches these words to males and male activities, she does not exclude women from using or receiving war words. Instead, Woolf identifies English females, their private homes, their unpaid-for, at-home educations, and their unpaid labor as sites and conditions together educating females for war while English male-only, public-education institutions, institutional conditions, and teachers educate boys for war. Not only does Woolf use war and war-related words to elucidate omnipresent

violence in English language, society, and political, legal, economic, and education institutions, she chooses these words as ongoing reminders that violent words and violent acts, including war as the ultimate violence, divide and displace to exclude. After all, a gun's length, a cannon's length, ship and plane's distance from their human targets themselves divide one person from another before their agents even fire. Firing at another with bullets or words results in the ultimate division, displacement, and exclusion whether through injury, maiming, or eradication of body or spirit.

Defining Excludes, Excluding Violences

Beyond selecting war words, Woolf's narrator uses one particular word that represents exclusion. Specifically, she endlessly defines, sometimes seeming to mount one definition upon another. Claiming defining is a form of violence may induce readers' furrowed brows, frowns, or simply their bewilderment, for, especially in academe, one daily defines. Nevertheless, because defining means determining what to include and exclude, to define requires one to exclude, an inherently violent act. Deeply engrained in Western culture, defining means one must identify patterns, determine criteria, and form categories, ultimately deducing meaning that includes only items meeting the criteria for a given category. Although in the Western world, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) was the first to classify “all human things,” taxonomy traces back to human language skills' origins (Manktelow, n.d.).⁴ People whose societies' histories link to the Ancient Greeks and their ways of reasoning, have this system of identifying patterns, determining criteria, and forming categories drilled into them from the time they are toddlers. Thus, individuals may not recognize when they move from applying this process—patterns, criteria, categories, definition—to plants, animals, and inanimate objects to human beings. Turning defining and its underlying processes upon human beings symbolically violates which sometimes also leads to physical and psychological violence but always dehumanizes, subordinates, oppresses, and imprisons.

Well before Freud's science but perhaps more forcefully after, at least 2,000 years of males have defined females as “lacking”—lacking a phallus, lacking facial hair, lacking physical strength, lacking stamina, lacking brain size, lacking intellectual abilities, lacking reason, lacking mental strength, and lacking all other features, qualities, and characteristics with which God and Nature endow only males. The narrator's seemingly obsessive defining in *Three Guineas* reveals females do not meet the criteria for the male category, a category not limited to sexuality, reproductive abilities, or the body in general; males exclude females not only from the male category but from all things males identify belong or connect to males, including humanity itself.

Woolf's (1938) narrator asserts patriarchs support their reasoning by turning to the usual authorities, God and Nature. In Western, Judeo-Christian societies, females not only remain outside maleness but quite

literally emerge from the first man's rib. Not created for God but *for* and *of* man, females can only be subordinate, serve at males' will, exist outside the rights, privileges, comforts, and responsibilities God and Nature give males—by definition. As Woolf's narrator notes multiple times in *Three Guineas*, for the over 2,000 years since St. Paul's death, Christian males have cited St. Paul to support their subordinating females, assigning them subservient status, excluding them from participating in life beyond the domestic sphere, and naming married women their husband's legal property with no independent identity.⁵ In 1753, for example, Judge Sir William Blackstone clarifies married women's legal status: "the very being, or legal existence of the woman, is suspended during the marriage, or at least is consolidated and incorporated into that of her husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything" (Blackstone, 1765–1769, n.p.). Blackstone thinly but legally disguises English husbands' owning their wives as protection and care (Caine & Sluga, 2002, pp. 12–13). Although wife-selling has never been legal in England, English husbands readily extend their legal possession to wife-selling at will, for magistrates tend to turn a blind eye: "one early 19th-century magistrate...[is] on record as stating...he...[does] not believe he...[has] the right to prevent wife sales" (Quartet, 2017). Indeed, wife-selling is not an archaic practice, for in 1928, just 10 years before *Three Guineas*' publication and the same year Parliament passes the 1928 Representation of the People Act (1928 Equal Franchise Act), legislating suffrage for all British men and women aged 21, a man in Blackwood South Wales sells his wife for £1 (Edwards, 2015; Prevost, 2016).⁶

In keeping with Paul's words to the Corinthians, Christians, even in Woolf's time, focus females' origin, status, and *raison d'être* around their heads as Woolf's (1938) narrator states multiple times in *Three Guineas*, likely because Paul proclaims God is man's head, but man is woman's head and because women must cover their heads to reflect they know and accept women exist for man's glory.

...a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman: but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man. (*King James Bible*, 1769/n.d., I Corinthians 11: 7–9)

As Woolf's (1938) narrator notes, Paul's hierarchy and decrees for hair coverings continue to influence patriarchs, preventing and then limiting women's access to education, access to public institutions and civil services, work in the professions, voting rights, among other activities, for they are not men but come from men to serve men and be men's glory.

With Henry VIII's creating the Church of England and inducting himself its head, one can see how St. Paul's words hold particular

significance in Woolf's England's secular contexts not only because the population is moving away from the Church and its grip as Woolf's narrator reminds readers but because the Church of England is the State's church, is one with the State as its name transmits, and therefore receives income from the State's taxes: "The work of an archbishop is worth £15,000 a year *to the State...*" (Woolf, 1938, p. 54, emphasis added), the archbishop's salary, the highest salary Woolf's narrator quotes from the impeccable Whitaker's spot-on *Almanack*, is salary paid at the taxpayers' expense.⁷ Upon becoming Church of England, the Church inextricably links to the State, transferring its "rules" and influence on moral, social, political, legal, and perhaps even economic workings to the emerging secular society whose people choose to accept, embrace, and perpetuate them. Looking to Lerner's (1986) analysis reminds too that this Church-State liaison occurs because Henry VIII treats females as resource and commodity, as reproductive wealth, as property he may exchange or discard at will, using virtually any means he chooses should he judge his woman's value depreciating. As late as WWI's end (1918), even the most secular of men cite God and Nature's intent as justification for excluding females: God and Nature purposefully create females as beings unsuitable for personhood, freedom, and inclusion, as beings needing men's protection and care. Therefore, by definition, females are "non-persons" and property.

Clothing Speaks: Who Is the Fairest of All?

In addition to exclusion's violent language manifesting in war words and the defining process, Woolf (1938) depicts warring using non-verbal language that, like definition, excludes. Through this third kind of language use, clothing-language, Woolf (1938) reiterates and underscores violence that often goes unnoticed. Because clothing is part of the everyday, one may not immediately recognize it excludes and therefore enacts violence. Woolf's (1938) depicting warring through clothing-language likely helps draw women into her text because they immediately recognize clothing as language, as possibly sending ambiguous or misinterpretable messages, and as probably launching subterfuge. Because for centuries women were to be silent—like children, seen but not heard—clothing and its accoutrements become vital, non-verbal language even for such powerful, unsilenced women as Queen Elizabeth I. Through her attire, Elizabeth I not only communicates to those she encounters personally, she commissions numerous portraits she reproduces on "flyers" sent throughout her realm, so her people recognize her when she moves among them. For these mass-produced and -distributed portraits, Elizabeth I carefully constructs her attire to transmit precise messages that help her create herself as brand and relay specific political and economic messages throughout her realm. The first to advertise herself, create herself as brand, and communicate to the public using her image on flyers, Elizabeth messages her largely

illiterate people through her clothing. By brand, she is the Virgin Queen. Thus, her portraits often include her dripping in pearls, clearly announcing and reinforcing her brand, the Virgin Queen, her virtue and purity—of body, heart, mind, and purpose to make England wealthy and strong—ever intact (Cartwright, 2020; Larson, 2021; Peterson, 2019).⁸ Necessarily, Elizabeth I publicizes more than her brand, for threats against her life run rampant as people inside and outside England conspire to replace her on England's throne.⁹ As a result, she unambiguously conveys she may be pure but neither politically naïve nor ignorant. In one well-known painting (c. 1602), eyes and ears cover her massive skirts broadcasting to all, “I have eyes and ears everywhere” (Cartwright, 2020).¹⁰

Although for centuries everyday women have also communicated through their garb, because hair covers much of one's head and the head catches viewers' attention first, hair becomes important to women's clothing and its language (Ofek, 2009; Rifelj, 2010). Unlike Elizabeth I who painstakingly constructs her appearance through clothing and its accoutrements to transmit messages she chooses to communicate, everyday women, even in late-19th- and early-20th-century England, style their hair to reflect the pre-constructed, normalized messages religious and later secular patriarchs dictate. By adhering to society's hair rules, whether religious or secular, women demonstrate they understand their place in patriarchy's basement and therefore defer to their male heads, aligning their attitudes and identities with male-authored ideologies, value systems, and dictates (Haskins, 1993; Ofek, 2009). Until WWI, females' hairstyles and hair abundance communicate character, marital status, class, sexual passion, and sometimes ability to shelter (Gitter, 1984; Rifelj, 2010; Tindall, 1966). A girl's exposing her head hair, leaving it loose or in braids, tells all in view she remains a child or signals her unmarried social and virginal sexual status; a female's covering her head or containing her hair in “up-dos” messages she is of marriageable age or already married (Jolly, 2004; Ofek, 2009). Beyond marital status, hair reveals a female's character, especially her sexual morality, for in the Judeo-Christian tradition, females' hair, a “locus of sinfulness, corruption, [and] unbridled sexuality,” declares sexual transgression when uncovered, loose, or messy—a woman loose like her hair—unbridled womanhood emerging as demon snakes from her head (Ofek, 2009), at once Mary Magdalene (Haskins, 1993) and Medusa.

Perhaps best known from Victorian-era novels, Victorian women not only speak through their dresses and hair but learn fan and flower language through which they silently message. If a woman puts her fan across her heart, she states, “You have won my love”; when pressing the fan against her lips, she grants, “You may kiss me”; twirling the fan in her left hand, she cautions, “We are watched” (Starp, 2018).¹¹ Although flowers can transmit far more messages than fans, using flowers for messaging requires

more planning and forethought than does communicating with fans. Each flower type relates a particular meaning; different kinds of flowers arranged together transmit specific meanings; and the way one arranges flowers relates still different meanings (Ingram, 1869). Because clothing replaces women's voices for centuries when patriarchs silence females' speech, when women's speaking yields punishment, and when certain kinds of speech are taboo, messaging without speaking becomes socially, culturally, religiously, and even politically engrained, all-but-woven into females' DNA, as education, law, professions, economics, politics, elitism, and belief in their God- and Nature-ordained right to dominate embed deeply into men.

Taking advantage of women's long experience using clothing-language, Woolf (1938) plays on St. Paul's focus on "heads," man as woman's head, turning Paul's dictate and men's judging and stereotyping females on their heads. She calls into question men's stereotyping and judging women as innately vain, shallow, foolish, silly, thoughtless, and frivolously excessive, spending money on baubles, ribbons, exotic feathers, and elaborate hats. In *Three Guineas*, rather than wearing clothes of fine fabrics accessorized with jewels, gold, fur, ribbons, and lace, women wear simple clothing that communicates little more than the season, the woman's social class, and often, regardless of class, her poverty. Instead, educated men—professional men—communicate through their professional attire adorned with medals, gems, gold-bullion cord, and ermine, completing their public messages with such accessories as silver batons and peculiar hats. By repeatedly calling attention to these men's fancy garb, Woolf's narrator weaves a clothing-language motif throughout *Three Guineas'* tapestry, often weaving men's clothing-language in word pictures, and once weaving five visual images, five photographs, each of a different man in a different profession wearing clothing unique to his profession. Like Queen Elizabeth I, these professional men use clothing to advertise themselves but rather than advertising self as nation sheltering and advancing those within, they peddle their personal importance, personal wealth, personal power, personal eliteness. They further tout their importance by strutting in ceremonies and processions clothed in what women view as mysterious garb that trumpets their service to—even their creation of—splendid Empire and splendid war (p. 39). Unlike Queen Elizabeth I whose person and carefully planned attire represented in paintings and 16th-century "flyers" transmit clear, wordless messages, Woolf's 1930s' professional men send non-verbal messages that baffle female observers who rarely understand what men's clothing with its metals, gems, gold-bullion cord, ermine, and bizarre head gear conveys. Elizabeth I wants all people—illiterate housemaids to highest noblemen—to comprehend her messages. The professional men Woolf pictures clothe and accessorize themselves to exclude most if not all females from understanding more than each wearer's position above all women, his unnamed accomplishments unattainable for

all women, his profession closed or barely opened to women, his wealth impossible for women to earn, his knowledge and access to information mostly inaccessible to women.

Men arrayed in glory and mystery strike female viewers with awe and fear, for men's presenting themselves fancily costumed in ceremonies, processions, and dinner parties serves to rub women's noses in their own lack, their own ignorance, their own exclusion now and in the foreseeable future—"shall not, shall not, shall not"—violence again (pp. 105, 129).

You shall not learn; you shall not earn; you shall not own; you shall not—such was the society relationship of brother to sister for many centuries.is there not something in the conglomeration of people in societies that releases what is most selfish and violent, least rational and humane in the individuals themselves? ... Inevitably we look upon societies as conspiracies that sink the private brother. ...and inflate in his stead a monstrous male, loud of voice, hard of fist, childishly intent upon scoring the floor of the earth with chalk marks, with whose mystic boundaries human beings are penned, rigidly, separately, artificially; where, daubed red and gold, decorated like a savage with feathers he goes through mystic rites and enjoys the dubious pleasures of power and dominion while we, "his" women are locked in the private house without share.... (p. 105)

Not knowing what professional men's splendid clothing and accoutrements mean not only arouses curiosity and awe but incites mystery and fear of their unknown meanings. Females' understanding no more than these men's positions above women and the women "shall nots" men's professional garb drives home, women comprehend and feel exactly what they are supposed to: "less" or "lack," outside and underfoot, beaten down and beaten back, locked out and locked in. These professional men's advertising their exclusivity means advertising their God- and Nature-made exclusivity, their difference from women in every important physical and mental attribute, their difference in education, in economic, legal, political, property-owing, and social status, their difference in freedom to access education and work in the professions so to realize economic independence and indifferent influence in public affairs, and their difference in freedom to define themselves. Like war words and warring through defining, men's clothing-language excludes.

Through clothing, these professional men perpetuate violence against not only females but violence that first created and now maintains "our splendid Empire" by infinitely sustaining "our splendid war" (p. 39), violence tracing back to patriarchal relations, patriarchal ideologies, and those relations and ideologies' merging when patriarchs created the State as institution (Lerner, 1986). However poorly 1930s' patriarchs receive Woolf's

(1938) spotlighting Britain ever at war, England and its men's centuries'-old, multi-pronged violence against women, and that omnipresent violence as hypocrisy, British patriachs continue warring in two different countries even as Woolf writes. English patriachs are rallying to fight against foreign fascism's proliferating in two other countries while heralding their own England as democracy's model. They would likely have burst into flames had they recognized Woolf's (1938) having constructed her argument upon a scaffolding of violent words, the defining process, and professional men's clothing-language, all representing violence through exclusion. Given her nephew, Quentin Bell (1972), male friends (Bell, 1972), and male and female writing colleagues' (Bell, 1972; Leavis, 1938) responses to *Three Guineas*, I cannot imagine these condescending and dismissive readers read carefully and thoughtfully enough to discern her perceptiveness, cleverness, skill, or self-protecting linguistic subterfuge.

Linguistic Structural Violence: X v. Y

Finally, war words, warring through defining, and warring through clothing-language converge in the fourth way Woolf (1938) uses language violence in *Three Guineas* to elucidate violence as one criterion necessary to defining patriarchy and the State patriachs create. Stymieing the State's resources, potential wealth, and potential peace and prosperity, exclusion enacts violence, preventing female innovators, workers, and producers from accessing so-called common resources and achieving independence and from contributing more than reproductive and domestic labor to the community pot.

All this wealth [earned in the professions] may in the course of time come our way if we follow the professions. In short, we may change our position from being the victims of the patriarchal system, paid on the truck system, with £30 or £40 a year in cash and board and lodging thrown in, to being the champions of the capitalist system.... (p. 67)

Excluding females from the professions virtually ensures patriachs in those professions need not compete with women, may retain the mystique they have nurtured surrounding their uniquely male, God- and Nature-given attributes, rights, and privileges, and may therefore remain the elite, the powerful, the controllers Woolf's narrator repeatedly reminds readers England's "democratic" patriachs name Dictator and Tyrant when such individuals emerge abroad. More than stymieing, exclusion reflects bloodthirst, wastes time, money, strength, and the human spirit.

...almost every biography we read of professional men in the nineteenth century, to limit ourselves to that not distant and fully documented age, is largely concerned with war. ... Some of these battles, as you can testify, are still in progress. ... In fact the only

profession which does not seem to have fought a fierce battle [to exclude women] during the nineteenth century is the profession of literature. All the other professions according to the testimony of biography, seem to be as bloodthirsty as the profession of arms itself. It is true that the combatants did not inflict flesh wounds; chivalry forbade; but you will agree that a battle that wastes time is as deadly as a battle that wastes blood. You will agree that a battle that costs money is as deadly as a battle that costs a leg or an arm. You will agree that a battle that forces youth to spend its strength haggling in committee rooms, soliciting favours, assuming a mask of reverence to cloak its ridicule, inflicts wounds upon the human spirit which no surgery can heal. (pp. 63–64)

Here, one sees Woolf not only uses men's professional garb as clothing-language but uses that language to mask and cloak the truth, implying men's professional clothing masks and cloaks some truth beneath, another way to exclude.

In her fourth language use, Woolf narrows her focus to two professions, positioning the bloodthirsty legal and military professions front-and-center by highlighting the *X n. Y* linguistic structure legal and military practitioners commonly use. Woolf's choosing these professions is no accident, for although bloodthirsty, in principle, legal professionals concern themselves with justice within England's borders while military professionals—especially their current supporters backing the battle against foreign fascism—focus on justice outside England's borders. Within both professions, practitioners use war language of competition, confrontation, defending, breaching, and aggression; verbalize their interactions using the warring, competitive-linguistic *X n. Y* structure; use the violence of dividing and displacing to exclude that war language and linguistic structures embody; verbalize their interactions' outcomes as winning or losing; and justify and enforce excluding others as their birthright, a "right" by definition, and a "right" won. Meanwhile word-mines still pattern every page, defining continues its exclusionary process, and professional men's clothing speaks from backstage.

Signaling violence, the legal profession's using the *X n. Y* linguistic structure reveals the profession exists for and functions to combat, in principle to retain law and order and ensure justice. Woolf's (1938) narrator demonstrates one need neither look far nor for long to learn that multiple times over the centuries, the legal profession's members have excluded women, fought legal battles to continue excluding women, and used their own profession's workings, the legal process itself, to exclude women, declaring them legally "non-persons" or "property." Probably the example closest to Woolf's 1930s' analysis occurs when the Law Society legally excludes women from the legal profession, this time via the famous *Bebb*

n. Law Society case.¹² The trial begins July 1, 1913, 40 years after women’s first attempt to become solicitors (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019). In her case, Bebb asks the Law Society to declare her a person within the meaning of the Solicitors Act of 1843, section 2 (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019), thereby allowing her to sit the Law Society’s preliminary examination.

No person shall act as an Attorney or Solicitor...unless such *Person* shall after the passing of this Act be admitted and enrolled and otherwise duly qualified as an Attorney or Solicitor, pursuant to the Directions and Regulations of this Act. (Solicitors Act of 1843, section 2, quoted in Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019)

Representing Bebb at trial, Lord Stanley Buckmaster, KC uses the Solicitors Act of 1843, section 48, to evidence his asserting women may legally become solicitors.

...every word importing the Masculine Gender only shall extend and be applied to a Female as well as Male...unless in any of the Cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially provided, or there by something in the Subject or Context, *repugnant to such Construction*. (Solicitors Act of 1843, section 48, quoted in Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019, emphasis added)

Not only contending words importing the masculine gender extend to females, Buckmaster cites precedents for women’s having worked as solicitors even without being named “solicitor” (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019; “Landmarks in Law,” 2019).¹³ Justice Joyce rejects Lord Buckmaster’s argument because

...being a solicitor or attorney...[is] a public office rather than a member of a private profession as contended on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and...[because] it...[is] a long-established common law principle that a woman...[is] not a person, women...[are] incapable of carrying out a public function. (quoted in Lowe, 1969; “UK: 75 Years,” 1997)

Joyce further contends Parliament, not the court, is responsible for changing law (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019; “Landmarks in Law,” 2019). Bebb loses. Case dismissed.

This 1913 ruling not only supports earlier legal definitions of women as non-persons, documented in such legal records as 1843’s Solicitors Act and Blackstone’s (1765–1769) legal commentaries on marriage, but ensures women’s exclusion. Although Joyce’s ruling perpetuates defining, judging, and violating women, influencing society’s every corner, Bebb’s appeal, with Lord Robert Cecil as counsel (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019), has an even greater influence. Documented in the 1914 law reports (1 CH. 286), the Court of Appeal hears Bebb’s case before the Master of the Rolls Lord Cozens-Hardy, Lord Justice Swinfen Eady, and Lord Justice Phillimore,

December 1913 (Auchmuty, 2011; Bourne, 2019). Like Buckmaster, Lord Cecil argues the Solicitors Act of 1843, sections 2 and 48, provides for women's entering the profession unless an absolute rule of law disqualifies them (Vignoles, 2018). Cecil further asserts women practiced as solicitors in the 14th century during King Edward III's reign, presumably during the Hundred Years' War, and in 1913 are already practicing abroad (Vignoles, 2018). Lord Cecil concludes: "There is no reason in the nature of things why women should not practise, and the plaintiff is a particularly capable person" (quoted in Vignoles, 2018).¹⁴ The three justices rule the statutes' provisions do not provide enough evidence to support the legislature's having intended women to enter the profession, for women have never been solicitors (Vignoles, 2018).

Associate Barrister Laura Vignoles (2018) summarizes the Court of Appeal judges' ruling: "That's just the way it is!" Therefore, the judges ultimately agree with Master of the Rolls Justice Joyce by relying upon the "long uniform and uninterrupted usage" (Master of the Rolls, Cozens-Hardy) establishing a common-law principle preventing women from becoming legal professionals: "no instance of a woman attorney has... as far as it is known, ever existed"; "from that time continuously to the present, there is no instance of any woman being an attorney" (Lord Justice Swinfen Eady); therefore one must rely upon "the inveterate practice of the centuries" (Lord Justice Swinfen Eady and Lord Justice Phillimore quoted in Vignoles, 2018), a practice in "long uniform and interrupted usage, which we ought...to be very loth to depart from" (1914 1 CH. 286).

To strengthen the reasoning behind their decision, the judges also note married women are unfit "either for entering into articles or for contracting with their clients" because they are not at liberty to enter into binding contracts; by extension, the judges note allowing "spinsters" entry also presents difficulties: "it would be a serious inconvenience if, in the middle of...[a spinster's] articles, or in the middle of conducting a piece of litigation, a woman was suddenly to be disqualified from contracting by reason of her marriage" (quoted in Vignoles, 2018, n.p.). Although of no help to *Bebb*, Master of the Rolls Cozens-Hardy speaks for the record:

...in point of intelligence and education and competency women—and in particular the applicant here, who is a distinguished Oxford student—are at least equal to a great many, and, probably, far better than many, of the candidates who will come up for examination. (quoted in Vignoles, 2018, n.p.)

Like Master of the Rolls Joyce, the Court of Appeal judges conclude Parliament is responsible for changing legislation, not the court. *Bebb v. Law Society* shows "how the courts ...[use] precedent in order to maintain the...[*status quo*], and...[demonstrate] the inflexibility and limits of the law" (Denis-Smith quoted in "Landmarks in Law," 2019).¹⁵ The case highlights

the “decades-long resistance of...male lawyers, MPs and judges to the idea of allowing women to be lawyers, and the need for feminist campaigners to strategise on all fronts to shift attitudes” (Rackley & Auchmuty quoted in “Landmarks in Law,” 2019).¹⁶

Although *Bebb v. Law Society* influences Parliament’s passing the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act (1919) in December 1919, legislating women’s legal access to the profession, and although four women pass the Law Society’s examinations in 1922 with the Society’s admitting its first woman solicitor that December, few women enter, in part because they lack the 300–500-guinea annual premium. In 1922, fathers may risk their guineas on sons, but few will risk guineas on daughters. If having the initial premium and if a firm hires her, her salary, far lower than her male counterparts’, makes the 300–500-guinea annual premium an ongoing obstacle to her continued employment within the profession—exclusion again since she has no path to earning income to pay the premium.

Woolf’s (1938) second profession of focus, the military, remains closed to women in 1930s’ England despite such WWI women’s work at warfront as uncovering enemy landmines to protect military men and tending the wounded and dying and such WWI women’s work at the home front as building munitions, making asbestos-filled gas masks, and stirring the deadly “Devil’s Porridge” (Holman, 2015; Johnston, 2014).¹⁷ Because blocked from the profession, even women dead, wounded, or ill from landmine eruptions, munitions-factory explosions, and asbestos poisoning earn no respect, no recognition, no honors, no disability compensation, and no death benefits for their families, only masks of reverence. Perhaps women are so dispensable because the year before WWI (1914–1918) begins, Mr. Justice Joyce judges and rules women legally non-persons and, of course, because the State cannot justify paying non-persons salaries budgeted for persons, those human beings called military men. Selecting the military as her second profession of focus is not merely because of its *X v. Y* linguistic structure, often expressed using such related structures as *Fight against A*, *Battle of B*, and *Campaign of C*, but because this linguistic structure reflects competition, confrontation, defense, breaching, and aggressing, not merely because this structure superimposes the legal profession, not merely because this linguistic structure represents violent physical reality, but because in 1938 the military continues to include women in its violence while excluding women in violence from professional salaries, benefits, respect, recognition, honors, disability compensation, and death benefits for their families. Significantly, when Woolf’s (1938) narrator gives examples, she does not use language illustrating women’s civil disobedience, anti-violence, or passivism but war language, for not only does violence seem to understand only violence, women use violent language perhaps because language is inherently violent and because their battle “tactics” and

“attacks,” consisting of the usual committees, petitions, humble appeals, bazaars, and questions, melt under professional men’s steel bullets, iron cannon balls, and heated assaults like ice cream, cake, and trifle women sell at their bazaars (p. 65).

Woolf’s narrator focuses on a single example with multiple parts, an example illustrating legal and military professionals’ communicating, combining the violent linguistic structure *X v. Y* and its variations with verbal and non-verbal war language. Woolf’s narrator need not search ancient history for cases, but may point to times still in readers’ memories, Victorian and Edwardian times. After noting too many cases demonstrating professionals’ love for battle exist to name or relate their stories, she selects Sophia Jex-Blake (1840–1912), a woman whose life, battles, and legal cases straddle the Victorian and Edwardian eras. Sophia’s battles begin in her father’s house, move to Edinburgh’s Royal College of Surgeons, and continue until her death in 1912 through legal actions within medical education institutions, courts, and Parliament (McCullins, 1918).¹⁸ Indeed, Woolf’s narrator may select Sophia’s case because her 1938 contemporaries would probably recognize her name and remember some particulars from newspaper articles. For these same reasons, Woolf’s narrator gives only a word or two of particular episodes as if merely to jog the reader’s memory of actual events. The narrator describes Sophia’s actions using war words; the encounters she enumerates form the violence-provoking linguistic structure, *X v. Y*. Woolf’s narrator begins recounting Sophia’s first engagement in the war, *Victims of Patriarchy v. Patriarchy*, with the first battle, *Fathers v. Daughters*, otherwise named *The Battle of Harley Street*. *The Battle of Harley Street* reminds readers women’s war against patriarchy begins in their homes, when they are girls, and against their fathers, their “heads.”

In 1859 Sophia battles against her father who forbids her to accept money for tutoring mathematics. As he counters her maneuvers to accept payment, claiming she will look bad to everyone if accepting wages, she recognizes he instead believes he will look bad because society will think he lacks money to provide well for his daughter and think he manages neither his daughter nor his household. “Like a fool I have consented to give up the fees for this term only—though I am miserably poor. It was foolish. It only defers the struggle” (p. 65). One local newspaper names the next fight in Sophia’s personal war against patriarchy “the first skirmish,” *Sophia Jex-Blake v. the Royal College of Surgeons*, Edinburgh, 1869 (p. 65). Much Woolf’s (1938) narrator includes in her account occurs after Sophia’s fight for admission in 1869, transpiring in 1870 after she and six other women win their battle against the Royal College of Surgeons to gain entry to sit for admission’s exams: “In March 1869 after much internal strain, Edinburgh University approved Jex-Blake’s application, but” the university court “eventually rejected” it “on the grounds the university could not

make the necessary arrangements ‘in the interest of one lady’” (McCullins, 2018, n.p.).¹⁹ Writing for BBC Scotland, Darren McCullins (2018) fills the gaps in Woolf’s account, drawing from the 19th-century report in the local paper, *The Scotsman*.

...a campaign carried in...[*The Scotsman*] newspaper called on more women to join her [fight for admission]. The story gathered attention and more women joined her cause, pushing to study medicine in Edinburgh.

...

In November 1869, the women passed the matriculation exam and were admitted to the university medical school.

The university charged them higher fees and the women, led by Jex-Blake were forced to arrange lectures for themselves due to a loophole whereby university staff were permitted but not required to teach women. (McCullins, 2018, n.p.)

Woolf’s (1938) narrator relates details that, rather than occurring in 1869, occur in 1870 when the women are making their way to the examination room to take their anatomy exams (McCullins, 2018, n.p.). *Three Guineas*’ narrator quotes from an 1870 newspaper account:²⁰

“A disturbance of a very unbecoming nature took place yesterday afternoon in front of the Royal College of Surgeons.... ... nearly 200 students assembled in front of the gate leading to the building.” The medical students howled and sang songs. “The gate was closed in [the women’s] faces.... Dr. Handyside found it utterly impossible to begin his demonstration....a pet sheep was introduced into the room” and so on. (Woolf, 1938, p. 65)

McCullins (2018) names the day’s events “hostile”: “A mob of more than 200 people pelted the women with mud and rubbish as they made their way to sit an anatomy exam. The abuse was unwavering until a supporter hurriedly unbolted a door to get them inside” (n.p.). McCullins also sheds light on Woolf’s narrator’s quotation from the 1870’s newspaper story, “a pet sheep was introduced into the room,” a statement Woolf’s contemporaries may well have understood but that arouses more perplexity in today’s readers than understanding: “As students sat the exam, the mob [of male medical students] shoved a sheep into the hall, causing chaos. It is said the professor in charge of the exam remarked: “The sheep can stay, it is clearly more intelligent than those out there” (McCullins 2018, n.p.). This 19th-century professor reveals himself an enlightened man.

Woolf’s (1938) narrator likens Sophia’s fight at Edinburgh’s Royal College of Surgeons to women’s fight at Cambridge “during the battle of the Degree” (p. 65). The battles continue as does the war, *Victims of Patriarchy v. Patriarchy*, war words, words defining, clothing-language, and linguistic

structures used for wars, battles, fights, campaigns, and skirmishes. Woolf's narrator continues using such language, evoking the guns resounding in the educated man's ears. In an "Aha!" moment, I picture Woolf's educated man covering his ears because those guns' sonic booms sound not from abroad but from his very doorstep within England! Professional men are firing these guns whose collective blast reminds readers Englishmen not only perpetually war abroad but war within green England's borders, always battling to maintain their own exclusivity, elite mystique, free and cheap labor, dominion, wealth, and authority, power, and control, always fighting to exclude females, even from personhood, still combatting in this millennia-long raging war. No end comes into view.

Nothing would induce the authorities encamped within the sacred gates to allow the women to enter. They said that God was on their side, Nature was on their side, Law was on their side, and Property was on their side. The college was founded for the benefit of men only; men only were entitled by law to benefit from its endowments. (p. 65)

Notice the war language of "encampment," of "sides"; notice women's exclusion from the college, from benefits, from entitlements the law endows only men; notice women barred from crossing college's sacred gates—excluded from the heaven where they might claim the education needed to earn their own livings so to have an independent-disinterested opinion, disinterested because no longer needing to support "our splendid Empire...our splendid war" to survive (p. 39). Woolf argues girls are educated to support war and as women support war because they must charm, cajole, and acquiesce to men who wage and support war, so men—whether fathers, brothers, husbands, or would-be husbands—will continue to provide room, board, dress allowances, and pocket money for the females they prevent from earning income.

Consciously she must use whatever charm or beauty she possessed to flatter and cajole the busy men, the soldiers, the lawyers, the ambassadors, the cabinet ministers.... Consciously she must accept their views, and fall in with their decrees because it was only so that she could wheedle them into giving her the means to marry or marriage itself. (p. 39)

Women also support war because only when men leave for wars abroad do women have freedom from the domestic, freedom to earn money, freedom to gain training and education for paid work, freedom to move about town and city unaccompanied.

...her unconscious influence was even more strongly in favor of war. How else can we explain that amazing outburst in August 1914, when the daughters of educated men who had been educated thus rushed into hospitals...drove lorries, worked in

fields and munition factories, and used all their immense stores of charm, of sympathy, to persuade young men that to fight was heroic and that the wounded in battle deserved all her care and all her praise? ... So profound was her unconscious loathing for the education of the private house with its cruelty, its poverty, its hypocrisy, its immorality, its inanity that she would undertake any task however menial, exercise any fascination however fatal that enabled her to escape. Thus consciously she desired "our splendid Empire"; unconsciously she desired our splendid war. (p. 39)

Woolf presents representatives from among many facts she extracts from battles women-outsiders have waged against the patriarchal elite who possess all the property, all the money, all the institutions; against the patriarchal elite who control university admissions, access to university libraries, lectures, labs, exams, and degrees; against the patriarchal elite who control education for, exams for, admission to, and wages paid in the professions; against the patriarchal elite who write all the nation's laws, bills, and mandates; against the patriarchal elite who judge excluding women from education and professions godly and natural, right and legal because throughout English history judges have defined women as innately, legally non-persons and property; against the patriarchal elite who use God and Nature to justify excluding women and enforcing that exclusion through any means, even and often violent. By using war words and war-inspired linguistic structures, Woolf—a passivist who, even into WWII and Germany's attack on England, steadfastly asserts England should not return Germany's bombs, bullets, and gas in kind—illustrates patriarchal violence, embedded in every aspect of English society, embedded in the very definition of the State patriarchy has established, drives possibilities for change achievable only through violence.²¹ Passivist Virginia Woolf describes women's actions using violent language and linguistic structures, puts violent language and linguistic structures in women's mouths, pellets *Three Guineas*' pages with that descriptive, violent language and women's violent words. Because, according to Lerner (1986), patriarchy precedes the State and because patriarchs create the State as institution, does Woolf mean patriarchs—and all patriarchy's manifestations including the State patriarchs have created and empowered—drive violence, monopolize violence, and disguise violence behind words, clothing, linguistic structures, as well as behind the usual suspects, God, Nature, Law, and Property, always excluding? Does she mean patriarchs have relied upon and used violence to displace female others for so long—severing them from access to personhood, education, earning their livings, and therefore from having independent-disinterested opinions, freedom over their bodies, minds, and movements—that women cannot even secure the right to define themselves as human without fighting violence with violence? Does not using violence to secure the right to define oneself as human annul what it means to be human?

Empire within Empire

Because Woolf (1938) establishes women have been at war for at least 2,000 years, she also identifies the weapons they have used for these 2,000 years, advancing little and taking little territory. Women's "old weapons" include women's abilities to charm, cajole, and acquiesce and their physical attributes of physical beauty, "pure," "intact" bodies, and reproductive potential. With the right to earn their own livings, women may toss these weapons in the bin. Because the narrator asserts women's new weapon is the right to earn an independent income, all change-roads lead to women's entering the professions. Entering the professions hinges upon women's not merely attending university, not merely passing or excelling on exit exams, but obtaining the right to earn and receive degrees, the credentials required to enter the professions. Thus, Woolf's narrator positions women's exclusion from the professions and their desire to access those professions centrally, strategically, with professional men surrounding and pelting them with mud and rubbish, hanging female effigies, forcing milk down their throats, and other such pernicious acts to rebuff women wanting a share. Searching the encirclement for holes, women spin 'round and 'round, human machine guns spewing violence: words, words, words; bazaars, bazaars, and more bazaars to fund their defense and advancement, but their words and goods stand little chance against steel bullets and iron cannon balls, mere melting ice cream, cake, and trifle. In fact, in *Three Guineas*, England and its patriarch-owned and -controlled professions present as microcosm to the British Empire. The British Empire—our splendid Empire that wages our splendid war—repeats itself within the English nation of professions and professional men waging war against women who want a share in that splendid English Empire of Professions.

Patriarchal professionals—like British imperialists—drain their Empires' underlings of wealth and power. Male professionals even advertise themselves as exotic, the selves they are selling as desirable, rare, and difficult-to-obtain the way British imperialists peddle their colonies' people and goods as exotic, desirable, rare, and difficult-to-acquire. Just as Woolf's narrator cautions female readers not to think they remain innocent in perpetuating war and violence, she crushes any thought they may entertain that the male professionals she describes as peacocks and feathered savages live carefree, easy lives. She says they wear dog collars labeled "For God and Empire"—the truth their fine robes cloak. Women have worn dog collars, been collared and chained to walls and hearths, just as prisoners have worn collars, just as, when general enslavement emerges, slaves have worn collars, and just as colonized people, said to be free but working for their colonial masters, have worn collars. Are professional men, hidden beneath fine fabrics, gems, gold-bullion cords, feathers, and ermine, actually slaves, prisoners, and English colonials the State they created has enslaved, imprisoned, and colonized, men collared underneath their

fine-garb disguise, men continuously pressed to work ever-harder, ever-longer for Empire? Woolf's narrator asks women if they want to exchange one form of slavery for another. Has the State patriarchy created, investing it with patriarchy's violence-driven ideologies, turned against its patriarchal creators like science fiction's artificial intelligence turns on its human engineers? By 1938, have patriarch-created State powers become anonymous powers (Foucault, 1977/1995) effectively reinstating hunter-gatherers' division of labor but with a tweak, turning that different-but-equal labor into degreed, stratified, hierarchized slave labor? Does Woolf offer solutions or suggest a strategy by which England's enslaved may free themselves?

Turning her argument on its head, Woolf now backs the difference exclusion effects, the exclusion against which English women have warded for centuries. She reasons one can neither quickly nor easily dissolve the difference exclusion has made in men and women's points of view, perceptions, ways of knowing, and ways of problem-solving, hardening over millennia. To join the society the educated man asks her to join to help prevent war would mean men and women's deliquescing into sameness, effectively returning women to silence when absorbing them into his society, eradicating what may be the only good thing patriarchy's excluding females has yielded: difference. She stipulates this difference must not manifest in non-personhood and all that comes with non-person status but present itself in viewpoints, insights, knowledge base, and problem-solving potential exponentially multiplied when men and women unite to put their differences to work preventing war. Woolf nevertheless merely offers a strategy through which the English, all others living under patriarchy, and all other democratic pretenders might at once free themselves and prevent war. She surrenders the onus to her readers: What difference does difference make?

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Endnotes

- ¹ Writing for *American Rifleman*, Gil B. Horman explains a gun's muzzle blast produces sound pressure levels (SPLs) of 140 dBs or louder causing a sonic boom as the bullet leaves the muzzle and travels at supersonic speed from the muzzle through the air. People often describe the sonic boom as a whip-like snap or crack.

- ² In the famous December 1913 Court of Appeal case, *Bebb v. Law Society*, the ruling Judge, Mr. Justice Joyce, judges “women...[are] not ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Solicitors Act of 1843” (McCullins, 2018). Woolf (1938) looks primarily at recent rather than ancient history to emphasize English society has neither advanced rapidly nor changed significantly since ancient times. My statements summarizing her argument do not mean women have gained no rights by the time of *Three Guineas*’ 1938 publication. Many rights English women gained by the 1930s occur since Woolf’s birth in 1882. As Woolf notes, in 1938, women have not yet gained access to some professions. Although in 1878 the University of London begins granting women degrees, rather than mere certificates of completion, University of Oxford blocks women from earning degrees until 1920, and University of Cambridge bars women from earning degrees until 1948. Even after universities admit women and confer degrees on women, they strictly limit entry and scholarships available to women as Woolf states.
- ³ I retain British spelling when British spelling appears in quotations.
- ⁴ Swedish systematic biologist, Mariette Manktelow (Evolutionary Biology Centre, Uppsala University) explains that those from the Western world think of ancient taxonomy as emerging from the Greeks and Romans. In the West, the Greeks and Romans do introduce the first taxonomical systems because Westerners have no knowledge of Eastern taxonomy until the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the Chinese and Egyptians formulate taxonomies millennia before the Greeks and Romans. Around 3,000 B.C.E, Emperor of China and Father of Chinese Medicine, Shen Nung, writes one of the earliest pharmacopoeias, *Divine Husbandman’s Materia Medica*. Wall-paintings from around 1500 B.C.E. illustrate medicinal plants, and one finds in one of the rarest and most ancient Egyptian papyrus rolls, *Ebers Papyrus*, names and descriptions for medicinal plants doctors must know how to identify and distinguish among in the field. Even with taxonomy’s long history in the Western world, science historians identify Swedish botanical taxonomist, Carolus Linnæus (1707–1778), as the first to devise a uniform system for defining and naming plants and animals and systematically applying that system. Linnæus first applies his system to flowering plants and ferns, publishing *Species Plantarum* in 1753. In 1758, he publishes its 10th edition, one including plants and animals, *Systema Naturæ*. Linnæus’ binomial nomenclature system earns him the title, Father of Taxonomy (Manktelow, n.d.).
- ⁵ Lerner (1986) traces subordinating, excluding, and owning women back 2000–4000 years before St. Paul. Unlike Lerner, Woolf does not write to an academic audience but to her beloved common reader.

Therefore, she keeps her evidence within that reader's knowledge and comfort realms.

- 6 Although the 1928 wife-selling event I cite occurs in Britain, it does not occur in England but in Wales. Lister (2019) cites a 1926 record as the last-known wife-selling report in England: "Horace Clayton of Leeds was charged with deserting his wife and two children. When the courts finally tracked him down, Horace had been living in Hull with another woman he had allegedly bought from her husband for £10" (n.p.). Thompson (1991) cites 1913 as the last known wife-selling report in England. In 1913, a woman in Leeds gives evidence to the Leeds police court that her husband sold her to a workmate for £1 (pp. 408–409).
- 7 £100 in 1938 is worth £7,481.28 in August 2022, an almost 75% inflationary increase; therefore, £15,000 in 1938 is worth £1,122,192 in August 2022 or \$1,357,498.83 in U.S. currency.
- 8 In probably the most famous portrait of Elizabeth I, *The Armada Portrait*, Elizabeth I wears seven, long, pearl strands, has massive pearls woven into her hair and headpiece, long rows of pearls outlining her sleeves, bodice, and skirt, huge individual pearls studding her puffed sleeves, at least five enormous tear-drop pearls hanging from her dress' bodice, and more large pearls studding her skirt. Although Elizabeth I has far more symbolism painted into this portrait than pearls' symbolism, I offer it as an example of advertising her brand. Three *Armada Portraits* contemporary to Elizabeth I remain, one housed in the National Portrait Gallery, London, one in Woburn Abbey, village of Woburn, Bedfordshire, England, and one in Elizabeth's birthplace, Queen's House (villa), Greenwich, England (Katz, 2019, n.p.). Although originally attributed to the queen's "Serjeant Painter," George Gower, some scholars contend multiple artists or studios produced the paintings (Katz, 2019, n.p.). For another example of Elizabeth I in pearls, see *The Pelican Portrait*, Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool, England. See also Dr. K. L. Peterson (2019), "Oxford University's 'pendant pearl' portraits of Queen Elizabeth I," Center for Early Modern Studies, University of Oxford's website, and Mark Cartwright's (2020) *World History Encyclopedia* article.
- 9 Historians know of 14 attempts on Elizabeth I's life during her reign.
- 10 Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, England, houses this oil on canvas entitled *The Rainbow Portrait* of Elizabeth I. Even in this portrait, Elizabeth wears large, 3-pearled earrings, two pearl rings at neck's base holding a pendant from which a large teardrop pearl hangs, and another long, knotted, pearl strand extending beyond her trunk. Scholars attribute this painting to Isaac Oliver, Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger, or Taddeo Zuccari (Cartwright, 2020).

- ¹¹ Writing for *Sotheby's*, Alexander Starp (2018) explains “it is perhaps doubtful...[a woman’s] male counterpart could have mastered this secret fan language, said to have consisted of about two dozen different moves or gestures” (n.p.). Although to demystify fans’ secret code, fan maker and retailer, Duvelleroy (1827), publishes a leaflet explaining fan language and etiquette, French retailers invent fan language and etiquette to improve sales after the French Revolution (Sharp, 2018). However unromantic the reason behind Duvelleroy’s leaflet and fan language itself, his leaflet proves so successful Duvelleroy opens “a boutique on London’s fashionable New Bond Street” and becomes Queen Victoria’s royal supplier (Sharp, 2018). To view a photograph of Duvelleroy’s leaflet online, please see Sotheby’s website.
- ¹² In 1912 a private bill to legislate women’s legal right to become solicitors comes before Parliament. Lacking support, the bill fails. After the 1912 bill fails in Parliament, the Law Society agrees to a test case concerning female solicitors. Although the test includes four women, Bebb brings the test case (Auchmuty, 2011). When Bebb brings her case, she has already proven herself, first by passing Oxford’s entrance exams in 1908 and then by earning a First Class in jurisprudence in 1911 (Rogan, 2018). To put Bebb’s excellence into context, approximately 60% of male jurisprudence students at the time graduate with a Third Class or lower (Rogan, 2018). Despite her outstanding record at Oxford, as a woman, Bebb does not have the right to earn a degree (Rogan, 2018). Not surprising, in the 30 years since Oxford opened law study to women, Bebb is one of only seven, for women could only study, not practice law in England and Wales (Rogan, 2018).
- ¹³ R. A. Wright serves alongside Lord Buckmaster to represent Bebb and the three other women included in her case, Gwyneth Bebb, Karin Costelloe, Maud Ingram (later Maud Crofts), and Frances Nettlefold. Wright continues to represent the women when they appeal the case, this time working with Lord Cecil. As an interesting aside, one of the plaintiffs, Karin Costelloe, marries Virginia Woolf’s brother, Adrian Stephens, in 1914. Woolf’s intimate connection with her brother’s wife, Karin, increases the likelihood Woolf has more than documentary sources from which to work when thinking through and evidencing her argument in *Three Guineas*. She has a personal source from whom to draw information. Karin Costelloe does not end her intellectual and professional career after *Bebb v. Law Society* but, together with her husband, trains as a doctor of psychoanalysis. The couple qualifies for practice in 1927. Conscientious objectors, Adrian and Karin work on a dairy farm during WWI, another means by which Woolf would connect to Karin both politically and intellectually.

- ¹⁴ As elsewhere, I maintain the British spelling in quotations. In British English, “practise” is a verb, and “practice” is a noun.
- ¹⁵ Dana Denis-Smith is founder of the First 100 Years project. Those working on this project chart women’s journeys in the law (“Landmarks in Law,” 2019).
- ¹⁶ Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmuty (2019) edit the book *Women’s Legal Landmarks: Celebrating the History of Women and Law in the UK and Ireland*. Erika Rackley is Professor of Law, Kent University, UK; Rosemary Auchmuty is Professor of Law, University of Reading, UK. Please note I again maintain British spelling within quotations, this time for “strategize” whose British spelling is “stratigise.”
- ¹⁷ Although Woolf argues for women’s inclusion in the professions, her narrator expresses her delight that women are not in the military; she thinks one can count on government officials to continue excluding women from the military profession.
- ¹⁸ Prior to her seeking admission to medical school in Edinburgh, Sophia Jex-Blake travels to the United States (1865) and, before returning home, applies for admission at Harvard Medical School (McCullins, 2018). Her rejection letter reads: “There is no provision for the education of women in any department of this university” (McCullins, 2018).
- ¹⁹ Now named the “Edinburgh Seven,” these women include: Sophia Jex-Blake, Isabel Thorne, Edith Pechey, Matilda Chaplin, Helen Evans, Mary Anderson, and Emily Bovell (“UK: 75 years,” 1997, n.p.).
- ²⁰ Please note, Woolf writes about events occurring in 1870 as occurring in 1869. She neither dates the newspaper account she quotes nor names the newspaper from which she quotes. I take literary license, identifying the newspaper account as having occurred in 1870, the actual year the reporter would have published the article.
- ²¹ Woolf changes her views under Germany’s incessant assaults on the British Isles during WWII.

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
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In Memoriam



Dr. Billy F. Cowart

August 5, 1932–December 25, 2021

Dr. Billy F. Cowart, first university President of Texas A&M International University and namesake of Cowart Hall, passed away on Christmas Day, December 25, 2021, at the age of 89 in Temple, Texas. In his TIMAU obituary, he is credited with having had an enormous impact on the institution by helping to establish the university's campus model—"a model that was duplicated across the state and nation." He was known as a kind, compassionate, and soft-spoken man with strong principles. Our Martha May Tevis has offers her recollections of Billy as fellow student, colleague, SOPHE member, and friend:

I first met Billy Cowart at a Southwest Society of Education meeting in 1965. After completing my Ph.D. at The University of Texas at Austin, I had just started teaching at Pan American College. Someone told me about a meeting and there I met Billy. He had been part of a foursome in graduate school: Billy Jack Willers, Donna Younkers, and Jim Van Patton. They all shared Dr. William Drake (for whom The Drake Lecture is named) as their advisor. Immediately they adopted me and that was a wonderful experience. Billy would love to tell stories about their experiences. One of his favorites was the time that the four of them borrowed Dr. George Sanchez's brand-new boat, a boat he had been saving for several years and that was his "pride and joy." At the end of their afternoon with the boat, it had been damaged and almost lost. The four of them were terrified that their Ph.D. dreams were lost. After delaying as long as possible and with no ideas about repairing it in a few hours, they finally confessed to Dr. Sanchez. He was very understanding. If the students looked half as distressed as they were telling me about it years later, Dr. Sanchez probably thought they had suffered enough.

Once the end of doctoral study was in sight we all began looking for college teaching positions. I accepted a position at what was then Pan American College in Edinburg, Texas (now The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley), and Billy later began his career at Texas A&I in Kingsville and later went on to Texas A & M International University in Laredo. Billy and I held positions at the only two degree-granting universities in our part of Texas, and we both worked with students from similar backgrounds. Unfortunately, some faculty members looked down on our Hispanic students, who were predominately first-generation college students and often first-generation high school graduates. Dr. George I. Sanchez was very supportive of Billy and me and always asked us about our universities which were the main sources of higher education in Texas for Hispanic Americans at that time. Eventually Billy became president of TAMIU and was responsible for a significant increase in student enrollment and programs.

Martha May Tevis

In Memoriam

Dr. Stanley D. Ivie

Professor Emeritus, Texas Woman's University

1936–2022

The passing of longtime SOPHE member and friend, Stan Ivie, has deeply affected those of us who knew him. Martha May Tevis and I have collaborated each to offer a brief elegy in order to recognize and memorialize Stan's many contributions to SOPHE and to education.



Although I cannot remember exactly when we met, Stan and I were both quite young and enjoying attending meetings, listening to papers, and then spending absolutely delicious hours discussing them with other young professors. He and I became somewhat like brother and sister or cousins. After very late nights we would nevertheless be at 8:00 AM meetings on time. It was an exhilarating time! The memories are sweet.

Stan was the perfect one to keep the conversation alive as he had that rare gift of being intellectually serious, exciting, and entertaining all at the same time. He never forgot our individual interests as attested to by his generous sharing of his work by mail between meetings. I have kept all these missives as his insights have proved relevant during most any time period. Sadly, too often it happens that journal entries are read and then forgotten. Stan was very encouraging of the scholarship of others and was especially encouraging of students and new professors' papers.

For many years Stan brought a different stunning blonde to meetings every year. However, one year he showed up with a lovely, vivacious, smart brunette. I told Stan that if he did not recognize what a special person she was that I did not want to meet any of his future friends. Within a very short time I was informed that he had married Jeri whom I also consider to be one of my best friends. Stan was one of my dearest and closest friends and I miss him.

Martha May Tevis



Stan maintained a lifelong commitment to the study, analysis, and criticism of public education. He was consistently interested in the literary devices we use in teaching and the role of the affective domain, aesthetics, and axiology. His 1999 SOPHE Presidential Address in Biloxi, MS reviewed the importance of the aesthetic consideration in education and the place of teaching as an art in itself. His deconstruction of high-stakes testing a few years later sounded the alarm of increasing legislative interference in educational practice. Perhaps my favorite of all his papers was his 2005 paper, "Metaphor Matrix and Leadership Style" which included a questionnaire resulting in learning the prevalence of one of five leadership styles. It was his 1989 paper, *What Should a Woman Be?*, that proves most memorable. When they noticed his paper's title on the program, and given Stan's habit of inviting his current girlfriends to SOPHE annual meetings, Martha, Karen McKellips, Donna Younker, and Mary Lou Aylor put bows in their hair, wore lots of makeup, and moved to the very front. The paper, a serious consideration of Rousseau's consideration of gender difference, is a thoughtful appraisal of Rousseau's "natural law," but the amusement it created indicated the closeness of the SOPHE organization's membership. The last paper Stan presented in 2017 was a detailed examination of how the role of the metaphors of mechanism, organism, and mind shaped the philosophical positions of realism, naturalism, and idealism. Stan planned to join us in San Antonio this Fall. His paper, *Storytelling and Bigotry*, is included here in our effort to memorialize Stan Ivie, thoughtful scholar and good friend.

David Snelgrove

Storytelling and Bigotry

Stanley D. Ivie, Texas Woman's University

Habits of Mind

I had a friend whose favorite saying was: “My mind is made up; don’t confuse me with facts.” He was a hard nut to crack! Why are there so many hard nuts to crack—people with rigid and frozen minds? What prevents some people from entertaining fresh and exciting perspectives on life? If facts and logic fail to pierce a bigot’s armor, what alternative weapons does life provide? Jesus, Shakespeare, and Hemingway all turned to storytelling.

Einstein had just finished delivering a talk to the Flat Earth Society. As he was preparing to leave the room, an elderly woman came up and blocked his exit. She proceeded to thank him profusely for coming and sharing his theories on the universe. She then added, “You know of course I don’t believe a single word you had to say.” Einstein, looking taken aback by her remark, asked, “Why is that?” The elderly woman replied smartly, “Everyone knows the world is held up by Atlas standing on a giant turtle.” Einstein smiled and asked, “What is the turtle standing on?” The woman’s eyes flashed as she retorted, “Oh, aren’t you the clever one? You think you have me stumped. Well think again. There is nothing but turtles all the way down.”

Why do people cling tenaciously to what are obviously false ideas? History bears witness to a plethora of mistaken notions that were once accepted as hallowed truths. Ptolemy’s geocentric view of the universe was endorsed by the ancient world as well as by the Medieval Church. Ptolemy’s cosmology was not replaced until the 16th century, when Copernicus introduced his heliocentric theory. Even President Johnson bought into the falling dominos theory: if the United States allowed South Viet Nam to fall to Communism, all of Southeast Asia would follow.

Consequently, Johnson kept sending more Marines. Napoleon marched the French army off to conquer Russia, only to be defeated by “Old Man Winter.” Lee experienced a similar fate at Gettysburg. The best laid plans of mice and men often go awry. The 19th century belief in White, Anglo-Saxon cultural superiority was given poetic expression in Kipling’s poem, “The White Man’s Burden.” Educators have flirted with mistaken ideas about learning, including the old view that the mind is a muscle that can be strengthened through exercise, and the current belief that the brain is a computer for processing sensory data. Both are fallacious! Why are people

so reluctant to relinquish mistaken ideas? The answer is simple: once an individual accepts an idea, it becomes a part of who that person is. Through this process individuals therefore become emotionally invested, cherishing even the most stupid notions. A recent example: Trump's followers, having heard his endless claims of a stolen election, are unable to break free of these lies.

Mistaken theories can sometimes lead one to experience a rude awakening. Some years ago, during the single period in my life, I met an attractive woman and invited her to lunch. Later that day I visited the local florist and sent her flowers, following the florist's theory that women like flowers, therefore, if a man sends flowers, the woman will like the man. A few days later I called the woman expecting a warm reception. To my amazement she greeted me with a stream of negative-sounding words, followed by, "I am not used to accepting flowers from men that I hardly know." Slam! Clearly there was something wrong with the florist's theory. I was forced to formulate a new plan of action, drawing upon The Right Guy Theory. The theory runs something like this: If you are the right guy, sending flowers is the right thing to do. Conversely, if you are the wrong guy, it is the wrong thing to do. Indeed, if you are the wrong guy, there isn't anything you can do to become the right guy. Furthermore, only the woman knows who the right guy is and she isn't telling. So if you are wise and you are invited to a party, the prudent thing to do is to get a drink and stand around and look available. Sooner or later, some woman will come along and pick you to be her right guy. Then it is off to the races.

Leadership and Followership

Politicians could profit by coming to understand The Right Guy Theory. Chris Christie recently published a new book, *Republican Rescue*. He was interviewed by Nicolle Wallace on her afternoon news program (MSNBC). She gave the poor guy no quarter. Later they said that the publisher had only sold 2,000 copies—hardly enough to pay for the printing. I checked the evaluation of the book on the internet. It only received a one-star rating. Clearly both Christie and the book need to be rescued.

Do you remember the Miller Analogy Test? You had to think like a psychologist in order to make a decent score. Here would be a good analogy: Hand is to glove as Trump is to the Republican Party. One is tailor-made to fit the designs of the other. Trump possessed all of the qualities the Republican Party could not resist—paranoia, narcissistic, spiteful, delusional, and prone to believing in wild conspiracies. What could be better? Trump showed the Republicans how to claim victory rather than accepting defeat. Both Trump and the Republicans accepted the little ditty: When in trouble or in doubt, run in circles, scream, and shout. Trump reinforced the Republicans' view that they were the only "true" Americans. Lies, lies, and more lies! Over the four years Trump was President he told better than 30,000 lies. The biggest lie, however, was the one that the

election had been stolen by Biden and the Democratic Party. He told the lie over and over again—drumming it into the heads of the American people. Even after 60 lawsuits were thrown out by courts and ballots were recounted in all battleground states, Trump continued to propagate this big lie. His supporters heard it so many times they came to believe it was true. As a crescendo Trump called his right-wing mob together on January 6, 2021, it was no trick to get them to invade the Capitol and try to stop the counting of the votes cast by the Electoral College. Knocking down the Capitol police and breaking down the doors, the Trump-inspired mob filled the Capitol with chants of “hang Mike Pence and kill Nancy Pelosi.” Images of the insurrection became permanently etched in the collective consciousness of the American people. Who can forget the faces of such characters as the painted shaman with buffalo horns, the insulting fellow proudly displaying the Confederate Battle Flag, or the joker prancing off with Nancy Pelosi’s podium? Reconstructing the whole story is now in the hands of the 1/6 Committee.

Why do people attach themselves like barnacles to some magnetic personality? The answer lies tucked away in the depths of the human psyche. Dominance is a characteristic widely shared throughout the animal kingdom. Every litter of pups has its top dog. No herd of horses is complete without its alpha mare. Though humans are believed to have left their instincts behind in their decent from the trees, social habits have emerged to perform a parallel function. Every family has its take-charge person. No mob is complete without its Al Capone. Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln are all enshrined in stone in the nation’s Capitol. The leader personifies the core values of the group, corporation, or nation. Without leadership few worthwhile things can be accomplished.

Have you ever given your allegiance wholeheartedly to someone? When I was a boy, I had a hero, Bryce. He was four years older than me, and he had mastered all the skills of both Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn. Bryce could run faster, fight harder, and dream up more interesting stuff to get into than any other kid in the neighborhood. My dad always said that if Bryce were going to hell I would be right there with him. My dad was right about that. One day we were playing around the old schoolhouse. There were holes in the brick foundation to permit air to flow under the first floor of the building. The holes were just big enough to allow the head and body of a skinny kid to slip through. Bryce squeezed through the hole; I followed right behind him. It was pitch dark under the school. I never liked the dark, and I loathed confined spaces. Bryce beckoned for me to follow him into the darkness. I tagged closely on his heels. Shortly we came to metal air duct system just big enough for a kid to crawl through. The air duct lead to the furnace room under the old elementary school. We came out on top of a large pile of coal. I had indeed followed Bryce to the Gates of Hell. The rioters who stormed the Capitol gave their unthinking allegiance to Trump, who placed them on a dark path leading to years of legal hell.

Core Values

The Republican Party—the party of Abe Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Dwight Eisenhower—has lost it way. It has become the home of rightwing bigots, racists, and violent conspiracy groups. As Nancy Pelosi has told us, they were not only at the doors to the Capitol, but they were inside the chambers. The FBI tells us domestic terrorism is the biggest threat facing the nation. Forty-three Republic Senators voted against impeaching Trump for having incited the riot. Though Republicans pay lip service to the Constitution, their actions have revealed their real self-interest. The future of American democracy is clearly on the line.

The insurrection on January 6, 2021, has called into sharp focus America's core values. No nation is any stronger than the beliefs of its people. The nation's democratic faith has honored the pursuit of truth, the inherent dignity of every individual, the quest for social justice, equity before the law, and the rational solution of common problems. A healthy nation is one where a common bond of feeling underscores its basic values. Plato (1968) seems to have recognized this fact when he says, "Are not all citizens bound together by sharing in the same pleasures and pains, all feeling glad or grieved on the same occasions of gain or loss; whereas the bond is broken when such feelings are no longer universal, but any event of public or personal concern fills some with joy and others with distress?" (p. 163). Remember, 140 Republicans in the House of Representatives, after returning to their chamber following the riot, voted not to accept the Electors' votes confirming Biden as the election winner. If asked for his judgment concerning the health of American democracy, Plato would probably advise that the country faces serious problems in the days ahead.

Reason or Emotion

How can a common bond of unity of purpose be created? Some people can be persuaded by reason; others are best approached through emotion. Both practices have had a long and impressive history. The glorification of reason in the modern world begins with Rene Descartes (1965), who began philosophizing by doubting everything. One brute fact led Descartes to his famous self-evident truth, "I think; therefore, I am" (p. 93).

Starting with knowledge of his own existence, Descartes constructed his whole philosophical system, including God, whom he defines as the mathematical regularity in the universe. John Dewey (1934/1960), who is generally regarded as a seminal figure in the development of the philosophy of pragmatism, was a true believer in the power of the scientific method. In his book, *A Common Faith*, Dewey tells us that there is but one sure road of access to truth, "the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection" (p. 32). Fareed Zakaria is a good example of someone who believes in the power of reason. Zakaria's book, *The Post-American World* (2008), has become a modern-day classic in political discourse. His television program

on PBS on Sunday mornings is watched by millions of thoughtful citizens. What is the most fruitful path to follow in becoming a rational thinker? Zakaria advocates a liberal arts education.

Feeling is as much a part of the human experience as is reasoning. Jean J. Rousseau was the father of Romanticism—the belief that nature has within itself a spirit of wisdom and goodness. Mankind can tune into that spirit through intuition. Rousseau’s Romanticism can be seen in the non-directive psychotherapy of Carl Rogers. Rogers believed the patient has within him or herself all of the necessary resources for self-healing. Rogers maintains once patients are mentally healthy, they should follow the dictates of their deepest feelings. M. Scott Peck’s book, *The Road Less Traveled* (1985), picks up psychotherapy where Rogers leaves off. Peck adds a Freudian twist to his psychotherapy, for, according to Peck, “The unconscious is wiser than we are about other people as well as ourselves. The fact of the matter is that our unconscious is wiser than we are about everything” (p. 251). How can the human heart be changed? Individual therapy and group therapy have proven successful for some.

Fairytales to History

There is a third way people have been induced to rethink their opinions: the way of Plato, Jesus, Shakespeare, and Hemingway. Storytelling balances the heart and the head. It can work a powerful influence over human understanding. Storytelling is a universal aspect of human society. Historically, it has been the role assigned to the grandmother of the family. Stories have the advantage of being alive and filled with imagination. They expose human foibles, pride, and greed. Stories serve as a mirror for looking at ourselves and others. They pluck the strings of our common humanity. When I was a boy, my mother read fairytales to my brother and me every night before we went to bed. They filled our minds with wonder. My favorites were *Rapunzel*, who was a pretty girl with long blonde hair, and *Rumpelstiltskin*, who had a knack for spinning straw into gold. Fairytales are filled with the drama of the struggle between good and evil. It would be interesting to know how many stogy politicians enjoyed fairytales when they were children.

History is the story we tell about ourselves. Our stories commemorate events or achievements in the past. In grade school we all learned, “Columbus sailed the ocean blue in 1492.” Though Columbus was an Italian sailing under the Spanish flag, for many years and some to this day Americanize him by giving him his own special day on our calendar. We also learned that the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock, and that shortly thereafter they celebrated Thanksgiving. The colonial period ended with a bang, the Revolutionary War. Every year we participate in a national ritual, the 4th of July. The Revolutionary War was followed by the writing of the Constitution, the holy-of-all-holies. The union created by the Constitution was almost destroyed by the Civil War. Fortunately, the country found an

iconic figure to serve as President, Abraham Lincoln. After the Civil War the country turned its attention to conquering the West, which was greatly facilitated by the building of the transcontinental railroad. In the 20th century, the United States fought and won two world wars, built an atomic bomb, and sent a rocket ship to the moon. The American story has been one of epic achievements.

There is, however, another side to the story. It is one of slavery, segregation, and discrimination. The book and movie, *Gone with the Wind*, represents a distorted, stereotypical view of the Black experience. Forced labor at the crack of a whip, the auction block, the lynching of an “Uppity Negro,” all were part of the darker side to the American story. And the tragic part of the whole nasty saga is the seeds that were planted on the plantations of the Old South are still bearing their bitter fruit today. Racism is still alive and well right here in River City. Look at all of the rightwing forces that came together at the nation’s Capitol on January 6. The event was years in the making. Donald Trump stepped into a Republican Party that welcomed him with open arms. Trump verbalized what the Republicans had long felt in their bones, anger and resentment. The stage called for a revival of America’s racist past. Lying, greed, and transactional values became the telling features of Trump’s administration. After all the grief he has put the nation through, wouldn’t it be ironic if Trump were reelected President?

Prejudice

Prejudice is a habit of mind deeply rooted in communal experience. Southern Utah, where I grew up as a boy, was settled in the second half of the 19th century by Scandinavians who had been converted to the Mormon faith. Even today great numbers of people there have blonde hair and blue eyes. Many also share in the same surnames—Anderson, Christensen, and Peterson. Given this social milieu, it is not surprising that provincialism became the rule of the day. As the fates would have it, I have a friend and colleague who grew up in another Mormon community. Once we were sharing experiences we had as children, and we both had read and enjoyed the storybook, *Little Black Sambo*. My friend confessed he was half-grown before he discovered there were actually real, live people who resembled Sambo. He had thought Sambo was merely a storybook character. I had learned at an earlier age that there were Black people in the world. When I was six or seven, my family took an infrequent trip to Salt Lake City. My Dad decided it was time for a haircut, and he took me with him to barbershop. There in the barbershop was a Black kid shining shoes. My dad greeted him with the words, “How are you doing Rastus?” To which the shoeshine boy replied smartly, “Rastus my ass!” I like to think, right there in that barbershop, was the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement.

Media can have a profound effect on how we think and feel. Which films and television series have touched your inner core? Some have

reinforced racial stereotypes—*The Birth of a Nation* and *Gone with the Wind*. Both romanticized the Old South and painted a subservient picture of African-Americans. A recent television series on Gettysburg and Lincoln finally got around to painting a more accurate picture of the Civil War. The popular television series, *Roots* (1977) captured the attention of the viewing public in the 1970s. American history reflected more than a single, white point of view. The made for television film, *The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman* (1973), struck a chord with millions of viewers. Racism may be an old and familiar tune, but the strings of the heart can be changed through powerful images projected on film.

Spooky

When I was a boy, my parents took me to see *The Wizard of Oz*. I sat through the movie until Dorothy and her friends were walking down the long, dark tunnel. The loud music and the voice of the Wizard scared the bejabbers out of me. My parents had to take me home. Whenever I have watched the film in later years, I have always been reminded of the panic I felt as a boy. Trump's insurrection at the Capitol touched off the same sort of panic. Republicans in the House and the Senate remind me of the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, and the Cowardly Lion. The Scarecrow didn't have a brain. The Tin Man didn't have a heart. And the Cowardly Lion lacked courage. Louie Gohmert, a Representative from Texas, clearly doesn't have a brain. Lindsey Graham, a Senator from South Carolina, doesn't have a heart. And Mitch McConnell, former Speaker of the House, doesn't have an ounce of courage. Who is the Wizard scaring all of them? You guessed it—Donald J. Trump! Why is Trump so spooky? Because he doesn't care a hoot about anyone except himself. Trump is like the Wizard, all sound and fury signifying nothing. Of course the Republicans all voted for Trump. He reflected the image they saw when they looked into the mirror. Why didn't the Republicans vote for impeachment? Such a vote would mean they were rejecting themselves. Why is the Republican Party a dying political organization? Fromm (1974) offers us an answer: "Any society which excludes, relatively, the development of love, must in the long run perish of its own contradiction with the basic necessities of human nature" (p. 112).

Not every day is Christmas. We all have to learn we are not the center of God's universe. When I was 7 or 8 years of age, I thought I was a pretty smart kid. One evening I decided to show my family just how smart I was. I sassied my father. He became very angry—disappearing into the bathroom and reappearing with a razor strap in hand. While I cowered in fright next to the refrigerator, my saintly mother interceded on my behalf. I came within a hair's breadth of having my backside tanned but good. Right then and there, I learned the First Rule of family life: Don't piss off your father! Later I learned the Second Rule: Don't verbally abuse your mother! If you abuse your mother, it will piss off your father! There is nothing sadder than someone who has never learned his or her limitations. Mary Trump in

her book, *Too Much but Never Enough* (2020), tells the story of how Donald J. Trump was spoiled by his family. He never learned the meaning of the word “No.” The American people rejected Trump in the 2020 election. Nancy Pelosi impeached him twice. And now the January 6 Committee has his White House papers. How many times does he have to be told “No” before he gets the message?

Federal Family

Metaphorically, the federal government is like a family. The Executive branch is the father. The White House stands four-square like a man. The Congress is the mother. The Capitol with its rounded dome is clearly a famine symbol. The Supreme Court is the keeper of the book of rules, the Constitution, which governs the relationships within the family. The building where the Court resides reflects the same mystical feeling projected by the Oracle at Delphi. Governing is all about power. The most powerful person in any country is the one who possesses the authority to throw you in jail. In the United States that power is vested in the Attorney General. The rioters who invaded the Capitol failed to learn the two Big Rules governing the nation’s family: Don’t abuse your mother! And don’t piss off your father! Now a lot of folk are going to have their backsides tanned.

It is said that one sure-fire way of gaining a man’s attention is to walk him out of his jail cell and into the courtyard where they are putting the finishing touches on his gallows. If he is ever going to experience an epiphany, that is the moment. Psychologists tell us punishment is an inefficient tool for changing behavior, better to use positive reinforcement. History, however, tells us that everything depends on the severity of the punishment. Flogging kept generations of deckhands rising and lowering sails. The rioters at the Capitol behaved like a bunch of romantic revolutionaries. Once inside the doors, they busied themselves taking pictures of their exploits. It is hard to tell the FBI you were just a disinterested bystander when they have a picture of you parading around inside the Capitol with a Confederate flag. Facing a stiff prison sentence is one painful way of modifying behavior.

Moses Method

There is one final technique for dealing with rigid, unthinking people. It is what is called the Moses Method. You will remember from Sunday school that Moses lead the children of Israel around in the wilderness for 40 years. Now the word “forty,” as it is used in the Bible, is symbolic and not literal. Forty years meant they wandered around for a necessary and sufficient time in order to accomplish some specific purpose. What was the purpose to be served? Moses discovered that many of his followers were rigid, frozen minded people. They were belligerent, argumentative, and they complained about everything. Finally, he had had enough. He decided to lead them around in wilderness for as long as it took for the hard-headed members to die off. Of course, there is another story that is

equally tempting to believe. The reason why Moses led his followers around in the wilderness for 40 years is that even back then men wouldn't stop to ask for directions.

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The 2021 SoPHE Presidential Address

Toward Witness Consciousness: Journeying into Transpersonal Knowing and Being¹

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Introduction

In this time of collective sadness, deep social divides, unending pandemic, and global uncertainty, the SoPHE Annual Meeting is a welcome opportunity for connecting-in-community and dialogue. Concerned discussions about these troubling times have dominated this year's meeting, whether in the paper-panel sessions or the conversations over meals and coffee-breaks.

For myself, I have wondered, what is the source of this continuous, background stress and vague, unrelenting anxiety? Is it a sign that we have entered another of civilizations' Dark Ages or a planetary Season of Darkness? Overwhelming problems and crises plague every global infrastructure, from nature and the environment, to the food-supply chain and public health, to economic, political, and governmental structures. The problems are systemic and seem to be compounding and worsening. Are we now bearing the weight and consequence of generations of environmental abuse, unaddressed structural violence (e.g. racism, colonialization, discrimination), unheard grievances, and other forms of injustice and inhumanness? Are the turmoil and chaos deliberately orchestrated and engineered by a consciousness we are a part of, whether we know it or not? It would be too easy to attribute the stress and anxieties to the disruptions associated with the pandemic, or to blame those who feed the intractable, ideological polarizations that paralyze. After all, I contribute to my own (and others') stresses and anxieties every time such thoughts and emotions show up and occupy my mind.

These ontological and existential questions about being and meaning in present, uncertain times have taken center stage in my everyday consciousness and attention. In that context, I offer some reflections on these questions. I describe herein the metacognitive awareness of this searching journey, the discoveries of non-ordinary, *transpersonal* ways of perceiving, knowing and being in the world, and some suggestions of what "witness consciousness" could mean for educators and researchers. Although witness consciousness typically refers to the phenomenological, subjective narratives told by survivor-witnesses of past disasters, violence,

and traumas, it also refers to our present-day narratives, yours and mine, as we are indeed survivor–witnesses, of and in, these apocalyptic times.

Much of my address is predicated on a call to pilgrimage I received in 2015 and my *response-answerability* to it, which played out as my journeying over 500,000 air, sea, and ground miles from 2015 to 2021. Originally, I construed the meaning of the pilgrimage to be a “coming-full-circle peace pilgrimage,” but I have since identified it as a “pilgrimage into witness consciousness.”

Call to Pilgrimage

Pilgrimage is born of pain and promise.

—William S. Schmidt²

“Pilgrimage into witness consciousness” is a genre that integrates two pilgrimage types: actual traveling to historical sites or sacred spaces, and journeying into the interior world of mind and consciousness.³ My own pilgrimage destinations include memorials, museums, and other historic sites of profound loss. Additional opportunities for my own interior journeying were opened when travel bans emerging from the global pandemic were imposed beginning in early 2020. For me the pain and promise of my call to pilgrimage in 2015 references my visit to Hiroshima, Japan fifty years before, in 1965, when I saw the remnants of the atomic bomb dropped there, was overwhelmed, and had a meltdown.

My meltdown was a glimpse into *chaos*. I saw the hypocrisy of national narratives propagated, as I perceived and construed it, by the government, the military-industrial complex, the media complex, popular culture, and the schools. The narratives were insane, incomprehensible justification for mass violence, not only justification of the apocalypse of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, but also of the then-raging War in Viet Nam in 1965. Reflecting on this now, I realize that this insanity applies today in 2021, as entrenched identities and deep beliefs about the inferiority of the “other” escalate to fear-peddling rhetoric, communication breakdowns, hard-lined political conflicts and power struggles, hate speech, and violence.

During my 1965 Hiroshima meltdown, I could not speak to anyone for three days, but when I came out of it, I knew my life would take a different course. It was five decades later, in 2015, as part of the call, that I became aware of a message seeded in my unconscious in 1965 when I was in that chaotic, altered mind-state. The voice said:

You were meant to come here to Hiroshima. Welcome. This is the culmination of your first peace pilgrimage. There will be many more in your lifetime. ... Now, we invite you to embark on a new pilgrimage.⁴

Both the 1965 meltdown in Hiroshima, and the 2015 voices calling me to pilgrimage are examples of out-of-the-ordinary, transpersonal experiences. The clairaudient transmissions were like the calls to pilgrimage documented by Alan Morinis,⁵ Jean and Wallace Clift,⁶ and Mildred Lisette Norman, an American pacifist and activist better known by the name Peace Pilgrim.⁷ In academic discourse the validity and legitimacy of non-observable, non-empirical, transpersonal experiences are still doubted. To a Westerner committed to materialistic philosophy and to the Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm, the transpersonal domain seems incredible and absurd.⁸ How does one know whether such voices are coming from the imagination, creativity, or fiction? Could they be hallucinations? Could they be false or distorted memories?

I recognize these criticisms come from the sense that such a “glimpse into chaos” in my own 1965 Hiroshima meltdown was also unbelievable to many. For many, it would be an existential threat to embrace a hypothesis of a broken world. The suggestion we may have entered a Dark Age might be judged as unfounded speculation, despite the large body of evidence of multiple, systemic, and persistent global crises.

Spaces for Witnessing and Reflecting

My pilgrimage destinations, which included museums, memorials, and other historic sites of profound suffering, served as sobering and sacred spaces for witnessing and truth-telling, for commemoration and memorialization, and for reflection and soul-searching. I experienced the exhibit rooms and memorial grounds as safe spaces where one could open to transpersonal experiences and insights, bear witness to suppressed memories, face difficult and unreconciled historical pasts, and experiment with mind frames for reconciliation and redemption.

My 1965 visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum in Japan served as a personal baseline reference point. Two National Peace Parks in Korea—the No Gun Ri Peace Park and Memorial Museum and the Jeju 4•3 Peace Park—were keystone sites for my transpersonal experiences and acute insights. The historical legacy and heritage of racial terror in the U.S. depicted at the National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama, U.S. were instructive to me in highlighting and making meaning of present-day global apocalypse narratives.

The No Gun Ri Peace Park and Museum memorializes the July 1950 massacre early in the Korean War when U.S. soldiers killed an estimated 400 villagers by dropping bombs on refugee columns and firing on them while trapped at the twin-underpass railroad bridge at No Gun Ri.⁹ The Jeju 4•3 Peace Park, also in South Korea, documents a seven-year bloodbath which began on March 1, 1947, when police killed six demonstrators during an Independence Movement Rally. The killings triggered protests and demonstrations about police brutality. The protests escalated into violent attacks on government offices, police stations, and polling centers across

Jeju Island on April 3, 1948, which were then followed by a government crackdown, implementation of a “scorched-earth policy,” and a brutal counterinsurgency program. The island-wide crackdown, out of fear and suspicion that Jeju Island had turned Communist, led to an unstoppable massacre. Ultimately the conflict resulted in an estimated 30,000 deaths, 40,000 political refugees, and 95% of villages in the middle of Jeju Island being destroyed.¹⁰

The National Memorial for Peace and Justice was established in 2018 as the nation’s first memorial dedicated to the legacy of racialized terror in the U.S. It stands as sacred space for witnessing, memory, and reflection for “more than 4,400 African American men, women, and children [who] were hanged, burned alive, shot, drowned, and beaten to death by white mobs between 1877 and 1950.”¹¹

Transpersonal Experiences

Transpersonal refers to “experiences in which the sense of identity extends beyond the ego to encompass other aspects of reality.”¹² The transpersonal includes perceptions and cognitions which go beyond the five senses, beyond the sense of oneself as separate from the rest of the world, and beyond dualistic thinking.¹³ The transpersonal includes a broad sweep of psychospiritual development, “from our deepest wounds and needs, to the existential crisis of the human being, to the most transcendent capacities of our consciousness.”¹⁴

Transpersonal experiences provide entrées into *witness consciousness*, the ability to observe inner processes and the context of consciousness itself, one’s own and others’, in non-judgmental ways. Miri Albahari defines witness consciousness as mode-neutral awareness,¹⁵ not restricted to any particular sensory or cognitive modality like hearing or thinking. It has an intrinsic phenomenal character, an awareness that is always present but largely unnoticed in ordinary consciousness states.¹⁶

This is the same metacognitive awareness that one is engaging in the *process* of witness consciousness. Witness consciousness encompasses *bearing witness*, the mindful process of retrieving, facing, and acknowledging unbearable memories and traumas.¹⁷ Witnessing has two processes: to be an eyewitness, and to bear witness. An eyewitness is a spectator who observes the event with one’s own eyes. In contrast, bearing witness means a spectator is subjectively testifying to a lived experience. In eyewitness testimony the speaker *objectifies* the episode and positions the observer in the experiential moment. By contrast, in bearing witness the speaker must have a *subjective* grasp of the embodied experience, that is, to wrap one’s thoughts and emotions around one’s own and others’ experiences.¹⁸

Unlike eye-witnessing, bearing witness *cannot be objectively verified* because there can never be a true co-witness; bearing witness is an experience that occurs in the invisible realm of mind, memory, and consciousness, and

therefore the witness is testifying to something that cannot be objectively observed.¹⁹ To bear witness is to journey into the terrain of profound suffering, where the dignity of one's being is under assault, and where the meaning and value of one's life and existence are being squashed.²⁰ Studying survivor testimonies from Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben observes that "human beings are human insofar as they bear witness to the inhuman."²¹ Mahatma Gandhi describes this extraordinary knowing: "To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face," he writes, "one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself."²²

Brian Stevenson, the social-justice-activist lawyer and head of the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) in Montgomery Alabama, writes:

We are all broken by something.... Sometimes we're fractured by the choices we make; sometimes we're shattered by things we would never have chosen. But our brokenness is also the source of our common humanity, the basis for our shared search for comfort, meaning, and healing. Our shared vulnerability and imperfection nurtures and sustains our capacity for compassion.²³

Agamben, Gandhi, and Stevenson all emphasize the consciousness of witnessing: to acknowledge the unbearable and unthinkable, which haunt us in our closeted memories, hidden traumas, and unreconciled historical pasts. It means having the courage to witness the brokenness in all of us which we do not want to know about, especially in ourselves.²⁴ In all, this is a process that opens a consciousness that is transpersonal, transgenerational, and transcultural in both collective remembrances and personal memories. It suggests a way of perceiving, thinking, experiencing and being in the world. We witness the universality of human suffering, the brokenness, and the struggle to defend dignity. We glimpse the possibility of peace by our souls, and equanimity in consciousness itself.

In our professional arenas of teaching and research, witnessing may become a framework for understanding the historical and philosophical meanings emerging from subjective, transpersonal, witness-bearing narratives, including the biographies and chronicles of lived experience and memories of the historical past as well as those of present-day controversies and conflicts. The learning process into witnessing can be described within themes such as the connected universe, historical regression, and encounters with the supernatural or supernormal. I prefer to call this a process of learning rather than "healing" to avoid the expectation that this is a cure, or that one's pain, grief, or suffering can or will be eliminated or avoided.

The Connected Universe

The connected universe is an overarching theme in opening transpersonal witness consciousness. As transpersonal experiences reach beyond the boundaries of ego and personal-body space, one can

identify or empathize with other persons, an entire group of people, or all of humanity. The sense of the connected universe “involves authentic identification with other people animals, plants and various other aspects of nature and the cosmos.”²⁵ The aim is to listen empathically to where the listener feels as though one is experiencing, if virtually, the memory the speaker describes. Psychiatrist Heinz Kohut explains that empathy is “to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person.”²⁶ This acute feeling of connectedness, the very spirit of community felt in shared, common rites-of-passage is called *communitas*.²⁷ Thich Nhat Hanh uses the term *interbeing* to describe a state of inter-dependently co-existing and the consciousness of everything interconnected.²⁸

In a pilgrimage experience, one first witnesses fragmentation and disconnectedness before experiencing connectedness. For example, at No Gun Ri Peace Park, one bears witness to the brutality and inhumanness of 70 years ago, from the massacre of 400 refugees, to the U.S. government’s report that exonerated all military wrongdoing—this despite Air Force policies to strafe refugees and orders to attack and kill civilians. We bear witness to U.S. President Clinton’s statement of “regret,” a self-contradictory message that acknowledges U.S. troops killed civilians, yet all-the-while denying the validity of government documents that authorized those killings. We bear witness to the U.S. government’s refusal to offer reparations, redress, or restitution to survivors.²⁹

We also learn about Park Seonyong, now aged 95, who witnessed her five-year-old daughter and two-year-old son killed and was herself shot in the side and arm. “Looking back, I still feel terrified,” she says. “Imagine how painful it was to see your own kids dying before your very eyes. It is terrifying to see people bleeding and dying. It was horrible.”³⁰ We bear witness to Park’s unending pain and sorrow. How does remembering and witnessing the suffering proceed to redemption, restoration, repairing, and reconciliation? Watching the video of her with her son, Dr. Chung Koo-do, repeating this story I felt like a co-witness to her sadness, my sense of *interbeing* connection with her, with Dr. Chung, with her two children she lost, and with the souls of all who died there. This moment felt like a vast knowing of what it means to be in *communitas* with the human family as a whole, an “all-over-the-body” free and joyous feeling of a common bond of vulnerability and spiritual resilience which united everyone and everything across geographies and generations.

When the Associated Press story published her story in 1999, it was healing for Park to know that her accounts were finally corroborated by U.S. witnesses. “I have never been happier before,” she said. “Now I can rest in peace when I die.”³¹ Park’s pain and sorrow becomes a legacy for all global citizens to own; we are all connected in humanity’s legacy of suffering. Through this witnessing experience, we each become a keeper of No Gun Ri’s memory; we collectively become keepers of No Gun Ri’s

memory. I come to know—we all come to feel and know—how we are all connected as global peace ambassadors for No Gun Ri.

Historical Regression

In historical regression, temporal boundaries are crossed. It is possible to “know” the lives including the suffering of our ancestors, of other cultures and historical periods, and of past lives or previous incarnations. Historical regression is a part of C. J. Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious.³² “This vast repository of ancestral, racial, and collective memories contains the entire historical and cultural heritage of humanity.”³³

At the Jeju 4•3 Peace Park, the guide pointed to five monuments, like gravestone sculptures, bodies without heads. “The monuments represent those who perished in Jeju 4•3,” she explained to my student group. At that moment, five crows appear, circling above us, cawing loudly. Afterwards, I said to the students:

The crows were crying the enormous sorrow and horror of Jeju 4•3. But they were also bringing strength, compassion, gratitude, and affirmation. The crows declared, “Thank you for coming to Jeju and learning about what happened here. We are happy to see you, young adults, blessing you to go forward in your lives as peace envoys.”

The students nod in quiet recognition.

According to Korean legend, crows are messengers from the other world. In a *Hankyodreh* news photo³⁴ taken on the 70th anniversary of the Jeju 4•3 Massacre, crows stood on the headstones of victims at the Jeju 4•3 Peace Park, as though each to say, “I am the spirit of this person named on this tombstone. *Kamsabammida*, thank you for coming here.”

At No Gun Ri, butterflies traverse the worlds. We witness the butterfly’s message of rebirth in the sculpture entitled *Coexistence of Incompletion*. In this sculpture and in No Gun Ri’s rose garden, butterflies console the pain and sadness of a divided nation—the divided nation here refers to North and South Korea. When villagers at No Gun Ri departed the physical world, they found their being in another dimension where they live in full awareness and know how really to fly and dance. The places themselves become sacred ground. The buildings, the ground, nature all around speak the legacy and the hope.

On yet another leg of my pilgrimage I visited Montgomery, Alabama, a community shaped by slavery. I felt the legacy as I walked the streets and stood by the river, a portal for the U.S. domestic slave trade. I felt the heavy energy, and I heard the sounds of that era in the buildings, on the streets, and on the riverbank. I experienced and identify with what Stevenson explains:

It felt like I could hear the sounds of enslaved people coming into that river. . . . I can hear it. It’s the sound of suffering. It’s the sound

of agony, the sound of misery, and when you hear that misery, when you understand that, it will push you to do things that you won't otherwise be able to do. There is a history of untold cruelty that hides in silence, and there are things we can hear in these spaces that can motivate us.³⁵

Encounters with the Supernatural or Supernormal

Rites of passage, symbolic rituals, and spiritual imagery can evoke a sense of communication and connection with spirit guides, deities, the deceased, or other archetypal figures or symbols.³⁶ For example, in *A Little Pond*, the 2009 docudrama based on the No Gun Ri Massacre,³⁷ two whales swim across the sky as the refugees trek their way over a bridge across a wide river. The lyrical calm feels like a peace blessing, a premonition of the mysterious tranquility that would come on July 29, 1950 when the shooting stopped and U.S. troops left. On that same afternoon, North Korean soldiers arrived, offering comfort to the survivors at the tunnel, showing them a safe path home and giving them food. Of this afternoon Suhi Choi writes, "This was the most ironic moment of the No Gun Ri incident. Refugees fleeing from a North Korean advance were liberated by the very troops from whom they were fleeing."³⁸

The Earth remembers. In the Community Soil Collection Project based at the National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, individual victims of lynching are memorialized by containers of soil collected from lynching sites and by the creation of a memorial that acknowledges the horrors of racial injustice. Citizens of the community are invited to participate in this bearing-witness ritual by collecting the soil.³⁹ The project involves volunteers in engaging and reckoning with the memory of the racialized terror of lynching. The jars of collected soil are displayed in Montgomery at the Legacy Museum: From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration, the Peace & Justice Memorial Center, and at the EJI office. Lynching's history of terror and suffering are made tangible and visible when these jars of soil are displayed. The lives of the forgotten people who were never protected and never honored are thereby resurrected and recognized. For, "There is sweat in that soil, the sweat of enslaved people. There are the tears of people who suffered when they were being brutalized and lynched. There's the blood of these victims. But there's also hope in that soil."⁴⁰ The soil carries the pain and sadness of the suffering as well as the inspiration and opportunity for new life, a chance to grow something hopeful, and healing for the future.

Returning to Hiroshima, the buzzing song of the cicadas dominates Peace Memorial Park.⁴¹ Their singing envelopes the ringing of the peace bell and becomes the heartbeat for mediation among the visitors who come to pay tribute.



Journeying into the transpersonal, witness consciousness reveals that there exist dimensions of reality of which we are not normally aware. Reflecting and meditating on these dimensions give us deeper insight both into who we are and the nature of reality. Reflecting and meditating reveal options to consider in one's self-concept (i.e. identity), and one's worldview, including the material, social, and metaphysical dimensions. This knowledge raises the question, Will we accept and own our vulnerability and brokenness? If we do, we will be stronger, not weaker, with more capacity for compassion that heals, and for energy and will to transform the narratives of racial and gender inequality and dehumanization? Owning our vulnerability is to feel the need to remember more. To remember more is to bear further witness to the inhuman in our unreconciled pasts, so that we can recover, so that we can restore, and so that we can script a different future.

Will we be able to consider and reflect on the present chaos and brokenness in our world? Will we be able to transcend intractable ideological polarities? By opening ourselves to witness consciousness in our own life journeys first, we might grasp the "universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth" Gandhi describes and "to love the meanest of creation as oneself."⁴² Such openness may further inspire us with the hope, *interbeing*, and *communitas* needed to face the turmoil, bear witness to the inhuman, and together walk the path toward justice restored.

Endnotes

- ¹ *Editors' Note*: Roy Tamashiro delivered an earlier version of this paper as the 2021 *SoPHE Presidential Address* at the Society for Philosophy and History of Education (SoPHE) Annual Meeting on October 5, 2021, in St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.
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The 2021 Drake Lecture

Forgetting and Remembering: Cultural Memory Work Toward Racial Justice¹

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In this paper I consider processes that develop cultural memory and examples of how such processes can be put to work to serve racial reckoning and justice. Contemporary battles about the meaning of symbols such as the Confederate flag and statues of Confederate leaders reflect broader ideological contestations over the nation's cultural memory—the weighty matter of “who and what should be remembered” (Doss, 2010, p. 2), and who and what should be forgotten. Forgetting such monuments is a matter of justice as their common presence in public spaces valorizes centuries of racial tyranny. Cultural memory scholars suggest that monuments are ideological and political because they reflect a group's shared affirmation of the events and figures worthy of representing in material form to help keep their memory alive in the narrative landscape. To enact such processes of affirmation, the practice of memorializing involves financial resources, decisions about location and access, and reflection on the contours of representation. Memorials also require collective labor to actualize their mission of remembrance. Peace museums can close without visitors and funding, cemeteries can decay without daily care, and monuments can sit silent without witnesses to hear their stories.

Here I consider the possibilities of cultural memory as a narrative practice in public, academic, and family spaces oriented toward racial justice. I draw from cultural memory scholarship in order to consider both recognized sites of racial justice memory work (removal of Confederate monuments) and other examples of local, academic, and family memory as sites of consideration. I see memory work as a form of labor and responsibility. This work can occur through collective public practices oriented to forgetting some dominant memories and remembering subjugated ones, oral and written practices that repeat and concretize counter-narratives, and the narrative semiotic teaching of monuments and memorials (Brockmeier, 2002). In a field saturated with competing versions of history and popular memory and what Doss calls “memorial

mania” (2010, p. 2), the physical markers of cultural memory compete for public attention and sustenance. Interrupting dominant cultural narratives to enable layered and subjugated memories to surface demand attention and labor. I briefly situate my work in memory studies, then describe Brockmeier’s (2002) conception of three narrative orders which can aid in forming cultural memories. I describe examples of contested cultural memories in the U.S., the state of Oklahoma, and in academia. I conclude with an example from family inquiry used as a vehicle for dominant groups to explore their family’s complicity historically in racial injustices that can reframe family and cultural memory (Bailey, 2022).²

Memory studies encompass diverse foci, academic disciplines, and theoretical orientations. Such inquiry can include positivist studies in the fields of psychology and neuroscience which examine the slipperiness of human memory or the best processes for shoring up our memory storehouses as they leak (e.g. Loftus, 2005). In feminist studies, memory work can refer to a research methodology through which women collaboratively explore patriarchal influences on their lives (e.g. Kaufman et al., 2002). Within cultural geography, memory studies include how space and land can highlight or occlude aspects of human experience (Alderman & Inwood, 2013, p. 187). In Cultural Studies, memory studies can include the study of popular conceptions of the past as they manifest in the present in varied sociocultural contexts and community practices, rituals, and materiality enabling cultures to preserve a sense of identity over time.

Cultural memory studies embrace a range of investigations into how we as cultural beings collectively preserve, remember, and forget some historical events and interpretations and how relationships between cultural memory and identities form, reform, and gain shape and substance through rites, sacred objects, rituals, archives, and gatherings. Such memories are consequential, as Alderman and Inwood (2013) describe, as “how we imagine ourselves in the present is intimately linked to how we remember ourselves in the past” (p. 186). In this sense, memory practices can facilitate imaginaries that contribute to creating “socially just futures” (Alderman & Inwood, 2013). This is the cultural orientation that grounds my work here. I am interested in how to form cultural memory in ways that can contribute to historical awareness, reconciliation, and healing through labor, attention, and diverse forms of narration.

We cannot recall, nor perhaps would we want to, all the many events of our lives, and we cannot track or preserve the varied events of our familial or social histories. Indeed, there are many memories we as individuals or communities might wish to forget. Cultural memory scholars recognize that processes of memorialization through which we foster and construct a shared sense of cultural identity or history are always selective, dynamic, and partial. Memory ebbs and flows as some events crystallize momentarily in cultural discourse through intense narration only soon to pass away,

becoming faint or forgotten, as others replace them. In popular memory, forgetting and remembering involve networks of relation which expose us to some narratives instead of others or nudge us to consider one cultural memory as more- or less-persuasive and truthful than another.

A recent example of the stakes involved in which cultural memories persuade and achieve narrative dominance in the politics of truth is the explosive reaction to Hannah-Jones' *1619 Project*, which narrates a "new origin story" of the United States. In this rich and controversial project supported by *The New York Times*, Hannah-Jones (2021) strives to "reframe the country's history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions of Black Americans at the very center" of the national narrative (Serwer, 2019, n. p.). Her work unsettles an often-beloved national story of the country's formation in enlightenment ideals of reason and freedom belied by the utter centrality of the slave trade in America's founding. The furor erupting in the wake of her work and the blistering critiques it evokes (Serwer, 2019) reflect the deep investments in dominant cultural memories and origin stories. The response also offers a glimpse of how groups can de-center dominant cultural memories and create others which can become vehicles for dialogue, justice, and reconciliation.

Woven through these processes of resistance in creating new cultural memories are the power of affect and the politics of time—how the politics of emotion shape us (Ahmed, 2014), how we choose to attend (Ingold, 2018), and which work we choose to do in the fleeting time we are given (Burkeman, 2021). In Burkeman's (2021) *Four Thousand Weeks*, he explores what he calls "time management for mortals." With compelling writing and good humor, Burkeman dismisses dominant messages time management and organization books convey to discipline our bodies to become more efficient and productive. He believes timers and software that spur Pavlovian responses and endless instrumentalist checklists keep us focused on minutia rather than on a holistic view of our lives. Steadily insisting we reorient ourselves to the realities of our fleeting embodiment, he underscores the most motivational management framework of all—our mortality. He reminds us that in a life span of 80 or so years, which we know is never guaranteed, individuals have about 4,000 weeks to live. We forget these sobering numbers amidst our daily demands. Burkeman's examination of time management from this philosophical perspective relentlessly returns him to the question of how he and the rest of us "want to spend those weeks—in all their mundane glory, as they pass" (Bailey, 2021, p. 143). His reminder of the politics of time relates to the labor of cultural memory work and narratives we choose to nourish with our time.

It is labor to forget, and it is labor to remember. Choose your labor.

Cultural Memory Work

Scholars trace various ways we create and sustain cultural memory. For Brockmeier (2002), cultural processes of remembering and forgetting depend on an “interplay between individual and social organization of memory” (p. 16). He conceptualizes the process as “culturally mediated within a symbolic space laid out by a variety of semiotic vehicles and devices” (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 25). In my reading, an implicit assumption underlying these arguments is that advancing some events and interpretations over others requires labor. Brockmeier’s (2002) concept of “*narrative as cultural memory*” nourishes my analysis of current examples of memory work that help me speak to the collective labor involved in such narrative processes. To Brockmeier (2002), the intricacies of effective memorials which support cultural memory engage three systems of meaning making—three “orders” in his framing—which allow us to craft, preserve, and amplify narratives that can become remembered. He describes these as linguistic, material, and discursive orders. I use these orders to consider several contemporary sites of memorializing, many of which focus on the still unactualized potential of memory work for racial justice.



Figure 1. *The field of chairs at the Oklahoma City National Museum and Memorial. Photograph by Lucy E. Bailey.*

Cultural memory is supported through a *linguistic order*, such as oral and written stories, in which people mobilize plot devices (actors, events, predicaments, and resolutions) in writing about events and places, describe to others the meaning of those events and places, and bend and collapse registers of time to link aspects of past and present in dynamic narrative configurations. Cultural memory work requires framing events in a cohesive story that fosters a sense of belonging to a cultural group, however defined (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 18). When, for example, pilgrims journey to the Oklahoma City National Museum and Memorial as I have dozens of times without realizing its narrative memory work (see Bailey & Kingston, 2020)

and *read* plaques detailing the Murrah Building bombing in 1995 which killed 168 people, *listen to* the audio recordings preserving survivors' stories, and *describe to others* those events, they engage the linguistic order of cultural memory work. This narrative order might include sharing through social media, family conversations, or group museum tours about the man who enacted the violence, the resulting losses and survivors, the meaning of those events, and the journey to create the peace memorial, museum, and annual marathon memorializing these events. In this sense, cultural remembering of the Murrah bombing is fueled by what we visitors—and it must be a “we”—describe, speak about, and write about.

Brockmeier's (2002) second order, a semiotic order, can extend a linguistic order to support narrative integration which fuels cultural memory and belonging through the materiality of a given site or space—whether an art exhibit, a museum, a monument, a book, or another marker of some kind. An example familiar to many in Oklahoma is the physical space and gardens of the Oklahoma City National Museum and Memorial (Figure 1). Community members and architects envisioned, designed, and dedicated this site of remembrance within a city block of space in memory of the Murrah bombing. Its material elements reflect spatial and relational configurations which narrate a cohesive story of events before, during, and after the bombing. A grand survivor tree flourishes near remains of the building, two massive arches etched with the times the bombing began and ended frame two entry points to the grounds, a shimmering rectangle of water stretches between the arches, and a field of 168 empty chairs face the water representing those lives lost.

Visitors recognize and contribute to the site's semiotic order through interactions such as touching walls, leaving objects, and writing messages of tribute. A fence edges the ground on which visitors affix an ever-evolving array of tokens of remembrance including messages and stuffed toy animals and chalk pads in front of the museum welcome visitors to scrawl drawings and messages. These dynamic forms of materiality engage visitors in a narrative of remembrance and tribute which nourishes the cultural memory of the bombing and their connection to these events. To Brockmeier (2002), such markers function within a semiotic system to coalesce as a narrative text that works alongside linguistic and performative orders to form cultural memory. Material symbols can also convey absence to inform a symbolic order, such as empty chairs on the grounds signaling the loss of lives.

The third component of the process of narrative integration central to cultural memory work is discursive and performative (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 35). Brockmeier's three orders are not always discrete, as the semiotic order noted previously also has discursive components. The discursive order of narrative requires enacting a process in which the site design engages the viewer, pilgrim, or visitor in its narrative goal. Brockmeier (2002) describes

this process as involving discursive practices that present historical facts “symbolically [to] activate [the material] installation and turn it into an agent in a cultural system” (p. 35). The discursive practice encourages actions aligned with the installation’s goal. The memorial marks the unspeakable violence that led to such widespread suffering and destruction and pays tribute to lost lives. Designers intend it to “achieve something” (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 35)—a call to peace, *a demand to remember*, a calling out of “you,”—the witness, the visitor—as a necessary actor in accomplishing those goals. To Brockmeier (2002), the discursive work of a material site “draws visitors and viewers” into a particular “position” in relation to the linguistic and semiotic orders to enable actualizing the memorial’s cultural memory work beyond the site (p. 35).

The enactment of this discursive work relies on meanings embedded in the marker’s social-geographical context. The precise placement and size of memorials can matter here (see Alderman & Inwood, 2021). In the example of the Oklahoma City Peace Memorial and Museum, the dedication of a full city block to the memorial at the very site where the federal building bombing took place is consequential. Deemed the largest act of domestic terrorism in the country’s history, the bombing was massive in its loss of life, material destruction—and in targeting a federal building—its symbolic and actual threat to the nation. Among the messages of the memorial’s placement and scope is the weighty reminder of the threat of violence, the power of the State’s organized response, the need to stand vigilant to threats, the responsibility to remember innocent lives lost, and the power of remembering to offer peace and comfort. The discursive order invites varied actions aligned with these orientations.

The coalescing work of these orders enables the forming of cultural memories we deem worthy, salient, or sacred to nourish and inherit. They can shape what we notice, narrate, remember, and pass on (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 23) as inheritances. Because our social moorings and communities, such as our family, our racial, ethnic, and religious communities, and our activist or academic allies, frame and shape our memory work, the process is riddled with power relations. As feminist theorist Sara Ahmed (2017) notes in relation to her critique of institutional norms, “The more people travel along a path...the more our lives might be directed in some ways, rather than others because of this easing of progression” (p. 46). In fact, “once a flow is directed, it acquires a momentum. Once a momentum is acquired, it is directive...what is in front of us depends on the direction we have already taken” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 45).

Cultural memory can work in similar ways. Visible and invisible power relations fueling multiple orders that enable remembering and forgetting are all around us reconfiguring great swaths of history in new temporal relations through these narrative orders. They invite us to follow the flow and direction of the cultural memory and imagine ourselves as part of

the community of belonging it symbolizes. They can also reflect forms of collective labor inviting and even demanding us to create more bearable memories for others to inherit as our 4,000 weeks pass by.

Cultural Memory as Inheritance

One can turn attention to cultural battles surrounding the removal of Confederate monuments across the U.S. in recent years for a glimpse into the value and fragility of cultural memory and the labor involved in sustaining it. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, more than 2,000 U.S. memorials honor the Confederacy (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). Such markers include statues of Confederate generals and buildings, as well as schools bearing leaders' names. Since the late 1990s, intensifying in the wake of George Floyd's murder in 2020, robust activism has targeted their removal (Cox, 2021). To many, such memorials sustain a cultural memory of the Confederate South steeped in white supremacy and the enslavement of millions of innocent African-ascendant (Dillard, 2006) people. The common presence of such monuments in public spaces where a diversity of people live, learn, and move normalizes and valorizes a government which has fought to uphold racial tyranny for centuries.

The sites in which these memorials, or semiotic orders of narrative, reside—such as state capitol grounds, public lands, schools, parks, or any spaces supported by public funding—further imbue these sites with the message that they speak the state's desires. Such public markers require ongoing embodied labor, care, and resources on the part of the state for their upkeep. In spurring the removal of a total of 168 symbols between 2015–2020, protestors ask, “Whose Heritage?” do such memorials represent? (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). What are the daily psychological and spiritual consequences of such memorials? Where are their counternarratives visible? Indeed, whose cultural memories do we privilege and sustain?



Figure 2. A 2021 map of Confederate monuments and removals. Southern Poverty Law Center (splcenter.org).

Many such U.S. memorials have been in place for decades. Yet a lesser-known story of how some entered public spaces in the first place—an active cultural forgetting, perhaps—is that many were erected in the decades well after the Civil War, during Jim Crow, or in some cases, even a century after the Civil War, during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s (see Cox, 2021). Confederate General Robert E. Lee, for example, did not want memorials constructed in his honor or dedicated to the Confederacy. Recognizing their symbolic power, he believed they would fuel rather than soften divisions after the Civil War (Cox, 2021, p. 39; Romeros, 2017). After his death, groups invested in his status erected monuments to him and other leaders during the ongoing post-war struggle for civil rights. Thus, baked into the semiotic narrative origins of some Confederate statues, through their temporal and spatial placement in primarily Southern states after the Civil War during Jim Crow and the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the funding and labor invested in erecting them, is an intentional, virulent, narrative reminder of white power. Lee and others became symbols for “the lost cause” mythic of cultural memory in which the South fought heroically to sustain state’s rights. The monuments’ establishment post-Civil War exemplifies power relations used to collapse time in memory work to nurture connections between the present and past and the semiotic and discursive orders of cultural memory work that serve to glorify the Confederacy. Discursively, these monuments enact symbolic violence through warning Black activists to “remember their place.”

These assemblages of concrete and bronze, just like configurations of red, white, and blue in various versions of U.S. flags, hold no inherent meaning. We breathe complex meanings into them which solidify and shift over time in various geographies and in dialogue with other symbols. Yet their symbolic fields of operation limit their interpretation. As Carlson and Schramm-Pate (2003) note in their research on the Confederate flag, despite some groups’ efforts to dislodge the flag’s racist hauntings with messages of a rebellious spirit or a regional identity salient to all who live there, semiotic machinations with the flag could not shake loose the racist history to which the flag remains tethered today. Similarly, some decry the removal of these figures allegedly because of their beauty, their historic meaning, or their representation of a “shared heritage.” Yet, the origins of their production, the meanings they carry across a century, their creation to intimidate and wreak symbolic violence, and their contemporary mobilization by white supremacist groups carry entrenched cultural meanings of hate that defy new interpretation. Some suggest these memorials belong in history museums, as has occurred with Nazi symbols, better to contain their virulence.

Semiotic and discursive orders of the statues are not only consequential for creating cultural memory and narratives of belonging among Americans. Subjugated cultural memories gain visibility through painting or projecting images of Black visionaries onto these monuments in public celebrations,

in renaming schools (Brown, in process), and in erecting statues of Black freedom and triumph (Schneider, 2021). This also occurs through public dialogue about the removal of statues or the absence of particular markers that cultivate new imaginaries of who we want to be. In *No Common Ground*, a study of Confederate monuments, Cox (2021) describes justice-oriented organizing that finally led to some Confederate memorials' removal. The 2021 removal of the 12-ton, 21-foot-high, bronze statue of General Lee in Richmond, VA that sat atop a 40-foot pedestal of granite after its 130-year reign in this public space leaves light and sky behind, and air to breathe. Other removals have led to the creation of murals, gardens, and new statues honoring freedom.

Both the materiality of Richmond's Lee statue and its active removal signals how cultural remembering and forgetting are always in motion and in tension. The two are always shifting in their material expressions, always scripting different temporal relations between then and now, always in danger of—or in need of—erasure, and always reflecting competing visions about which cultural memories we should solidify with materiality and which we should choose to let crumble. That Lee's statue cost \$10,000 (a quarter of a million dollars today), was unveiled to a crowd of 150,000 people (Brumfield, 2017; Cox, 2021), and sat in glory for more than a century speaks to the powerful interests its cultural memory served and reflected. That it came down in 2021—at a cost of \$2 million—demonstrates both the collective labor and the power exercised and invested in its forgetting.

Academic Memory Work



Figure 3. Book cover of Hemmings, *Why Stories Matter*.

There exist entire social histories of forgetting, to use Klein's (2007) term. He analyzes popular memory in Los Angeles and the bulldozing of districts which are now forgotten and replaced by glamorous narratives of

the creation of Hollywood. Higher education, too, is riddled with cultural memories and inheritances, dominant cultural frames and subaltern frames that operate simultaneously or shift over time. Concerned community members have advocated to change the names of campus buildings with racist histories, for example, as well as removing statues and markers (Alderman & Reuben, 2020) in order to help cultivate orders necessary to form new cultural memories. Academic memory can sustain and forget varied memories. For example, feminist historian Clare Hemmings, in *Why Stories Matter* (Figure 3), analyzes dominant feminist accounts of women's history noting how politics of the many stories feminists tell about history obscure alternative narratives which non-feminists might easily coopt.

The practice of academic citation is another vehicle for nourishing memory involving all three narrative orders. The linguistic order is evident in discussing, writing, and disseminating dominant memories; the semiotic order is visible in which physical materials, books, artifacts, podcasts, and other vehicles of value are dedicated to one set of memories or another; and the discursive order is visible in the implicit call to others to value, use, and circulate academic sources. Citation practices might reflect affection for certain narratives which create well-worn grooves and orientations (Ahmed, 2017). Scholars can perpetuate forgetting and remembering through concretizing in their writing whose work is visible and valuable and thus dominant in this semiotic system. One well-worn narrative groove in Women's Studies, for instance, is the familiar "wave" metaphor of the women's movement (first, second, third, fourth waves, etc.). However teachable, this metaphor obscures the frothing waters and deep hues between waves and forms of resistance manifested in women's history that can reframe popular memory of the movement. Movements ebb and flow, with both trickles and gushes.

In recent years historian Maggie Nash (2019) has directed her analytic gaze to the history of land-grant universities in order to contribute to countering widespread amnesia of U.S. settler colonialism related to higher education. She traces U.S. governmental machinations and legislation leading to the forced removal of American Indians from the very land on which public universities came to be built and flourish—supporting "the wide public" of the state while the vision of "the public" remains narrow. The original mission of land grants was to "teach agriculture, military tactics, and mechanic arts (and classical studies) so members of the working classes could obtain a liberal, practical education" (Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, n.d., para 1). Some imagined land-grant institutions as places of service oriented to increasing educational access.

Nash traces the practices of "claiming" "unclaimed" Indigenous land to establish land-grant institutions. Much celebrated for their visionary public promise, land-grants actually emerge from coercive policies, warfare, and dispossession of Native peoples, but this history relentlessly falls out

of cultural memory. Some universities now render visible their Indigenous roots through land acknowledgments on plaques, email signatures, and mission statements. These are all steps in the linguistic and semiotic orders of establishing cultural memory. They can aid in reframing origin stories and amplifying counternarratives about the terrain on which land grants reside. Yet there is more work to do in addressing such dispossessions beyond acknowledgements; reparations and returns can accompany cultural memory work.




Figure 4: *Innis' book*, *The Princeton Fugitive Slave*.

Other memory work in higher education focuses on rendering visible the intersections between the institution of slavery and institutions of learning. Legal scholar Lolita Buckner Innis' work surfaces these intersections in her innovative biography of James Collins Johnson, a fugitive who lived in Princeton, New Jersey for 60 years (Figure 4). Innis works to remember a forgotten institutional memory of the constitutive historical intersections between slavery and higher education. For example, finances to support Princeton in the 18th and 19th centuries and white Southern students who attended often came from plantation households. The institution, in turn, relied on Black workers to fuel its educational mission, workers who supported white male students' education through laundering their clothes, emptying their chamber pots, chopping their wood, and cooking and cleaning.

Johnson's livelihood, Innis reveals, depended on this service. She examines other intersections as well.³ Such institutional forgetting can weave the erasure of financial origins and the human beings that made them possible into their glowing origin stories and replace them with narratives of enlightenment, access, and possibility. Historical studies can surface information that can be woven into new cultural memories to capture more complex narratives in the interests of racial justice. Brasher, Alderman, and Inwood's (forthcoming) language of campuses as "wounded places" also seems fitting for the processes Innis' and Nash's work make visible. The

linguistic order evident here also discursively calls for healing directions of acknowledgement and reparations in cultural and geographical memory work.

It is labor to forget, and it is labor to remember. Choose your labor.

Place-Based Memory Work

Cultural memories are often situated within geographic landscapes with place-based meanings which underscore the importance of local, place-based memory work. Alderman and Inwood (2013) use the term “landscapes of memory” to convey how landscapes have a “normative power” in which they give “voice to certain versions of the past,” grant them “legitimacy,” thereby “ordering and controlling the public meaning of the past” (p. 188). Such ordering and controlling manifests in narratives about the Oklahoma territory’s Land Run and the Centennial Land Run Monument in Oklahoma City which memorializes it. These massive bronze statues of galloping horses, wagons, and determined riders straining in their saddles and charging into Oklahoma territory celebrate the early settlers who fought harsh conditions to claim ostensibly “uninhabited” land in 1889. This powerful set of sculptures was created by a Norman, Oklahoma artist, Paul Moore, situated in a semiotics of Western survival and triumph, created over many years with much family labor and commitment. The city land on which it sits is a fitting aesthetic home framed by water and the vast Oklahoma sky.

However, a writer representing Indigenous perspectives describes the marker as a “monumental monstrosity,” because the powerful statues and other markers set in a public park deny the existence of Indigenous peoples on the land far preceding settlers (Fowler, 2020). The cultural memory of the Land Run that helped establish the state now known as Oklahoma crafts an origin story that preserves and champions one set of memories and perpetuates the erasure, the forgetting, of another set of memories. Too often the dialogue and arguments about statues such as the Confederate examples exemplified earlier can dissolve into armed contestations and fierce identity battles about mine and yours, us and them, worthy memories and dismissible ones. Whose memories get to “win” and thereby be remembered? What might a counter-memorial look like alongside, complicating, or speaking back to these massive statues? What would it look like to establish multiple, layered cultural memories in such spaces?

The Tulsa Race Massacre that occurred in 1921 has a long history of active cultural forgetting and a more recent history of active and widespread remembering. Although some Tulsans have never forgotten the turn of the century’s vibrant, nourishing, and active Black Wall Street community (see Johnson, 2021), knowledge of the mass of angry, white

Tulsans who burned the community to the ground, killing hundreds of its Black citizens in 1921, has intensified in popular memory as more Oklahomans have learned and listened in recent years. In broader cultural memory, the community, and the violence, became forgotten. Descendants, staff writers of *The Black Wall Street Times*, and local historians have worked for decades to cultivate a linguistic order toward remembering both the massacre and the resilience of the community through writing, storying, classes, memory tours, scholarship, teacher education, popular histories, and the establishment of a center for tribute.



Figure 5. The Healing Walkway, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Photograph by Amanda Kingston.

Beginning in 2020, a year of events led up to the 100th commemoration of the massacre. These events provided opportunities for people to gather in peace and pay tribute to those who lost their lives, acknowledge the few remaining survivors, and to foreground the history and resilience of Black Oklahomans. Reflecting the discursive third order of narrative that can help sustain this cultural memory's prominence in Oklahoma and the nation's history of racial violence, leaders also *called for others* to act beyond honoring and commemorating. As the organizing committee expressed, "We believe strongly in reparations. Our focus is on the larger scope of reparations, which means repairing past damages and making amends through acknowledgment, apology, and atonement. This process is central to racial reconciliation in Tulsa" (Greenwood Rising).

Family Memory Work

The final example I consider is cultural memory work and its potential for racial justice through family inquiry. Families invested in a particular identity narrative can actively forget aspects of their family past through

excising troubling aspects from family storytelling or downplaying them at a reunion. They can toss pictures, change the subject, and repeat favorite stories they want to instantiate in the family narrative. Some seem to have taken up a call to racial justice through reframing family memory in ways I read as using linguistic, semiotic, and discursive orders. I have been interested in how white scholars conduct historical family inquiries to engage in racial justice work, to acknowledge, apologize for, and atone for their family's historical complicity in racial violence as an example of what cultural memory work toward racial justice might look like. I turn to one example here (e.g. Bailey, 2022).⁴

There has been a robust turn to family inquiry in the last two decades which includes varied forms of identity work and creative engagement with one's own family as a site of research. Scrutinizing how people engage in family inquiry, remembering and forgetting, is an ongoing interest to me because our narrations of family can reflect our identity investments through remembering some narratives and forgetting others. Family constructions can become part of a racial project because all of us have variable awareness of our ancestors, extended kin, or even-closer relatives. As Brockmeier (2002) says of cultural memory more broadly, people narrate various versions of their families which reflect and create their sense of belonging. Work on family can become hagiographic when we encounter family members worth praising or angst-ridden when we encounter those whom we prefer to prune from our family trees.

Since 1998, with his publication, *Slaves in the Family*, Edward Ball's award-winning research into his family's history manifests his efforts to reframe and create new family memories oriented toward racial justice. This journalist has conducted extensive research on his Southern-plantation-owning family to remember events some members of his family wished to "forget"—to ignore, cover up, or actively push away. Ball (1998) describes the colorful stories he heard as a child about his family's heritage as owners of numerous Southern plantations. Family storytelling was a common cultural practice for the Balls aligned with the linguistic order of narrative necessary for cultivating a coherent picture of family identity and memory.

As the years passed, and Ball began to wonder about the silences in his family storytelling—the part of his family history his father sometimes says they do not talk about—he used his considerable research skills to begin an inquiry into his family's complicity in slavery. Ball (1998) notes how his family memory was inherently racialized in *inscribing silences* about his family's racial crimes, writing, "the Balls lived side by side with Black families for six generations" but "no one talked about how slavery had helped us" (p. 13). Six years, dozens of conversations, numerous trips across the nation and globe, much questioning and searching, and hundreds of pages later, Ball produced his National Book Award-winning text. In what I frame as his racial-justice oriented family memory work, Ball lays bare his family's past and narrates the history of the families his own family enslaved.

He works to “face the plantation” as he calls it—to be accountable to his family history—through tracing, uncovering, and reflecting on his family’s involvement in the atrocity of slavery (Ball, 1998, p. 14). Through an oppressive inheritance borne of records necessary to run Southern plantations, he relies on over 10,000 pages of Ball family documents preserved in archives throughout the South to help him conduct his research. To even possess such an archive from which to script a family narrative inheritance reflects the kind of archival inequities and injustices that expose which lives are chosen to be recognized, gain substance, and shape and become cultural memory, and which lives remain unremarked upon or hidden. Who could write, with which materials, whose lives were worth recording, in what ways, and which remnants endure centuries later are all questions tied to archival privilege and silences central to justice-focused historical work.

For scholars investigating subjugated histories, engaging with records in some historical periods requires extensive strategizing. For example, in her book, *Self-Taught: African American Education in Slavery and Freedom* (2005), Williams describes the necessary critical reading practices she brought to the archive to explore how African-American people historically pursued education. In the introduction to her book she writes, “I returned...to the same missionary archives that other historians have used, and I learned to read between the lines, to pull out people who are mentioned only in passing...they were present...in the interstices, in the negative spaces that comprise such a substantial part of the picture” (Williams, 2005, pp. 1–2). Ball’s family records were thus vital for Ball history as well as the histories of the men, women, and children his family enslaved.

Ball mines his haunted archival wealth to contribute to the linguistic and semiotic orders of family memory, producing three massive books (1998; 2001; 2020). His 1998 text also engages in the discursive order of memory work by including a call to action for other Southern families who may hold similar records in their family archives. In Ball’s (1998) acknowledgments section, he pleads:

...to the families of former slave owners and others with records from the plantation period...to release their records to the archives...because the lives of slaves were chronicled by their owners...not by government scribes...such private letters and papers [thus] contain the family history of millions. (p. 455)

The ethical urgency of his call for archival equity urges the reader to act, recognize, reframe, and make accessible any crucial resources they possess to enable Black family descendants to access ancestral records to enrich their own family memory. In the Ball family alone, he notes, “close to 4,000 [B]lack people were born into slavery in his family, or bought by them, during a 167-year period” (1698–1865) when the Civil War ended, leaving as many as 75,000 descendants. His is a call to redistribute precious archival

resources that should never have been his or others to own, possess, or control in the first place.

This white racial project of family historical accountability necessitates grappling with many truths and, in my reading, methodologically destabilizes a Ball grand-family-racial narrative of white innocence or benevolence. His dual story eventually connects through discovering shared bloodlines among Black and white Ball family descendants, thereby expanding his and others' constructed sense of "family." Ball fuels those temporal reconfigurations necessary to cultural memory work that removal of Confederate statues also accomplishes. He conveys that the racism underlying the plantation system is not in "the past," but continues to the present. He refuses a colorblind racial narrative of past harm that is now "over," and "irrelevant," in favor of foregrounding a dynamic legacy that blends past and present and persists in varied forms. Ball continues this line of family inquiry in subsequent books, *The Sweet Hell Inside* (2002) and, most recently, in *Life of a Klansman* (2020). This is family memory work that moves determinedly toward racial justice.

Conclusion: The Work of Cultural Memory

Today's cultural memory evidenced in Confederate removals, academic memory practices, and family memory work all speak to the labor and narrative orders involved in fostering more-bearable cultural memories toward racial justice. Recognizing cultural memory as a project of power and formation through particular narrative orders (Brockmeier, 2002) allows us better to mark, trace, and excavate counter memories, forgotten memories, and partial memories that merit amplifying through sustained attention to these discursive, semiotic, and linguistic orders. With Burkeman's (2021) reminders of the centrality of mortality to our choices and attention, to remember otherwise demands dedication to accountable memory work. And these potential transformational projects *can* happen in family, public, and academic spaces when we collectively consider the cultural memories we want to honor and to work purposefully toward those visions.

It is labor to forget, and it is labor to remember. Choose your labor.

Endnotes

- ¹ I am grateful to have been a member of SOPHE for the last 15 years and honored to be invited to give The Drake Lecture. I was scheduled to give the Lecture a few years ago but was unable to travel. The amazing Karen McKellips stepped in to present about the value of biographies in her life which continued a theme we presented for

a panel together a previous year. I remain grateful for this kind act still, years later. Karen died suddenly and far too soon in September, 2020. I thought about Karen throughout the process of writing and preparing for this presentation. I wished she could have been present with us in St. Louis this year, offering a fierce, incisive commentary on contemporary politics, wearing something bold and colorful aligned with her spirit, and gracing us all with another good story. And another. Thank you, Karen. We won't forget you.

- ² After presenting The Drake Lecture in October, 2021, I developed it further, which is the version I present here. I also developed a separate paper from remarks in the family section to explore in detail Ball's text, *Slaves in the Family* (1998), as a form of family memory work (Bailey, 2022).
- ³ See Bailey (2021) for a full review of Innis' book in the *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Education (JISE)*.
- ⁴ After presenting The Drake Lecture in October, 2021, I drew from my remarks to develop a separate paper exploring Ball's work in *Slaves in the Family* (1998), published in 2022.

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Personalism: An Elucidation of the Philosophical Foundations of the Educational Theory of Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm (1875–1951)¹

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Introduction

The former physicist and educationalist Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm (1875–1951) is known as one of the founders of the Dutch academic discipline “pedagogiek,” which we translate to “educational studies” within this article.² Kohnstamm is well-known for his *persoonlijkheidspedagogiek* [pedagogy of personality], which centers the idea of each child becoming a unique personality.³ Kohnstamm’s educational theory is particularly interesting because of its unique coherence with the philosophy of personalism. Although many publications about Kohnstamm and his philosophy of personalism exist, very few of their authors investigate the coherence between his educational theory and the philosophy of personalism.⁴ Moreover, these authors neither make a clear distinction between the personalistic concepts of person and personality nor do they sufficiently examine what these concepts mean in Kohnstamm’s personalism and how they influence his educational theory. The aim of our work is to provide a more extensive analysis of Kohnstamm’s personalism and concepts related to personalism in order to obtain an enriched understanding of the philosophical foundations of his educational theory. Therefore, after a brief account of Kohnstamm’s biography, we provide an analysis of Kohnstamm’s personalism. Furthermore, we pay particular attention to the philosophy of the German-American philosopher and psychologist William Stern (1871–1938), whose work proves an important inspiration for Kohnstamm. Next we explicate three important personalistic concepts, namely the person, the personality, and the associated concept of the I–Thou relation. We end our argument with an account of how Kohnstamm’s personalism influenced his educational theory.

Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm and His Shift to Personalism

Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm studied physics and philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. After a career as a Professor of Physics and working as an unpaid Lecturer in Philosophy, from 1919 Kohnstamm held the newly established Chair of Educational Studies at the University of Amsterdam. In 1932, he was also appointed Professor of Educational Studies in Utrecht. Kohnstamm was one of the first professors of educational studies in the Netherlands and therefore responsible for creating academic content.⁵

During secondary school (1887–1893), Kohnstamm was influenced by the idea that the natural sciences and technology were sources of progress. This so-called materialism and corresponding positivism were based on the idea that reality can be traced back to matter, laws, and patterns, and that insights into these would eventually lead to a greater mastery of reality.⁶ Within secondary schools and universities, materialistic thinking created a major place for mathematics and physics, characterised by explanatory models, patterns, and laws. However, at the start of his academic studies (1893–1901), Kohnstamm distanced himself from materialistic and positivistic thinking. After reading the popular study of Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899), *Kraft und Stoff* [*Force and Matter*] (1855), Kohnstamm was disillusioned by the study's poor evidential value and the dogmatic and one-sided nature of materialism.⁷ During this time an encounter with the Bible shook and changed his materialistic conviction. Kohnstamm's university teachers also contributed to this change in his convictions. Partly owing to their influence, Kohnstamm developed an interest in the search for truth and in scientific theoretical questions, such as whether reality can be fully described.

During his academic studies, Kohnstamm was introduced to the work of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), within whose works he discovered the philosophy of idealism. Kohnstamm appreciated the transcendental nature of Kant's philosophy, namely the possibility to consider values, norms, or ideas as generally valid and, at the same time, as being related to empirical reality. This transcendental nature contrasts with the materialistic conviction wherein no other reality is taken into account.⁸ Kohnstamm interprets idealism as a philosophical theory that starts from a metaphysical world comprising the unchanging and eternal ideas that are related to and influence reality. In Kohnstamm's view, man strives to participate in the metaphysical world through reasoning, generalizing, and conforming to general beliefs and laws.⁹ In this way, actions are influenced and controlled. Kant's philosophy gave Kohnstamm an opportunity to focus on subjective thinking and place man as a unique and moral being in the center of his thinking.¹⁰

The transition of Kohnstamm's worldview from materialistic to idealistic not only is attributable to his own quest for the truth and the influence of his teachers, but also to a scientific revolution within the

academic world. This revolution, known as the *revolt against positivism* in light of the influential study of Stuart Hughes, took place from about 1890 to 1930 and was characterised by an aversion to absolute thinking and opposition to the dominance of causality in mathematics and the natural sciences.¹¹ Within this scientific revolution, there was still a strong commitment to logic and objectivity; however, there was also a constant search for the recognition of the importance of subjective values in science. Moreover, the adherents of this revolution opposed the application of empirical methods to understand human behaviour and sought an answer to the question of the relationship between determination and freedom of man.¹²

In 1907, in addition to his position as Assistant Professor of Physics, Kohnstamm became a Lecturer of Philosophy. In his opening lecture, *Transcendenteel Idealisme* [*Transcendental Idealism*], Kohnstamm discusses his views on science and the validity of causal reasoning.¹³ Further, he rejects materialism, positivism, and monism, or the idea that there is only one general methodology to explain phenomena. Kohnstamm's ideas were based on the work of German, neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). Rickert's work appealed to Kohnstamm because in *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* [*The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*] (1896–1902, 2 vols.), Rickert defends the right of transcendental values in the practice of science.¹⁴ Rickert's ideas were in line with Kohnstamm's view that knowledge and science could never be separated from moral values. Moreover, Rickert's theory gave Kohnstamm the opportunity to acknowledge "individual concreteness" and the importance of "history and its meaning" in scientific thought, in line with Kohnstamm's aim to introduce a methodology of science that recognized the free personality and will of man.¹⁵

Kohnstamm's thought of the person as a unique and valuable being, presented in his inaugural lecture *Determinisme en Natuurwetenschap* [*Determinism and Natural Science*] (1908) on the occasion of his appointment as Professor of Physics, became increasingly prominent and gained a central position in his thinking. In his lecture, Kohnstamm set out to demonstrate the close relationship between physical and psychological phenomena. He states that a human being cannot be classified under a law or rule, but each must be seen as an individual and free being.¹⁶ By advancing these ideas on human beings, he turns against the doctrine of determinism, which is the idea that no substantial change in the world is possible.¹⁷ Remarkably, in subsequent years (1908–1913), Kohnstamm also turned against the idealistic worldview without expressing this explicitly or mentioning a development, encounter, or event. He eventually believed that, in idealism, the human being was used as a means of expressing the general value or "the idea" but that idealism itself did not acknowledge what makes the individual personality unique.¹⁸ In other words, idealism did not match his idea of the person as a unique human being.

In 1913, Kohnstamm, who came from a liberal Jewish background, converted to Christianity after a spiritual experience. According to Kohnstamm, his philosophy of personalism was born in that moment: “When I am asked: What does my personalism actually mean, and how did it emerge, I must refer to this moment.”¹⁹ During the years following his conversion to Christianity, Kohnstamm developed his theory of personalism into what he called biblical personalism.

From 1905 onwards, besides a professorship in physics (1908–1928) and a lectureship in philosophy (1907–1908), Kohnstamm was involved in numerous social and political activities. He became an advocate for democracy and for the freedom of choice and conscience of man. Influenced by these activities, his search for truth and the discovery of the unique and individual personality, the coincidental fact of a vacant position as Professor of Educational Studies led to his switch to a professorship in that discipline in 1919. In his newfound capacity, Kohnstamm wrote his most famous work, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording* [*Becoming Personality*] (1929), the second of the three-volume work *Schepper en Schepping* [*Creator and Creation*]. In this work, he further develops his personalism and his educational theory.²⁰

The Philosophy of Personalism

Personalism is not a uniform philosophy but has many different variations of thought, however all versions consider “the person” or “the personality” as the key category. In contrast with materialism and idealism, according to the philosophy of personalism, there is no system of general valid rules, laws, or values. Personalism acknowledges a unique human being in every individual, and each person is assigned with personal dignity and freedom.²¹ Although the person is the central notion to personalism, the person is not considered as an individual, but as a person in community with other persons. Personalism emphasises the relationship between the person and the other and God as well as the important value of community, and an aspect in which personalism differs from individualism. At the same time, the individual person carries an absolute value and is not subordinate to the community, an area in which personalism differs from collectivism.²²

In his recent study on the origins of personalism, Bengtsson traces the origins of personalistic thinking to the work of the 18th-century German and Christian philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819).²³ In his work Jacobi reacts to the Enlightenment’s rational thinking which, in his view, had developed into pantheism and atheism, where God is respectively immanent and denied. He also opposes Kantian idealism in which, although not denying God or the divine, God or the divine cannot be known by a person. Kantian idealism does not take into account the individual and free person by emphasising on the pursuit of generally valid values or ideas. Yet, according to Jacobi, a person can have a higher and spiritual experience and an individual and personal relationship with God, who also is seen as a

person. From this personal relationship with God, life can be understood and given meaning. Some later versions of personalism replace God as a person with the idea of the human person or a system of ideas. In the latter case, personalism begins to resemble the idealism rejected by Jacobi, yet is distinguished by its emphasis on the unique meaning of the person and their individual experience. Owing to these differing interpretations of God, significant differences arose between various versions of personalism. However, these versions overlap and enjoy a common European and Christian origin.²⁴ The best-known versions of personalism are American personalism: founded by philosopher and theologian Borden Parker Bowne (1847–1910), and the French school of the Catholic theologian Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950).²⁵ Also notable is the personalistic philosophy of another contemporary of Kohnstamm, the Russian personalist and religious existentialist philosopher Nikolaj Aleksandrovitsj Berdyaev (1874–1948).²⁶

In his study on personalism, Arie de Wilde distinguishes two waves of personalistic thinking in the 20th century.²⁷ These waves relate to the aforementioned *revolt against positivism*. The first wave took place in the first two decades of the 20th century and was a response to the existing materialistic view on humanity and the mechanisation and modernisation of society. In this first wave, the unique meaning and dignity of the person was emphasised and the limits of reason and rationalisation were indicated. The first wave includes the work of psychologist and philosopher Louis William (Ludwig Wilhelm) Stern (1871–1938), a prominent representative of German personalism and an important source of inspiration for Kohnstamm.²⁸ Stern worked at the universities of Breslau and Hamburg, and since 1934 at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. He is considered a pioneer in the field of developmental psychology and one of the founders of differential psychology.²⁹ Stern explicates his philosophy, which he calls critical personalism, in his three-volume work *Person und Sache: System der Philosophischen Weltanschauung* [*Person and Thing: System of Philosophical Worldview*] (1907–1924). In this work, Stern warns about reducing the person to a sum of physical and psychological characteristics that he calls impersonalism. He argues labelling the person a unique or inspired individual does not do justice to the notion of the person. Stern calls this naïve personalism. Stern's critical personalism originates from a schematic explication and definition of the person. He defines the person as an indivisible whole or a totality, a *unitas multiplex*.³⁰ For Stern, a person forms an inseparable unity of body and mind and comprises countless interdependent traits.³¹

The second wave of personalistic thinking occurred immediately after the World War I and continued until about 1930. It built on the first wave and formed a response to social and economic changes that resulted from WWI, when associated feelings of insecurity and uncertainty led to the people's loss of faith in fixed patterns and systems. This feeling also influences the debate about causality in science that started before

the war.³² During the second wave, the focus shifted from abstract and philosophical topics to the more social-, political-, and economic-oriented applications that were important for society. The stories from the front, the high number of refugees, and the affected economies raised the possibility of living in communion with others. A holistic view of man in society was sought: a view of man that acknowledges the person, a human being, as a totality instead of reducing man to a productive element, a citizen of a certain country, or a subordinate of the (war) economy.³³ The schematic and rational thinking of the natural sciences can be recognised in the first wave of personalistic thinking, as can be seen in the work of Stern; however, schematic and rational thinking was abandoned in the second wave, wherein the more irrational and subjective approaches in the methodology of science were acknowledged.³⁴ Although Kohnstamm focuses on the philosophy of personalism prevalent during the first wave and uses schematic models in his work, his work can be classified under the second wave because of his fierce rejection of the dominance of causal reasoning in science and his emphasis on the person as a unique personality in communion with others.

de Wilde also classifies phenomenology and existentialism, and the emerging attention on the I–Thou relation under the second wave.³⁵ Although the I–Thou relation had already been described by Jacobi, it is seen as a typical product of the development of 20th-century thought on European personalism.³⁶ The focus on the I–Thou relation under the second wave can be explained by the fact that the I–Thou relation reflects a personal relationship with other human beings, the community, the world, and God. This relationship is characterised by subjectivity and does not represent formulas, schemes, natural laws, or causality.³⁷

Kohnstamm's Personalism: Idealism vs. Personalism

In *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek* [*Pedagogy of the State or Personality Pedagogy*] (1919) and *Persoonlijkheid en Idee* [*Personality and Idea*] (1922), Kohnstamm elaborates on his personalism and applies distinctions between idealism and personalism introduced by Jacobi, although he never mentions Jacobi's name.³⁸ In these publications, Kohnstamm does not explain idealism on the basis of Kant, which was the starting point for Jacobi, but on an interpretation of Plato's doctrine.³⁹ As we described previously, Kohnstamm interprets idealism as a theory wherein the unchanging and eternal idea within the metaphysical world is central. In his explanation, he equates values with ideas characterised by unity and generality.⁴⁰ By presenting idealism as an unchanging law system and emphasising the importance of generalisation, Kohnstamm's interpretation of idealism shows similarities with materialism and positivism.⁴¹

In contrast with his interpretation of idealism, Kohnstamm describes his version of personalism as follows: “the ideal of the development of the individual person into an incomparable personality.”⁴² According to

Kohnstamm, the thought of the special and individual personality takes central stage. Such a focus on individual personality proves impossible in impersonal idealism, an idea is based on generality, whereby the uniqueness of each personality is ignored. In addition to the person of man, God has a prominent place in Kohnstamm's personalism. God represents the highest personality in Kohnstamm's theory. In contrast with idealism, God is not a distant norm, law, or idea but a personality that manifests itself in this world who wants to have a relationship with the human person. God therefore is seen as a person who leads the human in a concrete and individual way by speaking in and to a person's conscience. In this way, the person knows how to live and what is right. Thereby, the human personality does not merge with God's personality; it retains the person's independence and will. This personalistic idea contrasts with idealism, wherein the person is absorbed into the absolute idea.⁴³

According to Kohnstamm, the main difference between personalism and idealism is that in idealism, values are ideas in the sense of eternal and unchanging forms. Moreover, the individual and the special are worthless; the aim is uniformity. In personalism, Kohnstamm sees the possibility of differentiation in values and the recognition and appreciation for the individuality and distinctiveness of each person. He seems to use his interpretation of idealism better to position his personalism, which ultimately and directly influences the explication of his concepts of person and personality and his educational theory.

The personalism Kohnstamm introduces in 1919 evolves over time. Kohnstamm presents his first interpretation of personalism in the field of educational theory based on the distinction between idealism and personalism. In his lecture in 1919, Kohnstamm distinguishes three forms of educational theory: the educational theory of the state (state pedagogy), individualistic educational theory (individualistic pedagogy), and educational theory of personality (*persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*). State pedagogy is based on one general idea, namely the upbringing and formation of a child to an ideal state-citizen. However, this educational idea requires uniformity and ignores the uniqueness of the child's personality. This theory is also a form of idealism owing to its general validity and schematised approach that does not take individuality and uniqueness into account but assumes a one-size-fits-all approach. For Kohnstamm, state pedagogy represents abstract thinking and uniformity within the school curriculum that holds mathematics in a central position because mathematics offers one general, valid outcome and does not take individual expression into account. In individualistic pedagogy, Kohnstamm attends to individual personality and differentiated upbringing; however, according to him, this theory focuses primarily on the individual person.⁴⁴ In personality pedagogy, Kohnstamm emphasizes both a child's own, free personality and the importance of the child's community. Personality pedagogy is a form of personalism because "the personality" is the key category of thinking and because education

should concentrate on the development of the individual person into an incomparable personality. Kohnstamm's educational theory represents concrete thinking and the possibility of individual expression within the school curriculum, such as the subjects literature, music, and the arts.

The Person in Kohnstamm's Theory

In Kohnstamm's personalism, being a person has an important place for man as well as for God. In the first volume of *Schepper en Schepping: Het Waarheidsprobleem* [*The Problem of Truth*] (1926), Kohnstamm repeatedly states difficulty in defining a person because no definition proves sufficient. Kohnstamm's difficulty fits within the tradition of personalism, particularly in the second wave, wherein static formulas or definitions are neither strived for nor intended. Eventually, Kohnstamm formulates a definition for the sake of recognisability.⁴⁵ In his definition, he mentions numerous important characteristics of the concept of person and derives many of these characteristics from Stern's definition of the person.⁴⁶ Building on Stern's definition, Kohnstamm constructs several levels of existence. He agrees with Stern that every being deserves its own name because it assumes a certain value. For the lowest level, he uses the term "individual," referring to the word "indivisible," an indivisible unity. Based on the first part of Stern's definition, Kohnstamm describes the term individual as "an existing being that despite the multiplicity of parts, forms a real, peculiar and intrinsic valuable unity and despite this multiplicity of parts, forms a whole."⁴⁷ By this Kohnstamm means that one can speak of an individual when describing, for example, the Koh-i-Noor diamond, a gemstone already known during the 13th century, originating from India and currently owned by the British royal family, since this diamond comprises several parts that form a whole and is unique among its kind. The concept of the individual can also be summarised as follows: everything that bears its own name.⁴⁸

Then, Kohnstamm went on to make his construction more complex. He distinguishes a living group from a lifeless group under the category of the individual. The living individuals are distinguished from the lifeless by uniform and purposeful activity [*einheitliche zielstrebige*], a term derived from Stern. The Koh-i-Noor diamond does not fall under this subcategory because it is not alive; however, the category does include grain that germinates or a blackbird that builds a nest. The grain and blackbird are both characterized as living individuals based on the purpose for which they live. When the grain and blackbird are considered self-active, they can both be seen as spontaneous individuals, a subsequent distinction made by Kohnstamm. Here, by "spontaneous" Kohnstamm means the living individual can develop activity without the help or input of others. He calls this, using Stern's expression, self-activity [*selbsttätigkeit*]. Kohnstamm's explanation of the spontaneous individual is consistent with Stern's definition of the person; however, in Kohnstamm's theory, the spontaneous individual is not yet equal to a person. In Stern's definition, the blackbird

and grain may be identified as a person, but calling a blackbird a person does not fit with Kohnstamm's view.⁴⁹ The main difference between the person and all other spontaneous individuals, such as the blackbird and grain, is that the person is characterised by morality whereas spontaneous individuals are not. Although the individual and person have overlapping characteristics, the characteristic of morality is distinctive between the two. In Kohnstamm's theory, the person is a moral individual and distinguishes himself or herself from everything else created, such as animals and plants, which are merely individuals.⁵⁰

Thus, while Kohnstamm extensively follows Stern in the definition of the person, his explication of the human person is clearly different. In Stern's personalism, being a person is not limited to human beings.⁵¹ Stern distinguishes a hierarchy of persons of different sizes, starting with the atom, followed by a cell, plant, animal, human, family, people, humanity, earth, and solar system and ending with the Absolute person or God [*Al-persoon*]. Each person is part of the higher person while, at the same time, the person forms the unity for everything under him. Thus, the human person is part of and subordinate to the family, the people, humanity, earth, and eventually the Absolute person, and forms unity for the lower people: animals, plants, cells, and atoms. All persons mentioned are real persons and have their own value because they are units with a purpose.⁵² In Kohnstamm's personalism, although man is above the atom, cell, plant, and animal, and is a part of higher categories such as family, people, society, earth, or cosmos, he is not subordinate to these higher categories. The human person is the highest created category and "a being of his own nature" owing to the characteristics of moral knowledge. Therefore, man as a person has a separate place in his system and is not just "a part of," or "merging into," or "developing into" higher categories. Based on this important characteristic of moral knowledge, Kohnstamm also takes a stance against evolutionist theory by which the human person is one part of a chain of developments.⁵³

In *Persoonlijkheid in Wording* [*Becoming Personality*], Kohnstamm criticizes Stern and mentions another important characteristic of the person, namely self-awareness. Kohnstamm considers self-awareness important as this characteristic makes having relationships with other persons possible. This characteristic is also important in his theory to the concept of God as a person. God as a person with self-awareness is important to Kohnstamm because awareness makes it possible for man to have a relationship with God.⁵⁴ Man's relationship with God shows the main difference between Kohnstamm's and Stern's theories. In Stern's theory, God or the Absolute person is not a person with self-awareness, which, according to Kohnstamm, would make a relationship between man and God impossible. For Stern, the highest possible relationship which a man can enter into is a relationship between man and ideas or a set of ideas. Stern's critical personalism therefore seems to lead to a form of idealism. Kohnstamm therefore characterizes Stern's theory as personalistic pantheism or semi-

personalistic. The possibility of a relationship between a person and God forms the centre of Kohnstamm's personalism and key to truth.⁵⁵

The Personality in Kohnstamm's Theory

What does the personality mean in Kohnstamm's theory? From the start of his career as Professor of Educational Studies, the personality is significantly emphasized and forms the key category in Kohnstamm's personalism.⁵⁶ Note that he does not view the personality solely in a psychological sense, namely as a totality of personal traits or characteristics. Moreover, while Kohnstamm puts the personality at the centre of his personalism, he does not present the human personality as the highest ideal. He explicitly distances himself from romantic personalism, as proposed by Nietzsche, in which the human personality is elevated to a cult: self-willed and not bound by a superhuman will or divine commandment.⁵⁷

Although Kohnstamm defines the concept of person, he refrains from defining the personality. According to Kohnstamm, no definition could offer a sufficient representation of the uniqueness of the personality. Any attempt to define or classify the personality therefore results in generalities and harms the personality. In other words, the personality can only be intuitively understood.⁵⁸ Although Kohnstamm does not define the concept of personality, it is discussed in several notions in his theory. We speak to three notions of personality within our argument.

The first notion follows what Kohnstamm repeatedly writes about the personality: the personality expresses the uniqueness of every person. The personality is the uniqueness and individuality of man, that which is never repeated and never returns.⁵⁹ This explanation of the personality corresponds to that of the German philosopher and personalist Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1951), who describes the personality as follows:

What personality is, can only be said in contrast to the person. Because both are not the same. Every person is a person; Personhood as such is therefore a general one, however much the individual persons may be different. ... Personality is that in a person, what he has for himself, does not return to others, the unique and the only thing about a person.⁶⁰

Hartmann also says, "Personality is that in a person, which is not common to others."⁶¹ Although person and personality are related, both Hartmann and Kohnstamm stress the difference between the generality of the person and the uniqueness of the personality.

Kohnstamm attributes individuality to human beings, animals, and plants as well as to things such as a unique diamond. Kohnstamm ascribes morality as a distinguishing characteristic for the person. Subsequently, he links personality to the moral characteristic of the person. The second notion in Kohnstamm's work is related to this characteristic. According

to Kohnstamm, each personality gives unique answers to the questions of right and wrong and the personality characterizes the person in their deepest decisions.⁶² In other words, Kohnstamm interprets the personality as a continuous series of normative choices. The personality makes moral choices, learns, improves, and consequently develops, and it must continuously make new choices. Therefore, Kohnstamm also interprets the personality as “a realm of infinity” or an ideal that is constantly strived for but never achieved by the person because a new choice must always be made.⁶³ That is why Kohnstamm speaks of a becoming personality and not being a personality.⁶⁴ The similarities here between Kohnstamm’s and Stern’s views are striking. Although Stern gives a different explanation to the personality than Kohnstamm, he sees the personality as unique for the human and the becoming of a personality as a task that can never be completed.⁶⁵

To explain the personality, Kohnstamm uses concepts from ethics and theology because these disciplines offer vocabulary for existential phenomena.⁶⁶ However, even on the basis of these disciplines, he cannot define the personality because, for him, the personality remains part of a great mystery. Therefore, the third notion in Kohnstamm’s work is to consider the personality as a reflection of the character of a divine personality, a reflection of God or a being, and part of a great mystery. Kohnstamm considers the personality of man as a derivative or reflection of the personality of God, originating in the idea that man was created in God’s image.⁶⁷ Terms used by Kohnstamm such as “the higher,” “the mysterious unity,” or “primal intuition” are imbued with a mystical perspective. His description of the personality, as mentioned previously, shows similarities to having a mystical individual experience that cannot be expressed in words. This mystery of the personality is also reflected in the highest level of behaviour, as distinguished by Kohnstamm. To explain differences between behaviours of types of creatures, Kohnstamm distinguishes several levels: the inorganic, the vegetative, the animal, the human, and the absolute. The human and absolute levels are attributed to human beings and are related to the characteristic of self-awareness. The human level is characterised by self-awareness and intellectual, moral and aesthetic formation. Kohnstamm calls the highest level the absolute level, in which the personality is involved:

I who becomes aware of his relationship to... the Original Ground, the Whole of Things. Such an experience can only be expressed in religious language. From a pantheistic (idealistic–impersonalistic) or theistic (personalistic) point of view, the attainment of this absolute level can be called: the awareness of our coherence with the All, or our standing before God.⁶⁸

For Kohnstamm, the absolute level is the highest level of experience of man. He utilises abstract and mysterious language to describe this level.

This spiritual experience proposed by Kohnstamm shows similarities with the much more concretely proposed I–Thou relation.

The I–Thou Relation in Kohnstamm’s Theory

The I–Thou relation brings to mind the most famous I–Thou thinker, the Austrian-Jewish philosopher and personalist Martin Buber (1878–1965).⁶⁹ Although Kohnstamm and Buber were contemporaries and their personalistic philosophies appear at about the same time, it is not clear whether Kohnstamm read Buber’s work while he was developing his personalism and educational theory during the 1920s. In a previous study on Kohnstamm’s personalism by Hofstee (1973), he opines Kohnstamm developed his personalism independent of Buber’s work.⁷⁰ Like many other philosophers of the 1920s, Kohnstamm shows an interest in the I–Thou relation but does not refer to names or sources.⁷¹

Both Kohnstamm and Buber can be classified as biblical personalists; the former a Jew who converted to Christianity and therefore came to embrace the New Testament, which Buber did not.⁷² Since the two had what can be called biblical personalism in common, many similarities can be found throughout their theories, including individual responsibility of each person, consequent respect for the individual person, and encounters with the other and reciprocal understanding in relationships. These concepts have their origins in the ideas that man is created in the image of God and that the person is the creature who resembles God and interacts with God within a relationship. In both philosophers’ theories being in a relationship with God can be described as “a mystery.”⁷³

In *Persoonlijkheid in Wording* (1929), Kohnstamm equates the concepts of person and personality with the I–Thou relation.⁷⁴ He describes the I–Thou relation between man and God as a unique relationship in which both retain their personality and in which responsibility and freedom are safeguarded.⁷⁵ In the I–Thou relation, the personality of man meets the personality of God.⁷⁶ Although this relationship is a mystery, it is no abstraction. He describes it as: “...a complete and concrete experience that we have from God approaching us in Jesus Christ.”⁷⁷ For Kohnstamm, this relationship means a living contact between a person (human being) and a Person (God/Jesus).⁷⁸ Despite his areligious upbringing, he refers in his explanation to an Israelian interpretation of the relation between God and person, an interpretation he shares with Buber.⁷⁹ Kohnstamm presents the “knowing” of God in this relationship as “Israelian knowing,” which he explains as “being in an intimate life relationship.”⁸⁰ This relationship is characterized by love and the practical knowledge to make ethical choices. Kohnstamm contrasts this kind of knowing to *gnosis*, the Greek conception of knowledge. He describes *gnosis* as an idealistic term. For Kohnstamm, this Greek conception means keeping a distance from the object of knowledge, thus emphasising objectivity.⁸¹

Unlike Buber's, Kohnstamm's interpretation of this relationship is explicitly Christian, as it is linked to the person of Jesus Christ. In referring to Jesus, Kohnstamm distinguishes himself from other personalistic movements, leading him to articulate a Christian approach to personalism and, consequently, educational theory.⁸²

Educational Implications of Kohnstamm's Personalism

Kohnstamm's educational theory is characterised by his personalistic interpretations and explanations of the concepts of person, personality, and the I–Thou relation. In this section, we briefly address the main implications of Kohnstamm's personalism for his educational theory.

One implication relates to Kohnstamm's concept of the uniqueness of personality.⁸³ Education must take the uniqueness of every child into account and is thus, in the first place, characterized by differentiation and the desire to develop the child's intelligence, talents, and qualities. Kohnstamm strongly advocates for the teaching of literature, the arts, physical education, and drama, since, in these subjects a child need not relate to a uniform or prescribed answer; on the contrary, diversity and creativity are desired and offer the child the opportunity to express his or her individuality. It is precisely in these subjects that a personality can express itself in a unique way and thus may form and develop. Especially in physical education, Kohnstamm sees the personalist idea reflected in the person as a unity between body and mind.⁸⁴ However, this focus on the uniqueness of the personality should not be confused with an individualistic educational theory. In Kohnstamm's personalism, the person is always a "individual in a community," a balance in which the individual serves the community but never sacrifices his or her individuality for the community.⁸⁵

A second implication relates to Kohnstamm's concept of personality as a continuous series of normative choices. Kohnstamm equates the education of the child and his or her personality with the formation of conscience. According to the philosophy of personalism, there is no given system of laws and norms. The right thing to do differs for every person. One's conscience guides the making of normative choices and limits the kind of subjectivity that may result from a philosophy without a system of laws. In other words, conscience regulates what the person should do under certain circumstances. Therefore, the formation of a conscience is the most important aim of education. In Kohnstamm's theory, upbringing and education mean that parents teach the child to listen to the voice of his or her conscience and to bear responsibility for his or her own decisions and actions.⁸⁶

Kohnstamm's emphasis on conscience education is also linked to his concept of personality, which he equates with the I–Thou relation. For, God is the one who speaks in the conscience and gives a concrete answer to the question of what the person ought to do in a particular set

of circumstances.⁸⁷ It is the parent's task to educate a child to stand in the I–Thou relationship and to listen to God's voice. In this way, the child can live, grow, develop and become a personality in a state which Kohnstamm himself describes as “full of inner peace.”⁸⁸

Although Kohnstamm starts to apply his personalism to school curriculum in 1919, he does not limit educational sciences to school, rather he extends them to leisure time, youth movements, and the family. He especially stresses that the family is the best and most important place for conscience education that takes into account the unique character of the child.⁸⁹ This is because of the simple fact that parents and siblings know their child best. If the school wants to contribute to the development of the personality and the formation of conscience, direct contact and a relationship between the child and the teacher are required. Kohnstamm considers this relationship to be more important than any curriculum or educational plan. The teacher should see the unique personality of the child and, based on this personality, should differentiate between individuals in his or her teaching.⁹⁰

Conclusion

Kohnstamm gives God, whom he regards as the highest personality, a prominent place in his personalism. The individual can find truth in his or her relationship with God, whereupon the personality fulfils its purpose. This interpretation of personalism forms the theoretical basis for his educational theory, which can be summarised as a theory of the development of each individual person into an incomparable and unique personality, reflecting the individual's unique relationship with God.

The main features of Kohnstamm's educational theory can be understood by distinguishing between the three concepts of person, personality, and the I–Thou relation on the one hand, and showing the consistency between them on the other. There is a strong connection between Kohnstamm's explanation of personality as the uniqueness of a person and his plea for education that is characterised by differentiation and the desire to develop the child's intelligence, talents, and qualities. Another feature is his emphasis on education as the process of conscience formation. This is based on his interpretation of the personality as a continuous series of normative choices equated with the I–Thou relation, a relation in which God speaks and guides the person through the voice of the conscience. The family is the most important arena for the formation of conscience, wherein the child is educated to listen to this voice.

Kohnstamm's interpretation of personalism makes his theory manifestly Christian, while also leaving room for more general educational ideas. Kohnstamm intended to write an educational theory based on his personalism that was connected to a Christian upbringing but, at the same time, left room for a non-Christian upbringing.⁹¹ The space

Kohnstamm allows for other beliefs is in line with the pluriform concept of truth for which he stood. He describes his personalism several times as just one approach to the truth. Kohnstamm sees the recognition of other worldviews as a logical consequence of his personalism because it corresponds to the idea that each personality is unique and has his or her own beliefs and interpretations.⁹² Therefore, he does not elaborate on how his Christian education theory should be understood by and worked out for non-Christians.

Our argument mainly addresses Kohnstamm's biblical personalism, ideas which he developed before World War II. After the war, he broadened his personalism by incorporating humanism and a personalist-socialist orientation towards society.⁹³ Whether and, if so, how this shift affects his educational theory requires further inquiry.

Endnotes

- ¹ This work is supported by the NWO (the Dutch Scientific Organization) under grant number 023.010.007.
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- ⁴ In chronological order: *Ockert Cornelius Erasmus, Die Personalisme van Kohnstamm as Grondslag vir sy Filosofie van die Opvoeding* (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1962); Harm Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm. Ontstaan en Grondslagen* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1973); Andries Lodewijk Rende Vermeer, *Philipp A. Kohnstamm over Democratie* (Kampen: J.H. Kok); and Exalto et al., "Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm (1875–1951)."
- ⁵ Mulder, "Patterns, Principles, and Profession: The Early Decades of Educational Science in the Netherlands;" Nathan Deen, *Een Halve eeuw Onderwijsresearch in Nederland: Het Nuttsseminarium voor Pedagogiek aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1919–1969* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969); John Exalto, "Sexual Hygiene."

- ⁶ Ernst Mulder, *Beginsel en Beroep. Pedagogiek aan de Universiteit in Nederland 1900–1940* (Amsterdam: Historisch Seminarium van de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1989), 11; Henk A. Klomp, *De Relativiteitstheorie in Nederland. Breekijzer voor Democratisering in het Interbellum* (Utrecht: Epsilon Uitgaven, 1997), 7.
- ⁷ Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, *Hoe Mijn “Bijbelsch Personalisme” Ontstond* (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1934), 19.
- ⁸ David Baneke, “Synthetic Technocracy: Dutch Scientific Intellectuals in Science, Society and Culture, 1880–1950,” *The British Journal for the History of Science* 44, no. 1 (2011): 89–113; Arie de Wilde, *De Persoon: Over de Grondslagen van het Personalistisch Denken* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1951), chap. 4 and 68, 223.
- ⁹ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*, 10–13.
- ¹⁰ de Wilde, *De Persoon*, 68–69; Mulder, *Beginsel en Beroep*, 11.
- ¹¹ H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European Social Thought (1890–1930)*, 3rd ed. (Brighton, Sussex, UK: The Harvester Press Limited, 1979), 183–191.
- ¹² Baneke, “Synthetic Technocracy,” 96–97; Exalto et al., “Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm,” 41; Klomp, *De Relativiteitstheorie in Nederland*, 9–13, 68–70; Mulder, *Beginsel en Beroep*, 11–14; Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*, chap. 2; and Ido Weijers, “Philip Kohnstamm: Universeel Intellectueel, Vrijzinnig,” *Comenius* 3 (1988): 259–273.
- ¹³ Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Transcendenteel Idealisme: Rede Uitgesproken op Maandag 21 Januari 1907 Door Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm” (lecture, University of Amsterdam, January 21, 1907).
- ¹⁴ Kohnstamm, *Hoe Mijn “Bijbelsch Personalisme” Ontstond*, 24.
- ¹⁵ Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 30–31; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, preface to *Schepper en Schepping: Een Stelsel van Personalistische Wijsbegeerte op Bijbelschen Grondslag*, vol. 1, *Het Waarheidsprobleem: Grondleggende Kritiek van het Christelijke Waarheidsbennustzijn* (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1926); Kohnstamm, *Hoe Mijn “Bijbelsch Personalisme” Ontstond*, 24; Baneke, “Synthetic Technocracy,” 99.
- ¹⁶ Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Determinisme en Natuurwetenschap: Rede op Maandag 26 October 1908 Uitgesproken Door Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm” (lecture, University of Amsterdam, October 26, 1908), 36.
- ¹⁷ Klomp, *De Relativiteitstheorie in Nederland*, 130.
- ¹⁸ Kohnstamm, “Determinisme en Natuurwetenschap;” Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 31–36.
- ¹⁹ Kohnstamm, *Hoe Mijn “Bijbelsch Personalisme” Ontstond*, 30.

- ²⁰ Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, *Schepper en Schepping. Een Stelsel van Personalistische Wijsbegeerte op Bijbelschen Grondslag*, vol. 2, *Persoonlijkheid in Wordin: Schets eener Christelijke Opvoedkunde* (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1929). The first volume is entitled *Het Waarheidsprobleem* (1926). The third volume is entitled *De Heilige [The Holy One]* (1931).
- ²¹ Jan Olof Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006); Patricia A. Sayre, "Personalism," in *A Companion to Philosophy of Religion*, ed. C. Taliaferro, P. Draper, and P. L. Quinn (West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 151–158.
- ²² Dries Deweer, "The Political Theory of Personalism: Maritain and Mounier on Personhood and Citizenship," *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 74, no. 2 (2013): 108–126.
- ²³ Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism*; Johan de Tavernier, "The Historical Roots of Personalism: From Renouvier's *Le Personnalisme*, Mounier's *Manifeste au Service du Personnalisme* and Maritain's *Humanisme Intégral to Janssens' Personne et Société*," *Ethical Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2009): 361–392; S. H. Han, *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen im Personalismus* (Martin Bubers, Ferdinand Ebners, Emil Brunners und Friedrich Gogartens (Hamburg, Germany: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2001).
- ²⁴ Sayre, "Personalism," 151–158.
- ²⁵ Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism*; de Tavernier, "The Historical Roots of Personalism;" Erazim Kohak, "Personalism: The Next Hundred Years," *Personalist Forum* 4 (1988): 43–52.
- ²⁶ Having lived in exile in Paris since 1924, Berdyaev was involved in the personalistic journal *Esprit* founded by the aforementioned Mounier and is therefore also classified under French personalism. Berdyaev regards the person as a free existence. As a consequence of that freedom, the person influences society, and person and society serve each other. Berdyaev's philosophy has many similarities with Kohnstamm's personalism, including the centrality in their philosophies of the human person, the emphasis they place on the value of human freedom, their opposition to the objectification of man, and their ideas on the relationship between God and man, a relationship characterised by freedom and love. One point of distinction concerns the value of democracy, on which Berdyaev has a typically Russian view. Berdyaev preferred a kind of corporatism, a form of communism, whereas Kohnstamm was a defender of democracy and democratic rights (de Wilde, *De Betwee*, 98–106; Exalto et al., "Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm;" Piama Gajdenko and E. M. Swiderski, "The Problem of Freedom in Nicolai Berdjaev's Existential Philosophy," *Studies in East European Thought* 46, no. 3 (1994): 153–185). Despite the similarities between these thinkers, there is no evidence that Kohnstamm ever read the work of Berdyaev.

- ²⁷ de Wilde, *De Persoon*, 77–107; Carel Kruger Oberholzer, “Moderne Persoonsvisies,” *HTS Theological Studies* 13, no. 2 (1957): 45–81, 61.
- ²⁸ James T. Lamiel, *Uncovering Critical Personalism Readings from William Stern’s Contributions to Scientific Psychology* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2021), doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-67734-3; James T. Lamiel and Werner Deutsch, “In the Light of a Star: An Introduction to William Stern’s Critical Personalism,” *Theory & Psychology* 10, no. 6 (2000): 715–730.
- ²⁹ Rebecca Heinemann, *Das Kind als Person: William Stern als Wegbereiter der Kinder- und Jugendforschung 1900 bis 1933* (Bad Heilbrunn: Julius Klinkhardt, 2016); James T. Lamiel, *Beyond Individual and Group Differences: Human Individuality, Scientific Psychology, and William Stern’s Critical Personalism* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).
- ³⁰ Heinemann, *Das Kind als Person*; Lamiel and Deutsch, “In the Light of a Star;” Lamiel, *Beyond Individual and Group Differences*; and James T. Lamiel, “Introducing William Stern (1871–1938),” *History of Psychology* 15, no. 4 (2012): 379–384.
- ³¹ James T. Lamiel, “Psychology and Personalism by William Stern,” *New Ideas in Psychology* 28, no. 2 (2010): 110–134.
- ³² David Baneke, *Synthetisch Denke: Natuurwetenschappers over Hun Rol in een Moderne Maatschappij, 1900–1940* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2008), 146–149; Klomp, *De Relativiteitstheorie in Nederland*, chap. 1.
- ³³ Baneke, “Synthetic Technocracy,” 100–101; Deweer, “The Political Theory of Personalism,” 109; de Wilde, *De Persoon*, chap. 6; and Sayre, “Personalism,” 151–158.
- ³⁴ Baneke, “Synthetic Technocracy,” 100–101; Exalto et al., “Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm,” 41.
- ³⁵ de Wilde, *De Persoon*, chap. 6; Deweer, “The Political Theory of Personalism,” 109.
- ³⁶ Marinus H. Bolkestein, *Het Ik-Gij Schema in de Nieuwere Philosophie en Theologie* (Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen, 1941).
- ³⁷ de Tavernier, “The Historical Roots of Personalism”; de Wilde, *De Persoon*, 165–169; Henri van Praag, *De Zin der Opvoeding* (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1950), 150–154.
- ³⁸ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee* (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1922).
- ³⁹ Kohnstamm also called idealism platonism. Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Platonisme en Personalisme,” *Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte* 16 (1922): 302–311.
- ⁴⁰ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*, 9; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*, 15–16.

- ⁴¹ Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 57.
- ⁴² Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*, 14.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 20.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁴⁵ Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Stern’s Psychologie,” *Pedagogische Studiën* 1, no. 5 (1936): 142–146; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Het Levenswerk van William Stern,” *Pedagogische Studiën* 19, no. 6 (1938): 175–179.
- ⁴⁶ Stern’s definition of the person reads: “A person is an entity that despite the multiplicity of parts forms a real, unique and intrinsically valuable unity, and despite the multiplicity of the parts functions achieves a unifying, goal striving self-activation.” Wilhelm Stern, *Die Menschliche Persönlichkeit*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1923), 5. Translation from Lamiell, “Psychology and Personalism by William Stern,” 129.
- ⁴⁷ “Een Bestaand Wezen Dat Ondanks de Veelheid der Delen, een Reële, Eigenaardige en Eigenwaardige Eenheid Vormt en Als Zodanig Ondanks die Veelheid een Geheel Vormt,” Kohnstamm, *Het Waarheidsprobleem*, 373. Translation by authors.
- ⁴⁸ Kohnstamm, *Het Waarheidsprobleem*, 373; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 70–75.
- ⁴⁹ Kohnstamm, *Het Waarheidsprobleem*, 374.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 376.
- ⁵¹ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 70–75; Cornelius A. Plantinga, *The Personalist Philosophies of William Stern and Philipp Kohnstamm* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1940).
- ⁵² Heinemann, *Das Kind als Person*, 155; Stern, *Die Menschliche Persönlichkeit*, 7–10.
- ⁵³ P. A. Hoogwerf, *De Pedagogiek van Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm: Met een Inleiding tot Zijn Werken door*, P. A. Hoogwerf, *Bekende Pedagogen*, ed. J. H. Gunning Wzn, P. A. Hoogwerf, and H. J. van Wijlen (Groningen, Den Haag, Batavia: J. B. Wolters, 1933), 120.
- ⁵⁴ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 39–44, 70–75; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Personalisme, Personalistische Psychologie,” in *Pedagogische Encyclopedie*, ed. R. Casimir and J. E. Verheyen (Groningen, Batavia: J. B. Wolters, 1949), 399–403.
- ⁵⁵ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 70–75; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Types and Meanings of Personalism,” *The Personalist* 18 (1937): 167–176; Plantinga, *The Personalist Philosophies of William Stern and Philipp Kohnstamm*, 49–65.

- ⁵⁶ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 70–75.
- ⁵⁷ Kohnstamm, Preface to *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Persoonlijkheidscultus of Personalistische Opvoeding,” *Lichamelijke Opvoeding: Maandblad Genijid Aan de Studie van Lichamelijke Oefeningen* 1, no. 9 (1932): 217–224.
- ⁵⁸ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*, 21. Translation by authors.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; Kohnstamm, “Personalisme, Personalistische Psychologie,” 399–403.
- ⁶⁰ Nicolas Hartmann, “Das Ethos der Persönlichkeit,” in *Abhandlungen zur Systematischen Philosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1955), 311–318 (citation, p. 311). Translation by authors.
- ⁶¹ Hartmann, “Das Ethos der Persönlichkeit,” 313.
- ⁶² Kohnstamm, *Het Waarheidsprobleem*, 372–376; Hoogwerf, *De Pedagogiek van Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm*, 135, 155.
- ⁶³ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 11, 26; Hoogwerf, *De Pedagogiek van Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm*, 105.
- ⁶⁴ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 70–78; Kohnstamm, “Persoonlijkheidscultus of Personalistische Opvoeding;” Kohnstamm, *Schepper en Schepping*, vol. 3; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, *De Heilige: Proeve van Een Christelijke Geloofsleer voor Dezen Tijd* (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon., 1931), 52; Hoogwerf, *De Pedagogiek van Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm*, 34.
- ⁶⁵ Heinemann, *Das Kind als Person*, 156–175; Lamiell, “Psychology and Personalism by William Stern;” Stern, *Die Menschliche Persönlichkeit*, 17; Michael A. Tissaw, “A Critical Look at Critical (Neo)personalism: Unitas Multiplex and the ‘Person’ Concept,” *New Ideas in Psychology* 28, no. 2 (2010): 159–167; and Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Über typen des Personalismus,” in ed. Alfred Adler, *Festschrift William Stern zum 60 Geburtstag am 29 April 1931* (Leipzig, Germany: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1931), 158–161, 161.
- ⁶⁶ Kohnstamm, Preface to *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*; Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, chap. 2; Plantinga, *The Personalist Philosophies of William Stern and Philipp Kohnstamm*, 181, 192.
- ⁶⁷ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspedagogiek*, 14; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*; Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, 21–24, 49–56.
- ⁶⁸ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 43–44. Translation by authors.
- ⁶⁹ Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Leipzig, Germany: Insel-Verlag, 1923).
- ⁷⁰ Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 68, 72, 75.

- ⁷¹ Kohnstamm, *Het Waarheidsprobleem*, 437; Kohnstamm, Preface to *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*; Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 76.
- ⁷² Hofstee, *Het Bijbels Personalisme van Prof. Dr. Ph. A. Kohnstamm*, 114–124.
- ⁷³ Also in Berdyaev's theory. de Wilde, *De Persoon*, 19, 84–85, 134.
- ⁷⁴ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, Preface and 70–75; Kohnstamm, "Types and Meanings of Personalism."
- ⁷⁵ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 100–111; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, *Modern-Psychologische Opvattingen Omtrent Godsdiens en Religie: Een Kritisch Overzicht* (Amsterdam: Boekhandel W. ten Have, 1931), 58; Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, 49–60.
- ⁷⁶ Kohnstamm, Preface to *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*; Also in Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, 56–60.
- ⁷⁷ Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, 58.
- ⁷⁸ See also Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*.
- ⁷⁹ de Wilde, *De Persoon*, ch. IX.
- ⁸⁰ Kohnstamm, *De Heilige*, 6.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 3–9.
- ⁸² Kohnstamm, *Hoe mijn Bijbelsch Personalisme Ontstond*; Kohnstamm, "Personalisme, Personalistische Psychologie," 403.
- ⁸³ Personalism resonates with identity theories because they both assume that the person as a unique individuality. While the relationship between the philosophy of personalism and identity is interesting, it is not the subject of this study. Within the context of this study, we note that identity theories describe how identity develops; see for instance Erik Erickson's identity theory and his ideas on identity crisis. Kohnstamm's explanations of the personality and the educational implications may partly coincide with identity development but differ from the process of identity development.
- ⁸⁴ Ph. A. Kohnstamm, "Persoonlijkheidscultus of Personalistische Opvoeding," *Lichamelijke Opvoeding: Maandblad Gewijd Aan de Studie van Lichamelijke Oefeningen* 1, no. 9 (1932), 217–224.
- ⁸⁵ Kohnstamm, *Staatspædagogiek of Persoonlijkheidspædagogiek*; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, sec. 27.
- ⁸⁶ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 60; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, "Pædagogiek," in *Scientia: Handboek voor Wetenschap, Kunst en Godsdiens*, vol. 1, ed. A. W. de Groot (Utrecht: Uitgeversmaatschappij W. de Haan, 1938), 209–238.

- ⁸⁷ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkeitspedagogiek*, 18–22.
- ⁸⁸ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 66–78, 122.
- ⁸⁹ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkeitspedagogiek*, 24–26; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 132–135.
- ⁹⁰ Kohnstamm, *Staatspedagogiek of Persoonlijkeitspedagogiek*, 25–26; Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm, “Inleiding tot de Psychologie der Puberteit,” in *Brochuren-Reeks “De Jeugd” voor Ouders en Opvoeders. Christelijke Jeugdwerk I, Reeks Lezingen Gebonden in den Cursus ’23/’24 voor de Amsterdamsche Christelijke Jeugdcentrale*, eds. Ph .A. Kohnstamm, A. J. Drewes, P. Stegenga, and A. A. Van Rhijn (Utrecht: G. J. A. Ruys, 1924), 3–15. Personalism also influenced Kohnstamm’s ideas for a new school. Kohnstamm’s ideal school is one where personality is formed and space is given to all kinds of worldviews. Therefore, Kohnstamm argues that school should be a place where children from different backgrounds and diverse worldviews meet each other. Through encounters at school, children might then learn how to respect each other and interact. In this way, the personality would also be developed. For a more detailed analysis of Kohnstamm’s ideas for a new school and its relation to his personalism, see: Marloes Hoencamp, John Exalto, Abraham de Muynck, and Doret de Ruyter, “A Dutch example of New Education: Philipp Abraham Kohnstamm (1875–1951) and his ideas about the New School,” *History of Education* (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1080/0046760X.2022.2038697>
- ⁹¹ Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 43.
- ⁹² Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid en Idee*, 67; Kohnstamm, “Platonisme en Personalisme,” 309; Kohnstamm, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, 120–135; Philipp Kohnstamm, “Towards a New Philosophy,” *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, no. 18 (1930): 159–174; and Kohnstamm, “Types and Meanings of Personalism,” 176.
- ⁹³ For instance, Ph. Kohnstamm, “Idealisme Contra Existentialisme en Personalisme,” *Het Keerpunt* 1 (1947): 659–671.

Threats to Academic Freedom and Tenure: Analysis of American Association of University Professors Committee A Reports and Implications for Faculty

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Academic freedom is the freedom to research and publish findings, freedom in teaching subject matter within the curriculum, and freedom to decide whom to admit to study without fear of repression from internal or external repression or fear of dismissal.¹ Academic freedom serves the common good, allows universities to contribute to society, and is essential to the mission of universities so that scholars have the freedom to teach and disseminate knowledge without fear of repression or retaliation. The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) *1940 Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*² is grounded in the idea universities exist for the common good, particularly public universities. There admittedly is considerable variation in how academic freedom is defined, and it is exactly this tension that calls for an examination of recent historically relevant cases. Any understanding of a contemporaneous meaning of academic freedom requires one explore recent challenges. The complexities of this relationship are essential because the U.S. Supreme Court historically has not given academic freedom Constitutional protection, therefore the meaning of academic freedom and the protections it affords shift over time.³

Most recent examinations of academic freedom have focused on the study of court cases in the context of the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court's *Garvetti v. Ceballos* ruling.⁴ Stephen Aby and Dave Witt examine the outcome of the *Garvetti* ruling in terms of increasingly hostile academic environments for faculty.⁵ Robert Roberts focuses on lower-court rulings regarding academic freedom since 2006, yet fails to draw conclusions regarding speech in the classroom.⁶ Another recent inquiry of *Garvetti* considers its implications for faculty governance at public institutions.⁷

The purpose of our study is to determine an understanding of issues underlying violations of academic freedom in the recent past, and implications for faculty. We focus the scope of our historical examination on AAUP Committee A, the Academic Freedom and Tenure committee,

reports between 2006 and the present. We selected 2006 as our starting point since the *Garvetti* decision pertains to speech in the workplace⁸ and because this decision characterizes academic freedom very differently from how it is defined by the AAUP's 1940 *Statement*.⁹ Additionally, in the Constitution's First Amendment no mention is made of protections for academic freedom, consequently any recognition of academic freedom arises from interpretation of the First Amendment rather than any specific mention.¹⁰ More specifically, our argument relies upon an understanding of the relationship between academic freedom and freedom of speech, the latter of which is protected under the First Amendment. The complexities of this relationship are essential because the U.S. Supreme Court historically has denied Constitutional protection of academic freedom, however, the AAUP's *Statement* is grounded in the idea universities exist for the common good, particularly public universities. Though the *Garvetti* decision is limited to government employees, the 2006 demarcation we employ remains relevant because case law defines the separation of freedom of speech and academic freedom relevant to all higher education institutions.

Scholarship grounded in the study of recent history strives to examine the most timely and accurate data, particularly if its purpose is to analyze recent events with the intent of illuminating future implications.¹¹ A timely historical examination of recent cases can provide meaningful conclusions on how academic freedom has been understood and enacted by institutions and the implications for faculty¹² as well as the historical trajectory of events and the lessons that might be drawn from them. A framework aided us in identifying historical cases and situating them, as well as helping us to decide which events and which situations are of greatest consequence to the issue. We take methodological inspiration from Currie and Walsh's understanding of historical narratives and their idea of the importance of a common historical experience among individuals and groups.¹³ By examining a series of related cases, we argue it is possible to develop an understanding of common perspectives across events.¹⁴ An awareness of accounts of historical change can be useful to members of similar types of organizations in order to surmise and consider organizational values and priorities, as well as the limits of individual members' autonomy. The challenge with such work is not so much to discover historical events and situate them, but to identify and choose certain events and bring those to the foreground. Given our purpose—to develop an understanding of the broader implications of AAUP Committee A reports—we focused our analysis on issues the cases are based upon, giving particular attention to how institutions portray central issues compared to how those issues are understood given Committee A's investigations in order to identify the issues within and across cases, their significance, and present and future potential impact.¹⁵

Historical Background of Academic Freedom

Our current concept of academic freedom comes to us from German universities in the 19th century.¹⁶ Academic freedom exists in two forms, *Lehrfreiheit* and *lernfreiheit*. *Lehrfreiheit* refers to freedom to conduct research, and *lernfreiheit* is the freedom to teach without undue constraint. These ideals allow a scholar to uncover knowledge in a discipline as the scholar sees fit, and to then disseminate that knowledge to peers and students. While academic freedom is not absolute—in fact some degree of institutional authority is necessary so faculty can conduct day-to-day operations associated with teaching and research¹⁷—the intertwined nature of individual and institutional academic freedoms has been understood by some as essential in that institutional freedom cannot exist without the existence of individual freedom.¹⁸ Ream and Glanzer¹⁹ argue that shifts in the nature and definition of academic freedom are the result of interpreting academic freedom within different views of humanity and relationship with institutions. Recently academic freedom is defined within the context of the tension between individual and institutional freedoms in increasingly complex organizations.

During the early 20th century, some U.S. faculty began formally to organize and assert their right to academic freedom. In 1913, Arthur Lovejoy, a philosophy professor at Johns Hopkins University, formed a national association of faculty at nine leading universities. These 600 faculty formed the basis for what would become known as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The AAUP's *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*²⁰ (since revised several times) emphasizes the value of affording and protecting individual rights of faculty and students in conjunction with their institutions to fend off external or political intrusion.

Background and Methodology

Our data set consists of 31 Committee A Reports from 2006 to 2021. These cases were published in *Academe*, the AAUP journal, and publicly available online. We collaboratively identified the issues as claimed by the institution in each case. Our analysis began with sorting cases according to the central issue/s of each. Our initial sort revealed four major thematic issues: academic freedom, financial exigency, external influences, and termination with cause. Many cases involved more than one issue, such as a combination of academic freedom and due process, or financial exigency and due process. Our next step was to compare how institutions portrayed the issues in each case versus how the AAUP report authors represented what was at issue in each case. The differences between the two portrayals of each case, as presented by case authors, proved essential to identifying underlying or hidden political agendas not readily apparent to observers,

from which we set out to reveal and discuss meaningful implications for faculty. Additionally we identified commonalities across cases.

Case Overviews

Table 1 names assigned categories and illustrates how due process was an overlapping factor in many cases.

Emergent Categories	Total
Academic Freedom	19 (16 double-counted as “due process”)
Financial Exigency	12 (6 double-counted as “due process”)
External Influences	1 (double-counted as “due process”)
Termination with Cause	5 (4 double-counted as “due process”)

Table 1. Aggregate Overview of Cases

Academic Freedom

The largest number of cases in a single category involved issues of academic freedom. All such cases manifested in termination of tenure-track faculty members, non-tenure track faculty members (full- and part-time), or tenured faculty members. Of significant note, academic freedom is not conferred with a faculty member’s tenure, rather “Both the protection of academic freedom and the requirements of academic responsibility apply not only to the full-time probationary and the tenured teacher, but also to all others, such as part-time faculty and teaching assistants, who exercise teaching responsibilities.”²¹ The implication for faculty is that academic freedom applies to all ranks, and includes full-time and part-time faculty. In theory, a part-time lecturer would have the same protections as a tenured professor.

With only one exception, all cases involved internal disputes between faculty members and administrators. Our interpretation of these cases reveals dispute outcomes appear heavily weighted in favor of institutions and their respective administrators. One representative example is the case of Mr. Richard Schmitt’s 2018 termination by the administration of Nunez Community College following 22 years of service on its faculty. At the time of his termination, he held the rank of Associate Professor; however, the institution abolished tenure in 1999. Mr. Schmitt disagreed with the accuracy of student performance data that was to be included in an upcoming SACS accreditation report. While the SACS report and documents contained information he refused to include, Mr. Schmitt was nevertheless still listed as the report’s author. Once discovered, he requested his name be removed from the documents, yet the institution’s chancellor denied his request.²²

On May 18, 2018, Mr. Schmitt was informed via conference that his NCC faculty appointment would not be renewed; the chancellor claimed

that Mr. Schmitt and the institution were not a good fit. Nunez Community College's handbook includes policy and procedure for notifying faculty members of dismissal and discontinuation of appointments, including the provision of an appeal hearing, yet Mr. Schmidt was denied either hearing or appeal.²³

A second case is that of Dr. Ivor van Heerden, a researcher who served a non-tenure-track appointment at Louisiana State University since 1992. His scholarly work focuses on soil erosion in hurricane-prone areas. In August 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, and subsequently Dr. van Heerden received considerable media attention given his scholarly expertise. When he concluded a main cause of flooding was structural failure of levees managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the university's leadership did not want the university linked to findings which might jeopardize their work with the USACE. Following a series of actions designed to limit Dr. van Heerden's interaction with the media, his faculty contract was rescinded in 2009.²⁴

Financial Exigency

A financial exigency declaration is a catastrophic action for any higher education institution. An institution can only declare a state of financial exigency if their academic integrity will be compromised by prolonged and severe reduction in funding. If it becomes necessary to cut academic programs, the AAUP advises faculty input should be part of the decision-making process. In September 2008, the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, Texas incurred catastrophic damage from Hurricane Ike. In November of that year the Board of Regents declared financial exigency and began a process that would eventually result in the termination of 131 faculty positions. Rather than undertaking a programmatic review with faculty input, the review committee was limited to reviewing only department-chair-penned recommendations of those faculty selected for termination. Faculty input was further quashed by administrators who refused to allow the institution's faculty senate any input in selecting review committee members. Furthermore, the review committee's membership was never disclosed and no records were maintained of their meetings or deliberations. None of the faculty members selected for termination were given specific justification for the committee's selection; faculty slated for termination could only learn details if they were willing to file an appeal. Of the 131 faculty selected for termination, 30 filed appeals and five were reinstated.²⁵

In 2014, the University of Southern Maine's administration announced their intent to eliminate several programs and affiliated programs' faculty purportedly in order to "balance the institution's finances." While The University of Maine system trustees did not declare a state of financial exigency, their requested actions followed the procedures of financial

exigency. Troublingly, when the trustee board's announcement was delivered by the university president, it came without having solicited faculty discussion or input on the elimination of programs and programs' faculty members. A total of 60 tenured and untenured faculty across four programs were identified for termination. In addition to the fact that the institution's trustees never declared a state of financial exigency, it appears that, of the recommended terminations, many terminations were slated to be handed to senior faculty members, targeted for termination because their length of service placed them near the top of faculty salaries, such action representing due cause for age discrimination.²⁶

Termination with Cause

The case of St. Edward's University in Texas involved the termination of three faculty members: two tenured and one tenure-track. The issue focused primarily on the two tenured faculty who were purportedly dismissed due to allegations of "continued disrespect and disregard for the mission and goals of the university."²⁷ This case also proved to be a due-process issue (as were the majority of cases reviewed), in that faculty members were never provided with a hearing or appeal process, inconsistent with AAUP recommendations as well as the institution's internal policy. In a similar case in 2016, Spalding University (Kentucky) terminated a tenured professor of social work due to allegations of "abuse of power, bullying, and harassment of colleagues and students."²⁸ The professor's hearing consisted of one meeting with the provost, and no appeal process was allowed. Like the case of St. Edward's University, due process was at issue because of the lack of adherence both to AAUP recommendations and the institution's own internal policy.²⁹ In both cases, while there was ample evidence to support allegations made against the faculty, termination hearings violated the spirit and letter of the AAUP and institutions' processes since they were informal and there were no options for the faculty member to appeal termination.

Implications

Looking across the major themes that emerged from our examination of AAUP Committee Reports, one commonality spanned nearly all cases. A conspicuous lack of due process characterized termination, whether faculty members were in non-tenure-track, continuous appointments or in tenure-track/tenured faculty lines. AAUP guidelines, as well as many institutional operating policies, require the involvement of a faculty committee in terminations, particularly necessary in cases where facts are disputed. According to the AAUP's *1940 Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, the accused should be informed in writing of proposed charges to their employment status and should have ample opportunity to present a defense to refute the charges.³⁰

One purpose of tenure and continuous appointment is to protect faculty's academic freedom from undue pressure from inside or outside an institution.³¹ Every case reviewed save one involved internal institutional politics. There was only a single case where a faculty member was terminated due to external dynamics. This sparsity highlights how the greatest threat to academic freedom seem to come from factors internal to an institution. The 20th century includes several such examples where academic freedom was impeded. In 1948 many U.S. faculty found their positions threatened during the cold war by the House Un-American Activities Committee's investigations of alleged communists. Some states required loyalty oaths of state employees, including faculty, amid a climate of fear of communism and socialism.³² Loyalty oaths are only one example of external influences that can still bring pressure to bear on an institution and its faculty.

There are a variety of external factors that can be brought to bear on a faculty member whose presence is considered less-than-desirable in the institution's eyes. These include individual trustees, financial donors, alumni (though this can overlap with donors), the media, and elected officials.³³ Each of these roles represent those who, although they exist outside the daily operations of an institution, they carry political clout within an institution. Given the AAUP's definition of academic freedom, persons in these roles fall within the definition of external factors capable of abrogating a faculty member's academic freedom. While there was only a single case where external factors were evident, that single case is indeed noteworthy given the national media attention it attracted: Dr. Melissa Click, assistant professor of communications at the University of Missouri, in Columbia. In February 2016, based on charges of misconduct, the Board of Curators voted to terminate her employment without providing the faculty hearing required both by the university's policy documents and AAUP standards. Her dismissal followed her actions in November 2015, when she was alleged to have been involved in attempts to remove student reporters from a "no-reporters zone" in a public area; however, public space cannot be restricted in such a manner. In January 2016 more than 100 Republican Missouri state legislators called for her dismissal. In the month that followed, legislative unrest continued to be reported in the press culminating in the higher education appropriations committee of Missouri's House of Representatives approving a spending plan that included a 2% operating budget increase for all public higher education institutions—all except the University of Missouri. After several assurances that her employment was not at risk, following national media attention and complaints from Missouri legislators, she was informed her application for promotion and tenure would not be supported, a premonition upheld by the university's Board of Curators.

Our examination of cases from 2006 to 2021 revealed an unexpected trend evident over time. Immediately following Hurricane Ike in 2008, The University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston terminated 131 faculty, approximately one third of them tenured. This was the only case examined where an institution claimed adverse and catastrophic financial impact due to a climatic event. After 2010, however, the number of cases examined wherein institutions claimed faculty terminations were implemented due to financial exigency increased sharply, yet only one additional case was related to a climatic event. Though an institution's justification might be explained as financial exigency, in only two cases was such a declaration issued by the institutions' respective governing boards. In some cases, faculty were served termination letters which made no mention of financial exigency, although the institutions claimed financial exigency as the reason faculty terminations had become necessary.

One interpretation for an increasing trend in institutions' declared financial exigency is the success The University of Texas Medical Branch experienced in terminating tenured faculty—in spite of AAUP guidelines and even its own institutional policy and procedure—emboldened additional institutions to pursue similar actions knowing their claims would be able to withstand legal challenges as well as the AAUP's public pressure. While an uneven power differential is a presiding factor in any termination, institutions, even those declaring financial exigency, retain access to considerable financial resources. Remaining institutional resources, which include legal counsel, effectively dwarf those resources of individual faculty members. Financial expenditures required to fight a protracted legal battle, potential loss of revenue from unemployment, and potential damage to one's career from negative publicity all can make publicly challenging an institution a costly and risky endeavor. Many public institutions are further protected by sovereign immunity, which insulates them from most civil lawsuits. At risk of appearing cynical, such one-sided battles give credence to the adage “might makes right.”

In several cases, reasons used to end employment clearly differed from facts uncovered by AAUP's investigation. Troublingly for the future of fair faculty rights and due process, taken as a whole such cases indicate a massive transfer of power from faculty to administration, and signals how institutions' curricular mission has fallen squarely into the hands of administrators, wresting away curriculum from the rightful purview of faculty. In most cases decisions to close programs are driven by criteria not primarily educational in nature, decisions not only procedurally but also essentially substantively illegitimate. In many cases financial exigency is used as camouflage for reasons other than financial reasons and, additionally, such decisions lack due process. After 2008, these cases show that financial exigency is increasingly applied to faculty termination when, in fact, established conditions for declaring financial exigency are

not met at these institutions. Consequently, it seems to us that the greatest contemporaneous threat to academic freedom overwhelmingly comes from inside academe—from our own institutional leadership. Our analysis determines external threats, while they do exist, prove rare exceptions to internal threats.

Lack of institutional transparency denies faculty members the opportunity to grow in ways that yield future personal and institutional success. Such opacity also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for one coherently to formulate an appeal. In other words, how can one credibly defend oneself against charges if they are not presented with the actual complaint? In some cases where financial exigency was given as the termination reason, AAUP's investigation reveals individuals singled out who were perceived by administration to be "outspoken," or "squeaky wheels." In such circumstances, the evidence crystalizes around academic freedom rather than financial exigency.

Conclusion

The AAUP plays a valuable role in establishing professional expectations and procedural guidelines in academe. As evident in many cases examined in the course of this study, institutional leadership not only dismissed the AAUP's investigation, but refused to cooperate because institutional leadership considered the AAUP irrelevant due to its lack of legal standing.³⁴ Greatly complicating institutional leadership's obfuscations, AAUP investigations cannot convey any legal enforceability unless they are aligned with state or federal law; legal enforceability would require revising AAUP guidelines on a state-by-state basis or grounding AAUP guidelines in federal employment law. Another alternative would be to lobby states to revise employment laws to provide procedural protections for those in academe. Two challenges logically emerge from this course of action. The first is how to ensure possible legal protections would cover faculty employed at public *and* private institutions. Given legal challenges that could arise, particularly in so-called "right-to-work" states, a lengthy court battle likely would ensue: battles with uncertain outcomes. The second challenge could be rooted in public perception regarding legal protections to tenure and academic freedom, difficult terrain indeed in highly politically polarized times—times where the value of higher education is publicly called evermore into question.

One unfortunate characteristic of many cases we examined is they cannot effectively be used by professional organizations to illustrate the importance of academic freedom, due process, tenure, or other important principles. It is tempting to use some of these cases to demonstrate why tenure and academic freedom benefit the public interest, however many of these cases do not present the faculty in question as particularly sympathetic figures. Trying forcibly to remove a student from a public venue (recall,

paradoxically, the professor in question worked in the communications department; this fact was not lost on the viewing public), disrupting faculty meetings to the point they must be rescheduled, and threats of retaliation against untenured faculty make it difficult for our profession to argue the necessity of due process. Some of these examples seem so outrageous as to have been part of the plot of the academic novel *Straight Man* by Richard Russo.³⁵

Additionally, these cases reveal further ambiguity in the bounds of faculty expression. Cases regarding expression in the classroom were by far in the minority; indeed, most cases involved speech outside of the classroom such as in faculty meetings, emails, online blogs, words spoken in public venues, opinions published in the press, and even conversations with colleagues off-campus during dinner. Now, in academe it becomes far more difficult to disentangle academic freedom from Constitutionally protected First Amendment speech. One can formulate a persuasive argument that some of the previously listed examples, such as those in informal settings, or off-campus, are Constitutionally protected. However, if administrators decide to view anything written or spoken in any setting even if only peripherally related to the workplace through the lens of *Garvetti*, then anything faculty say can potentially be used against them at a later date. Given the lack of due process across cases examined, this possibility becomes even more problematic should the institution use financial exigency as a cover for ridding itself of “troublesome” faculty. It seems that from these cases there may, in fact, be no protected faculty speech whatsoever if institutional leaders are determined to interpret speech in the worst possible light or to weaponize faculty speech. Lacking clear and concrete protections, it seems that faculty now possess what amounts currently only to partial academic freedom and that any academic freedom faculty enjoy is proffered solely via permission or fiat of one’s administrative superiors.

Some AAUP cases suggest interpersonal behaviors—perhaps collegiality is a better word—as an underlying factor. Faculty members encourage and support colleagues to express their ideas and views forthrightly and freely on issues both in our profession and institutions. However, at what point does a colleague’s expression shift from mere outspokenness to a nuisance or “fly in the ointment?” Furthermore, at what point does one shift even further to become so disruptive that their participation is a hindrance to daily operations or the reputation of an institution? We admit these characterizations of speech are highly subjective and likely vary considerably in definition from one person to another; additionally these characterizations are perceived differently depending on the level and function of individuals within the organization.

Results and themes from our consideration of these particular AAUP cases have marked similarities to other research studies conducted on this topic. King discusses the value of shared governance by describing

what shared governance is and how it affects roles and expectations. While challenges remain (and even proliferate), the advantages of shared governance greatly outweigh its disadvantages, revealing that “effective shared governance is important for the well-being of universities.”³⁶ A lack of faculty consultation significantly inhibits and even eliminates shared governance processes, hindering the exchange of ideas, viewpoints, and knowledge creation. When shared governance and faculty consultation is lacking, the possibility of erosion of trust among staff increases precipitously, which can lead to negative consequences across all aspects of an institution, including student outcomes.³⁷

Endnotes

- 1 American Association of University Professors, “Reports and Publications,” *1940 Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, <http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure>
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 James Swezey and Christopher Ross, “Faculty Perceptions of Academic Freedom at a Private Religious University,” *ICCTE Journal* 6, no. 1 (2011): 1–6.
- 4 *Garrett v. Ceballos*, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court delivered their *Garrett v. Ceballos* decision in 2006 and it is considered a landmark case in defining the limits of public employees’ free speech. The suit originated in 1989 when Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office, questioned the accuracy of an affidavit issued by his office. Ceballos claimed he was later subjected to retaliation in the form of reassignment and denial of promotion. The case was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled against Ceballos in a 5–4 decision. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority decision, resting his opinion on whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee to determine if Ceballos’ speech was protected. The majority concluded that, since Ceballos spoke in the capacity of a public employee, his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. The result was public employees could have no expectation of First Amendment protection within the context of their job duties with respect to speech that could affect the organization’s operations. The *Garrett* decision does not pertain directly to higher education, but has been used by lower courts as a basis to judge protected and non-protected speech.
- 5 Stephen Aby and Dave Witt, “Negotiating Academic Freedom: A Cautionary Tale,” *AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom* 3 (2012), <https://www.aaup.org/JAF3/negotiating-academic-freedom-cautionary-tale>

- 6 Robert North Roberts, "The Deconstitutionalization of Academic Freedom after *Garcetti v. Ceballos*?" *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 32, no. 1 (2012): 45–61.
- 7 John Murray, "Academic Freedom and Governance: An Analysis of *Garcetti v. Ceballos* and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Research in Education* 20, no. 1 (2010): 81–97.
- 8 The *Garcetti* decision pertains to government employees.
- 9 The suit originated in 1989 when Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office, questioned the accuracy of an affidavit issued by his office. Ceballos claimed he was later subjected to retaliation in the form of reassignment and denial of promotion. Ceballos initially filed an internal grievance that was denied; he then filed suit in U.S. District Court alleging his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that Ceballos' speech took place in the context of his employment and therefore was not protected under the First Amendment. The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled against Ceballos in a 5–4 decision. The majority opinion concluded Ceballos spoke in the capacity of a public employee, therefore, his speech was not protected under the First Amendment.
- 10 *Keyishian v. Board of Regents*, 385 US 589, 603 (1967).
- 11 Eugene Provenzo, *The Social Reader: A Critical History* (New York: Peter Lang, 2011).
- 12 Claire Bond Potter, *Doing Recent History* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012).
- 13 Sara L. McGaughey, Arun Kumaraswamy, and Peter Liesch, "Institutions, Entrepreneurship and Co-Evolution in International Business," *Journal of World Business* 51, no. 6 (2016): 871–881.
- 14 Adrien Currie and Kirsten Walsh, "Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers," *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science* 9, no. 1 (2018): 1–34.
- 15 Keith Barton, "A Sociocultural Perspective on Children's Understanding of Historical Change: Comparative Findings from Northern Ireland and the United States," *American Educational Research Journal* 38, no. 2 (2001): 881–913.
- 16 Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).
- 17 Anthony Diekema, *Academic Freedom and Christian Scholarship* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000).

- ¹⁸ Conrad Russell, *Academic Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 1993); George Marsden, *The Soul of the American University* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- ¹⁹ Todd Ream and Perry Glanzer, “Christian Faith and Scholarship: An Exploration of Contemporary Developments,” *ASHE Higher Education Report* 33, no. 2 (2007): 1–139.
- ²⁰ American Association of University Professors, *1940 Statement*.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: Nunez Community College,” (2019), <https://www.aaup.org/report/academic-freedom-and-tenure-nunez-community-college-louisiana>
- ²³ In many cases untenured faculty were informed their contracts were not going to be renewed. From an institutional perspective this is not considered the same as termination of employment, but rather non-renewal of contract. From an outcomes perspective the difference proves largely semantic.
- ²⁴ *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: Louisiana State University-Baton Rouge,” (2011), <https://www.aaup.org/report/academic-freedom-and-tenure-louisiana-state-university-baton-rouge>
- ²⁵ *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center,” (2015), <https://www.aaup.org/report/academic-freedom-and-tenure-university-texas-md-anderson-cancer-center>
- ²⁶ *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of Southern Maine,” (2015), <https://www.aaup.org/report/USM>
- ²⁷ *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: St. Edward’s University,” (2018), <https://www.aaup.org/report/academic-freedom-and-tenure-st-edwards-university-texas>
- ²⁸ *Academe*, “Academic Freedom and Tenure: Spalding University,” (2017), <https://www.aaup.org/report/academic-freedom-and-tenure-spalding-university-kentucky>
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ American Association of University Professors, *1940 Statement*.
- ³¹ Diekema, *Academic Freedom and Christian Scholarship*.
- ³² Michael Sletcher, “The Loyalty of Educators and Public Employees: Opposition to Loyalty Oaths in Twentieth-Century Massachusetts and the U.S. Supreme Court,” *Massachusetts Historical Review* 12 (2010): 35–68.
- ³³ The term “trustee” refers to members of governing boards of higher education institutions. Depending on the institution this role may be

referred to as trustee, governor, regent, controller, or another term. Unless otherwise specified, we use the term “trustee” to refer to a board member unless using a title specified by a particular institution. By definition trustees, unlike other members of an institution, are charged with an institution’s fiduciary responsibility. Many institutions regulate the direct control trustees can have over the internal operations of an institution. Some states limit their roles by law (typically for public institutions). For the most part, individual trustees can only act within an institution if they do so on behalf of the entire board.

- ³⁴ AAUP policies are professional guidelines, but do not carry any legal weight.
- ³⁵ The novel *Straight Man* was written by Richard Russo in 1997. Some elements in the plot include a department chair hiding in a crawlspace surreptitiously to listen to a faculty meeting voting on his dismissal, his threat to campus wildlife until every day until his department received a budget, and affairs between professors and students.
- ³⁶ C. Judson King, *Tailoring Shared Governance to the Needs and Opportunities of the Times* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Center for Studies in Higher Education, 2013), 7.
- ³⁷ Phoebe Haddon, “Academic Freedom and Governance: A Call for Increased Dialogue and Diversity,” *Texas Law Review* 66 (1987): 1561–1575.

Pragmatism and the Absolute: The Problem of Truth

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Introduction

Disagreement about the knowledge of truth is not new in philosophy. Greek philosophy beginning with Plato (428–348 B.C.E.) separates the real from the ideal, placing abstract, ideal forms as the end of knowledge. Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.), in his “Posterior Analytics,” says that “The Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without sense. Even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion, since demonstrations are concerned with predicates [perceptions] such as we have defined.”¹ Thus, the absolutist and rationalist views of universal truth contrast with the empirical, experience-based view. The universal or absolutist view of Truth is that nothing is *sui generis*, it is formed by reason. Whatever enters our consciousness does so in consideration of the likeness with everything else that has entered such that, logically, there must be a higher, perfect form to be validated by reason. For the absolutist and the rationalist, the source of Truth is a supreme being. God becomes the source of ultimate reality, approachable but unknowable by mortals. The counter-position, empiricism, posits that experience and applied intelligence, often in the form of the scientific method—not reason—form the basis of Truth. Pragmatism develops the empiricist view of Truth with a variety of configurations focused on the emphasis of the thinker. The American logician, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), agreeing with Aristotle’s view, says,

The abstract acknowledgment of God, Freedom, and Immortality, apart from those other religious beliefs (which cannot possibly rest on metaphysical grounds) which alone may animate this, is now seen to have no practical consequence whatever. The world is getting to think of these creatures of metaphysics, as Aristotle said of the Platonic ideas: “they are mere prattle or twitterings, and even if they exist, they are irrelevant.”²

The purpose of this paper is to identify, describe, analyze, and summarize disagreements over the place and meaning of belief, knowledge, and truth in its relation to philosophy in the early 20th century by examining

some of the available literature in which these disagreements are expressed, finally extrapolating this summary to education today.

The Absolute and the Pragmatic

Josiah Royce (1855–1916), presented the 1903 Presidential Address at the American Philosophy Association. Entitled “The Eternal and the Practical,” he writes,

There are two general tendencies of opinion which nearly all recent thinkers, whatever be their school, seem disposed to favor. The first of these tendencies is that towards a considerable, although, in different thinkers, a very varying, degree of empiricism.³

The first of these empirical tendencies was the “radical empiricism” William James (1842–1910) coins in his work, *The Will to Believe*; the second is found in *Studies in Logical Theory* by John Dewey (1849–1952) et al., and finally, the humanist philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller (1864–1937). Royce notes that the tendencies he discusses are relatively new, while the issues are old. He admits that practical considerations are important to philosophy but that these lead to a certain level of controversy. In admitting to adhering at one time to the “spirit of pragmatism—thinking, judging, reasoning, believing,”⁴ Royce opines that,

...although objects of experience seem, from a well-known realistic point of view, to be given to us whole, with all their properties and relations, as objects independent of our will ... what is directly given to us at any moment (that is, what is immediately and merely given to us) is simply the fact of our special momentary need for further insight and for further action.⁵

So the pragmatist, in Royce’s view, “has his little horde of maxims; he proclaims the truth; he refutes errors; he asserts that we ought to believe thus or so; and thus lays down the law as vigorously as do other men.”⁶ His analysis allowed him to draw several conclusions; 1. “Every judgement... is the expression of a present activity;” 2. “Judgement should be not only ours but true;” 3. Judgement should be equally true to others or in other times;” 4. Judgements are true “in concrete experience;” 5. Judgements become “mere states of mind, or stages of its experience;” 6. “We need to conceive [judgements] as partial functions of self;” and 7. Judgements of “an inclusive and invariant self ... [are] of course complete at no moment in time.”⁷ Royce concludes that,

The need for the eternal is consequently one of the deepest of all our practical needs. Herein lies the justification for pragmatism and the logical impossibility of pure pragmatism. Everything finite and temporal is practical. All that is practical borrows its truth from the Eternal.⁸

Peirce’s comments in 1871 and 1872 at The Metaphysical Club at Harvard began the development of pragmatism. The pragmatists, however,

did not form a monolithic and comprehensive philosophy. By 1905 Peirce had tried to separate himself from pragmatists coining a new term, pragmatism, for his ideas that tied more closely to his own broader concept of phaneroscopy.⁹ Other pragmatists did similarly. William James sought to fit pragmatism into his broader concept of radical empiricism, Schiller's humanism was a form of pragmatism different from Peirce's or James', and Dewey's instrumentalism developed from pragmatic underpinnings. They all had in common a mistrust of metaphysics and dogma and rejected the meaningless and incomprehensible transcendental, absolutist, idealist, and rationalistic concepts of truth and reality and their monistic and dualistic *Weltanschauungen*. Peirce's thought inspired not only new pragmatists but a host of anti-pragmatists who, from various viewpoints criticized the pragmatic conceptions of beliefs, knowledge, and truth.

Schiller was an avowed opponent of absolutist and rationalist conceptions of truth. Writing as A. Troglodyte, captive of Plato's cave, Schiller writes that he "accepts without reserve the data of modern science, and derives from them a philosophical cosmology, which can emulate the completeness of our scientific cosmogonies...[being] repelled by the fragmentariness, the unattractive form and the inconclusiveness of modern philosophy."¹⁰ He considers "any theory which puts forward an abstraction as the ultimate explanation of all things is false."¹¹ He believes that any source of truth outside of the self, experience, and science, any source that relies on, in his words, "Absolute, or the Unknowable, or the Idea, or the Will, or the Unconscious, or Matter, or Reason, the Good or the Infinite,"¹² to be unsuccessful. Schiller finds the reconciliation of science and metaphysics problematic, with metaphysics dependent on abstraction, while the scientific doctrine of methodically applies intelligence to experience.

James took the credit for establishing "pragmatism" as a movement emanating from his University of California lectures of 1898,¹³ citing Peirce as the originator of the term. James calls pragmatism "the most likely direction in which to start upon the trail of truth."¹⁴ Peirce's principles, developed in a series of essays in *Popular Science Monthly* in 1877 and 1878, are better elucidated in his Lowell Lectures given at Harvard in 1903. Indeed, in the first of his *Lectures on Pragmatism*, he admits that for the twenty years between the *Popular Science Monthly* articles and James' California lectures, pragmatism was largely ignored. After James' lecture, however, pragmatism began to be recognized as an alternative to the absolutist, idealist, and dogmatic philosophy of the 19th century's end. In 1897 James published *The Will to Believe*, in 1903 Schiller published *Humanism*, and John Dewey published *Studies in Logical Theory*. Peirce writes, "The new pragmatists seem to be distinguished for their terse, vivid and concrete style of expression together with a certain buoyance of tone as if they were conscious of carrying about them the master key to all secrets of metaphysics."¹⁵

James takes on the question of the Absolute vs. the Empirical conceptions of truth and knowledge as early as 1884, constructing what he calls (after Peirce) “common sensism,”¹⁶ though his ideas soon find that concept inadequate. His *Pragmatism* had just been published and a number of essays appeared between 1904 and 1906. These were collected in a posthumous volume, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, in 1912. These essays not only criticize the absolutist/idealist conceptions of knowledge and truth, but also describe more completely his own ideas of radical empiricism. James believed that radical empiricism included pragmatism but was more comprehensive than the pragmatic thought of the time. He, like Peirce before him, found his philosophy more complete. James seems continually astounded that absolutist/idealist philosophers did not understand that the basis of knowledge and truth is experience, that knowledge and truth are tentative and hypothetical, that unexperienceable constructs play no active role. He writes, “Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real.”¹⁷

Dewey responded to Royce and other critics of pragmatism in his 1905 Presidential Address at the American Philosophical Association, “Beliefs and Realities.” Dewey focuses on the instrumental nature of knowledge, its usefulness to individuals. Beliefs are formed from everyday experience. They serve the purpose of informing intelligent action. Dewey writes, “Beliefs look both ways: they are the original Mr. Facing-both-ways. They form and judge—either justify or condemn. ... To believe is to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign import.”¹⁸ He maintains philosophers of Royce’s ilk teach that,

...modern philosophy is, as every college senior recites, epistemology; ... [which] has the absorbed the Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete subjection to a ready-made and finished reality. ...allegiance to a reality, objective, universal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical ideas or meanings... calling it harmony, unity, totality.¹⁹

Dewey believed such teaching is entrenched in dogmatic detachment of experience from universals and in dualism, the dualism between faith and intelligence, and that the application of intelligence is thinking in the form of inquiry. Inquiry implies science, “the outcome of systematically directed inquiry... which should construe validity, objectivity, truth, and the test and system of truths, on the basis of what they actually mean and do within the inquiry activity.”²⁰ Dewey concludes that “Because the freedom of belief is ours free thought may exercise itself, and the freer it is the more sure the emancipation of belief.”²¹ Beliefs forced to conform to some pure, intellectual, or cognitive reality he rejects as useless.

Peirce’s theory of signs takes the place of the absolutist conception of the ideal and allows for a more universal understanding of experience.

He connects signs to truth through reason since “all reasoning is an interpretation of signs of some kind.”²² Signs consist of likenesses, indices, and symbols.²³ Peirce designates the highest order of sign as symbol and that “Language and all abstracted thinking, such as belongs to minds who think in words, is of the symbolic nature.”²⁴ For Peirce,

Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a *tabula rasa*. ...there manifestly is not one drop of principle in the whole vast reservoir of established scientific theory that has sprung from any other source than the power of the human mind to originate ideas that are true.²⁵

The reasoning he notes as the adductive process of perceptual judgement, saying, “The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash.²⁶ It is an act of insight, ...the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis, ... [that] would account for the facts or some of them.”²⁷ Truth is then formed from the reasoned accommodation of sensory experience.

Heidelberg Kongress für Philosophie, 1908

At the Third International Congress for Philosophy, Pragmatism was an important topic. Royce (1855–1916) presented the keynote lecture to the first session on the problem of truth, where he posited the existence of absolute truth with the agreement of the overwhelming majority of those in attendance. Schiller defended the pragmatic notion in opposition to the assembly who, though they agreed on little else, opposed pragmatic philosophy. Along with Royce other American attendees, including Paul Cares (1852–1919), Chicago editor of *The Monist*, and Andrew C. Armstrong (1860–1935) of Wesleyan University in Connecticut, sided with the European philosophers in their opposition to the pragmatic philosophy of Schiller, James, and Dewey.

While Royce, the pragmatist, struggled to accommodate the instrumental and humanist means of determining truth, Royce, the idealist, maintained that knowledge is subject to error. Thus, the individual must recognize the fallible nature of truth and remain skeptical of personal knowledge, seeking instead the true relation between our ideas and experiences and the real (ideal) world. This skeptical or fallible process left possible the ideal or absolute world outside experience. In his address, Royce talks about the philosophical enterprise as “the same general issue [that] has sooner or later to be faced. ...some phase of the problem about the nature of truth.”²⁸ He discusses three motives or means for the apprehension of truth. He first describes the problems he perceives with pragmatic or instrumental thought, the continuous reconstruction of knowledge, and truth in response to experience and thinking, “which leads many of us to describe human life altogether as a more or less progressive adjustment to a natural environment.”²⁹ He thinks the “doctrines known as Instrumentalism, Humanism, and Pragmatism ... [teach that] human

opinions, judgements, ideas and beliefs are, in a word, organic functions. And truth ... is a certain value belonging to such ideas.³⁰ Thus, "true" ideas help individuals adapt to "life as human beings. ... Truth, therefore, grows with our growth, changes with our needs, and is to be estimated in accordance with our success. The result is that all truth is as relative as it is instrumental, as human as it is useful."³¹

Royce's second motive or means for apprehending truth consists in "first rebelling against outer authority, creates its own laws.... In other cases, however it takes the form of a purely subjective idealism, confident in its own but claiming no authority. Or again, with still different results it consciously unites with its theoretical interests calls itself "Personal Idealism." For Royce this personal idealism "makes the whole problem of truth identical with the problem of the right and freedom of the individual,"³² pitting *Lebensanschauung* against *Weltanschauung*—the personal against the universal.

Royce's third motive arises from "our scientific, common sense...the fondness for dispassionately weighing evidence...the love of objectivity... [especially] the development of the modern critical study of the foundations of mathematics,"³³ like Boolean algebra or non-Euclidean geometry. For Royce this new system of logic results in "a new synthesis of Voluntarism and Absolutism."³⁴ Voluntarism asserts the primacy of individual will over intellect or reason, while Absolutism allows for the existence of a reality over and above personal perception. He rejects the term Intellectualism since a synthesis of personal will and objective truth relative to personal experience and reason yields, for Royce, "an absolute voluntarism, a theory of the way in which activities must go on if they go on at all. And, as I believe, just such a theory is that which in future is to solve for us the nature of truth."³⁵ Royce finds "the contrast between two well-known attitudes of will,—the will that is loyal to truth as an universal ideal, and the will that is concerned with its own passing caprices."³⁶ His three motives could be synthesized, their differences minimized, when

...the trivialities of mere instrumentalism will appear as what they are,—fragmentary hints, and transient expressions, of that will whose life is universal, whose form is absolute, and whose laws are at once those of logic, of ethics, of the unity of experience, and of whatever gives sense to life.³⁷

Armstrong's paper, "The Evolution of Pragmatism," delivers another type of criticism of Pragmatism. He does not acknowledge Pragmatism as a philosophic system as such, relegating it instead to an evolving methodological doctrine. "Whatever else the doctrine may suggest, to whatever further conclusions it may lead or tempt," he writes, "it proposes primarily a method of thought and inquiry—a method inherent in all thinking."³⁸ Armstrong finds the humanism of Schiller more

comprehensive than the Pragmatism of James and Dewey. He writes that Schiller “emphasizes an inclusive view of knowledge...more hospitable than pragmatism to metaphysical conclusions.”³⁹ Armstrong finds James’ and Schiller’s theistic orientation more acceptable. Dewey, for Armstrong, relies on “truths or beliefs which have already been accepted; and reaches the conclusion such [theistic] appreciation adds nothing to the evidence on which they rest.”⁴⁰ Armstrong concludes that the changing nature of pragmatism, metaphysically and epistemologically, limits it to methodology as it lacks an appreciation for a fixed epistemology or metaphysics.

Schiller, who attended Royce’s presentation and participated in the ensuing discussion, allowed that Royce had made certain concessions to pragmatic thought but had not made clear a number of important points including: 1. The exact nature of absolute truth; 2. The false division of pragmatists into instrumentalists and individualists; and 3. The social origins of truth.⁴¹ In his own paper, “*Der Rationalistische Wahrheitsbegriff*,” Schiller comes straight to the point asking, “is there a rationalistic concept of truth at all? Is such at all conceivable?”⁴² Focusing on his humanist thinking, he writes, “the concept of truth has a consistent relationship to human life and its purposes. The research and further development of truth thus becomes one of the main means by which man keeps himself alive in the struggle for existence.”⁴³ He identifies a number of key issues: 1. The agreement of thought with its object...which seems impossible if one assumes an object independent of human thought; 2. Truth should design, represent, or imitate an image of reality, no one can compare it with its original; 3. Truth should grasp the essence of things as they are...explain how one can grasp the essence, the *an sich* of things...no one can ever know whether and how truth encompasses the inner nature of transcendent things; 4. Truth...founded on self-certainty...must...distinguish the real logical necessity of thinking...from the fake, unreliable, merely psychological; 5. One must state a formal difference between a true and false system; and, 6. One must be able to state how truth differs from error. No formal truth can suffice. The real truth we seek must fundamentally exclude error, must not leave to chance whether a statement is actually true or not, and must not easily see the wrong as a kind of truth.⁴⁴ “It follows,” says Schiller, “that the real hallmark of the truth of an assertion is the value of the consequences that the assertion leads to.”⁴⁵

In a second response to Royce’s “The Problem of Truth in Light of Recent Discussions,” “The Rationalistic Conception of Truth,” published in the 1908–1909 volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Schiller took the view that rationalistic Truth is “a purely formal thing which is utterly incapable of discriminating between true and false.”⁴⁶ Reality cannot transcend human thought, cannot exist independent of the human mind. He contrasts his humanist conception of truth with the absolutist and transcendental truth of the rational idealists. “Humanism,” he writes,

“asserts ‘dependence’ and denies ‘transcendence’; Rationalism asserts ‘transcendence’ and denies ‘dependence.’”⁴⁷ God, the absolute, or an all-knower, thinks Schiller, is unnecessary to ascertaining truth which need not be present but may be psychical, not necessarily related to sensory reality. He writes, “For they include dreams, hallucinations and illusions, and the ‘objects’ of fancy, error, madness and deception. Even where the objects are ‘real’ they need not be ‘physical’ and ‘common,’ as, e.g., memories and pains and pleasures.”⁴⁸ He concludes that “theoretic truth is something it is possible to cherish as a belief only on the condition that we never behave as if we believed it.”⁴⁹ For Schiller, truth, which must remain conditional or tentative, awaiting reconstruction through further experience, requires verification.

Following papers delivered by Schiller and Armstrong, there ensued a lively debate in which participants demonstrated the continuum of ideas concerning the conception of truth. E. Dürr, Universität Bern, observed that,

The problem of truth arises from the fact that knowledge does not come about in one way, but in different ways. Certain insights are imposed on us, others that may relate to the same subject come through detours, arbitrarily, and do not have the character of unchangeability like the former.⁵⁰

A. Ruge (1881–1945), Universität Heidelberg, was concerned with the relativism resulting from experience-based truth. In his view the “logical question of truth is the question of the valid forms of reason, of the nature of reason and their relationships with the senseless.”⁵¹ V. W. Jerusalem (1854–1923), University of Vienna, and B. Jakowenko (1884–1949), Universität Freiburg, accused Schiller of not understanding the absolutist point view that “only the truth that is liberated from psychologism in every disguise (including pragmatic psychologism) is a genuinely transcendental truth.”⁵² Carus, editor of *The Monist*, ultimately summarized the absolutist and rationalist discussion saying,

Pragmatism comes from America, but, thank God, the movement has not yet taken possession of the whole country. Pragmatism is a disease that arises from the addiction to create something new and very original. But what is true about it is not new, and what is new is wrong.⁵³

He continued with the observations that Peirce no longer accepted pragmatism in its present form and that “Pierce’s renunciation of the movement is an unhappy sign of what pragmatism has become and of the pretensions it makes.”⁵⁴ Rudolf Goldscheid (1870–1931), University of Vienna, in a more conciliatory tone offered that,

...relativistic pragmatism is the necessary reaction against absolutist scholasticism, and where it loses itself to extremes,

only the extremes of scholasticism are to blame for it, which rationalism unjustly takes on so unlovingly today. Critical pragmatism certainly has the greatest future. Today we are only at the very primitive beginnings in this regard!⁵⁵

F. Kozłowski (1858–1935), University of Warsaw, questioning the equation of pragmatic truth with utility said,

It is therefore not fair to say that utility is the only criterion of truth. The truth is the harmony of our understanding with the truth; harmony but not identity. And its criterion—it is to advance science. Indeed, the truth is the ideal of reason, not its accessible and tangible goal.... We must reject the individualist and rationalist theories of truth: the former excludes science by excluding consensus; the second admitting a truth that is forever inevitable is obviously useless.⁵⁶

Finally, Schiller put the entire question to rest, at least for him. He said that the end of pragmatic and absolute truth is essentially one and the same. In his words,

...the concept of truth looks forward and not backwards. 'Absolute' truth becomes an unreached ideal. And that is actually the character of truth as we have it in science. Our truths are never final: the truth grows and increases with no foreseeable end.⁵⁷

Schiller's humanism was the basis for his consideration of the problem of truth. Not only was truth accessible through pragmatic and scientific means but also as a social construct. He continued,

...if we all freed ourselves from the illusion that we had ultimate truth: we would then no longer be so inclined to insist on our own opinion and more inclined to get along with the others. Thus, the multiplicity of truth is not a deficiency, but an excess, and recognizing this would certainly have the most beneficial effects on social life.⁵⁸

Cares, in his remarks after the papers of Schiller and Armstrong in Heidelberg, discounted James' contributions. He said,

Pierce is the only one among the pragmatists who can really think scientifically and sharply logically, the others, especially James, are quite ingenious people, writers and columnists who write like novelists, but not like real philosophers.⁵⁹

Even though James wrote *Pragmatism*, he always considered himself a "radical empiricist," but James, in response, published a collection of his essay in 1909 to respond to anti-pragmatist critics and, it seems, to deal with the frustration that intellectualist critics refused to acknowledge the value of the pragmatic viewpoint. He writes that the disagreement "over

what the word 'truth' shall be held to signify, and not over any of the facts embodied in truth situations; for both pragmatists and anti-pragmatists believe in existent objects, just as they believe in our ideas of them."⁶⁰ James describes his own perspective,

...*radical empiricism*, [as] empiricism because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification...radical because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, ...does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square. ...the world is a pluralism."⁶¹

James distinguishes between the empiricist way and the absolutist way of apprehending truth. He continues,

The absolutists...say that we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can *know when* we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when. To know is one thing, and to know for certain *that* we know is another.⁶²

Only through experience and reflective thinking can we allow our knowledge and opinions to grow more true though never absolutely true. "Our errors," he observes, "are surely not such awfully solemn things. ...a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf. At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher."⁶³ The scientific process and the method of verification posits, for James, that "it is only truth as technically verified that interests [science]."⁶⁴ Other forms of truth, rational idealist, absolutist, or revealed are important only in an abstract way.

Dewey responded to the analysis of truth by Royce and others and the attacks on pragmatism in books, journals, and at the Heidelberg Kongress of 1908. In his 1910 collection of essays, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, Dewey states the case for what he calls the,

...pragmatic spirit, ...a revolt against that habit of mind which disposes of anything whatever—even so humble an affair as a new method of philosophy—by tucking it away after this fashion, in the pigeon holes of a filing cabinet...it is better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction.⁶⁵

For Dewey, reconstruction along with instrumentalism, would become a consistent stance like Peirce's signs, James' radical empiricism, and Schiller's humanism. Dewey believed that "The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the phenomenon of life for the principle of transition [he could have said reconstruction], and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and life."⁶⁶ Perhaps

Darwinism in this context serves also as a metaphor for science in general. "Were it," he continues,

... a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they now are... the new logic introduces responsibility into the intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after all a confession of inability to master the courses of things that specifically concern us... Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problem, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the "Origin of Species."⁶⁷

Dewey calls the absolutist philosophy a "leisure class disease... [that] philosophic problems about the relation of 'the universe to moral and spiritual good' exist only in the sentimentalism that generates them."⁶⁸ Later Dewey addresses himself specifically to Royce's Heidelberg essay, accusing him of ignoring the importance of the rise of the sciences and the scientific method. Ultimately, for Dewey,

Experience, life... is social, and it exhibits this sociability nowhere more than in the continuity, the interpenetration, the reciprocal reinforcement of meanings and beliefs. Instead of an Absolute being required to substantiate this social phase of the life of intelligence it is much more probable that the Absolute is a somewhat barren and dry isolation and hypostatizing of the everyday sociality of experience.⁶⁹

Dewey later notes Royce's voluntarism, the primacy of will over intelligence, cognition over experience, which culminates in absolutism as the central tenet in Royce's philosophy. For Royce, writes Dewey,

... knowing is an act, an assertion, an acknowledging. Conjoined with them is the unfamiliar text that the active side, the voluntaristic and ethical side, is ultimate, and that no theoretical justification for it can be found.... [So] Scepticism and pessimism are but the consciousness of this clash, in recognizing that amid plurality of aims there can be no ground for one making any one supreme, and no guaranty of abiding satisfaction.⁷⁰

Dewey concludes that "Education, language and other means of communication are infinitely more important categories of knowledge than any of those exploited by absolutists.... Instrumentalism will be calling attention first, to the connection of intelligence with a genuine future, and, second, to the social constitution of personal, even of private, experience, above all of any experience that has assumed the knowledge-form."⁷¹

Continuing Debate

Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962), a student of James' and Royce's at Harvard, believed that

...the pragmatism of Peirce, and of James's Berkeley address was merely a doctrine concerning the meaning of propositions, concerning the way in which the really significant issue in any controversy could be determined...[that] James, at least, in his recent book [*Pragmatism*, 1907] and elsewhere, has clearly noted this distinction between pragmatism as a theory of meaning and pragmatism as a theory of truth.⁷²

Lovejoy found pragmatism to be a

...metaphysical doctrine, which, although not always very explicitly put forward, ...to have a rather fundamental place in the characteristic mode of thought of most representative of pragmatism. This is the doctrine of the real futurity or "openness" of the future, and of the determinative or "creative" efficacy of each "present" moment in the ever-transient process of conscious judgment, choice, and action.... Such a metaphysics appears to imply the partial contingency and (from the standpoint of any "present" knowledge) indeterminateness of the future content of reality.⁷³

He identifies 13 unique types of pragmatism which he separated into four groups. Group one he designates "Pragmatist Theories of Meaning," group two, "Pragmatism as an Epistemologically Functionless Theory Concerning the Nature of Truth," group three, "Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i.e., of the Criterion of Validity of a Judgement," and group four, "Pragmatism as Ontological Theory."⁷⁴ Lovejoy's interest was in the history of ideas and his focus was on the precise definition of terms which, for him was not, at that time (1908), an aspect of pragmatism. This left him open to the observation that all philosophers are, at least somewhat, unique. The number of Kantians, Hegelians, Materialists, or what have you, could be examined, outlined, and classified for if philosophers have not their own unique views what are they? Max Meyer (1873–1967) read Lovejoy's essay "with astonishment, not so much because Professor Lovejoy has tried to determine the exact number of pragmatisms—there are those who try to determine the exact number of sciences; why, then, not of pragmatisms?—but because the number of pragmatisms is so exceedingly small, just a dozen and one."⁷⁵ Meyer concludes that, "Just as there are as many sciences as there are scientists, so there are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists.... But however great the number may be, neither science nor pragmatism is any worse off on that account."⁷⁶

The Source of the Problem for Education

The debate on the meaning of truth was a part of the more general struggles of the widening chasm developing between the philosophic tradition and the emergence of the sciences, physical, natural, and social from philosophy. Walter Lippman, in his review of *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, writes that Dewey,

...had broken with the pretensions of philosophy. Professor Dewey is really urging us to do what philosophers have always done; he has asked us, however, to put away the illusions of divinity with which they shrouded their work. That pretentiousness is the enemy. It turns human thoughts into monstrous absolutes, and takes the impossible position that some of man's thoughts are too sacred for man's criticism.⁷⁷

He says that Dewey "is urging us consciously to manufacture our philosophy...[to] make our philosophies for our own needs and purposes."⁷⁸ From the 17th and 18th centuries, first the physical and natural sciences, then in the 19th century the social sciences, separated themselves from the philosophic paradigm to develop methods of enquiry, investigation, and verification. The search for Truth becomes a version of Zeno's paradox. We continuously approach but never quite reach the goal of ultimate knowledge. In Idealistic terms we know that Truth exists cognitively we but can never quite apprehend it. In Instrumental terms all truth and knowledge can only be held tentatively undergoing continuous reconstruction as new experiences, data, or ideas confront us.

The issue is too important to relegate to the differences between, say, Perennialism and Progressivism. After World War II the educational institution changed. The GI Bill assisted returning service personnel with vocational and higher education opportunities. The needs of these students required more than the liberal/professional education model that was prevalent in the pre-war era. The growth of higher education required adaptation to those needs. Population growth after the war put pressure on common education to similarly meet the needs of a larger and more diverse K–12 population. Schools provided diverse tracks for students; college prep, vocational/technical, and business curricula sought to meet those needs. The Sputnik era beginning in the late 1950s caused a reevaluation of the efficacy of schools. New curricula, especially in mathematics and the science, focused on improved achievement. Vocational and technical education was slowly divorced from the comprehensive high school onto separate campuses. The increasing role of technology in classrooms has changed in many ways the role of the teacher. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates that responses to changing conditions are a continuing issue and that democratic society is in a constant state of change. The roles of belief, knowledge, and truth are evolving with that social change. A

pluralistic and democratic society demands choices in worldviews and those worldviews are formed in the social, educational, religious, and political institutions. The challenge to education is the question of how to approach knowledge. Is it to be transmitted as a canon of information to be acquired by students or as information to be used in continuous pursuit of Truth? Dewey opines, “Only as the schools provide an understanding of the movement and direction of social forces and an understanding of social needs and of the resources that may be used to satisfy them, will they meet the challenge of democracy.”⁷⁹ The continuing debate over the dualistic notion of a liberal education versus a practical education, an absolutist as opposed to an empirical source of truth is as important now as it was in the early 20th century.

Endnotes

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- ²⁴ Ibid., 307.
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Teaching 1990s Christian Youth: The *Teen Study Bible* as Christian Fundamentalist Curriculum

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Introduction

Niche Bibles, including the *Teen Study Bible*,¹ have been used to provide tailored, spiritual, context-specific messaging for 1990s Christian youth.² However, as I reveal through my analysis, its messages became increasingly conservative between 1993 and 1998, leaving less and less room for youth to interpret or think critically about how they will navigate their world. Using Martin's critical theory of religion³ as a theoretical framework, in this paper I analyze as cultural and historical objects two 1990s editions of the *Teen Study Bible* in order to illustrate how the Bibles' authors prioritize and push their own interpretations and applications of isolated Biblical text to promote Fundamentalist religious and social conservatism. In doing so, the authors' Biblical commentary becomes an informal educational tool meant to teach Christian teens morality through a particular social and political lens using decontextualized, cherry-picked Bible quotations. Three research questions guide my content analysis: 1) In what ways did these authors employ language on the *Teen Study Bible's* feature pages?; 2) What are the educational implications of their language choices?; and 3) How did editorial changes made between the 1993 and 1998 editions, if any, reflect the authors' messaging? I begin this paper with a vignette, a personal account of the *Teen Study Bible* in my own life, which I utilize to show the influence of this particular Bible in 1990s teens' religious education. I then define my theoretical framework, a critical theory of religion, and justify its value for this particular content analysis. Next, I provide brief context of U.S. Fundamentalist Christian culture and associated trends through the 1990s which give way to the publication and use of the *Teen Study Bible* as an educational document. I then provide an overview of *Teen Study Bibles* published in 1993 and 1998, followed by a content analysis of the authors' choice and commentary on topics deemed relevant to teens which appear on feature pages, the majority of which teach teens moral issues by employing a politically and socially conservative framework.

The Teen Study Bible as Youth Group Companion: A Vignette

*I sit in the front row of the gray youth room under the blue glow of track lights, tuning out the youth pastor as he shares yet another story about Jesus and his many miracles. The small over-sugared cup of coffee I poured before heading to Sunday School sits empty at my feet. Although I care about my faith, no sermon can keep me engaged, no matter how young and hip the speaker is or how much coffee I drink. I look down at my Bible, a hand-me-down from my older sister, which was brand new in 1998. Even though it is now the early 2000s, this Bible is cool, with bright green letters against a purple backdrop. I hold a large section of the pages in my hand and let the pages slowly glide over the tip of my thumb, hoping to appear studious rather than bored. The steady stream of thin, partially transparent pages suddenly stop as my thumb reaches a stiff, glossy page. In large letters, the page reads “dating” and I pause to study it. Even though I am not allowed to date yet, or perhaps because of that, I am obsessed with the idea. I notice a Bible verse on the page and some advice that sounds like it is coming from my youth pastor, reminding me that avoiding kissing is a good way to stay pure. It reminds me of the books my sister reads like *I Kissed Dating Goodbye* and *Passion and Purity*, or all the times my friends and I remind each other that “modest is hottest,” or the purity retreat I went to last week where I wrote down all of the qualities I wanted in a husband and promised to avoid sex until I found him.*

Unraveling

In the early 2000s, I still carried the 1998 edition of the *Teen Study Bible* to church and turned to the author commentary for instruction when I wanted guidance on a specific issue, or simply to distract myself and pass the time during a boring sermon. I absorbed its teachings and out-of-context topical Bible passages as the one true interpretation and application of the Bible in my life. Because the commentary was in the Bible, among the canonical text, I automatically deemed the *Teen Study Bible* trustworthy. The vignette I offer is not specific to one particular memory of mine in relation to my religious experiences, but it offers a glimpse into my layered experiences growing up as a Christian teen in the 1990s and early 2000s. In particular, it highlights the central role of the *Teen Study Bible* in my life at the time. Although I studied the Bible occasionally during the week, my hands and eyes were often drawn to these thick “feature” pages scattered throughout my *Teen Study Bible*. I cannot claim that all '90s Christian kids had similar experiences, but my own narrative reveals how the design of the *Teen Study Bible* prioritizes modern issues and content, such as dating and relationships, over Biblical text in context. At best, this content communicates to youth that the Bible requires some frills in order to be interesting, relevant, meaningful, or engaging to youth. At worst, such commentary suggests it is not the Bible that should matter to youth, but rather what adults say about the Bible and how they apply scripture in ways that address adults' agendas for impressionable youth. Further, my vignette prompts one at least to question the lasting effects of Fundamentalist Christian discourse embedded in religious educational materials.

I am now an adult, but I am still unraveling some of these messages I learned growing up in the church, many of which I found scattered among Biblical texts that were a core part of my religious and moral education during adolescence. A quick glance at my Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok feeds shows that this unraveling, this deconstruction of dominant messages surrounding sexuality, purity, and particular moral codes is a shared experience among evangelical and ex-evangelical adults in the U.S., with trending hashtags like #exvangelical, #exfundie, and #purityculture. In the following sections, I provide context for the historical, political, and religious conditions that made way for the *Teen Study Bible* as an educational tool designed to promote religious and social conservatism. Analyzing religious educational texts and cultural artifacts of my youth, such as the *Teen Study Bible*, is part of this deconstructive work. In the remainder of my paper, I continue the unraveling as I critique the authors' use of language and manipulation of scripture to fit their particular moral agenda. In the following section, I define the theoretical framework I use for my analysis, a framework useful for understanding religion and religious tools as mechanisms of power.

Theoretical Framework

I chose Martin's critical theory of religion as the theoretical framework for this study because of its usefulness when considering the role of religious artifacts and objects in shaping religious and moral education in particular social, historical, and political contexts. Using Martin's critical theory of religion, I analyze the *Teen Study Bible* as a cultural and historical document by placing it in historical context. Martin's theory applies critical theory to the ways religions "create, shape, or modify societies or social groups."⁴ There are three major tenets: authority, authenticity, and legitimation. Interpreting how religious power is exercised and religious privilege is granted according to these tenets can be helpful in understanding the role of religion in the formation or perpetuation of social organizations and religious moral teachings.

The first tenet, authority, suggests that dominant religions rely on "absent authority figures" or "texts with missing authors," such as Jesus or the Bible.⁵ This phenomenon has two major implications. First, it creates a reliance on interpretation of the text rather than the text itself, which may shift according to the social, historical, and political contexts when interpretations are made. Next, authority might also facilitate "projection," or using an absent authority figure or missing author as justification for a particular action or value.

The second tenet is authenticity, which functions as a rhetorical tool used to emphasize differences between right and wrong, moral and evil, or true and false. Setting up such sets of dichotomies creates a reductive evaluative structure to be used by people practicing a particular religion to

judge society. Martin suggests that authenticity has two major implications. First, religious figures use authenticity to identify their own group as good and moral and the other as the complete opposite: as immoral, “corrupted, fallen, and false.”⁶ Too, authenticity can create and facilitate distance between the *moral* and the *other*. Individuals or groups who utilize authenticity in this way do so in an attempt to label themselves as authentically religious and to label others they disagree with as inauthentic.

The third and final tenet is legitimation, which is the process of using religious tools and discourse for a particular aim, often to identify insiders and outsiders of a particular religious community. Martin suggests that rather than focusing on the *meaning* of words in critical religious study, inquirers should instead ask about the *implication* of words: how religious words are used, who the intended audience is, and what the outcomes of discourse might be. Martin clearly states that “while legitimations might seem like intentional manipulations, this is not necessarily the case.”⁷ Rather, legitimation defines the tools required for religious conformity and the reinforcement of conformity through the use of symbols, rituals, and language particular to the religious culture.

Context

In this section, I discuss a brief history of the rise of U.S. Christian Fundamentalism through the 1990s, when the *Teen Study Bible* was originally published. I then highlight trends in Bible publishing in the 1990s to provide some additional context about this particular Bible edition.

The Rise of Christian Fundamentalism

While Christians have sought to influence social and political issues in North America since the arrival of the Puritans, Christian Fundamentalist involvement in politics and legislative power began much later.⁸ In *The Religious Right: A Reference Handbook*, the authors provide a chronology of specific milestones in the formation of the Religious Right.⁹ Such records date back to 1835 and include book publications, the founding of religious organizations and schools, and even heresy charges of notable Christian leaders. The evidence illustrates the level of power Christian Fundamentalist religious individuals and organizations gained over time, as well as this group’s interpretation of religious texts used to justify their actions.

The current Christian Fundamentalist movement originated in the 1920s, when religious leaders used political power “to restore the nation’s Christian identity.”¹⁰ In the 1940s, U.S. politicians supported the bipartisan claim that “Christian devotion and Christian mission work could be key weapons in the struggle against communism.”¹¹ After the formation of the lobbyist group National Association of Evangelicals in 1942, Republican politicians and evangelical leaders began to align anticommunist statements so that it became “sometimes difficult to distinguish” between the two

groups.¹² Evangelicals and conservative politicians again aligned in the late 1960s through the 1970s during the “culture wars” or “antiseccularism” period launched by U.S. Supreme Court rulings against organized prayer in public schools.¹³ This marks the beginning of a “fundamentalist civil war” among American Evangelicals over the appropriate “degree to which one should practice separation” from mainstream U.S. culture.¹⁴ In 1976, Evangelical leader Jerry Falwell had a “political awakening” and preached that Christians had a moral duty not only to be involved in politics, but to embed their religion into U.S. politics.¹⁵ Shortly after, Ronald Reagan aligned himself with evangelical leaders, a sign of the Religious Right’s growing political influence in the 1980s.

By the 1990s, the U.S. was “in the midst of a spiritual renewal”¹⁶ marked by “baby boomers... crying out for spiritual answers.”¹⁷ Parents and churches began to encourage youth to take abstinence pledges through programs such as the Promise Keepers¹⁸ and the True Love Waits movement.¹⁹ Beyond an emphasis on purity, these movements were founded upon patriarchal ideals and most often placed the burden of purity on women by asking them to dress and behave modestly and prudently.²⁰ By this time, evangelicalism and U.S. politics were closely intertwined. In 1996, in response to emerging interest in teen abstinence, President Bill Clinton created “a nationwide registry for the youth who pledge and remain celibate until after they’re married”²¹ (the irony of this action would not become public until 1998, when news spread of Clinton’s extramarital affair²²). The same year, the U.S. government directed a staggering \$50 million to develop “abstinence-only education” as part of the welfare reform bill.²³ Although the public mood surrounding the specific messaging of abstinence education was mixed at the time, conservative groups “believe[d] that supporting both abstinence and birth control [was] hypocritical and undermine[d] the forcefulness of a pure abstinence message.”²⁴ The two 1990s editions of the *Teen Study Bible* were published at the height of the abstinence movement, and some changes between the 1993 and 1998 editions reflect the increasing power of conservatism.

Bible Publishing

Echoing broader trends of U.S. consumerism in the 1970s and 1980s and the availability of a wide range of products, Bible retailers expanded their offerings.²⁵ In the 1980s, computer-aided translation and formatting increased the rate of publishing, and new Bible edition numbers increased, and technological improvements made way for the introduction of “specialty niche Bible” editions in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s.²⁶ Christian publishers tailored these Bibles to specific demographic groups such as women or teens, encouraging readers “to ‘take ownership’ of the Bible”²⁷ in order to apply its words to their unique circumstances. Combined with “a strong translation,” the appeal to certain aspects of identity such as age

or gender appeared to be “the most successful formula” to promote Bible sales during the 1990s.²⁸ Additionally, “virtually every Bible publisher [rode] the wave of niche editions that started in the early 1990s” throughout the decade until sales began to wane in 1998.²⁹

In 1997, a nationwide movement began in which teens donned bracelets marked “WWJD” an acronym for “What Would Jesus Do?” The WWJD adage first appeared in an 1896 novel in which a homeless man, overlooked by society, challenged a group of churchgoers to “live out the words they speak each Sunday morning” by asking, “what would Jesus do?,” of their actions.³⁰ A youth minister created about 20 WWJD bracelets in the 1980s, and they gained widespread popularity by 1997. The movement’s success “signal[ed] youth’s role in [spiritual] renewal” in the U.S.³¹ Furthermore, Christian retailers and publishers recognized the importance of targeting teens in specialized products and marketing. They, too, were a consumer group that required innovation in the Bible market.

The success of niche Bibles and merchandise trends among Christian teens paved the way for *Teen Study Bible* editions in 1993 and 1998. Additionally, the increased Christian influence on political conservatism in the mid-to-late 1990s might have fostered shifts in language between the 1993 and 1998 editions, which I analyze in a later section. In the following section, I describe the *Teen Study Bible* in further detail, which I then utilize in my content analysis.

Teen Study Bible

Origins

At the height of interest in niche Bible editions, Christian media and publishing group Zondervan published their first edition of the *Teen Study Bible* in 1993, shortly followed by a second edition in 1998. Still in print, the publishers boast the *Teen Study Bible* is “the best-selling Bible for teens ages 12–15.”³² Zondervan’s text is considered a “value added” Bible, with “abundant use of neon colours, diagrams, pictures, short Bible studies, and background information,” deemed necessary due to “modern people’s incessant need for visual stimulation and alternative new mediums of communication, and also modern readers’ increasing inability to comprehend the nature and content of the Bible.”³³ Such ornamentation is aligned with youth Bible trends of the day which “combine[d] features and notes intended to speak to ‘hot-button’ issues.”³⁴

Authors Larry and Sue Richards wrote their own commentary in the form of topical feature pages and notes scattered through the text of both the 1993 and 1998 editions. Larry Richards is a graduate of Dallas Theological Seminary, worked at Wheaton Bible College, and has written over 200 Christian books and study aids.³⁵ One of his books, *Creative Bible Teaching*, “emphasize[s] the need for students to be actively involved in the

search of the meaning of the Bible and to respond to that meaning in everyday experience.”³⁶ With this in mind, the content additions throughout the *Teen Study Bible* align with such an educational philosophy. However, Richards has also been criticized as being “not theological enough” while at the same time being “too theoretical.”³⁷ These critiques conflict, particularly when considering Richards’s work on the *Teen Study Bible* and the interpretive and practical messages he authored. Sue Richards, Larry’s wife, is a retired English teacher and licensed therapist.³⁸ Their project appears to be her first contribution to Christian writing or research.

This particular teen Bible is written in the New International Version (NIV) translation, recognized as “the most popular translation for Evangelical protestants” and the “best-selling English-language version of the Bible” since the 1980s.³⁹ Its publisher, Zondervan, has been “the sole North American licensee” for the NIV since 1971.⁴⁰ In 1997, Zondervan announced a gender-inclusive version of the NIV, which “drops the use of masculine generic nouns and pronouns.”⁴¹ However, the publisher quickly suspended the project in the U.S. after “pressure from hyperconservative elements of Evangelicalism, who claimed the new translation was a feminist plot (ignoring the long history of gender-inclusive translations stretching back to William Tyndale’s 16th-century version).”⁴² The same year, Zondervan published its new translation in the U.K.⁴³ Both 1993 and 1998 editions of the *Teen Study Bible* draw from the 1984 revision of the NIV, the most recent translation at the time and which omits gender-inclusive language.⁴⁴ This decision is significant when considered within context of the fundamentalist culture wars mentioned previously.

Features

There are 10 different featured commentaries in the *Teen Study Bible*. Common to study Bibles, commentary is meant to provide deeper understanding for the reader of Biblical text. In this particular Bible, featured commentary aims to provide insight relevant for teens. Introduction pages for each of the 66 books of the Bible highlight the relevance of the text, “telling you just what the book has to say to you, teenager of the ’90s”⁴⁵ (or “teenager heading toward the 21st century”⁴⁶). Most commentaries are scattered among the margins of the text, summarizing and interpreting certain text and attempting to draw connections between Biblical history and 1990s teens’ issues. Reminiscent of “Dear Abby,” one commentary answers questions to common problems teens might face. Finally, there are colored, glossy inserts, or feature pages, that “help [teens] look for answers to some of life’s most difficult problems.”⁴⁷ While each of these features may provide insight into evangelical teens’ education in the 1990s, I primarily focus my analysis on the brightly colored feature pages scattered throughout the 1993 and 1998 editions of the *Teen Study Bible*.

Methodology

I analyzed the *Teen Study Bible's* feature pages using traditional, qualitative, content analysis.⁴⁸ In traditional content analysis, themes are first identified “based on how different codes are related and linked.”⁴⁹ One challenge to this method of content analysis is a potential lack of context, meaning data becomes difficult fully to understand once the data is removed from its larger context. Because of this, it is important to consider how text is positioned. According to Janks, “[language] selections are motivated: they are designed to convey particular meanings in particular ways to have particular effects.”⁵⁰ This methodological tenet led me to pose my first two guiding questions, which ask for specific language used on the feature pages and their educational implications.

Content Analysis

In the following sections, I first describe the format of the feature page and its implications. I then describe three significant themes identified in the data, before conducting analysis using tenets from Martin’s critical theory of religion. I then follow with a discussion of the underlying educational messages given my analysis.

The Texts: Feature Pages

In the *Teen Study Bible*, there are 16 feature pages in all, each covering issues that the authors deem relevant to teens. These pages are printed on glossy cardstock, making them stand out and easily accessed, since they are scattered among the typically thin Bible pages. The placement of feature pages highlights their value. The thick pages, as stark contrast to thin Bible pages, serve to draw immediate attention and then amplify author commentary above the Biblical text. While interpretation is necessary to understand an ancient text, the physical attributes of the feature pages represent the authors’ interpretations, wherein the authors claim they alone have the authority to understand how scripture might be applied to modern issues that affect teens.

Each feature page has a bold header announcing the topic, followed by the authors’ discussion, relevant Bible verses, and the authors’ interpretation of the Bible’s application to the topic. There is also a dictionary definition of each term and an author-provided alternate definition, meant to make the definition more accessible for teens. The Bible verses on each page are completely removed from the context of the ancient Biblical authors, isolating specific quotations in order to suggest such verses are directly applicable to modern life and inferring that the quotations’ original context is unnecessary or superfluous. The way the topics are organized also suggest the Bible is to be used much like a rulebook or a guidebook for moral living, easily applied to modern life by removing Bible verses from their historical, literary, and religious contexts.

The major difference between the 1993 and 1998 versions of feature pages is in their design. The 1993 feature pages utilize bold colors and shapes, while the 1998 design is more modernized. Between 1993 and 1998, the authors altered some language. It is worth noting that the final four feature pages (on dating, friends, parents, and siblings) are located at the very back of the Bible, right before the back cover. It is interesting that these four pages are similar in theme, as they each discuss different types of relationships common in teens' lives. Again, this design suggests to teens that the Bible has clear guidelines about modern relationships such as dating.

I concentrate on three major data themes, including updates between editions: humor and relevance to teens, increasing conservatism, and (lack of) advice. In the following paragraphs, I define each theme and provide examples from the text along with my analysis.

Humor and Teen Relevance

This theme refers to the ways authors set out to appeal to teenagers specifically by attempting to make Biblical text and interpretation seamlessly relevant to issues teens might face. The commentary often includes humor, sometimes utilizing a satirical tone. By using humor and highlighting relevant topics, the authors reveal their assumptions about teenage life in the '90s. For example, on the feature page labeled "sex," the authors provide this alternate definition for sex: "another fun thing adults tell teenagers to keep away from."⁵¹ This attempt at humorous content with regard to sex serves two main purposes. First, it assumes teenagers minimize sex to a recreational activity void of any meaning or purpose. Next, the authors' alternative definition shows how the authors attempt to communicate distance between themselves and other Fundamentalist adults by seeming to put themselves on the same level as and sympathetic to their audience. This is a unique manifestation of authenticity. In pretending to distance themselves from other adults, the authors mean to position themselves as a trustworthy and relatable authority on Biblical interpretation, while still providing a clear roadmap or rule-book for teens on what is and is not appropriate moral behavior.

Similarly, on the entertainment feature page, the authors attempt to empathize with teens whose parents restrict them from engaging with popular entertainment, such as TV, movies, or music. Authors' commentary tries disingenuously to align with teens again in the feature page on parents by commiserating with teens who do not get along with their parents or who are frustrated by doing chores. Other teen-specific challenges the authors introduce are mall shopping, studying for tests, watching younger siblings, and developing acne. These are all highly specific and modern situations, yet the authors reference broad, out-of-context Bible verses to support

their claims about how God might want teens to behave in each situation. The authors project their own views about an absent authority figure or text by removing the Bible verses from their original, ancient context. Rather than providing a foundation of understanding for what Bible verses might have meant to ancient readers and drawing connections between historical meanings and a modern teen context, the authors directly apply out-of-context Bible verses to modern contexts. This teaches teen readers to see the Bible as full of direct answers to modern life's problems and conflicts, assuring teens that they can easily pick and choose verses and understand their meanings and the rules being given without first understanding either their context or ancient meanings.

Finally, the authors alternatively and humorously define siblings as "monsters."⁵² There is a Biblical reference on this page about dealing with enemies and overcoming evil. Rather than suggesting siblings are not and should not be enemies, the authors' verse selection on this feature page shows the authors' prioritization of making the Bible relevant to teens over understanding the Bible's teachings in order to shift teens' mindsets. The authors' voices again seek to forge an in-group connection with their reader, suggesting the authors alone are morally just, and others, including the readers' relatives, for example, may not have the same moral fortitude or understand and empathize with teens as the authors do.

Increased Conservatism

Data from this theme is consistent with conservative and Fundamentalist Christian political views of the 1990s. While much of the commentary is conservative in the 1993 edition, some of the 1998 edits reflect increasingly conservative interpretations. The timing of this shift is significant in context, since federal support of abstinence education became prevalent in 1996. These editorial changes utilize Martin's tenet of legitimization, meaning authors use teen-relevant language in order to reinforce their conservative moral code.

As discussed previously, the first feature-page topic is sex, unsurprising given the emphasis on abstinence education in the 1990s. In the 1998 edition of the *Teen Study Bible*, the alternate definition changed from an emphasis on fun and restrictions to "a three-letter word with some really l-o-n-g range consequences."⁵³ This shift not only removes the idea of fun from sex completely, but also reflects common moralistic teachings in sex education. However, the authors do not provide any details about what the specific consequences might be and offer abstinence as the only way to avoid these mystery consequences. Reflecting the day's dominant discourse surrounding abstinence-only sex education, this suggests all that Christian teens need to know about sex is how to avoid it, and that any interest in sex is outside God's intention for young people.

Remaining content on this page emphasizes heterosexual sex between two adults within the confines of legal marriage and only for the purpose of procreation. The authors similarly discuss dating as a heterosexual activity for the sole purpose of finding a spouse. In such heterosexual relationships, there are clearly defined roles: boys pay for dates and girls set physical boundaries. This echoes Fundamentalist discourse on abstinence and purity of the time. Interestingly, the authors also portray God's intentional design for sexual desire and pleasure, suggesting that sex is both physical and spiritual. Again, the authors define abstinence and heterosexuality as right and moral, creating a dichotomy which clearly defines "appropriate" sex and gender roles and also what might be considered deviant, despite their otherwise clear messaging that sex is in part for pleasure and to fulfil desire.

When discussing addiction, the authors dedicate most of this feature page's content to alcohol and drugs. The authors briefly state that other types of addictions are possible, all of which have negative consequences. Names of drugs are emblazoned on the background of this feature page, however, in the 1998 edition the color contrast between the text and the background is reduced, making it more difficult to read the background drug names. Like their commentary on sex, their commentary on addiction may suggest the authors wanted to discuss addiction and drugs without revealing too many details, as if doing so will encourage or provide a roadmap for addictive behavior. Completely missing is any empathy for the struggle of addiction and addictive behavior. The strict dichotomy the authors set up deems alcohol and drugs as synonymous with addiction, as sinful or corrupt, without leaving any room for healthy relationships with alcohol or for the utility of the addiction-recovery process.

Next, the authors encourage public and loud boasting of teens' Christianity as well as proselytizing. They highlight the legality of prayer in the U.S., sharing that private prayer and being publicly Christian are both legal in public schools. The authors also encourage witnessing, or sharing one's own story of faith, by coaching teens on how to talk to their friends about God. In a small but significant shift from 1993 to 1998, the authors change the alternate definition of witnessing from "a way to get friends to laugh at you by telling them about God"⁵⁴ to "telling your friends about God and sometimes having them laugh at you."⁵⁵ The new word arrangement separates the act of witnessing from friends laughing. While both sentences acknowledge that teens might be nervous to talk about Christianity in front of their friends, the shift clarifies the meaning to ensure the audience still takes witnessing seriously despite any hesitation or potential for backlash. While the authors emphasize that evangelism is a moral responsibility, it is worth noting that readers are encouraged to talk to their own friends rather than strangers. However, discussion about private prayer and public religiosity in public school takes a different tone, suggesting teens' Christianity should be outwardly noticeable and publicly

discussed, rather than something to discuss among close friends. The authors assume again that the world beyond the teen reader is corrupt and in need of Christian morality in the form of performing Christianity in visible ways and proselytizing.

(Lack of) Advice

In most cases, the authors use feature pages to present advice to teens. Those feature pages with advice include being kind to siblings, finding ways to earn parents' trust, and taking control of what they are able. At times, the authors provide a guarantee for following advice. For example, if teens confess their failures or wrongdoings to God, God will not only forgive them, but will also remove their feelings of guilt. Their advice is paired with Biblical references about God's forgiveness, but does not offer any support for how teens do and should feel. The authors provide stepped, oversimplified processes, such as when one asks for God's forgiveness teens' bad feelings will go away. Their words suggest that moral living, when lived according to the authors' advice, will provide simple solutions and salvation for teens.

Many pages lack advice but have prompts for teens to interpret the authors' questions on their own. In one example, the authors encourage, "you decide," following a string of questions.⁵⁶ In the feature page on dating, the authors list advice that teens might typically receive from adults, then quizzing teen readers, "which do you think is good advice?"⁵⁷ Perhaps it is a good exercise for teens to learn how to discern good advice from bad, but this text hardly provides critical thinking instruction necessary to learn to discern the two. While this prompt contrasts with other pages that provide clear and strict advice on moral issues, the questions still suggest there is a clear dichotomy between moral or right actions and evil or wrongdoing.

Discussion

These three themes underscore several key educational messages common across the *Teen Study Bible*. The first is a prescriptive attitude toward behavior with an emphasis on a strong good/bad dichotomy and a clear division between secular and religious activity. The authors provide guidelines for appropriate Christian teen living, such as abstaining from pre-marital sex, avoiding drugs and alcohol, and sharing the Christian message with friends. The authors use authority to create reader reliance on their Biblical interpretation reflective of 1990s evangelical politics. Additionally, the authors use authenticity to introduce moral dichotomies. Teaching moral codes creates legitimation, influencing teens that they must follow particular moral codes in order to be seen as good Christians.

The second educational message is gendered. References to traditional marriage between one man and one woman are prevalent throughout the text. Additionally, the authors outline examples of traditional gender roles

in dating relationships. Again, the authors utilize authority, authenticity, and legitimation to put boundaries on sex and gender by defining what is appropriate or desirable for Christian teens. Furthermore, these pages lay blame on young women for premarital sex rather than on both young men and women engaging in sex, and also pathologize biological processes and sexual urges of teens.

The third is religious devotion. The authors set up the text so that teens will unquestioningly believe the Bible contains all answers to modern life's questions no matter how specific. The authors repeatedly overstep their interpretive authority by communicating that their interpretations of the Bible establish moral guidelines for teens. With frequent references to prayer and obedience to God, author commentary implies obedience is key in being a good Christian, a tool of authenticity.

Conclusion

The 1993 and 1998 editions of the *Teen Study Bible* reveal the ways evangelical Christians taught youth during that time, emphasizing a strict moral code and rigidly defined gender roles. The 1998 edition illuminates an even more adamant effort to conservatize 1990s youth. Although a small glimpse into the niche Bible market of the 1990s, I highlight the role of Christian authors and publishers in educating youth through legalistic, gendered, and pious messages. Because the *Teen Study Bible* was heavily used in recent history, its impact proves to be not only current, but potentially still unfolding. Additionally, my study reveals how Biblical commentary works as an educational tool outside of formal education to promote conservative values, which have long-term social and political implications.

In this paper, while I provide some insight into the teachings of Fundamentalist Christians of the 1990s in general, I do not examine how teens might have responded to these messages. While this study might act as a benchmark for future studies on niche Bibles and author-provided commentary, future research on how teens respond to author commentary in the *Teen Study Bibles* would provide missing perspective on how such commentary affects youth. Additionally, a study in which adults reflect on their usage of the *Teen Study Bible* as 1990s youth could offer insight into the current and lasting impact of such evangelical messaging.

Endnotes

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Conspiracy Theory and Pragmatic Inquiry: Is There a Role for Education?

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Introduction

Raised as a Southern Baptist in the deep South's Bible Belt, religion has been an integral part of my life experience. Recently, I came across a Southern Baptist news source that voiced concern by some pastors and leaders about the number of their flock who adhere to conspiracy theories. At first, it amazed me how people I know and grew up with could hold such positions but after a bit of contemplation I realized that maybe I should not be so surprised. My religious education was filled with the struggle of good vs. evil, light vs. darkness, and cautioned that one must be ever vigilant that Satan or the great deceiver is lurking behind every corner in an attempt to trap one into sin. Drawing on a warrior metaphor, we are told by the apostle Paul to put on our armor and be the ever-mindful watchman. Some have referred to this as a form of spiritual warfare, a warfare that will continue until the apocalypse and the return of Christ to triumph over evil. In a recent article in *Christianity Today*, a survey conducted by the conservative American Enterprise Institute showed that 27% of white evangelicals believe the QAnon conspiracy theory is "completely or mostly accurate."¹ This includes the belief that former President Trump was "secretly battling a cabal of pedophile Democrats, that that election was stolen, and that antifa was responsible for the insurrections on January 6, 2021 at the United States Capitol."² While the antifa claim was supported by Rudy Giuliani and Franklin Graham, the FBI has claimed there is no credible evidence antifa played a role in the insurrection. Furthermore, the survey reports evangelicals are very socially and media-connected as well as politically attuned and motivated. Since they tend to rely on certain news sources (such as *The Epoch Times*, Fox News, Newsmax), they live in a type of "social echo chamber" that reinforces their values and beliefs, which largely go unchallenged. I wish to make clear that this "social echo chamber" is not just a feature of the political right, but also affects the left as they tend to follow MSNBC, CNN, *Democracy Now*, NPR, etc. These echo chambers are created by social media outlets such as Facebook, Twitter, google, Pinterest, YouTube, etc., and their use of sorting algorithms which prioritize what each viewer sees based on that user's previous searches or

queries. Put simply, the content we are allowed to see is based on analysis of our behavior and social media sites weed out material thought not to be of interest to us. We see not only the marketing of products but also the marketing of ideas, a focus of this paper.

In a recent study on conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries, researchers found that conspiracy mentality was strongest among those who felt politically disenfranchised, both on the left and the right.³ In “American Politics in Two Dimensions,” published in *The American Journal of Political Science*, researchers argue that conspiracy theories do not align clearly with the political left or right. They also note that conspiracy theorists, left and right, feel disillusioned, suspicious of authority, and politically ineffective. These researchers contend that Donald Trump did not invent conspiracy theory but certainly made good use of those theories which he utilized to strengthen his political base. Trump’s provocative pronouncements related to such topics as covid-19, the World Health Organization, immigration, NATO, etc., gave credence to multiple right-wing conspiracy theories that still dominate the current narrative.⁴ So the mantra of both the left and right often becomes, “If our elected leaders will not protect the country, we must do it ourselves.” In this paper I attempt briefly to explore the history of conspiracy theory, the characteristics of conspiracy theory, how it can present a challenge to science and inquiry, and finally through the lens of critical pragmatism offer some hope—or perhaps faith—that education through nurturing critical inquiry, as it should in a democracy, can help stem the tide of many dangerous conspiracy theories and those which might in fact be warranted.

The Nature of Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy theories are considered by some scholars to be “erroneous beliefs that people use to explain malevolent and or unlawful acts that are perceived to be directed by and in favor of a small and powerful group that works in secret against a larger group of unwitting victims.”⁵ Matthew Dentith, in his book *The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories*, lists three traits of a conspiracy theory. First, there exists or existed some set of agents with a plan; second, steps have been taken by the agents to minimize public awareness of what they are up to; and, thirdly, some end is or was desired by these agents.⁶ “The most important and ubiquitous characteristic of the conspirators,” writes Jovan Byford, “is their elite status: the villains of any conspiracy theory are typically found in universities or within the higher echelons of business and politics.”⁷ These villains sit in positions of privilege, control the press, media, education, and government, etc., that allow these groups to control information and thus indoctrinate the masses. Conspiracy theories often occur in time of confusion, anxiety, or uncertainty, such as in times of war, economic upheaval, natural disaster, and disease. Modern examples include the origins of the New Deal, World War II and its causes, the AIDS epidemic, the September 11th attacks,

the Kennedy assassination, the Iraq war, ebola, climate change, the 2020 U.S. presidential election, and, most recently, covid-19 origins, as well as replacement theory. Taking the New Deal as a historical example, some conspirators characterized the New Deal as “the Jew deal” due to some of FDR’s advisors being Jewish, including Felix Frankfurter, Bernard Baruch, Louis Brandeis, and Henry Morgenthau. Some conspiracists of the era saw the blue eagle symbol of the National Recovery Administration as resembling the beast of Revelation.⁸

While conspiracies historically have always been part of human existence, the more modern concept of conspiracy is dated by some scholars to be a product of the Enlightenment or reactions to it. In 1779, French savant and Jesuit priest Augustin Barruel published *Memoirs: Illustrating the History of Jacobism*, and Englishman John Robison published *Proofs of a Conspiracy: Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies*.⁹ Adam Weishaupt, the founder of the Illuminati was the chief target of the attacks. Weishaupt was a Bavarian academic at the University of Ingolstadt and, in 1776, formed a society that challenged the traditional doctrines of the church, advocating for the perfectibility of mankind, and stressing natural religion. In sympathy with Weishaupt’s more Enlightenment view of Jesus, Thomas Jefferson explains,

[Jesus’] intention was simply to reinstate natural religion, and by diffusing the light of his morality, to teach us to govern ourselves. His precepts are the love of god and love of our neighbor. And by teaching innocence of conduct, he expected to place men in their natural state of liberty and equality.¹⁰

Both Barruel and Robison contend the French Revolution was a conspiracy challenging tradition and religion, leading to the eventual destruction of Christianity. As an anti-Enlightenment and anti-philosophe, Barruel wrote in London where he attacked Jacobism, linked the Freemasons to the Knights Templar, and portrayed Jews as instrumental in the French Revolution. Robison was a chemist and professor of natural philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and fought against Enlightenment views of chemistry, attacking Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestly, even suggesting that Madame Lavoisier was an occult priestess.¹¹ Thomas Jefferson had read parts of the 3rd edition of Augustin Barruel’s book and referred to the book as “perfectly the ravings of a Bedlamite.”¹²

One of the most infamous conspiracy documents is the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which first appeared in 1905, written anonymously, although some scholars suggest it originated with the Russian secret police under Tsar Nicholas II, who praised the work. The *Protocols* are written in first person and attempt to document a meeting by Jews to achieve world domination. In the 1930s a highly publicized trial held in Berne, Switzerland,

proved the *Protocols* to be a forgery, but that did not seem to undermine the book's cult status with millions of readers around the world.¹³ The *Protocols* became popular in the U.S., Britain, and Germany. Sixteen years following the publication of the *Protocols*, British socialite Nesta Webster published another conspiracy, *World Revolution: The Plot Against Civilization*. Familiar with Barruel, Robison, and the *Protocols*, Webster sought to connect the French and Russian Revolutions to the work of Jews, claiming the Jews were the dominant force in the Illuminati. As scholars critiqued the work, Winston Churchill believed the *Protocols* truly exposed the conspiracy of Jews during the French Revolution.¹⁴ Replicating its historical roots, anti-Semitism often appears as a main characteristic of modern conspiracy theory, the general belief that Jews had or have considerable world power and wealth and control or seek to control democratic governments and financial institutions. Jovan Byford, in his book *Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction*, writes, "These conspiracies represent an omnipotent force with almost supernatural power, intent on the destruction of independent nations and the creation of a secular, Jewish controlled, New World Order."¹⁵ Anti-Semitism is characteristic of QAnon beliefs which seems paradoxical in that politically these same forces support the state of Israel over Palestinian sovereignty.

Conspiracy theories often use religious imagery or motifs as they seek to point to the world's evil and may do so using sexual innuendo, as is evident today. These theories may point out the rituals of the ancient Canaanites, Babylonians, etc., and may address child sacrifice, orgies, child molestation, etc. and point to how they, the conspiracists, hold their position based on moral authority or higher moral ground. This kind of imagery is consistent with QAnon conspiracy theories. QAnon is best known for its support of the conspiracy theory that the Democratic Party, Hollywood celebrities, and billionaires with Democratic Party sympathies have been and are engaging in pedophilia and human trafficking. These theories need to be taken seriously and can sometimes result in violent acts. One conspiracy theory, known as Pizzagate, holds that a secret, Satanic pedophile ring linked to the Democratic Party was meeting in Washington, D.C. at a pizzeria named Comet Ping Pong. A 28-year-old conspiracist from North Carolina claiming the moral high ground attempted to investigate the claims and in doing so fired several shots into the pizzeria. He told arresting officers that he had read online that the pizzeria was harboring child sex slaves. Another conspiracy, commonly known as replacement theory, is based on the idea that the Democratic Party is trying to increase immigration to the point that Democrats will dominate the electorate and thus replace "white America" and its values. The recent shooting in Buffalo, New York was initiated by an individual who proclaimed himself a white supremacist and who sought specifically to attack a grocery store frequented by African-American shoppers.¹⁶

Former President Donald Trump has been perceived as a charismatic leader who fought a secret battle challenging the deep-state's secretive cabal.¹⁷ Daniel Bell, in *The End of Ideology* (1962), writes “the tendency to convert concrete issues into ideological problems, to invest them with moral color and high emotional charge, is to invite conflicts which can only damage a society.”¹⁸ Bell stresses these conspiracy theories give a sense of comfort to the believer which may be responsible for making these theories so popular while, simultaneously leading individuals away from tackling serious issues.

Conspiracy and Scientific Inquiry: A Problem Beyond Covid-19

Karl Popper, in his *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (1963), notes that when conspiracy theorists gain political power, they tend to govern through the use of conspiracy theory. Conspiracists, Popper implies, tend to be suspicious of most authority including official sources of knowledge. As seen with covid-19, conspiracists may stand in opposition to science, public health measures, and government officials. In a most prophetic sense Popper argues, “This suspicion of scientific and medical knowledge translates into regrettable lifestyle choices with serious implications for public health...and sometimes lethal consequences.”¹⁹ Some scholars suggest conspiracy theories help us overcome feelings of powerlessness and alienation, which seems clearly evident in the case of covid-19 and the climate crisis.²⁰ When people feel powerless and alienated, this situation can often result in the emergence of a charismatic leader who makes the claim that together they can fight against the forces of evil or manipulation, and that leader may claim moral superiority.

In discussing science deniers, psychologists Sara and Jack Gorman, in their book *Denying to the Grave*, “suggest based on human cognitive function that calling science deniers irrational may not be the best way to understand their behavior, and by belittling them is the surest way to reinforcing an anti-science position.”²¹ Human beings tend to seek certainty, the why of the uncertainly or what we cannot explain. We all know that scientists, doctors, or public health officials are not the best in alleviating this uncertainly because they may lack the ability or choose not to explain things clearly and of interest. As practicing scientists, the Gormans suggest that “scientists seem to waiver between overly complicated explanations that only they can fathom and overly simplistic explanations that feel patronizing and convey minimal useful information.”²² This seems to be evident during the covid-19 press conferences held during the Trump administration which exacerbated misunderstanding and confusion. For many, the medical officials appeared arrogant, implying they know what is best for the public and insisting the public not question them. What I wish to emphasize in this paper and what officials often fail to do is to help the public understand how science works, to understand that inquiry is a process and not final, nor is it a search

for absolutes. Part of the problem is that scientists, including those just mentioned, often speak in absolutes but, in all honesty, know they can never be 100% sure. When they change their recommendations, as evident during the covid-19 pandemic, the public may see this as a lie, as the authorities lacking sufficient understanding, or as authorities trying to manipulate public opinion in some way. If one has low self-esteem, feels powerless, anxious, and does not trust authority, these kinds of explanations send a secreted message. Again, this is an issue for both the U.S. political right and left. There is some evidence that suggests that when we experience an emotional or stressful state our memory stores it in a way that resurfaces when that exact or a similar emotional state reoccurs.²³

Skepticism about science seems to permeate conspiracy culture and while some conspirators on the left might suggest that science is in the pocket of big Pharma and the military industrial complex, the right has challenged medical authorities in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations. Scientific skepticism can be based on a lack of understanding about how science works, its method of inquiry, but it can also result from how science can be manipulated by authorities to serve their own interests.

The Role of Education

There appears no doubt that the U.S. public, politicians, and the media need better to understand scientific inquiry and as educators we have an obligation to enhance that understanding. I believe engaging critical pragmatism can serve as a tool to challenge and effectively deal with certain conspiracy theories, left and right. In *A Quest for Certainty*, John Dewey writes, "Perfect certainly is what man wants. It cannot be found by practical doing or making; these take effect in an uncertain future, and involve peril, the risk of misadventure, frustration and failure."²⁴ Clearly, scientific inquiry is risky, and may not lead to a clear explanation or outcome. Dewey challenges the "quest for certainty" and this forms the basis of his view of scientific inquiry as a metaphor for democracy: a tool by which we openly communicate and share information to solve basic problems of human existence. It is not so much the information science gives us, although that is important, it is how science ideally goes about discovering that information. Dewey argues for a form of inquiry or experimental intelligence patterned after science that "liberates man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom."²⁵ This intelligence, which for the pragmatist integrates knowledge and action, is formed through testing ideas through practical life experience. "Intelligence is not something possessed once for all," Dewey notes, "it is in constant process of forming and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded will to earn and courage in re-adjustment."²⁶ What we lack on the left and the right is an open-mindedness and a willingness to listen

to others and that is exacerbated by how we use social media outlets—or perhaps how social media uses us. Open-mindedness and the courage to readjust our opinions based on new information is lacking in contemporary society and another reason for the need to teach children inquiry through discovery, curiosity, and imagination. Dewey would be concerned about the intellectual divide which has resulted in political division in which life experience is often denigrated by an educational elite.

Dewey challenges those who believe a scientific attitude of mind, a mind of inquiry, curiosity, and imagination are not relevant in teaching children or that children are unable to comprehend basic science. He argues in *How We Think* that childhood is “marked by ardent curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near, to the scientific attitude of mind.”²⁷ He links imagination and curiosity to this scientific attitude of mind (inquiry), in his view the democratic way of thinking. George Herbert Mead argues that good science welcomes all interested inquirers to deliberation, “a society that hoped to deploy scientific inquiry on behalf of its purpose would have to do the same, it would, on epistemic grounds, have to be widely inclusive.”²⁸ So in essence, “different perspectives, sensibilities, and experiences must be taken seriously.”²⁹ However, as Thomas Kuhn warns us, science may suppress novelties because they fall outside its paradigm.³⁰ The suppression of different perspectives (such as varying religious beliefs) and sensibilities is a threat to open dialogue and democracy itself. The left and the right can fall prey to this suppression and which endangers free speech.

How can we help students better recognize conspiracy theories that are irrational and, yes, those that are indeed rational? For this to occur we must fight against those who fear the discussion of controversial topics in the classroom. There must be room for open debate and discussion in classrooms. The purpose of school according to Dewey was to nurture “children in cooperative and mutually helpful living,” in essence a democratic community, but to accomplish this education has to focus more on inquiring than on acquiring.³¹ Last spring, I taught a group of students in the final year of their master’s program to become teachers. Mostly elementary, they were very concerned about the lack of science instruction in the professional development schools they work in. In my state, West Virginia, the lack of science teaching is due to a heavy stress on math and literacy which, although important, is tied to the neo-liberal focus of educational reform. Neo-liberalism “tends to treat all creative agency and potential rationally as properties of individuals rather than of groups, which are in turn understood only as fetters on the freedom and mobility of individuals.”³² Neo-liberalism fosters the notion of the competitive and isolated individual. This isolated individual may seek solace in a group that gives them an identity and that supports their values

and beliefs. This worldview can set the stage for adherence to conspiracy theory on the political left and right. While it may not seem a matter of immediacy to teach children science, I argue that it is based upon the lack of understanding people have about science and where better to start than when children are curious, creative, and imaginative and trying better to understand their world. However, it is not scientific knowledge alone that is significant, although scientific knowledge can be important (such as why we wash our hands during a pandemic), it is the method of inquiry that is most significant. Our current approach in science education does not give young children a sense of how scientific inquiry works, or how to understand what constitutes scientific evidence or information we can trust, at least for the time being. There is plenty of evidence that suggests that hands-on science for young children enhances their enjoyment of science but also enhances proficiency with science concepts.³³ However, I wish clearly to express it is not science, but its method of testing and sorting through information, with that information possibly changing, or being fallible, based on further inquiry. Dewey stresses that acquiring is always secondary to inquiry and that the teacher and the student both need to be involved in active inquiry. Of course, inquiry is not just about scientific understanding, but a social activity necessary for learning how to sort through what is viable, trustworthy information and what is not. For Dewey this kind of inquiry is a social and cooperative activity and ideally where the individual begins to see the self “from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs.”³⁴ This is education as social and moral, in essence an ethical association, a democratic community of sorts. This type of education is emphasized by Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John Puckett in their work *Dewey’s Dream* which stresses civil society, public schools, and democratic citizenship. They emphasize,

Human beings best develop their innate capacity for intelligence thought and action when they purposefully use it as a powerful instrument to help them solve the multitude of perplexing problems that continually confront them in their daily lives—and when they reflect on their experience and thereby increase their capacity for future intelligence thought and action.³⁵

And when one has faith in other human beings to use this knowledge for the benefit of the common good. This is faith in the power of “pooled and cooperative intelligence.”³⁶ Robert Westbrook contends that Dewey’s cooperative or associated thought is in opposition to privatized expert knowledge, which at times can contest science—certainly medical science and its ties to profit motive. He writes, “Dewey’s call for scientific intelligence was not a call for the rule of intelligent scientists but for egalitarian distribution of the capacity for scientific thinking and its incorporation into democratic decision making in the polity, workforce, and elsewhere.”³⁷

Critical pragmatism offers a means to critique the arrogance of science but also those who outright dismiss it.

Conclusion

Alison Kadlec in her book *Dewey's Critical Pragmatism*, argues for a social intelligence "based upon our willingness and ability to communicate flexibly with people from widely different backgrounds who have different, even profoundly so viewpoints."³⁸ This takes us back to Mead's³⁹ position on the need for open deliberation sensitive to differences of opinion and sensibilities. The willingness and desire to communicate or deliberate with others is a choice and too many refuse to make that choice or refuse to cross the boundaries of their social media feed. Democracy is faith in the potential of human beings and necessary for democracy and is a responsibility that must be cultivated. For the pragmatist, this is the cultivation of habits, or incorporated experiences, that push us to examine our own beliefs and assumptions and those of others. This is the purpose of a democratic education.

While new forms of communication, enhanced by technology, offer potential for meaningful deliberations, they can also serve to foster misinformation, mean-spiritedness, and, of course, conspiracy theories on the left and right. Growing political polarization makes meaningful deliberation more difficult or even impossible if people are not willing to reach beyond their sphere of influence. Kadlec notes,

While there are promising signs of social intelligence emerging in new creative uses of the internet, opportunities for meaningful deliberation are as, if not more, circumscribed than they have ever been before. This is due in large part to the evermore sophisticated channels through which polarization of public discourse and privatization of decision-making processes is occurring.⁴⁰

These circumstances clearly are leading to a feeling of disconnectedness from the decision-making process and a general distrust of authority.⁴¹ Unfortunately, this disconnectedness appears characteristic of both the left and right, leading to more polarization.

There is no simple solution in dealing with conspiracy theories and I have no idea how to handle those who refuse to acknowledge what appears valid and factual information and who often rely on "warped explanatory logic that is not amenable to rational debate."⁴² However, I do believe that educators do have an obligation to nurture young children in the spirit of inquiry, even something as simple as teaching them science in elementary school. This instruction needs to be linked to a type of civic education that explores the nature of inquiry in an integrated approach to subject matter, including the arts and humanities, in terms of how human beings experience and go about solving the basic problems of human existence.

Democracy is greatly threatened and cannot exist in an environment of mistrust and misinformation and a refusal to communicate beyond one's limited social sphere. Our ideological bubbles must be penetrated, where we are exposed to a wider variety of information and not just reinforcing our own point of view. However, we must be willing to penetrate the bubble, to challenge our own beliefs and values, a risky endeavor, yet when we make clear truth claims there is no reason to engage in this kind of open discourse. It is this failure to communicate that Dewey feared most and why he favored warranted assertability over absolute truth. In a spiritual sense, Dewey argues,

...the foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in human influence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not the belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action.⁴³

And thereby building, in essence, a community of inquirers.

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- ¹³ Byford, *Conspiracy Theories*, 55. George Soros is often discussed in this light as a controller of the global economy and politics.
- ¹⁴ See The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, “Zionism versus Bolshevism: The Struggle for the Soul of the Jewish People,” *Illustrated Sunday Herald*, February 8, 1920, 5, <https://archive.org/details/ZionismVsBolshevismByWinstonChurchill>
- ¹⁵ Byford, *Conspiracy Theories*, 95.
- ¹⁶ Mark Berman and Meryl Kornfield, “Buffalo Shooting Suspect Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime, Domestic Terrorism,” *The Washington Post*, June 1, 2022, 1. See also Connor Perrett and Kieran Press-Reynolds, “The Racist ‘Replacement Theory’ Tied to the Buffalo Shootings Has Increasingly Become a Right-Wing Rallying

- Call,” *Business Insider*, May 16, 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.nl/the-racist-replacement-theory-tied-to-the-buffalo-shootings-has-increasingly-become-a-right-wing-media-rallying-call/>
- ¹⁷ See Julia Carrie Wong, “QAnon Explained: The Anti-Semitism Conspiracy Gaining Traction Around the World,” *The Guardian*, August 25, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/25/qanon-conspiracy-theory-explained-trump-what-is>
- ¹⁸ See Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), 121; and Byford, *Conspiracy Theories*, 156.
- ¹⁹ Byford, *Conspiracy Theories*, 144–145. See also Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). Clearly the responses to covid-19 is an example of this concern.
- ²⁰ Sara E. Gorman and Jack M. Gorman, *Denying to the Grave: Why We Ignore the Science That Will Save Us* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 47.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 9.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 15.
- ²³ There is some evidence that being anti-science is connected to one’s geography and identity, particularly if one identifies as rural, even when living in an urban area. See Monica Potts, “Why Being Anti-Science Is Now Part of Many Rural Americans’ Identity,” *FiveThirtyEight* (Societal Distrust), April 25, 2022, 1–18, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-being-anti-science-is-now-part-of-many-rural-americans-identity/>
- ²⁴ John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1929), 21.
- ²⁵ John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 97.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ John Dewey, *How We Think* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), xxi.
- ²⁸ Robert Westbrook, “George Herbert Mead and the Promise of Pragmatist Democracy,” in *The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 86.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 88. See also Christopher K. Ansell, *Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Cheryl Misak, *Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation* (London: Routledge, 2000); and William R. Caspary, *Dewey on Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

- ³⁰ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 5.
- ³¹ John Dewey, “The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924,” vol. 1, in *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1991), 81; John Dewey, *The School and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1899).
- ³² Jeremy Gilbert, *Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), viii.
- ³³ Gorman and Gorman, *Denying to the Grave*, 25.
- ³⁴ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 148; John Dewey, “The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882–1898,” vol. 5, *Early Essays, 1895–1898*,” in *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1991), 84.
- ³⁵ John Saltmarsh, “Why Dewey Matters,” *The Good Society* 17, no. 2 (2008): 63–68. For the original source see Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John Puckett, *Dewey’s Dream: Universities and Democracies in an Age of Education Reform: Civil Society, Public Schools, and Democratic Citizenship* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2007), 85.
- ³⁶ John Dewey, “The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953,” vol. 11, in *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1991), 219.
- ³⁷ Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 187. Dewey’s view of the scientific community might be considered to be naive today due to our modern-day connection to capital, the military industrial complex, etc., however, it is science’s method of inquiry that he found central, although this can also be corrupted.
- ³⁸ Alison Kadlec, *Dewey’s Critical Pragmatism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 133.
- ³⁹ Robert Westbrook, “George Herbert Mead and the Promise of Pragmatist Democracy,” in *The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² Byford, *Conspiracy Theories*, 155.
- ⁴³ Dewey, *LW*, vol. 11, 219. Dewey owes much to C. S. Peirce concerning this notion of a community of democratic inquirers.

See Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," in *Philosophical Writings of Peirce: Selected and Edited with an Introduction by Justus Buchler* (New York: Dover, 1897), 38.